JUDGMENT
1. The present appeal has been filed by the assessee against the order passed by the learned Tribunal for the asst. yr. 1999-2000.
2. The appeal was admitted in terms of the following questions.
(i) Whether, upon a true and proper construction of the final decree dt. 10th Feb., 1986 in Title Suit No. 84 of 1956 and the Compromise Petition on the basis of which the same was passed, the Tribunal was justified in law in holding that the sum of Rs. 1,00,000 was mentioned therein as representing the fair market value of the property in the year 1986 or that there are any admission in that regard by the appellant and its purported findings in that behalf are arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse ?
(ii) Whether the. Tribunal was justified in law in rejecting the report dt. 20th Sept., 1994 of M/s Talbot & Co. determining the fair market value as on 1st April, 1981 at Rs. 1,35,000 per cottah on the basis of sale instances relating to properties at Wood Street and Ashoka Road, Alipore and in estimating the value of Rs. 75,000 per cottah and its purported findings in that behalf are arbitrary, unreasonable and perverse ?
3. Mr. Deb, learned advocate for the Revenue, had taken a very interesting point on the question of the method adopted by Talbot & Co., the valuer, for arriving at the valuation of the property on the strength of the report of the valuer which indicates the comparison made. He rightly points out that the valuation was assessed on the basis of the two comparable properties, one at Wood Street and the other at Ashoka Road, which is situated far away from the property under valuation situated at Puma Das Road. Admittedly, the three areas are completely different and the same cannot be comparable units for arriving at a proper valuation of the property. We do not think that there could be any doubt or dispute with regard to the proposition as stated by Mr. Deb and the valuation arrived at could well be said to be unreliable and without following the principles of valuation established in law. In such a situation, the valuation is to be made on the strength of the comparable units of the neighbouring area or adjacent to the properties. The same having not been done, it is very difficult to assail the finding of the Tribunal in rejecting the valuation made by the valuer.
4. Mr. Deb further contended that there was an admission by the parties in the suit for partition by reason whereof the valuation accepted in the document for partition cannot be overlooked and would be binding on the parties and the onus would shift on the assessee being a party to the compromise admitting the valuation to establish otherwise than what was admitted.
5. Mr. Deb relied on the decision to support this proposition in Thiru John v. Returning Officer and Ors. . We do not think that any issue can be joined with regard to the said proposition, which is now a settled one. If there is an admission, then the party cannot get rid of such admission in respect of the valuation in the course of the proceedings. The same would become admissible for the purpose of accepting the valuation.
6. But this proposition has to be construed on the basis of the admission made in the context in which it was so made. Admittedly, this admission was made in a compromise petition filed in a suit for partition instituted on 10th Sept., 1956. The valuation given in the suit for partition was as it stood on 10th Sept., 1956. There is no principle that this valuation of the suit would go on increasing with the passage of time or the valuation as it stands on the date of decree would be the valuation of the suit. In a suit for partition after the suit is decreed the valuation of the suit when filed would be the valuation and the stamp duty is to be paid according to such valuation when the decree is registered at the rate of the duty payable as on the date of registration. There is no principle to alter the valuation of the suit when filed unless there is a finding that the suit was not properly valued when filed. Admittedly, in the present case, there was no such issue and the suit was held to be properly valued and the Court fee paid was found to be sufficient. This proposition of fact is not in dispute. Though this might be binding on the parties, but it cannot be treated to be an admission with regard to the valuation of the property as of 1st of April 1981. The valuation of the suit property was being assessed for the purpose of determining capital gains. Therefore, the admission would not be relevant for the purpose of arriving at the valuation of the property as of 1st of April 1981, which was to be assessed according to the principle of valuation either through appointing a valuer or by the authority.
7. It is not in dispute that the valuation made by the valuer is simply an ordinary piece of evidence. It does not carry any weight more than that. The authorities are free to agree with the finding of the report or the certificate given by an approved valuer. At the same time, if it appears to the authority that the valuation was inaccurate or unreliable, it would be open to the authority to reject the same, and if there is no other evidence with regard to the market value of the property, the authorities would be justified in computing the value on well established principles of valuation as was held in Dina Nath v. CED . We do not find any reason to differ with the view taken in the said decision.
8. In the present case, it can be said, as rightly contended by Mr. Deb, that the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the piece of evidence being the report of the valuer. But the fact remains that the Tribunal had valued the property at Rs. 75,000 per cottah but there is no indication as to how the valuation was arrived at. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that this valuation was computed on the well-established principles of valuation. It appears from the reasoning given in the order appealed against that this valuation was arrived at abruptly without anything to support the valuation that it was made following the well-established principles of valuation. Even if it is assumed that the admission of the parties in the compromise suit was relied on, in that event, the whole land was admitted to have been valued at Rs. 1,00,000 comprising 13 cottah and odd 1/3rd of each of the consideration and then on the strength of the admission of the valuation would be assessing 13 cottah and odd for the whole property where the valuation of one cottah would come around Rs. 7,000, 8,000 approximately. Therefore, this valuation arrived at by the learned Tribunal cannot be justified.
9. It further appears that this valuation was submitted by the assessee in his wealth-tax returns for the asst. yrs. 1987-88 and was accepted by the WTO. The same valuation was also submitted in the return for the asst. yr. 1990-91 by the assessee, which was subsequently reopened by the WTO but ultimately the WTO had accepted the valuation of Rs. 15,44,700. Therefore, it appears that there was some materials to arrive at the valuation as in 1987-88 as well as in 1990-91, since accepted by the WTO, which is an undisputed proposition. Now on the basis of this valuation, if a reverse calculation is made for the period as of 1st of April 1981, the valuation would definitely be less than what was accepted in 1990-91 during which admittedly the valuation of properties had increased phenomenally.
10. Therefore, it does not appear that the valuation of Rs. 5,95,800 would be too disproportionate or too low than the valuation on 1st of April, 1981 compared to the valuation of the same property as in 1990-91, a proposition that may not sound too unreasonable having regard to the situation as noted above.
11. In any event when the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the report of the valuation, it had the responsibility to value the property following the accepted principles of valuation. But it had not done so, as it appears from the order itself. The alternative available to the authority was to remand the matter and get the valuation done by an appropriate valuer. This procedure was neither adopted by the AO nor by the Tribunal. On the other hand, the CIT(A) had accepted the said valuation though it could have remanded the matter.
12. In the circumstances, we do not think that this Court could remand the matter for fresh valuation after this long passage of time particularly when there were certain materials on record to show that in 1990-91 the valuation was accepted as at Rs. 15,44,700. The valuation arrived at, though not on a sound proposition by Talbot & Co., Rs. 5,95,800 could be too low a valuation to be discarded altogether. In the absence of any other material and when the Tribunal had not adopted the process of remanding the matter and had not valued the property, according to the well-accepted principle of valuation, there is no alternative but to accept the valuation made by the valuer which was on record, though we do not approve the method of comparison adopted by the valuer, in comparison to the valuation of the same property accepted by the WTO for the year 1990-91. At the same time, a property at Hindustan Road is also not less valuable from the standpoint of materials apparent on the record that this property was surrounded by roads on all three sides the accepted principle that emanates from this proposition, the report of the valuer is merely a piece of evidence which could be rejected by the authority concerned if it was found unreliable according to the accepted principle of valuation and in case it was rejected the authority had either to get a valuation done by the Departmental valuer or otherwise as the case may be or it could be valued by itself Mowing the accepted principle of valuation and in case it did not do so, in that event, if there were sufficient materials on record to arrive at a reasonable valuation, in that event, such valuation could be accepted by the authority in a proceeding under the IT Act.
13. For all these reasons, we set aside the order of the Tribunal and allow the appeal. We answer the question No. 1 in favour of the assessee. The question No. 2 is also answered in favour of the assessee.
14. There will, however, be no order as to costs.