JUDGMENT
M.F. Saldanha, J.
1. This appeal represents an almost disastrous state of affairs and is illustrative of a situation in which even after running from pillar to post, the appellant finds himself in the wrong box. The facts themselves will demonstrate the manifest injustice that has been done to the appellant. The appellant is a police constable who is facing a prosecution on alleged charges punishable under Section 498-A, I.P.C. Simultaneously, a decision was taken by the authorities to institute departmental action against him in respect of the same set of facts, namely, the circumstances under which his late wife had died, the appellant approached the Administrative Tribunal with an application where under he had prayed for an order deferring the departmental proceedings until disposal of the criminal case. The contention taken up was that the charges are virtually overlapping, that the witnesses are the same and that if the appellant were to disclose his defense in the disciplinary proceedings, the witnesses would thereafter be forewarned and consequently, serious prejudice may be done to his defense in the Criminal Court. This is an apprehension which is quite understandable in several situations and the appellant, therefore, desired that the proceedings should follow each other, the criminal case having precedence and that the simultaneous conduct of the parallel proceedings should not be permitted. Without examining the merits of the case, since the appellant had placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in the case of Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s. Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. and Others, 1988 II CLR 497 the Tribunal passed a short order to the effect that since in that decision, the appellant had moved the Civil Court for an injunction order for stoppage of the disciplinary proceedings until the criminal case was concluded, that the right forum would be the Civil Court and directed the appellant to approach the Civil Court and pray for appropriate reliefs.
2. The appellant thereupon approached the Trial Court and when his suit came up for interim orders, the learned Government Advocate raised a preliminary objection with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Civil Court. On the basis of the provisions of Sections 15 and 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, it was contended that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in respect of service matters and that consequently, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The learned trial Judge upheld this objection and dismissed the suit upholding that the correct forum was the Administrative Tribunal and not the Civil Court. Out of desperation, the appellant has now approached this Court virtually for a resolution of the question as to which of the two fora is the correct one and where he should go for obtaining appropriate orders. Notice was therefore, issued to the respondents as the matter requires resolution and the departmental enquiry was stayed by an interim order, whereas the criminal trial proceeded.
3. The appellant’s Learned Advocate has drawn my attention to the facts of the aforesaid case and he submits that in this and several other decisions, the Supreme Court has, without laying down any hard and fast rule, observed that it is appropriate that the criminal proceedings should first be concluded and the departmental action taken up thereafter if such action is warranted. He therefore, submits that the law is nor well-settled and that his client is therefore, entitled to a direction to that effect. He also draws the attention of this Court to the fact that in the aforesaid case, the plaintiff had approached the Civil Court for an appropriate injunction order and that the Supreme Court had not disapproved of such a procedure. He therefore, submitted that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and that the appeal be allowed.
4. As far as this aspects of the matter is concerned, one needs to take note of the fact that the petitioner before the Supreme Court had undoubtedly approached the Civil Court in the year 1986, but that when this had happened, there was no exclusion of jurisdiction of the Civil Court by virtue of a special statue such as the Administrative Tribunals Act. That question had never arisen in the proceeding under reference and therefore, the issue will have to be considered de hors that decision.
5. The learned Government Advocate has placed strong reliance on the provisions of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 which clearly specifies that all matters in relation to service disputes are required to be adjudicated upon by the Administrative Tribunal and that consequently, after the Act came into operation on 6-10-1986, that the Tribunal alone is the competent forum to decide all such disputes. He also draws my attention to the provisions of Section 28 of the Act which specifically bars the jurisdiction of Civil Courts and understandably so, since the exclusive jurisdiction in respect of service disputes stands vested in the Administrative Tribunal. Section 29 of the Act provides that even pending proceedings of this nature shall be transferred to the Administrative Tribunals. The learned Government Advocate therefore, submits that the order passed by the learned trial Judge is perfectly correct and that it deserves no interference with.
6. As far as this aspect of the matter is concerned, I need to observe that the appellant’s learned Advocate advanced a subsidiary argument insofar as he contended that this is not a service dispute. He states that this is not by way of appeal or revision against disciplinary orders, that effectively, he is not challenging the institution of the disciplinary proceedings, but that the relief is confined to the correct sequence of proceedings that is required to be observed. The submission is an interesting one because, the appellant’s learned Advocate contends that a service dispute presupposes some conflict in relation to service or a disciplinary proceeding, whereas the relief asked for by him is only in relation to the point of time at which that proceeding should be commenced or proceeded with. There is considerable substance in the submission canvassed by the appellant’s learned Advocate, but I must record that this is virtually a border-line case. It would be difficult to hold that the issue in relation to the correct conduct of a disciplinary proceeding does not come within the ambit of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act because, the section is all pervasive and virtually extends the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunal like an umbrella, over all aspects of such proceedings. To my mind, therefore, the appellant had rightly approached the Tribunal in the first instance and it was an error on the apart of the Tribunal to have referred him to the Civil Court at that point of time. That was a thoughtless order that ought not to have been passed.
7. Having regard to the provisions of Section 15 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, even the question as to the point of time at which the disciplinary proceedings should be taken up and proceeded with and whether they should run parallel to the criminal case or whether they should precede it or follow it, are matters within the province of Section 15 of the Act. To this extent therefore, it was competent for the Tribunal to have entertained the appellant’s application in the first instance. That order is not before this Court and therefore, it is not open to the appellant to ask for any variation of the order passed by the Tribunal. In view of the legal position however, the appellant is also not right in his challenge to the order passed by the learned trail Judge who has rightly upheld the objection regarding lack of jurisdiction of the Civil Court.
8. The last question that remains is as to whether the appellant should be made to suffer for this unfortunate state of affairs. The inherent powers of a Civil Court under Section 151, C.P.C. necessarily require that appropriate orders to further the ends of justice must be passed in proceedings before the Court. This is a case in which the relief asked for is a very transitory one. The appellant had approached the right forum and a consideration of the law on the point indicates that the application made by him ought to have been granted.
9. Under these circumstances, to my mind, only fair and correct order that this Court can pass is that even though the present appeal would fail and stands dismissed, the interim orders passed in this appeal should continue until disposal of the criminal trial.
10. With these directions, the appeal to stand disposed of. In the circumstances of the case, there would be no order as to costs.