JUDGMENT
V.S. Aggarwal, J.
1. The present revision petition is directed against the judgment of the Appellate Authority, Sirsa dated 17.4.1982. By virtue of the same, the learned Appellate Authority had set aside the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, Sirsa.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioners had filed an application under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1973 (for short ‘the Act’). The eviction of the respondent was claimed from the suit premises. The grounds of eviction taken up were that the respondent has not paid the arrears of rent from 20.1.1981 at the rate of Rs. 206/- p.m. besides house tax. The respondent is a person of quarrelsome nature and uses foul language. He is a nuisance to the occupants of the building and has impaired the value and utility of the premises by breaking the plaster of the walls. He has made some changes in construction of the building without consent of the petitioners.
3. The learned Rent Controller had issued notice of the eviction application to the respondent for 2.2.1982. However on 16.1.1982 both the parties submitted an application for recording of their statements on basis of the settlement that had been arrived at. The settlement duly signed was produced as Ex. P-1 which recited that the respondent admitted that he will vacate the premises within 2 days and in accordance with the settlement, order of evicition could be passed. As regards the arrears of rent, the factum of the same was admitted. But he stated that he will pay the arrears in six instalments and that he has made material alterations which have impaired the value and utility of the premises. On basis of the said compromise, the learned Rent Controller on 16.1.1982 passed the following order :
“File put up today on the application of the parties. The parties filed a compromise Ex.P1. Their statement to this effect also recorded. In view of the statement of the parties and the compromise filed by the parties, the present suit succeeds and is hereby decreed. The compromise Ex.P1 shall be a part of the Decree sheet. Decree sheet be prepared accordingly and the file be con signed to the record room.”
4. The respondent preferred an appeal. It came up for consideration before the Appellate Authority. The learned Appellate Authority held that satisfaction about the grounds of eviction has not been recorded and, therefore, the impugned order could not be sustained. It was further held that notice had been issued for 2.2.1982 but the file was taken up on 16.1.1982. The terms settled were unconscionable. 15 days time to pay or tender the arrears has not been granted. No structural changes had been mentioned. Thus, it was held that no ground of ejectment was proved. The order passed by the learned Rent Controller was set aside. Aggrieved by the same, the present revision petition has been filed.
5. The matter was listed time and again but none appeared on behalf of the respondent despite the notice. In these circumstances, the Court only had the advantage of hearing the petitioner’s learned course.
6. The first and foremost question that comes up for consideration is whether the learned Rent Controller has not recorded the satisfaction pertaining to the grounds of eviction and the order of eviction would be invalid or not ?
7. At the outset it must be stated that there is no dispute in terms that before any order of eviction could be passed, the learned Rent Controller must be satisfied with respect to the grounds of eviction. If the satisfaction is not there, even a compromise can well be rejected.
8. The Supreme Court in the case of K.K. Chari v. R.M. Seshadri, AIR 1973 SC 1311 had gone into the said question. It was held that before making an order of eviction, the Controller must be satisfied regarding the grounds of eviction. But if the tenant admits that the landlord is entitled to possession on one or other statutory grounds, it is open to the Court to act on that admission and pass an order of eviction. In other words, the learned Rent Controller can act on the admissions and record his satisfaction thereto.
9. A year later in the case of Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Iccharam alias Brijram and Ors., AIR 1974 SC 471 a similar question again had come up for consideration. It was further to be considered as to what is the effect of not recording the satisfaction in the order of eviction that is passed. It was held that if at the time of passing of the decree, there is some material before the Court on which the Court prima facie satisfied with regard to existence of statutory ground, it will be presumed that the Court is satisfied. The precise findings read:-
“From a conspectus of the cases cited at the bar, the principle that emerges is that if at the time of the passing of the decree, there was some material before the Court on the basis of which, the Court could be prima facie satisfied, about the existence of a statutory ground for eviction, it will be presumed that the Court was so satisfied and the decree for eviction apparently passed on the basis of a compromise, would be valid. Such material may take the shape either of evidence recorded or produced in the case, or, it may partly or wholly be in the shape of an express or implied admission made in the compromise agreement, itself. Admission, if true and clear are by far the best proof of the facts admitted. Admission in pleadings or judicial decisions admissible under Section 58, of the Evidence Act, made by the parties or their agents at or before the hearing of the case, stand on a higher footing than evidentiary admissions. The former class of admissions are fully binding on the party that makes them and constitute a waiver or proof, they by themselves can be made the foundation of the rights of the parties. On the other hand, evidentiary admissions which are receivable at the trial as evidence, are by themselves not conclusive. They can be shown to be wrong.”
Identical are the findings of the Supreme Court in the case of Hiralal Moolchand Doshi v. Barot Raman Lal, AIR 1993 SC 1443. On identical terms it was held:-
“An admission by the tenant about the existence of a statutory ground, express or implied, will be sufficient and there need not be any evidence before the Court on the merits of the grounds before the compromise order is passed. If there is an admission of the tenant it will not be open to him to challenge its correctness as the admissions made in judicial proceedings are absolutely binding on the parties. At any rate decree cannot be called a nullity to enable to executing court to go behind it.”
10. Herein the respondent tenant appeared, made a statement and admitted that ground of eviction is available regarding impairing the value and utility of the property and that he would pay the arrears which are due only in six instalments. It cannot there- fore, be termed that the order is without jurisdiction. Even if the Rent Controller did not record his satisfaction, it would be presumed on basis of the admission that he was satisfied when he passed the order of eviction.
11. The learned Appellate Authority had further gone into the fact and recorded that 15 days time from the first date of hearing to tender or pay the rent had not been granted. It is true that it has not been done. But when at the behest of the tenant no objection was raised and he undertook to vacate the premises within two days and that he does not want to tender the payment within 15 days, it becomes unnecessary to adjourn the matter unless it was shown that it was not with the consent of the tenant or that there way any fraud that has been practiced. To that extent, the reasoning of the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained. The other grounds of eviction had been admitted. The order of the Appellate Authority in that backdrop thus cannot be sustained.
12. At this stage, it may be noticed that in the grounds of appeal before the Appellate Authority, some other facts had been pleaded regarding which no opinion has been expressed. It would be appropriate, therefore, that the Appellate Authority may consider any of those pleas.
13. Subject to aforesaid, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned judgment of the Appellant Authority is set aside. The petition be listed-before the Appellate Authority on 1.12.1999. He may consider any of the other pleas that may be raised and pass a fresh order.