PETITIONER: M/S. KRISHNAMURTHI & CO. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADRAS & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT05/09/1972 BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ BENCH: KHANNA, HANS RAJ HEGDE, K.S. REDDY, P. JAGANMOHAN CITATION: 1972 AIR 2455 1973 SCR (2) 54 CITATOR INFO : MV 1985 SC 421 (77) R 1986 SC 662 (49) ACT: Madras General Sales Tax (Third Amendment) Act, 1967 Entry 47 and 47-A of the First Schedule-Whether invalid as they seek to impose Sales Tax with retrospective effect. HEADNOTE: Under Entry 47 of the First Schedule of the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959, the sale of 'lubricating oil and greases' was liable to sales tax at the point of first sale in the State at 6 per cent. With effect from April 1, 1964, Entry 47 was amended and instead of the words "lubricating oils and greases;" "lubricating oils, all kinds of mineral oils (not otherwise provided for in this Act) quencing oils and greases," were included. Till September 30, 1965, the assessments were made on the assumption that the amendment of entry 47 had made no difference to sale of furnace oil. The dealers paid and collected the tax on that basis and the department accepted it. Thereafter, according to a resolution of the Board of Revenue, the dealers started charging tax on furnace oil from September 14, 1965 at the rate of 6 per cent although furnace oil was a non-lubricating mineral oil, and the assessment orders were made accordingly. The view expressed by the Board of Revenue that entry 47 as amended included furnace oil was challenged before the High Court by a writ and the High Court held that entry 47 as amended did not include furnace oil. Appeal against the said judgment is pending before the Supreme Court. Thereafter, Madras General Sales Tax Act was a.-lain amended (Third Amendment) by which all kinds of mineral oils including furnace oil were included in entry 47 and Sales Tax would be payable during the period from April 1, 1964 to November 30, 1965 at the rate of 6% and the rate from December 1, 1965 to June 17, 1967, had been fixed at 61% and with effect from June 18, 1967, the rate had been fixed at 7 per cent and Sec. 4 validated all taxes) levied and collected before the passing of the amending Act and no suit lay for the refund of any tax paid or collected. The appellants who are dealers in mineral oils including furnace oils filed writ petitions challenging the retrospective imposition of a single point tax on furnace oil and other non-lubricating oils for the period prior to January 5, 1968, as violative of Art. 14 and 19 of the Constitution. The High Court, however, dismissed the writ petitions. Dismissing the appeals, HELD : (i) The legislative power conferred on the appropriate legislatures to enact laws in respect of topics covered by the several entries in the three lists can be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. The legislative power, in addition, includes the subsidiary or auxiliary power to validate laws which have been found to be invalid. if a law passed by a legislature is struck down by the Court as being invalid for one infirmity or another, it would be competent to the appropriate legislature 55 to cure the said infirmity and pass a validating law so as to make the provisions of the said earlier law effective from the date when it was passed. [59B] Rai Ramkrishna & Ors. v. The State of Bihar, [1964]; S.C.R. 897, referred to. (ii) In the present, case, the amending Act was intended to cure an infirmity as revealed by the judgment of the Madras High Court and to validate the past levy and collection of tax in respect of all kinds of non-lubricating mineral oils, including furnace oils, with effect from April 1, 1964. For this purpose, the legislature split the original entry 47 into two entries 47 and 47-A whereby, the sale of all kinds of mineral oils were made liable to tax. it is axiomatic that the Government needs revenue to carry on the administration and fulfil its obligation to the citizens. Further amending and validating Act to make "small repairs" is a permissible mode of legislation and is frequently resorted to in fiscal enactments. [61B] Therefore, the impugned provisions of the Amending Act are a valid piece of legislation and do not contravene Art. 19 of the Constitution. Enari Chinna Krishana Moorthy v. State of Orissa [1964] 7 S.C.R. 185; M/s. J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of U.P. and Anr. [1962] 2 S.C.R. 1; The Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra, [1954] S.C.R. 451; Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd., v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. [1966] 1 S.C.R. 523, referred to. JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 471-474 of
1969.
Appeals by certificate from the judgment and order, dated
September 27, 1968 of the Madras High Court in Writ
Petitions Nos. 283 to 286 of 1968.
M. C. Setalvad, Ravinder Narain, A. K. Verma, J. B. Dada-
kanji and O. C. Mathur, for the appellants.
S. T. Desai, A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the
respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KHANNA, J.-This judgment would dispose of four civil appeals
No. 471 to 474 of 1969 which have been filed on certificate
granted by the Madras High Court and are directed against
the, common judgment of that court, whereby petitions under
article 226 of the Constitution of India filed by the
appellants were dismissed. The crucial question which
arises for determination in these appeals is whether the
provisions of Madras General Sales Tax (Third Amendment)
Act, 1967 (Act No. 19 of 1967) are invalid on the ground
that they seek to impose sales tax with retrospective effect
in an unreasonable manner.
According to entry 47 of First Schedule to the Madras
General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Madras Act 1 of 1959)
(hereinafter referred to as the principal Act), the sale of
“lubricating oils and
56
greases” was liable to sales tax at the point of first sale
in the State at 6 per cent. With effect from April 1, 1964
entry 47 was amended by Madras Act 7 of 1964 and instead of
the words “lubricating oils and greases” in that entry, the
following words were substituted
“Lubricating oils, all kinds of mineral oils
(not otherwise provided for in this Act)
quenching oils and greases”
Till September 30, 1965, it is stated, the assessments were
made on the assumption that the amendment of entry 47 had
made no difference to sales of furnace oil and they were
liable to multipoint tax at 2 per cent. The dealers paid
and collected tax on that basis and the department accepted
it. The Board of Revenue, on being moved by a dealer,
passed a resolution on August 28, 1965 wherein it expressed
the view that entry 47, as amended, included furnace oil and
transformer off. The dealers thereafter from September 14,
1965 started charging tax on furnace oils at the rate of 6
per cent on the first sale of those oils and the assessment
orders were made accordingly. Furnace oil, it may be
stated, is a non-lubricating mineral oil. The view
expressed by the Board of Revenue that entry 47 as amended
included furnace oil was challenged in a writ petition
before the Madras High Court. The High Court gave its
decision on August 2, 1967. The title of the case is
Burmah Shell Oil Storage and Distributing Company of India
Limited, Madras 1 and Others v. The State of Madras, and it
is reported in (1968) 21 S.T.C. 227. The High Court held
that having regard to the objects and reasons appended to
Madras Act 7 of 1964 and the association of words which
preceded and followed the words “all kinds of mineral oils”,
the words “,III kinds of mineral oils” had only a limited
meaning, namely, mineral oils which were lubricants. Entry
47 as amended was, therefore, held not to include furnace
oil. Appeal against the said judgment, we have been told,
is pending in this Court.
The above decision of the Madras High Court led to the en-
actment of the Madras General Sales Tax (Third Amendment)
Act, 1947 (Act No. 19 of 1967) (hereinafter referred to as
the amending Act). The amending Act received the assent of
the Governor on December 29, 1967 and was published in the
Fort St. George Gazette, Extraordinary on January 5, 1968.
Section 2 of the amending Act has recast entry 47 in the
First Schedule to the principal Act and has also inserted a
new entry 47-A. Section 2 reads as under
“2. Amendment of First Schedule to Madras Act
1 of 1959.-In the First Schedule to the Madras
General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Madras Act 1 of
1959) (hereinafter referred to as the
principal Act),-
57
a) during the period commencing on the 1st
April 1964 and ending with the 30th November
1965, for item 47 and the entries relating
thereto, the following shall be deemed to have
been substituted, namely :-
"47 Lubricating oils (not otherwise provided for inDo 6 this Act), quenching oils and greases.
47-A All kinds of mineral oils (other than those
failingDo 6″; under item 47 and not
otherwise provided for in this Act),
including furnace oil.
(b) during the period commencing on the 1st December
1965 and ending with the 17th June 1967, for item 47 and the
entries relating thereto, the following shall be deemed to
have been substituted, namely :-
“47 Lubricating oils (not otherwise provided for in Do 61/
2 this
Act), quenching oils and greases.
47-A All kinds of mineral oils (other than those
falling Do 6 1/2″; under item 47 and
not otherwise provided for in this Act),
including furnace oil.
(c) with effect on and from the 18th June1967, for
item 47 and the entries relating thereto, the
following shall be deemed to have been
substituted, namely :-
“47 Lubricating oils (not otherwise provided for Do 7
in this Act), quenching oils and greases.
47-A All kinds of mineral oils (other than those
falling Do 7”. under item 47 and not otherwise
provided for in this Act), including
furnace oil.
It would thus appear that according to the amendment the
sales tax would be payable during the period from April 1,
1964 to, November 30, 1965 on items mentioned in entries 47
and 47-A at the rate of 6 per cent. The rate for the period
from December 1, 1965, to June 17, 1967 has been fixed at
61/2 per cent and with effect from June 18, 1967 the rate
has been fixed at 7 per cent. Section 4 of the amending Act
is the validating section and reads as under :
“4. Validation.-Notwithstanding anything con-
tained in. any judgment, decree or order of
any court or other authority, all taxes levied
or collected or purporting to have been levied
or collected under the principal Act on the
sale of the goods specified, in item 47-A of
the First Schedule to the principal Act as
amended by this Act for the period commencing
on the 1st April 1964 and ending with the date
of the publication of this Act in the Fort St.
George Gazette shall for all purposes be
deemed to be, and to have always been validly
levied or collected in accordance with law as
it section 2 had
58
been in force at all material times when such
tax was levied or collected and accordingly,-
(a) all acts, proceedings or things done or
taken by any authority, officer or person in
connection with the levy or collection of such
tax shall, for all purposes, be deemed to be
and to have always been done or taken in
accordance with law;
(b) no suit or other proceeding shall be
maintained or continued in any court for the
refund of any tax so paid;
(c) no court shall enforce any decree or
order directing the refund of any tax so
paid.”
The appellants, who are dealers in mineral oils including
furnace oils, filed writ petitions in the High Court to
challenge the validity of the amending Act. It was
contended on their behalf that retrospective imposition of a
single point tax on furnace oil and other non-lubricating
oils for the period prior to January 5, 1968 was illegal
inasmuch as it violated articles 14 and 19 of the
Constitution. This contention of the appellants was
repelled by the High Court and their writ petitions, as
mentioned earlier, were dismissed.
Mr. Setalvad in appeal before us has assailed the validity
of the provisions of sections 2 and 4 of the amending Act on
the ground that the retrospective operation of those
provisions is violative of article 19 (1 ) (g) of the
Constitution inasmuch as it constitutes unreasonable
restriction on the right of the appellants to carry on their
trade and business. As against that Mr. Desai on behalf of
the respondents contends that there has been no unreasonable
restriction on the exercise of the right of the appellants
and the impugned provisions cannot be struck down on the
ground that the legislature has given retrospective
operation to those provisions. In our opinion, the
contention of Mr. Desai is well founded.
We may at the outset state that though the legislature can
pass a law and make its provisions retrospective, it would
be relevant to consider the effect of the said retrospective
operation of the law both ‘in respect of the legislative
competence of the legislature and the reasonableness of the
restriction imposed by it. It would thus be open to a party
affected by the provisions of an Act to contend that the
retrospective operation of the Act so completely alters the
character of the tax imposed by it as to take out outside
the limits of the entry which gives the legislature
competence to enact the law or it may be open to the party
to contend in the alternative that the restrictions imposed
by the Act are so unreasonable
59
that they should be struck down on the ground that they con-
travene the fundamental rights granted under article 19 ( 1
) (f and (g) of the Constitution. At the same time, we have
to bear ‘ in mind that the legislative power conferred on
the appropriate legislatures to enact laws in respect of
topics covered by the several entries in the three lists can
be exercised both prospectively and retrospectively. Where
the legislature can make a valid law, it may provide not
only for the prospective operation of the material
provisions of the said law, it can also provide for the
retrospective operation of the said provisions. The
legislative power, in addition, includes the subsidiary or
auxiliary power to validate laws which have been found to be
invalid. If a law passed by a legislature is Struck down by
the court as being invalid for one infirmity or another, it
would be competent to the appropriate legislature to cure
the said infirmity and pass a validating law so as to make
the provisions of the said earlier law effective from the
date when it was passed lsee Ramakrishna & Others v. The
State ofBihar (2) .
In the light of what has been stated above, we can find no
legal infirmity in the provisions of the amending Act. As a
result of the amendment made by Madras Act 7 of 1964 in
entry 47 of the First Schedule to the principal Act, sales
tax, it appears, was intended to be levied on all kinds of
mineral oils. The Madras High Court, however’, took the
view in the case of Burmah Shell Oil Storage and
Distributing Company of India Limited (supra) that the words
“at kinds of mineral oils” took colour from the words which
preceded and followed them and, as such, the mineral oils
mentioned in the entry had a limited meaning, namely,
mineral oils which were lubricants. Entry 47 was,
therefore, held not to include furnace oil which was a non-
lubricant mineral oil. It was with a view to get over the
effect of that decision and to prevent the refund of sales
tax already realised on the assumption that the words “all
kinds of mineral oils” also covered mineral oils of non-
lubricating nature that the amending Act was passed. It
would ‘be pertinent in this context to reproduce the
statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Madras
General Sales Tax (‘Third Amendment) Bill, 1967 as under:
“In Tax Case Nos. 108 to 110 of 1967 the
Madras High Court held that the
expression “all kinds of mineral oils (,not
otherwise provided for in this Act)” occurring
in entry 47 of the First Schedule to the
Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (Madras Act
1 of 1959) as amended by the Madras General
Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 1964 (Madras Act 7
of 1964) will cover only such of the mineral
oils as are lubricants
(1) [1964] 1 S.C.R. 897.
6 0
and not furnace oil, etc., which are not
lubricants. It is, therefore, proposed to
make a separate entry in the First Schedule to
the Act so as. to cover all kinds of mineral
oils (other than those falling under entry 47
and not otherwise provided for in the Act),
including furnace oil the rate being the same
as for entry 47 and to validate the past levy
and collection of +ax in respect of all kinds
of mineral oils (other than lubricating oils,
quenching oils and greases) including furnace
oil with effect from the 1st April, 1964.
Existing entry 47 is also proposed to be
amended to cover only lubricating oils (not
otherwise provided for in the Act), quenching
oils and greases.”
It would thus appear that the amending Act was intended to
cure an infirmity as revealed by the judgment of the High
Court and to validate the past levy and collection of tax in
respect of all kinds of non-lubricating mineral oils,
including furnace oils, with effect from April 1, 1964. The
legislature for-this purpose split the original entry 47
into two entries, 47 and 47-A. The new entry 47 related to
lubricating oils (not otherwise provided for in the Act),
quenching oils and greases, while entry 47-A covered all
kinds of mineral oils (other than those falling under item
47 and not otherwise provided for in the Act) including
furnace oil. The tax levied by entry 47-A, in our opinion,
was not a fresh tax. It seems, as mentioned earlier, that
the legislature had intended as a result of the change made
in entry 47 by Act 7 of 1964 to levy tax on sale of mineral
oils of all kinds, including non-lubricants, at the rate
mentioned in that entry. As the language used by the
legislature in that entry was found by the High Court to be
not appropriate for levying tax on sale of non-lubricant
mineral oils, the amending Act was passed by the legislature
to rectify and remove the defect in the language found by
the High Court, so that the tax on sale of non-lubricant
mineral oils might be levied at the rate specified in entry
47 from April 1, 1964 when Act 7 of 1964 came into force.
It is axiomatic that the Government needs revenue to carry
on the administration and fulfil its obligation to the
ctizens. For that purpose it resorts to taxation. The
total amount needed is a apportioned under different heads.
The fiscal enactments brought on the statute book in that
connection are sometimes challenged by the tax payer in
courts of law. The courts then scrutinise the legal
provision to decide whether the levy of tax is legally valid
or suffers from some infirmity. In case the court conics to
the conclusion that the levy of tax is not valid as the
legal provision enacted for this purpose does not warrant
the levy of tax imposed because of some defect in
phraseology or other infirmity. the
61
legislature quite often passes an amending and validating
Act. The object of such an enactment is to remove and
rectify the defect in phraseology or lacuna of other nature
and also to validate the proceedings, including realisation
of tax, which have taken place in pursuance of the earlier
enactment which has been found by the Court to be vitiated
by an, infirmity. Such an amending and validating Act in
the very nature of things has a retrospective operation.
Its aim is to effectuate and carry out the object for which
the earlier principal Act had been enacted. Such an
amending and validating Act to make “small a permissible
mode of legislation and is frequently resorted to in fiscal
enactments. As observed in 73 Harvard Law Review 692 at p.
705 :
“It is necessary that the legislature should
be able to cure inadvertent defects in
statutes or their administration by making
what has been aptly called ‘small repairs’
Moreover, the individual who claims that a
vested right has arisen from the defect is
seeking a windfall since had the legislature’s
or administrator’s action had the effect it
was intended to and could have had, no such
right would have arisen. Thus, the interest
in the retroactive during of such a defect in
the administration of government outweighs the
individual’s interest in benefiting from the
defect. The Court has been extremely
reluctant to override the legislative judgment
as to the necessity for retrospective taxation
not only because of the paramount governmental
interest in obtaining adequate revenues, but
also because taxes are not in the nature of a
penalty or a contractual obligation but
rather a means of apportioning the costs. of
government among those who benefit from it.”
The above passage was quoted with approval by the
Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Assistant
Commissioner of Urban Land Tax and Others v. The Buckingham
& Carnatic Co. Ltd., etc. (1)
The period from April 1, 1964 to September 13, 1965 during
which the sales tax authorities charged multipoint tax on
sale of furnace oil at the rate of 2 per cent was, in our
opinion; very short and did not give rise to some kind of
vested right in favour of the appellants. It may well be
that the matter had not till then been examined by the
higher authorities. It was only when the Board of Revenue
was moved that the opinion was expressed by the Board as per
resolution dated August 28, 1965 that entry 47 covered
furnace oil.
(1) [1970] 1 S.C.R. 268.
62
In the case of Rai Ramkrishna & Others (supra) this Court
dealt with the, validity of Bihar Taxation on Passengers and
Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor Vehicles) Act, 1961
in the following circumstances. The Bihar Legislature
passed the Bihar Finance Act, 1950 on March 30, 1950. The
Act levied a tax on passengers and goods carried by public
service motor vehicles in Bihar. The appellants challenged
the validity of the Act and Its provisions were struck down
by this Court. The respondent then issued the Bihar
Ordinance on August 1, 1961. By that Ordinance, the
provisions of the Act of 1950 which had been struck down by
this Court were validated and brought into force
retrospectively from the date when the earlier, Act purport-
ed to come into force. Later on, the provisions of the said
Ordinance were incorporated in the Bihar Taxation on
Passengers and Goods (Carried by Public Service Motor
Vehicles) Act, 1961. As a result of the retrospective
operation of the Act of 1961, its material provisions were
deemed to have come into force from April 1, 1950. The
validity of the Act of 1961 was challenged on the ground
that the retrospective operation of the provisions of the
Act changed its character and took it outside the
legislative competence of the legislature. It was further
argued that the retrospective operation was so unreasonable
that it could not be saved under clauses (5) and (6) of
article 19 of the Constitution. Both these contentions were
repelled and it was held that the test of the length of time
covered by the retrospective operation could not by itself
be treated as a decisive test.
In the case of Epari Chinna Krishna Moorthy v. Stale of
Orissa(1) this Court dealt with the validity of the Orissa
Sales Tax Validation Act, 1961. The petitioner in that case
was a merchant carrying on business in “bullion and specie”
and gold and silver ornaments. He was a registered dealer
under the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947. The petitioner
claimed exemption from payment of sales tax in respect of
certain gold ornaments on the basis of a notification issued
on July 1, 1949 under section 6 of that Act. The sales tax
authorities disallowed the petitioner’s claim who thereupon
filed writ petitions in the High Court. The High Court
upheld the petitioner’s claim and issued writs directing.
the sales tax officer to allow the petitioners claim for
exemption. After the judgment of the High Court, the
impugned Act was passed by the legislature on August 1, 1961
and was published on September 18, 1961. Section 2 of the
impugned Act sought to put a meaning on the notification of
July 1, 1949 and stated that the notification shall always
be deemed to have meant like that. One of the contentions
raised in that case was that the retrospective operation of
the impugned section should
(1) [1964] 7 S.C.R. 185.
63
be struck down as unconstitutional because it imposed
unreasonable restrictions on the petitioner’s fundamental
right under article 19 (1) (g). This contention did not
find favour with this Court and it was observed that a
legislation could not be struck down although the
retrospective operation might operate harshly in some cases.
In the case of M/s J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State
of Uttar Pradesh and Another(1) this Court referred to the
earlier case of The Union of India v. Madan Gopal Kabra(2)
and held that the power to make retrospective legislation in
cases relating to tax on sale of goods was the same as in
the case of income tax. It was observed :
“The power of a legislature to enact a law
with reference to a topic entrusted to it, is,
as already stated, unqualified subject only to
any limitation imposed by the Constitution.
In the exercise of such a power, it will be
competent for the legislature to enact a law,
which is either prospective or retrospective.
In the Union of India v. Madan Gopal (supra)
it was held by this Court that the power to
impose tax on income under entry 82 of List I
in Schedule VII to the Constitution, compre-
hended the power to impose income-tax with
retrospective operation even for a period
prior to the Constitution. The position will
be the same as regards laws imposing tax on
sale of goods.”
Mr. Setalvad has referred to the fact that the appellants
did not realise the sales tax on the sale of furnace oil at
the rate of 6 per cent during at least some part of the
period for which retrospective operation had been given to
the amending Act. It is contended that this fact should
weigh with this Court in striking down the provisions of the
amending Act. There is, in our opinion, no force in this
contention. The fact that a dealer is not in a position to
pass on the sales tax to others does not affect the
competence of the legislature to enact a law imposing sales
tax retrospectively because that is a matter of legislative
policy. A similar argument was advanced in the case of M/s
J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. (supra) and was repelled in the
following words:
“And then it is argued that a sales tax being
an indirect tax, the seller who pays that tax
has the right to pass it on to the consumer,
that a law which imposes a sales tax long
after the sales had taken place deprives him
of that right, that retrospective operation
is, in consequence, an incident inconsistent
with the true character of a sales tax law,
and that the Validation Act is,
(1) [1962] 2 S.C.R. 1.
(2) [1954] S.C.R. 451.
64
therefore, not a law in respect of tax on the
sale of goods- as recognized, and it is ultra
vires entry 54. We see no force in this
contention. It is no doubt true that a sales
tax is, according to accepted notions,
intended to be passed on to the buyer, and
provisions authorising and regulating the
collection of sales tax by the seller from the
purchaser are, a usual feature of sales tax
legislation. But it is- not an essential
characteristic of a sales tax that the seller
must have the right to pass it on to the
consumer, nor is the power of the legislature
to impose a tax on sales conditional on its
making a provision for sellers to collect the
tax from the purchasers. Whether a law should
be enacted, imposing a sales tax, or
validating the imposition of sales tax, when
the seller is not in a position to pass it on
to the consumer, is a matter of policy and
does not affect the competence of the
legislature. This question is concluded by
the decision of this Court in The Tata Iron &
Steel Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar(1).”-
In the case of Jaora Sugar Mills (P) Ltd. v. State of Madhya
Pradesh and Others(1) this Court dealt with the validity of
section 3 of the Sugar Cess (Validation) Act, 1961 (Central
Act 38 of 1961).. The said section concerned the levy of
sugar-cane cess and provided that “all cesses imposed,
assessed or collected or purported to have been imposed,
assessed or collected under any State Act before the
commencement of this Act, shall be deemed to have been
validly imposed, assessed or collectedin accordance with
law as if the provisions of the said Act andof
notifications, orders and rules issued or made thereunder in
so far as such provisions relate to the imposition,
assessment and collection of such cess had Ben included in
and have been part of the section and this section had been
enforced at all material times when such cess was imposed,
assessed or collected”. Earlier the State Act under which
the sugar-cane cess had been levied was found to be invalid
on the ground of want of legislative competence to deal with
topics covered by it. The attack on the validity of section
3 of that Act was repelled and it was held that the
Parliament could, in exercise of its legislative competence,
pass a law retrospectively validating the collections made
under the State statutes. The present case is on a stronger
footing from the point of view of the respondents’ because
we are dealing in this case with retrospective legislation
made by the same legislature which had enacted the eariler
law. We are,
(1) [1958] S.C.R. 1355.
(2) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 523.
65
therefore, of the opinion that the impugned provisions are a
valid piece of legislation and do not contravene article 19
of the Constitution.
The appeals consequently fail and are dismissed with costs.
One hearing fee.
S.C. Appeals dismissed.
48Sup.C.I./73
66