JUDGMENT
S.S. Sudhalkar, J.
1. By this writ petition, the employer is challenging the award of the Labour Court dated 7.6.2000, copy Annexure P/5, vide which the Labour Court has ordered reinstatement of respondent No. 2 along with continuity of service and other consequential benefits but without back wages.
2. The case of the workman was that he was appointed as Helper on daily wages in the office of Landscape CCS of the petitioner-University on 25.3.1994. He worked as such upto 30.9.1994. He was again engaged on 17.10.1994 in the department of Animal Nutrition of the petitioner, where he worked upto 17.5.1995 when his services were terminated. He also contended that his juniors were retained.
3. The petitioner took up a stand that respondent No. 2 cannot be said to have worked for 240 days in a year because he had worked in two different departments of the petitioner-University. This stand of the petitioner was not accepted by the Labour Court and hence this writ petition.
4. After hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, we find that this writ petition is without merit.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the services in two different departments cannot be clubbed together. He has relied on the case of Sarva-janik Nirman Mazdoor Sangh, Bhilwara and others v. The Judge, Labour Court, Udaipur and another, reported as 1995(2) SCT 900 (Rajasthan) ; 1995 Lab. I.C. 2012. It has been held therein by the Rajasthan, High Court that period of employment under different units cannot be clubbed together for calculating 240 days.
6. Here, in this case, the position is different. Counsel ASr the petitioner has also relied on the affidavit of respondent No. 2, copy of which has been produced at Annexure P/2. The said affidavit is dated 20.10.1994, in which respondent No. 2 has stated that he has not completed 240 days of service in the petitioner-University as DPL Helper and he has not served in any de-
partment of the University earlier which may entitle him to complete 240 days. The important thing to be noted is that respondent No. 2 was re-engaged as above on 17.10.94 and the affidavit is dated 20.10.94 i.e. subsequent to the re-engagement. That means that at the time when respondent No. 2joined, the petitioner was not in doubt as to whether respondent was employed earlier or not but this affidavit is a clear device to deny continuity of service lo respondent No. 2 and taken after his re-employment. Moreover, in (he reply to the claim statement, copy of which has been produced as Annexure P/4, the objection of clubbing of service in two departments is not taken and it is not stated that the earlier service was not known to the petitioner. Moreover, relying on the affidavit, it has been stated that on 20.10.94, respondent No. 2 submitted an affidavit that he will not claim benefit if he is re-engaged. This clearly shows that the affidavit has been taken to completely wipe-out the earlier service and the affidavit and the above mentioned reply together show that the petitioner was knowing of the earlier service of respondent No. 2, when he was re-appointed.
7. In view of the above reasons, we find that the judgment cited by learned counsel for the petitioner does not apply to the facts of the present case. On the contrary, it is clear that the petitioner was knowing at the time of second employment regarding the first employment and the device has been worked out to deny benefits to respondent No. 2. This cannot be termed as legal.
In view of the above reasons, we do not find any merit in this writ petition and is hereby dismissed.
8. Petition dismissed.