High Court Karnataka High Court

M/S S M Suparies Nut Merchants vs The Karnataka Bank Ltd on 27 August, 2010

Karnataka High Court
M/S S M Suparies Nut Merchants vs The Karnataka Bank Ltd on 27 August, 2010
Author: Aravind Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE

DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF AUGUST 

BEFORE

THE I-ION'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARAVIND   u  'V

MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL 1¥Io.:3'sA2i57 G3?' 2éc3"('ir:~3.>.(':;%.T_j

BETWEEN:

M/S. S.M. SUPARIES, NUT M.EI--"x'CHAN'I'S._
No.5, "A" BLOCK, Apmc   _ "
SHIMOGA BY ITs'PRfoPRIETR1X~--... j »  " ~ . _
SMT. ANNAPOORNA,  ' . =  "
WIFE OF RV. MoHAN,_ '
AGED ABo'cT..36 YEARS;  ., 
R/AT. AN_AG'gj)DIGE-- ViLL"AG}::,_ " "
SHEDAGARU-.PC)S'F,_  *1.RT;1%IA}LALL1TALUK,

SHIMGQA::_D;STRICTIff_- «_ 
' """   "   3 ...APPELI.ANT

{B§'x.sfi._ G. ve:§"1;a¢acfia:A,--~Adv.,)

A_1_'IE=._

._  KARNAT'  'BANK LTD .,

'I~iAvn\JG'«1Ts HEAD OFFICE AT

 "  THROUGH ITS
 BRANCHfOF'FICE AT A.P.M.C.

 f$;H51'MOGA, REPT. BY

A "-...ITS.__MA1\iAGER.

...RESPOND EN'IE'?'

"   Sri. K.V. Shyama Prasad, AcIv.,}



Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction
in a District and as such execution V.
was not maintainable. K H H
ii) Further, under sec.4:Ed,"mit"is 
that where with Vrespectdt 
agreement any   v"Psart
has been made   alone
shall have  arbitral
procceediiigsiangifii applications
A  and the
tttt  be made in that

 court and;'in"no' other Court.

.. VvO'n raisi1igV___i;'hoese queries, Registry noted that

V':Princi.paE_Dist.rict_Judge, Shimoga, has no jurisdiction to

adjudicdated tdhedefiiecution petition and accordingly, it was

 ' 'posted befor.ex the Court. By order dated 14.11.2000, the

  iPri.ncCi'pal District Judge kept open the point regarding

0"»__"jurisdiction and ordered notice on judgment debtors.

M  



On service of notice Judgment Debtors l and V-2-._haVe

appeared and contested the execution petitio_n_._"~   ~

4. 011 9.8.2001, Principal'District~«.:}j'..1ldge',has"» 

issued sale notice. pursuant to which, 'iitw'o_"'prop'erties
were sold at spot. Court aucti-on/ sale »vas'l.con_'d--ucted on» '

3.8.2002.

5. On 19.1o.2ooe_,v--deb to be filed
under Order'  'ebyfjltlhe 18* judgment
debtor    who is also the
wife l   to set aside the sale
contending  irregularities in the sale.

Theg.-said kapvpiichatlo-nlvleame to be resisted by the

. .,.._,dei:reeiel1ol'der. Trial Court after considering rival

 its order dated 16.12.2002 dismissed

the-..appgvlicat~ion, which order is assailed in this appeal.

*  Heard the learned advocates appearing for the

   W



7. Sri.Venkatacha1a learned Counsel appearing for
the appellant first J.Dr would contend that Principal

District Judge did not have the jurisdiction  _

the execution petiton and the objection"rai-s:ewd"'by'--the W 2

office ought to have been uphe1d.;4in::'Viej'i2vdof.V

read with Section 42 of the':Arb.itrat1on and'jCo.I1«e,i1Viation 

Act, 1996. He would .  eirectitioritipetition
ought to have been  to have been
returned for   v.:th'e".Court having
jurisdiction;  submission by
contendingctddsdection 2{e) would clearly
 jurisdiction to entertain a

suit _ of originai'j.uris'diction would be the Court which

dd."-would :,,,'"be"i' ..entitd1e"d"dVto consider and adjudicate an

 by the claimant for execution of a

dec.ree.__>  iivould further contend that in the instant

 : case ezzecution petition ought to have been fiied before

  'Fri-nddcipal Civii Judge, (Sr.Dn] Shimoga since the said

  ~-idourt has the jurisdiction to try a original suit of this



nature. in support of his submission he relies---__upon

the judgment of the Hon'b1e Apex Court.«i.1_i

Coking Coal Ltd. Vs. M/s. Annapurna 

case reported in AIR 2008 S';CQ"2Q2'--8  i

judgment of the Delhi High' Court 

DELHI 14 [Virendra saigifii. I/V's.' M/s}. isfiijiciztizaitt
Jamnalal) and see}ts.._A_for_r'daiioufingi'-.of thtediatiapeal and

setting aside the order  .ii,;4gi;;ecuting Court.

8.   ._'_.':'31fi.i'I:Vi;;'3hyarnaprasad iearned
counseI.t._.cva_}5peariijig forjivthe~....resi)ondent decree holder
Would...Asupport'the'iordeifpassed by the executing Court

and conte.1idVsVvV'i'e:ading of Section 2(e} of the

 Arbitra_tion A¢:;.t199e it would emerge that it is the

 :'«Cixri_I Court of the District which has

j'L1ris'dictioi_1_ tsottry execution petition and when it is read

 with .. reference to the word "District" the execution

A  ioetit_ion presented in the instant case by the decree

 hoider before the Principal District Judge, Shimoga

fir"



case referred to supra is inapplicable to the facts --of the

present case since dicta laid down by the 

under Section me) of the Arbitration   

would not have any application to p_the,«faVcts_ iofilthe

present case as the Words udsecdinin 10996» Act.4"--are--.V

different. He would also subinit thathdapplicationdd filed'

under Order 21 Ru1fe..V_fl90_.*it's'eif';was_p.not0Vrnaintainable
since it is filed by the J.Dr and as
such she did 'hare uanfdindependent right
over the  as such he seeks for
rejectioniiv   heard the learned
advocates" the parties following points
arise for  .0

 {ii   the application filed under Order 21

it ». Riiie 90 is maintainabie'?

(ii) '  .:Whether the execution petition in

Ex. 1 7/ 2000
Principal District Judge. Shirnoga'?

was rnaintainable before

Q//'



[iii] Whether the order passed by the Principal
District: Judge in execution 
dated 1s--12m200o is liable to be arrir;:1¢a't;i 

reversed?

(iv) To what order'?

9. Retguestion No.1--,:In» so" far -as dc-ofi'tention"'

regarding the maintainability:ddc_:'of'V"-»tAthe ddappiication is
concerned same is tai§e.nfiip at first
instance itself   this point will
have the   points. Though Mr.
  contention before this
Courtz"fo:r" the .»it is seen that at the first

instance v'surhen'a.pp1icat'ion Was filed by the first J.Dr it

 wa's«V.oh"'betha1f of Vadddproprietary firm and was represented

    Srnt.Ar1napoorna. in the said capacity

app1ic,a't'ior;' in question has been filed by her and not in

 the cabacity of being Wife of second J.Dr. Even

dfidotherwise by reading of Order 21 Rule 90 it would

it " -"emerge that any person entitled to share in rateable

mi



distribution of assets would be entitled to object to the

sale of property and as such applicant. would be entitled

to seek for setting aside the sale. In the in'slta.IV:t_'__icVasje».,

firm being the Judgment Debtor it  he -A

entitled to seek rateable dis,tribution--os»  

proceeds in execution proceedingslgln view"oftl_1e  

contention of Sri.Shyampras'ad .learned:l_'Couv{I1sel for
respondent cannot be"«acc_e1;§teciVan'd'L'itiis__hereby rejected.

Question No.1.~is hel.d–V–in[ffavoAur” appellant and

against ._

:i=.0.= and 3: These two questions

being are being taken up for

considercztion “tog_e_ther_ In order to consider rival

‘ e.oi1-t.e11tions.Araised by the learned Advocates it would be

neclessarydito..5’extract relevant provisions of law pressed

into service namely Section 2[e) and Section 42 of the

A Arljitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and Section 2(c)

of the Arbitration Act, 1940 which reads as under:

M

1}

Section 2(e) of 1996, Act

“2.Definitions._[i) in this Part. un1ess~.r:’j’«.._l”‘-

the context otherwise requires._

(a) to (d) xxxxx

[e] “Court” means the prin_cipa.;l’ Civil

Court of original Ajurisdictionlinv -.1 ”

district. an’d__v”‘–i1z1cludves
Court in exereise of its”

origina1’*»~ .’CiVil. having
jurisdietion it the
V e ilqiiestiolns’ g V a sub} ect-
of :5-,,rl:l}itration if the
the subject-

tttt ” ‘V alulsiiit, but does not
‘ civil Court of a grade
” _ such principal Civil
V _ “or any Court of Small

Caiises; ”

1. .5ea¢:tiésn:r;g of 1996, Act

‘ Jurisdiction.WNotwithstanding

anytP1i’ng contained elsewhere in this Part or

inxany other law for the time being in force,

it llflwhere with respect to an arbitration

agreement any application under this Part

has been made in a Court, that Court alone

4/

shall have jurisdiction over the arbitralh

proceedings and all subsequent applicati0nusl.__u”e_

arising out of that agreement

arbitral proceedings shall be made

Court and in no other Courftfl.

Section 2(c) of 1940, Act

“2. I)efinitions.’M;;.Ii:’i’*..lthis VAct,_”~_1,1ii-lvelss it

there is a1’1yihl}’1,f_;§ 1*t%pugr1érr1t ii1VLthelsubjCQt} or

cor1text.W
{a) to {lo} V xxX.x>g_ H _ 9 V _
[cl ‘l’g,f1Ci.i:i’i’_”i .:i:he’a1is’.j_’~.aC ‘fcivsi Court

to decide the

____ M ii’ ” the subject

— the reference if the
been the subject-

” ._m211:vtieli~~°:of a suit, but does not
the of

under

for purpose

arl.)i.i1’a.ti.on proceedings
Section 21 include a Small Cause

Court. ”

C. if. The cont.e.11i.io11 of Sri.\/enkatachaia that words

f_’Prir1cipal Civil Court” referred to in 1996 Act. is

to be

~~v-“read in conjuriction with the sueceeciing words in the

Q”

same section wherein it has been stated that Civil Court

which has the jurisdicflon to decide the subjeejtVrn2_it’ter

of a suit, would mean a Court which ..A’t&’o111d’vt:”h2fiv–*.9

“Original Jurisdiction” to tryv~a”‘s11Ait -‘uitn

course if there was no arbitration d§spute’a_rid,Vit _

Court of original jL11″isdictio;fiV.eDwhteh. be”

entitled to adjudicate” app’licnati’o’n_._is to be considered
in the background “of the Horrble
Supreme in Coal Ltd’s case
referred the learned counsel for
the 22 which reads as
underf’ ” V V C C

C4 for the foregoing reasons as
iaIso–A.theVChirtctir1g precedents are of the opinion
Court has no _jartsdiotion to entertain
xtitese”lajaplications. The Registry, therefore, is
dmitéa to send the records to the Court of

C’ C-CV1,strict Judge. Dhanbad who in turn is directed

to transfer the case to a court having appropriate
jurisdzlction. The court concerned is requested to

dispose of the objection filed by the appellant

ea/’

herein as expeditiously as possible and not later
than three months jrom the date of receipt’e’,_.Q,’i”.

records”.

12. Sri.Venkatacha1a would contend—t.h:atvHonfbie”

Supreme Court having found that arbiitraticoittiawardpnot.’

being sustainable remitted the Vtmattepr the

District Judge, Dhanload ativyiit and a
further direction Judge to
transfer the precpordsx’ proper
only mean that
iufisdiction to try a suit. He
wou1N,,S\u-P_rni§ by the Hon’b1e Supreme

Court, app1jI.._ed~.,_to’~.–the facts of the present case the

on-ixyiconcisxsioniwaeeording to him which can be drawn is

“Civil Judge {Sr.Dn} Shimoga is the Court

original jurisdiction to try a suit with

unlimited jurisdiction which has to try the execution

in question and no other court. As such he

subniits that execution petiton ought to have been filed

W

before the said Court. liameiy Principai Civii Judge

(SI’.D}.’1] and not the Principal District Judge, Shinioéa,

13. This Court in the case of Haiti

an occasion to consider the issiieregarcling. jiuvrisaietiovnn

of the Courts to try petition filed

1996 Act and While iriter’i0retingVh ‘tIrie’~.1:§’3*o{2’1iVeioriVs. of”

Arbitration and Co.iic:i.1_iati_on to the

following effect:

“A reclsiing Sections 34 and

2&3} So)” intakes’. it clear that an

has to be filed in
the:iojlorigiriatjurisdiction in a
dielriet include any Civil Court

‘C of a inferior to such Principal Civil

V’ C. or Court of Small Causes.

3 C. Section 2(0) of the Act, 1940 and
A and 14 of the Act, Supreme Court

. guru Nanak Foundation Vs. M/s
‘Rattan singh and Sons, observed that in the
absence of an arbitration agreement if a
dispute was required to be resolved by

initiating proceedings in a Civil Court that

6?’

16

Court which will hauejurisdiction to entertain___

the suit alone would have jurisdiction
entertain the aurard and the arbitration-«.’i’rji:
view of Section 14(2) would have to file

award in that Court.”

And in conclusion it was heidto lfollowingg effectV:’=–4

“Learned Dis i J udge. C r
considering Section 14,«of Ciour”ts~A’2:3ict
has neither (2) of
Section 14anor the Civil
Courts Whatever,
that o those sections
to say that the
had no jurisdiction to
enteritatini But the question that

_–would” case is as to whether in
given'”c’ir:>-urnstances of the case, District
Cotr;rt.:at__Raichitr’ could have entertained the
jor execution and ordered for

attochsrrient of mo ueables. ”

{tis noticed that contention now put forward by

*i.Mr.Ktenkatacha1a is on the basis of the judgment of the

W

Hon’bie Supreme Court rendered in Bharat Coking Coal

Limited referred to supra. In the said judgrn«e’11tf–.it”-is

noticed that judgment and award that ‘

passed was under Arbiti-ation Ac.t.,~~~i.94i0 it it

Section 2{e) of 1996, Act was referreiciiii

time Arbitration Act, 1996V»Aet:.,had.’Co_meuintoilforieej. Iris’

the said case Hon’b],e_.Suprer:ie=Cot1rt has…aiso taken
note of the fact of Seetiori been interpreted
by the Apex Co. Ltd’s case
and at judgment it has been
held to the aim.

that such a View has
V_ _been’~ tfake”;–1 this Court in National
A__Iu1r1ini1j1:1,V_ _____ Co. Ltd. Vs. Pressteel &
Fa.bri:e’a.tions (P) Ltd. and Another [[2004}1
Statiligr
In regard to the forum before
which the appiication for modification or
setting aside the award is concerned, we

find no difficulty in coming to the

eonc}usion_ that in \fi€’.”W of the provisions

W’

of Section 34 read with Section 2 {e} of the
1996 Act. it is not this Court which
the jurisdiction to entertain_….._lj
application for modification of
and it could only be
court of original jui’is:?:lict..ior,l1″~.
conternpiated under Secti_on 2 the:
Act, therefore. ii*i=:T”our it
application xi? 1\.ot”” lrniailntainahllev…before

this Court.” 7

14. By rcadiviig cg-fl Act it would
emerge that defined to mean
and in a district. It is
also Section 2{e) it excludes

certain couiftsl. The exclusioii clause excludes any Civil

. it l*Co’urt i–n–feri.or to Principal Civil Court or any Court

I oi.._iSrria,ll«._.Ca_i3~se.s to exercise jurisdiction or to entertain

the«.._pet_iti0;oF’or application under the Act. The exclusion

iysyyspecific. Thus, a conjoint reading of inclusion and

it ‘exclusion clauses of Section 2(e) it would emerge that

l ~~}-egislature in its wisdom have thought necessary to vest

W

the jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the

subject matter of a suit under the Ai’bitratioIfi~_.b’and

Conciliation Act, 1996 with the “Principal

of a “District” and by excluding__any_ 4oth_ei”llCivi} Court K”

a grade inferior to such l3rinci”pal7.’_AC’i\/ill”C’o:.:rtA

Court of Small Causes. vv’ord~’Y§5rin’c;ipa1Civil’-C’

Court” is examinedvvith Voreference to Juristliiction of
“District Court” as’ d_efined’ ::’uric§l:eruL”Karnataka Civil
Courts Act _reads V’
“Secéti__§_1{g of the District
,Co11rt’s_.”:’ .°{::l_l._ Dis.tri_ct Courts shall be
‘Principal Civil Court of
olrigirial vvithin the local limitation
. .. of this juri.s’dic’:ion.

{2} Suljjectio the provisions of the Code of

..Cixril..iVl3rocedure 1908 [Central Act 5 of 1908).

‘iAti’r’i’sdictio’n of a District Court shall
extend to all original suits and proceedings of

” ‘icivil nature.

C it vifould emerge that District Courts are deemed to be

_.v___§’Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction and as such

4″

20

“Principal District Judge” of the District alone will
have jurisdiction to decide the questions

subject matter of a suit and no other Court.__;’_””‘* « f C’

15. Thus, when these two:’Selct’ions,na«rne’ly Section

2[e) of Arbitration and Conciliation

Section 14 of the Kamataka”‘Civi_l Courts read inil

conjunction it would: ‘meanC”‘””_P”rinc\ipa1 District Judge”
of that particular Distri’ct Principal Civil

Court of orig_;’ina;1r,ijurisdiction”within.tile local limits of its

jurisdiction vl3eiV}e1’*’1titled to decide the

questijons _the”~-«subject matter of Arbitration.
Hence, einto”_.-vvords Principal Civil Court to

‘and ilrieluclepithe Principal Civil Judge [Sr.Dn.]

‘ _WOuic1be’o_tiose for two reasons:

‘ –. Unlike in section 2(0) of 1940. Act where
the word “District” is used same does not

find a place in 1996, Act.

M

21

(b) While reading the exclusion clause in

comparison of two enactments _xnam’ely

1940, Act and 1996, Act the

difference which is ‘to~-be found -is in it

1940 Act only thendiiiiotirtllvof

were excludecl..§Ovl1ereas._ Act ”

any Pi’inc’ipal Civil
Court purpose of
Thus, ‘original jurisdiction in a
District only the Principal
Districtqudge and not the Principal Civil

Judge _(Sr4.”D.n)’»~or other Court having original

gurisdictiovtiiwhichis inferior in grade to such “Principal

‘Civil View of the same question No.2 has to

be’«.he1_’d’ .against the appellant and in favour of the

..respondent by holding execution petition filed before

C “‘._l?’riricipal District Judge, Shimoga was rnaintainable and

C V’ ” “it is to be held that order passed by the executing Court

M

in Ex.No.i’7/2000 dated 16-12-2002 does not _suffer
from any infirmity whatsoever and deser\res’*V.f_o.2″i’.)f3

affirmed.

16. Rezguestion No.4. In ‘.giex%.’r of “discuéfsjo’13:s

made herein above following order oassedf

(i) Appeai is }u1″efebyr _

{ii} Ordéfi-2′ aessed Vv.e2s§ecutin Court in

dgxfiméoi?/éooo;dgui1i£a12~2o02 ksfmreby

_kio’ofir1£12ed.4V”‘~~._ _ –

(iii]x’ 4. ord__ei~ costs.

‘ …..

d».sbb/so?