PETITIONER: JIBRIAL DIWAN Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/07/1997 BENCH: M.M. PUNCHHI, K. VENKATASWAMI ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT:
	O R D E R
Having heard learned counsel for	the appellant, we
called upon Mr. D.M. Nargolkar, learned counsel for	the
state of maharashtra	requiring him	make submission to
support the judgment under appeal. He candidly admitted that
he was	unable to do so we appreciate the fair stance he has
adopted. In support of the same, we record our reasons.
 Shri Azhar Hussain, PW 2 was a Minister at the relevant
time in	the state of Maharashtra. He had planned a cultural
show whereat some artists were invited. The case of	the
prosecution is	that two letter Exh. 28 and Exh. 29	were
prepared on the letter	head of the	Minister, whereupon
invitations were written to invite Raja Murad, and Javed
Khan PWs. These letters were allegedly forged for these did
not bear the signature of the Minister. The show was held on
the day	scheduled. The	show was held on the day scheduled.
The invites came on the basis	of those forged letters,
Later, a controversy was raised. the matter was investigated
by the	CBI. Charges were laid against the appellant as also
one Patel, accused No. 2.	The second accused stands
acquitted by the trial court. His	acquittal has	been
maintained by the high	Court. The allegation against	the
acquitted accused was that he had forged those letters. That
part of	the prosecution case on account of the acquittal of
the second accused has	become	sealed. The role of	the
appellant was that he had delivered those two forged letters
to the	recipients. For that	act, even though he	was
acquitted by the trial	court, the High Court has convicted
him for	offence under	Section 417, Section 471 read with
Section 465 IPC and awarded him sentences as disclosed in
the judgment under appeal.
 It bears repetition that	the appellant was not	the
forgerer of those documents.	Section 471 enjoins	that
whoever fraudulently or dishonestly uses as	genuine	any
document which	he knows or has reason to believe to be a
forged document, shall be punished in the same manner as if
he had	forged such document.	Section	465 provides	that
whoever	commits forgery;,	shall	be punished	with
imprisonment of	either description for a term which	may
extend to two years, or with	fine, or with both. Now the
words ‘dishonestly’ has been defined to mean that whoever
does anything with the intention of causing wrongful gain to
one person or wrongful loss to another person, is said to do
that thing ‘dishonestly’. The	word ‘fraudulently’ has been
defined to mean that	a person is said to	d a thing
fraudulently if	he does that thing with intent to defraud
but not	otherwise. This court in Dr. S. Dutt state of U.P
AIR 1966 SC 523 has explained the words intent to defraud’
as being not synonymous with words `intent to deceive’. It
requires some action resulting	in a disadvantage which but
for the	deception the	person defrauded would have avoided.
here by the delivery of forged letters, there is neither any
wrongful gain to anyone nor any wrongful loss to another.
The act	of the	appellant could not thus be termed to have
been done dishonestly. Likewise the appellant cannot be said
to have any intention to defraud because his action resulted
in no disadvantage to	any one	which but for the deception
the person defrauded would have acted	otherwise. The basic
ingredients of	the act done `dishonestly’ or `fraudulently’
being missing,	the charge under Section 471 read with 465
IPC was	totally misplaced and the High Court fell into an
error in convicting the appellant on those charges.
 So	far as the	conviction under Section 417 is
concerned, the	High Court has ignored	the definition of
`cheating’ provided in Section	415 IPC. The High Court has
gone to	hold that the accused	cannot be held guilty	for
offence under Section 420 IPC because there was no cheating
of any	valuable or property involved in the act or omission
of the	appellant. It has just been concluded therefrom that
the appellant would, therefore, be guilty for offence under
Section 417 IPC. What	is deducible is that the High Court
perhaps thought	that the act or omission of the appellant
was not	covered in the first part of offence of `cheating’
as defined in Section 415 IPC. If so the act or omission of
the accused could not	in any	event fall in the later part
because we fail to see how the act or omission of	the
appellant caused or was likely to cause harm to any person
in body	mind or repetition. Thus the	conviction of	the
appellant or offence under Section 417 was also totally out
of place and the verdict on that score deserve reversal.
 For the foregoing reasons, ewe unhesitatingly allow
this appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court
and acquit the appellant of all charges. Before concluding
the matter, we compliment Mr. Nargolkar for being candid in
conceding the acquittal of the appellant at the outset for
which we have added the above justification.