JUDGMENT
A. Pasayat, J.
1. Petitioner’s grievance in this application is that notwithstanding the order of acquittal passed by a Criminal Court his employers initiated departmental proceeding, and have passed an order of dismissal. The said order is under challenge before the appellate authority.
2. Background facts, as presented by petitioner, shorn of unnecessary details are as follows :
Petitioner was appointed as a part-time sweeper of Bank of India, a Nationalised Bank, at Rasta Branch on June 22, 1978, and was promoted and appointed as Daftary of Balasore Branch, In view of pendency of a criminal case, C.R. Case No. 1049 of 1982 corresponding to trial case No. 309 of 1987 in the Centre of Judicial Magistrate, first class, Balasore, for alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 468, 419 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, ‘IPC’) he was placed under suspension. He was convicted by the learned JMPC on August 26, 1987 for the offence punishable under Section 468, IPC. In view of such conviction, he was dismissed from service with effect from August 26, 1987. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Balasore allowed the petitioner’s appeal and set aside the conviction in Criminal Appeal No. 60/ 84 of 1988/87 vide judgment dated March 14, 1989. Petitioner moved the employer for reinstatement with all consequential benefits. In view of the judgment of acquittal, the authorities withdrew the order of dismissal with effect from August 26, 1987 by order dated July 31, 1989, but directed the petitioner to continue under suspension. In the departmental proceeding, the petitioner was dismissed from service with effect from October 23, 1989.
He has preferred an appeal on June 22, 1991 which is undisputedly pending.
3. Petitioner’s grievance is two fold. Firstly, it is submitted that in view of the order of acquittal, he is entitled to be reinstated with all consequential benefits. Secondly, the order of dismissal with effect from August 26, 1987 having been withdrawn, the order of suspension could not have been made operative from August 26, 1987. Opposite parties have acted illegally to deny the benefits to the petitioner, it is additionally submitted that the appeal which was filed more than four years back should have been disposed of expeditiously.
Mr. G.A.R. Dora, learned counsel for opposite party No. 1, submitted that the acquittal was on a technical ground and was not an honourable acquittal. According to him, even in the case of honourable acquittal, the departmental proceeding can be continued. It is submitted that on account of pendency of present writ application, the appeal filed by the petitioner has not been disposed of.
4. There is no constitutional, statutory or legal bar on the basis of which it can be held that departmental enquiry is bad in view of the order of acquittal recorded by a Criminal Court. Once the cardinal difference between a criminal proceeding and a disciplinary proceeding is kept in mind, there would be no scope for any confusion on this account. The dominant purpose of a criminal proceeding is to achieve the protection of the society at large, and the public, while that of the disciplinary proceeding is purity and efficiency of public service. Obviously, therefore, the fields of operation of the two proceedings are quite different and independent. The principle of issue estoppel has no application to a departmental proceeding, and applies to a criminal proceeding only. (See Masud Khan v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 28). Neither Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India nor the principle of issue estoppel can absolutely bar disciplinary proceedings after acquittal. The propriety and reasonableness of such disciplinary proceedings after acquittal is a different matter The only thing is that the acquittal should receive careful consideration. Article 20(2) of the Constitution only debars a subsequent criminal trial and not departmental proceedings. The principle of issue estoppel is concerned with admissibility of evidence designed to upset a finding of Criminal Court in subsequent trial. In Corporation of the City of Nagpur v. Ramachandra G. Modak, (1981-II-LLJ-6) (SC), it was observed that normally where the accused is acquitted honourably and completely exonerated of the charges, it is not expedient to continue a departmental enquiry on the very same charges, or grounds or evidence. But, merely because the accused is acquitted, the power of the authority concerned to continue the departmental enquiry is not taken away, nor its discretion in any way fettered. Discretion is left with the authority if it feels that on the facts and circumstances of the case, a departmental proceeding is expedient notwithstanding acquittal of the delinquent. In R.P. Kapur v. Union of India, (1966-II-LLJ-164) (SC), it is observed that even in case of acquittal the proceeding may follow where the acquittal is other than honourable.
The expression “honourably acquitted” is unknown to Courts of Justice. Apparently it is a form of order used in Court martial and other extra Judicial tribunals. The word “acquittal” is verbun equivocum and may in ordinary language be used to express the verdict, or formal judgment of the
Court that the accused is discharged of a felony. It needs no elaboration that acquittal in appeal wipes off the conviction and sentence for all purposes and as effectively as if it had never been passed. Quashing of conviction kills the conviction not then but performs the formal obsequies of the order which died at birth.
5. It is submitted by Mr. Dora that in the case at hand the acquittal was on a technical plea. In Jayaram Panda v. D.V. Rajyani, (1990-II-LLJ-186) (Ori) the view was reiterated that not withstanding acquittal in a criminal trial departmental proceeding can be continued. There is no merit in the averment of learned counsel for petitioner that the departmental proceeding is misconceived. However, what would be the effect of order dated July 31, 1989 directing withdrawal of the order dated August 26, 1987 is a matter, which would be considered by the appellate authority. We direct the appellate authority to dispose of the appeal by the end of April, 1995. In case, petitioner wants to file any additional grounds in the appeal, the appellate authority shall permit the same to be done. Learned counsel for petitioner
undertakes to file consolidated appeal petition within three weeks from today.
The writ application is accordingly disposed of. No costs.