JUDGMENT
S.K. Keshote, J.
1. Heard Learned Counsel for the petitioners. Earlier the petitioners have approached this Court in the same matter which is also subject matter of challenge in this Writ Petition. The earlier Writ Petitions have been decided by this Court on 18-12-1995 and the case of the petitioners was not accepted on merits. The relevant portion of the judgment of this Court in the previous Writ Petition filed by the petitioners reads as follows :
2. “Now looking to the affidavit-in-reply filed in Special Civil Application No. 6229 of 1995, it is clear that Jafrabad Kelvani Uttejak Mandal is running I.T.I. since long. As a result of the depletion in the strength of students, it was not feasible to run the institute in accordance with the Grant-in-aid Code which would apply to such institutes. Accordingly, when only one trainee remained out of 16 seats, permission of Director of Employment and Training was sought to close down the institute. Permission was granted vide letter dated October 12, 1995. A copy of the said letter is also annexed to the affidavit-in-reply. The institute was closed down and hence, the petitioners could not be continued. No grievance can be made against such action.”
3. In my opinion, if the institute is closed and that too after taking necessary permission that too after taking necessary permission from the Director of Technical Education, the action cannot be said to be contrary to law, and cannot be interfered with.
4. This Court held both the action of alleged closure of the institution and termination of services of the petitioners to be valid justified. When the institution was closed validly after taking the necessary permission from the Director of Technical Education, the petitioners’ claim to continue the institution is not justified. When there is no work available at the institution, the petitioners cannot be allowed to continue in service have been rightly terminated. The Counsel for the petitioners contended that the termination of services of the petitioners has been made without taking the prior approvals of the Education Department. It has further been intended that the permission to close down the classes cannot be read as permission to terminate the services of the petitioners. I do not find any substance in either of the contentions. The petitioners filed the Writ Petitioner earlier challenging both the closure of the institution as well as the termination of their services and after considering the merits of the case, this Court has, as stated earlier, found both the closure as well as the termination of the services to be legally valid and justified. Once the closure of the institution and the termination of the services of the petitioners were held to be valid, legal and justified and the petitioners’ grievance was not accepted the petitioners are estopped from challenging that order by this Writ Petition on a different ground. Though the memo of the previous Special Civil Applications have not been filed by the petitioners, but it is also not the case of the petitioners’ Counsel that in the earlier Writ Petition, the challenge to the termination of the services of the petitioners have not been made on this ground. Even if we proceed with the assumption that no such point has been raised, then too, this ground is not available to the petitioners on the principles of constructive res judicata. When the termination of the services of petitioners was held to be valid earlier, then, it is not open to the petitioners to question the validity of the same, by filing the second Writ Petition. Whatever grounds which are available to the petitioners to challenge the validity of the order of termination should have been raised earlier and in case it is not raised at that time, then it is not open to them to file this second Writ Petition challenging the order of termination on another ground. If such a course is allowed, then, there will be no end to litigations. Successive Writ Petitions will come before this Court and the matter will not attain finality. The second Writ Petition to challenge the order of termination by the petitioners is not maintainable. Even if the ground which has been raised no to challenge the validity of the order of termination is not raised in the previous Writ Petition, then too, it will be deemed to be raised and rejected. The earlier Writ Petition was decided on merits. Merely because this Writ Petition was withdrawn the decision which was given on merits does not wash off. Otherwise also, the Writ Petition has been withdrawn by the petitioners without granting any liberty to file a fresh Writ Petition and on this ground also this Writ Petition to the extent it relates to the challenge to the order of termination is not maintainable.
5. The Writ Petitions have been withdrawn by the petitioners as they were desirous of making a representation to the Government. A reading of the earlier order of this Court dated 18-12-1995 gives out that the Court has observed that if any such representation is made, authority will decided the same sympathetically. The interim order has also been extended till the date the representation is decided and one week thereafter. The representation filed by the petitioners has been decided by the respondent. The respondent has passed the order that the prayer of the petitioners for their absorption in other schools is not possible. The Learned Counsel for the petitioners has failed to point out any rule, regulation or resolution wherein it has been provided that on closure of the school, the services of the petitioners could not be terminated or in case the services are terminated they have to be absorbed elsewhere. The petitioners cases may be hard cases but merely on that basis, this Court will not lay down a bad law. This Court siting under Art. 226 of the Constitution can only enforce the legal or fundamental right of the petitioners. The petitioners have failed to make out any case of legal or fundamental right of absorption in other schools aided or Governmental. From the Writ Petition, it comes out that the institution was only getting 50% grant. The petitioners have not come up with a case in the Writ Petition that other person have been given such benefits. In paragraph (9.1) a plea of discrimination has been raised but the petitioners have not given out the details of the persons who were said to be similarly situated and they had been absorbed elsewhere. On the basis of such vague and bald averment the plea of discrimination cannot be accepted.
6. Lastly, the Learned Counsel for the petitions contended that the respondent have not passed a speaking order. In support of this contention, the Learned Counsel for the petitioners has placed reliance on the decisions reference to which has been given in the Writ Petition. This contention is also devoid of any merits. The respondents have given out the reasons that the petitioners cannot be absorbed elsewhere. What more reasons should be given in such cases. The representation of the petitioners was expected to be considered sympathetically and the same has been considered. For absorption, as stated earlier, the petitioners have failed to make out any legal right in their favour. In these facts and circumstances and looking to the nature of the matter to be considered by the respondents, it cannot be said that they have committed any illegality in passing the said order. The principle of passing of the speaking order as canvassed by the Learned Counsel for the petitioners cannot be stretched to that extent in the present case.
7. In the result, this Writ Petition fails and the same is dismissed.
8. Petition Dismissed.