Bombay High Court High Court

Shri Badrinarayan Bansilal … vs Shri Vinodkumar K. Shah on 19 September, 2008

Bombay High Court
Shri Badrinarayan Bansilal … vs Shri Vinodkumar K. Shah on 19 September, 2008
Bench: B.H. Marlapalle, D.B.Bhosale
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                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                       CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                         FIRST APPEAL NO.961     OF 2003




                                                                         
    Shri Badrinarayan Bansilal Somani,




                                                 
    Adult, Occ. Business,
    residing at :156, 1/B Mangalwar Peth,
    Pune-411 001.                       ..               Appellant.

                    Vs




                                                
    Shri Vinodkumar K. Shah,
    Adult, Occ.Business,
    Residing at :157, Camp,
    Pune-411 001.                               ..       Respondent.




                                       
    Mr A.V.Anturkar, for the appellant.
                           
    Mr Anil Dhavale, for the respondent.


                 CORAM :   B.H.MARLAPALLE & D.B.BHOSALE,JJ.
                 DATE :    19/09/2008


    JUDGMENT:      (Per D.B.Bhosale,J.)
      


    1.       This    appeal    is directed against the judgment                 and
   



    order    dated 15.5.2003 rendered by the learned Joint civil

Judge, Senior Division, Pune, in Special Civil Suit No.347

of 1988 instituted by the respondent-plaintiff. The suit

was for recovery of an amount of Rs.12,64,000/- against

the appellant-defendant along with interest at the rate of

24 per cent per annum. By the impugned judgment, the

defendant is directed to pay to the plaintiff Rs.12 lacs

together with interest at the rate of 15 per cent per

annum from the date of the suit till realization of the

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entire amount and also directed to pay Rs.20,931.50

towards interest for the period from 3.12.1997 to

23.8.1998, that is, the period prior to institution of the

suit.

2. Basic facts of the suit are not in dispute. As a

matter of fact, Mr Anturkar, learned counsel for the

appellant-defendant, submitted that he has instructions to

confine challenge in the appeal only to the rate of

interest, awarded by the trial Court and seek 9 per cent

per annum interest on the amount of Rs.12 lacs only from

the date of the
ig suit till realization of the entire

amount. In view thereof, we do not propose to make a

detailed reference to the facts.

3. Briefly stated, the plaintiff is a trader and

businessman. He knew the defendant and he claims that he

had extended financial aid to him from time to time. On

30.11.1997, the defendant once again had approached the

plaintiff with a request to give a loan of Rs. 12 lacs.

The plaintiff did pay this amount to the defendant on

30.11.1997 in cash. The defendant had promised to return

the said amount on 3.12.1997. The defendant had

accordingly issued a cheque bearing No.050646 dated

3.12.1997 of Rs.12 lacs drawn on Mahesh Sahakari Bank

Ltd.. The amount was not paid as promised, the plaintiff,

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thereafter, had presented the said cheque for encashment

and since it was bounced he has filed a complaint under

section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Since the

defendant did not make payment of the aforesaid amount the

plaintiff instituted the instant suit for recovery of the

amount with interest at the rate of 24% per annum.

4. The trial Court has decreed the suit holding that

the plaintiff has brought sufficient evidence on record to

prove that he had paid Rs 12 lacs to the defendant by way

of loan on 30.11.1997 and that the defendant had promised

to

pay the said amount on or before 3.12.1997 by issuing

post-dated cheque. The defence propounded by the

defendant that the aforesaid amount was paid by the

plaintiff for the purchase of shares has not been accepted

by the trial Court. Insofar as the claim towards interest

on the amount of Rs.12 lacs for the period before and

after the suit, the trial Court has granted it at the rate

of 15 per cent per annum. The trial Court has further

held that the plaintiff is entitled to get interest of

Rs.40,931.50 for the period from 3.12.1997 to 23.2.1998,

that is, for the period prior to the suit. Admittedly,

the defendant had paid Rs.20,000/- to the plaintiff and

hence the Court has directed the defendant to pay the

balance of Rs.20,931.50 only.

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5. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant

only on the rate of interest awarded by the trial court

which, according to Mr Anturkar, was much higher than what

the plaintiff is entitled in law. He invited our

attention to Section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure

(for short, “CPC”) and submitted that since there was no

agreement for the payment of interest between the parties

and that the amount was not received for commercial

purpose, the Court below was wrong in awarding interest at

the rate of 15 per cent per annum. He submitted that the

facts of the case clearly show that the plaintiff was not

entitled for

any interest and he was supposed to return

only Rs.12 lacs and, therefore, the cheque of that amount

only was issued. He submitted that the trial Court has

committed an error of law in awarding interest at the rate

of 15% per annum from the date the amount was paid till

the date of the suit. He submitted, in the absence of an

agreement for payment of interest the defendant was not

liable to pay the interest for the period prior to the

suit. He then submitted that even awarding interest at

the rate more than 6 per cent from the date of decree till

the payment thereof was also wrong and illegal. He

submitted that insofar as the rate of interest for the

period from the date of the suit till the date of decree

at the rate of 15% cannot be sustained in law since the

plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that the loan was

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obtained for commercial purpose. He submitted that it was

a simple transaction of personal loan and it did not have

a colour of commercial transaction.





                                                                        
                                                
    6.      The   question    that   falls   for     our      consideration

    centers   around     section 34 of CPC, and hence it would                   be

    advantageous    to    re-produce the said section            for      better




                                               
    appreciation    of    the contentions urged on behalf               of     the

    defendant.    Section 34 reads thus:




                                    
                         

“34. Interest -(1) Where and in so far as a decree
is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the

decree, order interest at such rate as the Court
deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum
adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of
the decree, in addition to any interest adjudged on
such principal sum for any period prior to the
institution of the suit, with further interest at

such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum as
the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum,

from the date of the decree to the date of payment,
or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit:

Provided that where the liability in relation to
the sum so adjudged had arisen out of a commercial

transaction, the rate of such further interest may
exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed
the contractual rate of interest or where there is
no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are
lent or advanced by nationalised banks in relation
to commercial transactions.

Explanation I.- In this sub-section, “nationalised
bank” mean a corresponding new bank as defined in
the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of
Undertakings) act, 1970 (5 of 1970).

Explanation II.- For the purposes of this section,

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a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is
connected with the industry, trade or business of
the party incurring the liability.

(2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to

the payment of further interest on such principal
sum from the date of the decree to the date of
payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be

deemed to have refused such interest, and a
separate suit therefor shall not lie.”

7. A mere perusal of Section 34 shows that it deals

with the question of interest in three stages. First is,

interest for the period prior to the institution of the

suit, the second stage is, interest on the principal sum

adjudged

date of
from

decree,

the date of institution of suit

at such rate as the Court
till the

deems

reasonable, and the third stage is, further interest on

the principal sum adjudged from the date of the decree

till realization of the decretal amount or to such earlier

date as the Court thinks fit at a rate not exceeding 6 per

cent per annum. The section does not refer to payment of

interest for the period prior to the institution of the

suit on the “principal sum adjudged”. It applies only to

additional interest on the principal sum adjudged from the

date of suit to the date of the decree and further

interest from the date of the decree to the date of

payment. A plain reading of this section show that an

interest on the principal amount adjudged from the date of

decree to the date of payment in any case cannot be

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allowed at a rate higher than six per cent per annum

unless the liability in relation to the sum adjudged had

arisen out of commercial transaction as provided for under

the first proviso to section 34. In short, about the

first stage, section 34 does not say anything while about

the second stage it says that the interest to be awarded

shall be as considered reasonable by the Court. About the

third stage, that is, from the date of decree till

realization, the power of the Court to award interest is

circumscribed, that is, it cannot be more than 6% per

annum. This is settled by the Supreme Court in Ramnik

Vallabhdas Madhvani Vs.
ig Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani (2004)

1 SCC 497.

                           
    8.       The      Supreme Court had an occasion to consider                        the

    meaning      of phrases "the principal sum adjudged" and "such
      


    principal      sum" occurring in section 34 of CPC in                        Central
   



    Bank    of   India      Vs.     Ravindra and ors, (2002)               1    Supreme

    Court    Cases      367.
                        367        In this case, the Supreme               Court       has





    observed      that      "if the amount of interest is paid,                     there

    will    be    no    occasion      for    capitalising         the      amount        of

    interest      and      converting      it    into    principal.             If     the





    interest      is not paid on the date due, from that date                          the

    creditor      is    deprived of such use of the money                    which       it

    would    have      made    if the debtor had paid             the      amount        of

    interest      on    the    date      due.   The creditor          needs       to     be




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    compensated      for    such    deprivation".        The      Supreme         Court

    further      held    that    the    expression     "the       principal          sum

    adjudged"      may    include the amount of interest charged                       on




                                                                              
    periodical      rests, and capitalised with the principal                        sum




                                                      

actually advanced, so as to become an amalgam of principal

in such cases where it is permissible or obligatory for

the court to hold so. Where the principal sum (on the

date of suit) has been so adjudged, the same shall be

treated as “principal sum”.

9. In the present case, perusal of the pleadings and

the oral evidence show that there was no agreement between

the parties for the payment of interest at fixed rate on

the principal sum actually advanced. The plaintiff,

therefore, is not entitled to claim interest on the amount

of Rs.12,64,000/- since Rs.64000/- were added to the

actual sum advanced by way of interest at the rate of 24 %

per annum from the date of payment to the date of the

suit. Section 34 does not refer to payment of interest

for the period prior to the institution of suit on the

principal sum adjudged. The principal sum, according to

the plaintiff, of Rs.12,64,000/- cannot be treated as the

“principal sum adjudged” on the date of the suit.

Therefore, the plaintiff would be entitled for interest

only on the principal amount actually advanced, i.e. Rs.

12,00000/-. We find support for the view in the decision

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of the Supreme Court in Union of India Vs The West Punjab

Factories Ltd, AIR 1966 SC 395, wherein, while dealing

with the contention that no interest could be awarded

for the period before the suit on the amount of damages

decreed, it was observed that in the absence of any usage

or contract, express or implied, or of any provision of

law to justify the award of interest, it is not possible

to award interest by way of damages. In the

circumstances, the Supreme Court held that no interest

could be awarded for the period upto the date of the suit

and the decretal amount in the two suits will have to be

reduced by the

amount of such interest awarded. For

taking such view the Supreme Court also placed reliance

upon its Judgment in Union of India Vs. Watkins and Mayor

Co, AIR 1966 SC 275. The Supreme Court in that case,

while dealing with a case under the Interest Act, 1939,

had observed that interest may be awarded for the period

prior to the date of the institution of the suit if there

is an agreement for the payment of interest at fixed rate

or if interest is payable by the usage of trade having the

force of law, or under the provisions of any substantive

law.

10. It is now well settled that in matter of grant of

interest under this section, the Court has discretion,

even not to grant the interest and it is not limited to

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the rate of interest. In other words, the grant of

interest under section 34 is a matter of discretion and is

to be exercised on the facts and circumstances of each

case more particularly where there is no agreement for the

payment of interest. Scrutiny of Section 34 of CPC

indicates guidelines for exercise of such discretion. It

shows that grant of interest at contract rate should be

the normal rule, the use of discretion to refuse interest

or reduce the agreed rate being the exception. To reduce

or deny interest would amount to penalising the creditor

for approaching the Court and encouraging the debtor to

deliberately

prolong the litigation. In short, where

there is no agreement for the payment of interest between

the parties, the Court is expected to use the discretion

and in such cases Courts are guided by the provisions

contained in section 34 of CPC. Undoubtedly, the courts

are expected to bear in mind that the discretion is

required to be exercised on sound judicial principals.

11. Thus, it is clear that in the absence of any agreed

rate of interest, the Court will have to use its

discretion keeping in view the provisions contained in

Section 34 of CPC so also the facts and circumstances of

each case and the nature of transaction. If prima facie

the nature of transaction does not disclose it to be a

commercial transaction, it would not be proper for Court

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to award any interest paid by nationalised Banks in

relation to commercial transaction for the period from the

date of suit to the date of decree. In the present case,

the trial Court has observed that the monies were paid for

the purpose of business and awarded 15% interest right

from the date of payment till the date of realization. We

do not find the material either in the form of document or

oral evidence in support thereof. In other words, there

is nothing on record to suggest that the payment of loan

was given for industry, trade or business of the

defendant. In fact, issuance of the cheque of the exact

amount which

was borrowed by the defendant itself is an

indicator that the transaction was not commercial. There

was nothing in writing between the two. In defence

defendant has set out a case that the amount was paid to

him for purchase of shares.

12. On perusal of the pleadings and the evidence of the

plaintiff we have no hesitation to hold that the plaintiff

has failed to prove that payment of the monies was for

business, trade or industry. Explanation-II makes it very

clear that a transaction is “commercial transaction” only

if it is connected with the industry, trade and business

of the party incurring liability. The plaintiff neither

in his plaint nor in his evidence has stated for what

purpose the amount was advanced. He has simply stated

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that the amount of Rs.12 lacs was paid to the defendant on

his request to give a loan and since he was knowing the

defendant he had paid that amount to him. The plaintiff

has further stated that the defendant had received the

said amount and had promised to return on or before

3.12.1997. The defendant had also issued a cheque of the

said sum and no interest was added to while issuing the

cheque. He has not stated either in the pleadings or in

his evidence the purpose of seeking loan from him. Thus

the evidence and the pleadings of the plaintiff are silent

as to the nature of transaction. The plaintiff is not a

money lender or
ig a financial institution. He is an

individual who claims that even on earlier occasions he

had paid loan to the defendant. In the circumstances it

would not be possible for us to hold that the transaction

was commercial transaction. In our opinion, it was a

simple personal loan paid by the plaintiff to the

defendant.

13. The trial Court was wrong in awarding interest at

the rate of 15 per cent per annum from the date

(30.11.1997) of payment till the realisation of the entire

amount. In the absence of an agreement for the payment of

interest and material to show that the transaction was

commercial transaction, the Court ought not to have

granted commercial rate of interest which was being

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charged by nationalised Banks at the relevant time.

Moreover, there was no material on record to show that the

rate of interest prevailing at the relevant time was 15%.

Similarly, awarding 15 per cent rate of interest from the

date of decree to the date of realization cannot be

sustained in law. In the facts of the present case, under

Section 34 of CPC, for the period from the date of payment

till the institution of the suit the plaintiff is not

entitled for any interest and from the date of the decree

till realization of the entire amount, the plaintiff is

entitled for the interest at the rate of 6% per annum.

14. In the circumstances, this appeal is partly

allowed. The defendant is not liable to pay interest for

the period from the date of borrowing the monies till the

date of institution of the suit. The defendant shall pay

the interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the

date of the decree till realization of the entire amount,

and insofar as the period from the date of institution of

the suit till the date of decree the defendant shall pay

the interest at the rate of 9 percent per annum. Decree

be drawn up accordingly. No costs.

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(D.B.BHOSALE, J.) (B.H.MARLAPALLE,J.)

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HIGH COURT

APPELLATE SIDE

FIRST APPEAL NO.961 OF 2003

Date of Judgment:

19TH SEPTEMBER,2008.

For approval and signature

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE B.H.MARLAPALLE.

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE D.B.BHOSALE.

1. Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?

2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?

3. Whether Their Lordships wish to see the

fair copy of the Judgment?

4. Whether this case involves a substantial
question of law as to the interpretation
of the Constitution of India, 1950 or

any Order made thereunder?

5. Whether it is to be circulated
to the Civil Judges?

6. Whether the case involves an important

question of law and whether a copy of
the judgment should be sent to Nagpur
Aurangabad or Goa offices?

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