ORDER
Amareshwar Sahay, J.
1. Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner, a constable in Bihar Military Police, was proceeded departmentally for the following charges :
“(i) That while on deputation to D.A.V. School, Hazaribagh on 8.5.1996 at 19.45 Hrs. he abused and pushed down constable 104 Fuleshwar Mandal.
(ii) That the same night while constable 104 Fuleshwar Mandal was asleep he assaulted him on his chest by his boots with the result that constable Mandal had to be shifted to hospital by the Sargent Major, Hazaribagh for first aid. As the paid of constable Mandal continued next day also he was admitted in the Hospital and was discharged on 13.5.1996 A gist of his incident was recorded in station diary No. 290/96; dated 9.5.1996 of Sadar Police Station.”
3. After conclusion of the departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer submitted his report as contained in Annexure-2 whereby he gave benefit of doubt to the petitioner.
4. The Disciplinary Authority after considering the entire materials as well as the report of the enquiry officer disagreed with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and held that the charges against the petitioner were established. Thereafter, a notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner, as to why he should not be dismissed from the service. The petitioner submitted his show cause, and, therefore, the Commandant, Bihar Military Police-3, Govindpur, Dhanbad-cum-the Disciplinary Authority after holding that the charges had been proved and then after finding the charges to be very serious in nature he passed an order for dismissal of the petitioner from service vide order dated 7.4.1998 (Annexure-4).
5. The petitioner, thereafter, filed an appeal before the appellate authority, who vide his reasoned order also held that the charges against the petitioner were established but, so far as the punishment was concerned, however, he reduced the same from dismissal from service to compulsory retirement of the petitioner vide order dated 3.11.1998 (Annexure-5).
6. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted memorial to the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar, which was also rejected vide order dated 25.11.1999 contained in Annexure-7 to the writ application.
7. The petitioner, in this writ application, has challenged the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority contained in Annexure- 4, the order passed by the appellate authority dated 7.11.1998 and the order dated 25.11,1999 passed by the Director General- cum-Inspector General of Police, Bihar (Annexure-7).
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned orders contained in Annexures, 4, 5 and 7 are illegal, arbitrary and against the principle of nature justice and, therefore, the same are liable to be quashed. Elaborating his argument the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that when the Enquiry Officer did not find that the charges were; proved against the petitioner then it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to assign reasons for disagreeing with the report of the Enquiry Officer but no any reason has been assigned and, therefore, the order passed by him was illegal. In support of his submission the learned counsel to the petitioner has relied on a decision in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in 1993 (4) SCC 727.
9. It is further submitted on behalf of the petitioner that no notice to show cause was issued to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority before imposing punishment and, therefore, the petitioner was denied reasonable opportunity to explain and as such, the order as contained in Annexure 4 was against the principle of natural justice/therefore, the same is liable to be quashed. Similarly, the orders passed by the appellate authority as well as by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police were also bad in law since they did not consider the points raised by the petitioner.
10. There is not dispute with regard to the law that when the disciplinary authority disagrees with the findings of the enquiry officer then he has to assigned reason for the same. The law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors., (supra) is well established.
11. To test the submission, made on behalf of the petitioner, I have carefully gone through the order passed by the disciplinary authority as contained in Annexure-4. It is relevant and important to note that before passing order of punishment as contained in Annexure-4, the disciplinary authority fully considered the enquiry report and then after examining the material on record, including the statement of the witnesses held that the charges against the petitioner were established by assigning reasons that Baidyanath Prasad Gupta had stated that he had seen the constable Fuleshwar Mandal screaming in great pains and he took him to the hospital for treatment and he specifically stated that the petitioner assaulted the constable Fuleshwar Mandal which he had fallen down.
12. The disciplinary authority after the aforesaid findings, issued notice to show cause to the petitioner as to why he should not be dismissed from the service by his letter dated 11.3.1998 contained in Aunexure-3 to the writ application. Therefore, it is apparent that before issuance of Annexure-4, imposing punishment, against the petitioner on 7.4.1998, the petitioner was given a chance to show cause and in the said show cause notice the reason for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry report was clearly mentioned. Therefore, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that no reason was assigned by the disciplinary authority for disagreeing with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and further that he was not granted reasonable opportunity before imposing punishment is devoid of any merit and, as such, the same is rejected.
13. The disciplinary authority has very carefully considered the materials on the record then had come to a definite finding of fact holding the petitioner guilty. Therefore, I do not find any illegality of any kind in the order of the Disciplinary Authority. So far as the order passed by the appellate authority contained in Annexure-5 is concerned it appears that the appellate authority also after considering the materials of record has held that the disciplinary authority has rightly held that the charges were proved against the petitioner. However, the appellate authority took a lenient view and converted the punishment of dismissal from service by reducing it to the compulsory retirement of the petitioner.
14. The order as contained in Annexure-7 passed by the Director General of Police is also a well reasoned order and he has accepted the findings of facts arrived at by the disciplinary authority as well as by the appellate authority and thereby rejected the petition of the petitioner.
15. Therefore, the decision of the Supreme Court is on no help to the petitioner, because of the fact that in the present case the disciplinary authority has assigned reasons for disagreeing with the findings of the enquiry officer and the same was communicated to the petitioner by issuing show cause notice as contained in Annexure-3 to the present writ application. Therefore, I find that the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not correct in that regard.
16. It is also well settled that the High Court under the powers of judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution cannot substitute its own findings on facts contrary to the findings arrived at by the Disciplinary Authority. Nothing has been pointed on behalf of the petitioner that any of findings on facts arrived at by the disciplinary authority was not against the materials on record, therefore, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order was contained in Annexures-4, 5 and 7. Accordingly, this application is dismissed.