ORDER
E. Padmanabhan, J.
1. In W.P.No.11671 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur Central co-operative Bank Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 14 of 1996 dated 22.5.1996 and quash the same.
2. In W.P.No:11672 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur District Tamil Nadu Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 21 of 1996 dated 18.6.1996 and quash the same.
3. In W.P.No: 11673 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, The Thanjavur District Animal Husbandry Department Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 13 of 1996 dated 13.5.1996 and quash the same.
4. In W.P.No.11674 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur Government Arts College Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 15 of 1996 dated 21.5.1996 and quash the same.
5. In W.P.No.11675 of 1996 the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur Tamil University Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 17 of 1996 dated 21.5.1996 and quash the same.
6. In W.P.No: 11676 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur District Public Health Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 16 of 1996 dated 21.5.1996 and quash the same.
7. In W.P.No: 11680 of 1996, the petitioner, Special officer, Thanjavur District Education Department Employees Co-operative Thrift and Credit Society has prayed for a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the first respondent in Minimum Wages Case No. 10 of 1996 dated 24.5.1996 and quash the same.
8. By the orders impugned in each of the writ petition, the first respondent who is the competent authority has directed the petitioner-Societies to pay minimum wages to the other respondents, who are workmen-employees in the petitioner societies. Challenging the proceedings of the first respondent-Deputy Commissioner of Labour and Authority constituted under The Minimum Wages Act passed in the respective cases, the present writ petitions have been filed by the management of the petitioner-societies.
9. Heard Mr.S.Vadivel, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr.V.Chandrasekar, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-Workmen, and the learned Additional Government Pleader appearing for the first respondent in each of the writ petition.
10. Mr.S.Vadivel, learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners advanced the following contentions:-
(i) The direction to pay minimum wages for a period exceeding 6 months from the date of the application is illegal and contrary to Section 20(2)(proviso); and
(ii) The first respondent acted arbitrarily and with illegality in condoning the delay in terms of Proviso to Sub Sec(2) of Section 20 as no sufficient cause has been shown for admission of the applications filed beyond the period of six months.
11. Per contra, Mr.V.Chandrasekar, learned counsel appearing for Mr.Ananthakrishnan contends that no interference is called for with respect to the proceedings of the first respondent as sufficient cause has been set out by the respective workmen in their respective applications which cause has been accepted by the first respondent as sufficient cause and this court under Art.226 will decline to interfere. It is further contended that the entire difference in wages has already been paid to the workmen and this court will decline to interfere as what has been paid is only minimum wages, which the employer is bound to pay from the date on which the notification is issued under Section 5(2) of the Act fixing the minimum wages. At any rate, it is contended that this court will decline to interfere with the proceedings as justice has been rendered to the workmen who have been denied of the minimum wages despite the fact that the employer being Co-operative society, which society should act as a model of employer and should have come forward to pay the minimum wages as soon as the Notification is issued instead of the employees being made to move the authority constituted under the Act.
12. Excepting the above contentions, Mr.S.Vadivel, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners fairly stated that he is not challenging the proceedings on any other ground. The challenge being that direction to pay beyond six months period is barred by limitation and the cause shown being not sufficient, the first respondent has acted with illegality in condoning the delay in admitting the petition as if sufficient cause has been shown for not making the petition within the time prescribed in terms of proviso to sub section (2) of Section 20. There is no quarrel that the employers have been paying less than the minimum wages and there is a valid Notification under Section 5(2) of The Minimum Wages Act by the State Government notifying th3e minimum wages.
13. It is also admitted that despite the writ petitioners being management of the Co-operative societies, they have failed to pay minimum wages as notified. Section 12 of the Payment of Minimum Wages Act provides tht an employer shall pay to every employee engaged in the scheduled employment under him wages at a rate not less than the minimum rate of wages fixed by such Notification for that class of the employees in that employment. The said Section 12, mandates that wages have to be paid as fixed under the Act. It is not as if a separate direction has to be issued to direct the employer to pay minimum wages while the said Provision makes it mandates the employer to pay the minimum wage whenever there is a notification covering the employment. It is also obligatory for the employer to maintain registers and the Inspector has to inspect those registers and verify as to whether the employer is paying the minimum wages. Section 22A provides that any employer who contravenes any provision of the Act, for such contravention is punishable with fine which may extend to Five hundred rupees. It is also a social obligation of the employer to pay the minimum wages.
14. The concept of payment of minimum wages has been the subject matter of consideration in Chandrabhavan Boarding and Lodging Vs. State of Mysore, and the Supreme Court held thus:-
“9. We have earlier noticed the circumstances under which the Act came to be enacted. Its main object is to prevent sweated labour as well as exploitation of unorganised labour. It proceeds on the basis that it is the duty of the State to see that at least minimum wages are paid to the employees irrespective of the capacity of the industry or unit to pay the same. The mandate of Article 43 of the Constitution is that the State should endeavour to secure by suitable legislation or economic organisation or in any other way, to all workers, agricultural, industrial or otherwise work, a living wage, conditions of work ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure and social and cultural opportunities. The fixing of minimum wages is just the first step in that direction. In course of time the State has to take many more steps to implement that mandate. As seen earlier that resolutions of the Geneva Convention of 1928, which had been accepted by this country called upon the covenanting States to fix minimum wages for the employees in employments where the labour is unorganized or where the wages paid are low. Minimum wages does not mean wage just sufficient for bare sustenance. At present the conception of a minimum wage is a wage which is somewhat intermediate to a wage which is just sufficient for bare sustenance and a fair wage. That concept includes not only the wage sufficient to meet the bare sustenance of an employee and his family, it also includes expenses necessary for his other primary needs such as medical expenses, expenses to meet some education for his children and in some cases transport charges, etc., see Unnicheyi and Others v. State of Kerala. The concept of minimum wage is likely to undergo a change with the growth of our economy and with the change in the standard of living. It is not a static concept. Its concomitants must necessarily increase with the progress of the society. It is likely to differ from place to place and from industry to industry. That is clear from the provisions of the Act itself and is inherent in the very concept.”
15. In terms of Art.43 of The Constitution, the State shall endeavour to secure by suitable legislation or Economic Organisations, or in any other way, to all workers a living wage, conditions of work, ensuring a decent standard of life and full enjoyment of leisure, social and cultural opportunities and in particular, the State shall endeavour to promote industries on an individual or on Co-operative basis in rural areas. Thus it is clear that in terms of Section 12, there is a notification and it is obligatory for the employer to pay the minimum wages. Despite such notification, minimum wages not having been paid, the employees moved the first respondent, which is the competent authority under Section 20 for directions.
16. Mr.S.Vadivel, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that in terms of Proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 20 Claim Application for direction under Section 20 has to be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages became payable. In the present case as the applications not having been made within the period of six months from the date on which the minimum wages became payable, the claims are barred and the proceedings instituted by the Workmen deserve to be rejected summarily. Mr.S.Vadivel also contended that though the authority constituted under section 20 may, if sufficient cause is shown, admit the application after the period of six months, if the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period. In the present case Mr.S.Vadivel, refers to the proceedings of the first respondent and contended that as a matter of routine without application of mind and arbitrarily the first respondent has admitted the applications even after the lapse of six months and when there is no sufficient cause at all.
17. In this respect a perusal of the applications submitted by the workmen in each of the writ petitions would show that the workmen showed sufficient cause running to nearly three pages. In the said applications filed by the workmen sufficient cause has been shown as detailed in the applications. A perusal of the applications submitted by the applicants would show that there is more than sufficient cause shown by the employees to entertain the applications. It may not be necessary to extract the very reasons assigned. This court finds that sufficient cause has been shown for not making the application within the period. It is not as if the workmen have not advanced any claim in this respect but they have been agitating and making claims besides persuading the respondents/writ petitioner-management to pay the minimum wages as seen from their representations dated 23.1.1995, 31.1.1995, 10.3.1995, 30.3.1995 and 17.10.1995. It is also clear from the contents of the applications filed by the workmen that they have been not only pressing for payment. The petitioners were made to believe that minimum wages will be paid to the workers as demanded by them and they were negotiations for a considerable period. The workmen have written more than five letters. But only after a considerable delay and after holding discussions the employers have declined to pay the minimum wages. Immediately thereafter the applications have been filed. Though in the proceedings, the fist respondent has not set out in detail but on facts it is clear that t sufficient cause has been shown in the applications. The first respondent has referred to the contents and concluded that it is a fit case to condone delay. As justice has been rendered by the first respondent in holding that there is sufficient cause for the employees to come before the authority after the 6 months period, this court will not be justified in interfering, though the first respondent has not assigned or recorded detailed reasons in this respect.
18. The payment of Minimum Wages being a social obligation and the Co-operative societies should behave like a model employer and there cannot be any justification for non payment of minimum wages, this court is of the considered view that delay, if any has been caused by the employer and sufficient cause has been shown and the applications have been entertained. A perusal of the condone delay applications would show that sufficient cause has been shown and merely because the first respondent, competent authority had not passed a long order, this court will not be justified in interfering with the reasons assigned. It cannot be said that it is an arbitrary exercise of power and it cannot also be held that no cause at all has been shown by the employees. A perusal of the applications would show that the employees have shown sufficient cause in this respect.
19. The Proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 20 confers wide discretion, a plenary power on the first respondent to condone the delay in presentation of a claim. The power conferred on the first respondent to condone the delay is not controlled by the period of limitation and the first respondent, in its discretion has the plenary power to condone the delay in the presentation of claim.
20. The learned counsel for the contesting respondents referred to the decision of the Apex Court in Balakrishnan Vs. Krishnamurthy 1999 (1) LW (SC) 739, where the Supreme Court analysed the case law in respect of Section 5 and in particular the discretion to be exercised while condoning the delay. In that respect it has been held thus:
“12. A court knows that refusal to condone delay would result in foreclosing a suitor from putting forth his cause. There is no presumption that delay in approaching the court is always deliberate. This court has held that the words sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice vide Shakunthala Devi Jain V. Kuntal Kumari and State of West Bengal Vs. The Administrator Howrah Municipality .
13. it must be remembered that in every case of delay, there can be some lapse ono the part of the litigant concerned. That alone is not enough to turn down his plea and to shut the door against him. If the explanation does not smack of mala fides or it is not put forth as part of the dilatory strategy the court must show utmost consideration to the suitor. But when there is reasonable ground to think that the delay was occasioned by the party deliberately to gain time, then the court should lean against acceptance of the explanation. While condoning delay, the court should not forget the opposite party altogether. It must be borne in mind that he is a looser and he too would have incurred quite a large litigation expenses. It would be a salutary guideline that when courts condone the delay due to laches on the part of the appellant, the court shall compensate the opposite party for his loss.”
21. As against the language used in Section 5 the language used in Proviso to Sub Section (2) of Section 20, confers wide discretion on the first respondent to entertain an application which has been filed beyond the period. Such discretion, on the facts of the case, this court is satisfied has been exercised by the first respondent. The discretion having been exercised and when justice has been rendered, this court will not be justified in interfering with the said discretion.
22. There is no illegality in the first respondent passing a composite order while exercising its discretion to entertain an application and also deciding the application for direction on merits. In this respect, the learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the decision of the Patna High Court in Bali Ram Vs. State of Bihar, . In this respect, the said Court held thus:-
“4. There is doubtless some force in this contention. When the application appeared to be prima facie time barred, the authority might have first decided the question as to whether sufficient cause was made out for condoning the delay. But there is no illegality if in one composite order, the authority first condones the delay in filing the application on being satisfied about the sufficiency of the cause and then disposes of the application on merits. The question is ultimately, one of prejudice. The petitioner was clearly informed of the date to which the case was posted viz., the 21st July, 1966. and had he cared to enter appearance on that date, he would have been aware of the next date of adjournment, to which the case was posted for hearing. But, apart from sending a show cause petition by post, the petitioner did nothing else, and absent himself. The result was that an ex parte order was passed against him.”
23. Mr.S.Vadivel, learned counsel for the petitioners relied upon the judgment of a Division Bench of this court in Gajendran Vs. The Management of Sri Gandiban Bus Service, reported in 1969, (II) MLJ 392 where the Division Bench took the view that Section 20(2) of The Minimum Wages Act is in substance similar to provision of Section 5 of The Limitation Act and therefore every day’s delay has to be explained. The Division Bench also on the facts of the said case held that there being no sufficient cause, exercise of discretion by the authority is not judicial and held that the order in that case suffers with error apparent on the face of the record. But this is not the case here. On facts the present case is distinguishable as reasons have been assigned showing sufficient cause and the authority was also satisfied and therefore the authority has exercised its discretion.
24. While considering Section 20(2), the Apex Court in Lonand Gram Panchayat Vs. Ramgiri held that the words “sufficient cause” in section 20(2) second proviso should receive a liberal construction. The Apex Court in held thus:-
“3. The Authority has a discretion to condone the delay in presenting the application provided sufficient cause for the entire delay is shown to its satisfaction. This discretion like other judicial discretion must be exercised with vigilance and circumspection according to justice, common sense, and sound judgment. The discretion is to know through law what is just, see Keighley case. (10 Coke’s Rep 139)
4. The wording of the second proviso is similar to the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. In Krishna v. Chathappan (ILR 13 Mad 269) the Madras High Court indicated in the following passage how the discretion under Section 5 should be exercised:
“We think that Section 5 gives the Courts a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence not inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the appellant.”
This decision received the approval, of this Court in Dinabandhu Sahu v. Jadumoni Mangaraj (ILR 13 Mad 269) and Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotetal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. . The words “sufficient cause” in the second proviso to Section 20(2) should receive a similar liberal construction.”
25. Following the Supreme Court pronouncement this court holds that the discretion exercised by the first respondent in all these writ petitions is not liable to be interfered by this court under Art.226. That apart, on a perusal of the files, this court also finds that sufficient cause has been shown by the workmen, which sufficient cause has been accepted by the first respondent, though not in so many sentences, but by stating that it has examined the cause shown and it is satisfied. This being a discretion exercised by the first respondent and being a sound discretion, which advanced the cause of justice and case of the workmen, who have been denied of the minimum wages, this court declines to interfere with the orders passed by the first respondent in all these writ petitions. Accordingly, both the contentions advanced by Mr.S.Vadivel, fail.
26. That apart, the difference ordered to be paid to the workmen has already been disbursed to the workmen and in law, what the workmen are entitled to, namely, the minimum wages, have been paid. It is not as if the workmen have collected some thing which is not due to them, nor collected a payment which is not authorised by law, nor the workmen have made an unlawful bargain. That being the position, the difference between the minimum wages and actual wages having been paid, this court declines to interfere with the proceedings of the first respondent in all these writ petitions as interference in these writ petitions would mean denying the minimum wages as notified under Section 5 of the Act, which minimum wages the workmen are entitled to. Therefore, all these writ petitions are dismissed. Consequently, connected WMPs are also dismissed. No costs.