ORDER
K.P. Sivasubramaniam, J.
1. The petitioner prays for the issue of a writ of certiorari to call for the records of the second respondent dated 21.11.2001 and to quash the same.
2.The petitioner states that he was working as a Secretary of the second respondent management being a Co-operative society. The second respondent, the Special Officer had assumed charge on 25.05.2001 having been appointed under Section 89 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983. The impugned order is an order of suspension passed against the petitioner. The petitioner has questioned the order of suspension on several grounds and considering the nature of disposal of the writ petition, it is sufficient to indicate that in the impugned order of suspension, there is no mention of public interest as warranting suspension of the petitioner.
3. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner the failure to mention (public interest) is fatal to the order of suspension. Reference is made to the provisions of Section 76 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (herein after referred to as “the Act”). Section 76(1)(a) and (b) of the Act entitle the competent authority to suspend an officer or servant of the Society if there was prima facie evidence against the said officer and such suspension was necessary in the interests of the Society or in the public interest. Therefore, according learned counsel for the petitioner, it was necessary for the competent authority to state specifically that the order of suspension was issued either in the interests of the Society or in the public interest.
4. Learned counsel also refers on the judgment of S.Ramalingam,J. in ARUMUGHAM,M.S. v. JOINT REGISTRAR, SALEM REGON, SALEM-7 (1991 Writ L.R., 636) in support of his contention that the order itself should indicate that the suspension necessitated in public interest or in the interest of the institution.
5. I have also heard learned Additional Government pleader who would submit that when once the competent authority is satisfied with the need to suspend the employee, it was not necessary that the order of suspension itself should indicate that it was necessary to suspend the employee in public interest or in the interest of the institution. The order itself was indicative of such a requirement and that an order of suspension does not require to be interpreted in a hyper technical manner. It is also stated that an order of suspension is not an order of punishment.
5.I have considered the submissions of both sides. As far as suspension under Section 76(1)(a) of the Act is concerned, suspension is contemplated where it becomes necessary in the interest of the Society. Under Section ,76(1)(b) of the Act in the event of the employee being involved in any other offence involving moral turpitude, the suspension of an employee would be in the interest of the public or in the interest of the Society. It is true that an order of suspension need not be dissected and viewed with any strict technicalities. But the basic requirement as pointed out in the very provisions as well as in the judgment as aforesaid is that the competent authority must be satisfied that the suspension has to be effected either in the interest of the Society or in the interest of the general public. Though an order of suspension does not amount to a punishment, the order definitely amounts to a stigma on the petitioner at least temporarily and therefore, it has to satisfy the basic requirements as aforesaid. Therefore, with the result, the impugned order is liable to set be set aside. This is however, subject to the liberty of the respondents to proceed further by taking fresh action in accordance with law.
6. Subject to the above observation, the writ petition is allowed. No costs. Connected W.P.M.P. is also closed as unnecessary.