JUDGMENT
Swatanter Kumar, J.
1. The scope of exercise of judicial discretion to achieve the ends of justice, in furtherance to the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure is the basic question that deserves consideration in the present case.
2. Adopting of derivative approach with some clarity would suffice to elucidate the point in controversy. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners while impugning the order dated 9.12.1998 in this revision contended that in the interest of justice, the learned trial Court ought to have granted another opportunity to lead evidence and ought not have passed the order closing the evidence of the plaintiffs. In order to barely examine the merit of this contention, reference to the impugned order would be appropriate.
“No PW is present. Issues were framed on 28.8.1997. Thereafter the plaintiff has been granted several opportunities. Last opportunity was granted for 16.10.1998. Thereafter one more opportunity was granted subject to cost of which the plaintiff has paid. Ld. counsel for the plaintiff has requested for one more opportunity but I do not find any justification for the same. Evidence of the plaintiff is closed by order. Defendant is directed to produce her entire evidence on 18.1.1999. She may take dasti summons on PF/DM.”
As is clear from the impugned order, before passing the order closing the evidence of the plaintiffs, the Court granted several opportunities, then last opportunity, still thereafter granted another adjournment while imposing costs. In other words the impugned order was preceded by the orders of lesser gravity passed by the Court.
3. Should such discretion by the Court can ever be termed as “uncontrolled and un-guided exercise of judicial discretion by the Court? ” I have no hesitation in answering the above question in the negative. Certainly, it is not possible for the Court to provide the panacea to all problems arising at different stages of the suit. The Code of Civil Procedure is a comprehensive code and the different stages of a suit are controlled and regulated by various checks and limitations provided in the Code. The pious wish of the legislation for expeditious disposal of the suit runs like a golden thread in the various provisions of the Code. The inherent powers vested in the Court under section 151 of the C.P.C. are of very wide magnitude, but are certainly controlled by self restraints and restrict exercise of such powers depending on merit of each case. The Court is under an implied obligation to balance the equities between the parties to a suit to achieve the ends of justice, which is the basic paramount object of the Code. The equities would demand that power under the provisions of the Code or the inherent powers should be exercised by the Court to correct imbalances or inequities resulting from unnecessary adjournments, between the parties. As a result of fault of one party to the suit, the other is certainly put to inconvenience or unnecessary harassment. Delay in conclusion, of “proceedings again is a factor of vital importance, as such, uncontrolled opportunity to a party to conclude its evidence in any number of opportunities would certainly prejudice the interest of the other party to the suit, who is exposed to prolong litigation and expense. Thus, there has to be a stage when the Court must decline to grant further opportunity to the defaulting party to conclude its evidence.
4. At this stage, reference to the judgment of this Court in the case of Kamla Devi and Ors. v. State of Haryana. C.M. No. 2726-CI of 1993 in RFA No. 459 of 1988, decided on 17.12.1998 would be appropriate:
“Inherent powers cannot be used as an instrument to intrude the powers of the Court in regard to a procedure or a remedy, if specifically provided in other provisions of the Code. No code or law could be codified so as to provide for each and every situation, at every stage of the proceedings arising from the vacuum left in the enactment. Such situations are to be supplied by the Court by recourse to inherent powers to create a bridge over such situation for meeting the ends of justice or prevent abuse of process of law. To do justice is the primary duty of the Court but duty imposed should be discharged in consonance with the provisions of the Code and within four corners of well enunciated principle, inherent powers being adjunct to the specifically provided powers of the Code as codified in the code. Thus they could not be used for disturbing the procedure provided under the Code because its ramification could prove retrogative to the administration of justice by Civil Court. Entertainment of such application would have the effect of infringing the concept of finality non-doctrine of civil jurisprudence.”
Reference to the provisions of Orders 16 and 18 of the Code of Civil Procedure would clearly indicate the intention of the Legislature to fairly conclude the evidence of the parties without unreasonably compromising the expeditious disposal of the suit. On the date fixed for hearing of the suit or on such adjourned date, as the Court may grant further time to the party having right to commence evidence is duty bound to state its case and conclude the evidence. In the event of default, the legislature has given specific powers to the Court under Order 17 Rule 3 of the Code for disposing of the suit or to proceed with the suit further as the Court may deem fit and proper, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case. These powers vested in the Court cannot be rendered ineffective or meaningless by granting indefinite adjournments for leadings evidence by a party. Such approach is bound to decimate the very purpose of the Code, i.e. to achieve the ends of justice and deliver expeditious decision in the cases. The provisions of the Code and such like enactments are meant to be implemented. Such provisions can neither be rendered ineffective nor taken to nadir so as to render provisions of the Code as trivial.
5. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer the judgment of this Court rendered in Civil Revision No. 4880 of 1998 titled Suraj Bhan v. Rajender Parshad and another decided on 24.12.1998 :
“The procedural law is enacted primarily with the object of doing substantial justice between the parties. Its purpose is to determine the dispute between the parties and provide finality to such determination. Again intention is to prevent multiplicity and/or frivolous litigation to achieve the object of this golden thread underlying the entire procedure prescribed under the code. In my humble opinion, the orders of such drastic consequences, should normally precede orders of lesser gravity at different stages of the suit. At the cost of repetition, it may be noticed that the Court must not be understood to indicate that grant of number of opportunities is a pre-requisite for passing orders like the impugned one. This question will have to be determined by the learned Court concerned in its discretion to be controlled by settled principle of law but keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case.”
Exercise of judicial discretion by the Court in implementing the provisions of the Code must be exercised uniformly and by creating equi-balance of equities between the parties. Implementation of the provisions of the Code at their appropriate stages must be adhered to without truncating the process and procedure to conclude the suit. This alone would help in avoiding serious ramifications in delivering administration of civil justice. The need for implementation of the statutory provisions of the Code and other enactments has been indicated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in one of its recent judgment in the case of P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr. (1998-3)120 P.L.R. 605 (S.C.). In this case the Court held as under :-
“Law of limitation may harshly effect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statue so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court, was, thus neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order is set aside. Consequently, the application for condonation of delay filed in the High Court would stand rejected and the Miscellaneous First Appeal shall stand dismissed as barred by time. No costs.”
6. Reference to another judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (Dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (Dead) by LRs and Ors. (1995-1)105 P.L.R. 293; would be appropriate :
” ……..We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.
6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the Court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another’s loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the Court auction on behalf of Chunnilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ex. B.15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the Court.”
The inevitable principle that emerges from the aforesaid established principle of law is that the Court must take recourse to the powers vested in the Court under the codified law at the appropriate stage and keeping in view the facts and circumstances of that case. It is true that it will not be possible to formulate a strait-jacket formula but passing of adverse orders against a party in the event of default, at some stage, at least, would be but necessary. In other words, the Court must take recourse to such powers as are essential for achieving the ends of justice. Expeditious disposal of the suit is the very foundation of the amplified procedure prescribed in the Code for conclusion of the suit. May be, a reasonable approach in this regard would, in any case, be highly appreciable. Even applying this concept of reasonableness in exercise of judicial powers would be fully satisfied in the present case. The said purpose is fully satisfied in the present case. The said purpose is fully achieved in the present case. The Court granted opportunities to the plaintiff to lead evidence then granted last opportunity and then finally imposed costs for adjourning the case to a date when finally evidence of the plaintiff was closed. Counsel was put at notice and so was the party i.e. plaintiffs were also cautioned by the Court by imposition of costs and that any further default is bound to result in an adverse orders against the plaintiffs. Persistent default on the part of the plaintiff inspite of such cautions and fair approach, adopted by the learned trial Court left the learned trial Court with no option but to pass the impugned order. I would willingly predicate the approach adopted by the learned trial Court in this case as then alone it is possible to ameliorate ways and means for expeditious disposal of the suit within the provisions of the Code and prevent prescribed procedure being rendered disfunctional.
7. I am not able to trace any element of arbitrariness or any illegality or other infirmities in the impugned order, which could justify interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction.
Finding no merit in this revision the said is dismissed in limine.