JUDGMENT
1. Being aggrieved by order dated February 19, 1991 passed by the Industrial Court, Nagpur, dismissing their complaint as not tenable on the ground of misjoinder of causes of actions, this petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
2. The petitioners have been working with the respondent Corporation and according to them, they were entitled to certain benefits on account of their continuous working in their respective posts for more than 180 days. There is no dispute that there has been a settlement on April 25, 1956 and under Clause 49 of the said settlement, the employees of the Corporation who have completed 180 days, were entitled for certain benefits mentioned therein. There is no dispute that Clause 49 of the said settlement is applicable to the case of the present petitioners.
3. The petitioners filed joint complaint before the Industrial Court for a declaration that the respondent-Corporation has engaged in unfair labour practices under Item No. 9 of Schedule-IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short “the Act”), as according to them, the respondent-Corporation committed breach of Clause 49 of the said settlement and failed to appoint the petitioners on time scale from the date they completed 180 days of continuous service on daily wages. The petitioners, further prayed for an order directing the respondent-Corporation to implement Clause 49 of the said settlement and grant all the benefits to the petitioners to which they were entitled under the said settlement.
4. The respondent-Corporation by their separate application (Ex. 11) took a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the joint complaint filed by the petitioners before the Industrial Court. It may be stated that the Industrial Court, however, did not proceed with the preliminary contention and therefore, the respondent-Corporation filed its written statement (Ex. 13) and the Industrial Court then proceeded to decided the matter not only on merit but also on preliminary point. The Industrial Court in its impugned order found that :
“The complaints have, therefore, proved that they have worked for 180 days continuously as alleged by them. I, therefore, hold that the complainants deserve to be given the time scale immediately after they had completed 180 days of continuous service.”
Therefore, the Industrial Court observed in the Judgment that-
“Therefore, I would like to advise the respondent to give time scale to the complaints from the date they had completed 180 days of their continuous service and as shown in Column 6 of the Schedule filed along with the complaint.”
The Industrial Court, however, was of the view that the joint complaint is not maintainable because of misjoinder of cause of action and, therefore, declined to grant the relief to the petitioners.
5. The question arises, as to whether a joint complaint filed by the petitioners was maintainable or not. Shri Trivedi, the learned counsel for the petitioners, urged that there is no provision under the Act whereby filing of joint complaint before the Industrial Court is prohibited. It has been submitted that though provisions of Code of Civil Procedure is not applicable to the proceeding before the Industrial Court arising out of the Provision of the Act, the general principles as contained in Order 1, Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure would be applicable and in that event, the learned counsel submitted that the joint complaint was maintainable, Shri Wankhede, for the respondent Corporation, on the other hand, pointed out that under Section 21 of the Act, a procedure is prescribed relating to proceedings of such nature. Proviso to Section 21 is relied on to show that where there is no recognised union to appear, the employee may himself appear or act in any proceeding relating to any such unfair labour practices. It is therefore, pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, that the law contemplates that there should be a complaint from individual employee or through union and as such joint employees have no right to appear or act in proceedings relating to certain unfair labour practices.
6. One of the objects in enacting the Act is to define and provide for the prevention of certain unfair labour practices by the employer. Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Recognition of Unions’ and Chapter IV deals with “Obligation and Rights of Recognised Unions, Other Unions and Certain Employees”. Section 21 of the Act, which is under Chapter IV, no doubt provides that no employee in an undertaking to which the provisions of the Central Act for the time being apply, shall be allowed to appear or act or allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to unfair labour practices specified in terms 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the Act except through the recognised union; provided that where there is no recognised union to appear, the employee may himself appear or act in any proceeding relating to any such unfair labour practices. Similarly, sub-section (2) of Section 21 of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Act, no employee in any industry to which the provisions of the Bombay Act, for the time being apply, shall be allowed to appear or act or allowed to be represented in any proceeding relating to unfair labour practices specified in items 2 and 6 of Schedule IV of the Act except through the representative of employees entitled to appear under Section 30 of the Bombay act.
7. It would be clear that Section 21 does not include Item 9 of Schedule IV of the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that under proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 21 of the Act, only the employee and not the employees jointly can appear or act in any such proceedings relating to unfair labor practices. The learned counsel, however, tried to contend that cause of action has arisen on different dates and therefore separate complaints were necessary from each of the employees. That contention is also devoid of any force because the general rule is that joinder of parties or joinder of causes of actions are discretionary in the sense that, if they are joined, there is no absolute right to have struck out, but it is discretionary for the Court to do so if it thinks fit.
Apart from that in an industrial dispute of collective nature the employees can be joined together as complaints before the Industrial Court where the relief claimed by them is common besides the cause of action.
The learned counsel for the respondent no doubt has urged that completion of 180 days not common in case of these petitioners and as such there would be different causes of actions.
8. This contention has also no merit. The substantial relief asked for is to implement the settlement. It is not the case that on account of different dates of completion of 180 days, the causes of action would be so distinct that it is not convenient to dispose of the complaints in one trial. Therefore, the principle underlying Order 1, Rule 1, Code of Civil Procedure could apply in the instant case. Order I Rule 1 reads as under :
“1. All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where-
(a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of the same act or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and
(d) If such person brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise.”
As discussed above, all the aforesaid essentials are present in this case. Therefore, the view taken by the Industrial Court cannot be said to be correct, in law. The petitioners claimed relief in respect of Clause 49 of the Settlement and there is also a common question of law and facts. The different dates of completion of 180 days would not be matter touching the cause of action. The objections raised on behalf of the respondent to the maintainability of joint complaint filed by the petitioners before the Industrial Court was untenable and the Industrial Court has committed an error in upholding that objection.
The result, therefore, is that impugned order will have to be quashed and set aside.
9. The petition is, therefore allowed. The impugned order is quashed and set aside. The joint complaint filed by the petitioners is hereby granted and the respondent-Corporation is directed to give to the petitioners the time scale on the dates each of the petitioners completed 180 days of continuous service, as shown by them in Column 6 of the Schedule annexed to the complaint, within a period of two months from today.
10. The rule is accordingly made absolute. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.