JUDGMENT
C.K. Thakker, J.
1. This appeal is filed against judgment and order dated February 15, 1991 passed in Special Civil Application No. 8885 of 1990.
2. The respondents were original petitioners. They filed the above petition for an appropriate writ, direction and/or order directing the respondent (present appellant) to consider the application filed by the petitioners for allotment of land under Section 23 of the Urban Land (Ceiling & Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) to the petitioners. Interim prayer was also made not to dispose of the land to the extent of 596 sq. mts. from Survey No. 189/D corresponding to final Plot No. 223.
3. It was the case of the petitioners that they held land bearing old Survey No. 189-B of Town Planning Scheme No. 14 admeasuring 5,220.04 sq. mts. of Dariapur-Kazipur, Ahmedabad. Since the land held by the petitioners was in excess of land permitted to be held under the provisions of the Act, they filled in Form No. 1. It was scrutinised by the Competent Authority and the Competent Authority & Additional Collector, Ahmedabad, declared 596 sq. mts. as excess land under the Act. The petitioners, therefore, preferred an appeal before the Urban Land Ceiling Tribunal, which came to be dismissed and the order passed by the Competent Authority was confirmed.
4. According to the petitioners that it is the policy of the State Government to dispose of excess land to its original owners at the market price, if such a prayer is made. The petitioners, therefore, made an application under Section 23 of the Act so that the land may be granted to them. Though said application was made on November 28, 1990, it was not decided for some time. Hence, they filed the above petition. The learned single Judge, after hearing the parties, directed the respondent to consider the application dated November 28, 1990 for allotment of land to the petitioners under Section 23 of the Act and to take a decision within six weeks after hearing the petitioners. The petition thus came to be allowed. It is this order which is challenged in this Letters Patent Appeal by the State.
5. Mr. P.G. Desai, learned Government Pleader raised various contentions. He submitted that the learned single Judge ought not to have issued direction when an application was made by the petitioners only on November 28, 1990. The petition was filed in December 1990 and in the middle of February 1991, Rule was made absolute by issuing direction. He submitted that the allotment of the land under Section 23 would require certain procedure to be followed. Necessary facts were to be collected by the authorities. Opinions of various Departments to be taken into account for the purpose of grant of land as also regarding fixation of rates and if the authorities are satisfied such prayer can be granted and it is not the right of the party to get the land. When the application of the petitioners was not still scrutinised and decided against them, no direction could have been issued.
6. Serious grievance was also made by the learned Government Pleader against that part of the judgment and order by which the learned single Judge has directed the State to dispose of the application within a period of six weeks and that too after hearing the petitioners. It was submitted that when there was no legal right to get the land and various factors are to be considered, it was not appropriate on the part of the learned single Judge to direct the authorities to decide application within a stipulated period. In any case, there was no question to observe principles of natural justice and the learned single Judge could not have ordered the State to afford hearing to the petitioner. On all these grounds, the appeal deserves to be allowed and the order passed by the learned single Judge deserves to be quashed and set aside.
7. Mr. J.M. Patel, Learned Counsel for the original petitioners, on the other hand, supported judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge. He submitted that as per the policy decision of the Government, such an application was maintainable and as the application was not disposed of, they approached This Court and the learned single Judge has issued a direction and no objection can be raised by the appellant against such direction.
8. Regarding time, the Learned Counsel submitted that in view of the fact that it pertained to disposal of land, time-limit was fixed by the learned single Judge. Regarding opportunity of hearing, he submitted that there was nothing wrong in issuing such direction and no prejudice was caused to the appellant.
9. In the facts and circumstances of the case, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be partly allowed by modifying the order passed by the learned single Judge.
10. It is not disputed by and between the parties that in accordance with the provisions of the Act, the land was declared as surplus. So far as that part of the order is concerned, it has become final and cannot now be challenged or reopened. It is not disputed by the State that in such cases, a person can make an application for grant of land under Section 23 of the Act. An application for that purpose was made by the petitioners.
11. The only question before the learned single Judge as well as before us is as to whether a direction could have been issued by the learned single Judge to dispose of the application within a stipulated period and to decide the same after hearing the petitioners.
12. In our opinion, the contention raised by the Government Pleader is well founded and must be upheld, that in such cases, the principles of natural justice cannot be imported. The action declaring land as surplus and vesting of such land in the State is statutory and the owner of a land cannot be said to have been deprived of property contrary to law. Such land, therefore, got vested in the Government and the owner had no right to claim back the said land. Hence, when an application under Section 23 was made, it was not necessary for the Government to extend the opportunity of hearing or to comply with the principles of natural justice. To that extent, therefore, the order passed by the learned single Judge is required to be quashed and set aside.
13. Prima facie, the learned Government Pleader is also right in submitting that though there was no undue delay on the part of the State in not deciding the application and direction by the learned single Judge to dispose of the application within a stipulated period was, therefore, not proper. As is clear from the record, an application was made by the petitioners on November 28, 1990 and within a period of one month, a petition was filed in December 1990. As stated by Mr. Desai, before taking a decision on an application under Section 23, necessary procedure was required to be followed. It would take some time. The petitioner ought to have waited and if within reasonable time, the authority had not disposed of such application, they could have approached the Court.
14. In the facts and circumstances, however, when the petitioners had approached This Court and the learned single Judge has directed the authorities to dispose of such application, and that more than seven years have passed thereafter, we would not interfere with that part of the order except by granting more time.
15. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that the appeal deserves to be partly allowed and is accordingly allowed to the extent by which the learned single Judge has directed the authorities to decide the application of the petitioners after extending opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. That part of the order in our judgment was not in consonance with law and, hence, it is set aside.
16. It is directed that the authorities will decide the application filed by the petitioners and will pass appropriate order in accordance with law on its own merits, without being influenced by the observations made by the learned single Judge or by us in this judgment. Such application will be decided as expeditiously as possible preferably within three months from the receipt of the writ.
17. The appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. In the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.