ORDER
P. Vishwanatha Shetty, J.
1. Though this petition is posted for preliminary hearing in ‘B Group’, with the consent of Learned Counsel appearing for the parties, it is taken up for final hearing and disposed of by this order.
2. The petitioner, who is the widow of one late Doddaiah, has filed this petition challenging order dated 2nd January 1990 passed by the second respondent confirming order dated 29th March 1983 passed by the first respondent. Copies of the orders passed by respondents 1 and 2 have been produced as Annexure-B and C respectively.
3. The brief facts of the case, which are relevant for the disposal of this petition, may be stated as follows:
The husband of the petitioner, late Doddaiah, was granted land measuring 4 acres in Survey No. 52 of Matakere village, H.D. Kote Taluk, Mysore District, by means of order dated 25th April 1953, Out of the said land, an extent of 1 acre was sold to the third respondent and another extent of 2 acres was sold to the 4th respondent, by means of registered sale deeds dated 11th June 1971 and 17th November 1964 respectively by the said Doddaiah. thereafter, the application filed by the petitioner under Section 5(1) of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), for declaration that the sale of the above extent of lands is null and void and for resumption of the possession of the same to her, come to be rejected by the first respondent as per the order Annexure-B. The appeal filed by the petitioner was also rejected by the second respondent as per the order Annexure-C on the ground that it was barred by limitation.
4. Sri Siddappa, Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the orders impugned are illegal and suffer from errors apparent on the face of the record. He submitted that the Appellate Authority has totally-abdicated the jurisdiction conferred on it by law, by refusing to condone the delay caused in filing the appeal though the petitioner had shown sufficient cause for the delay caused in filing the appeal, in the application filed by her seeking condonation of delay. He further submitted that the Appellate Authority, without assigning any reason, without hearing the petitioner and in a mechanical manner, proceeded to reject the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. He also submitted that the order Annexure-B passed by the first respondent is liable to be quashed as the first respondent rejected the application of the petitioner solely on the ground that the Saguvali Chit issued to the original grantee prohibited the grantee from alienating the land in question only for a period of 10 years and the said finding recorded by the first respondent is contrary to the stipulation made in the Saguvali Chit, which has been produced as Annexure-A along with the petition, and also Sub-rule (8) of Rule 43 of the Rules.
5. I find considerable force in the submissions made by the Learned Counsel for the petitioner that both the orders Annexure-B and C are liable to be quashed. It is not disputed that the petitioner was not heard before passing the order Annexure-C rejecting her application for condonation of delay caused in filing the appeal. Since the rejection of the petitioner’s application for condonation of delay results in the dismissal of the appeal on the ground of limitation, I am of the view that it was imperative on the part of the second respondent to have heard the petitioner before passing the said order. The entire procedure adopted by the second respondent while passing the order Annexure-C is totally illegal. Further, a plain reading of the order Annexure-C makes it clear that the second respondent proceeded to reject the petitioner’s application in a mechanical manner and without considering the cause shown by the petitioner for the delay caused in filing the appeal. It is the case of the petitioner that she is an illiterate, helpless, aged Harijan woman who had no knowledge of the order Annexure-B passed by the first respondent rejecting her application for resumption of the land in question and that she had come to know about the order Annexure-B only in October, 1989 and immediately thereafter, she filed the appeal. In this situation, the second respondent ought to have condoned the delay caused in filing the appeal. It is also relevant to point out that Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Act confers suo-motu power on the original Authority, that is, the Assistant Commissioner, to conduct an enquiry with regard to the alienations made by the original grantees and to declare the same as null and void if they were made either in violation of the terms of the grant or the provisions of law providing for the grant. Under the circumstances, the appellant Authority, while considering the cause shown for the delay caused in filing the appeal, must keep in mind the scheme of the Act and the helpless background of the beneficiaries of the legislation and give a liberal meaning to ‘sufficient cause’ shown by the appellants. The Appellate Authority cannot ignore the object of the Act and the illiteracy, ignorance, poverty and cultural and social backwardness of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. In the instant case, the Appellate Authority has totally failed to consider this aspect of the matter and passed the order Annexure-C rejecting the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that it was barred by limitation. Therefore, I am of the view that the order Annexure-C is liable to be quashed.
6. Though, in the normal course, I would have remitted the mater for fresh consideration to the Appellate Authority, since the dispute between the parties has been pending consideration for a considerable length of time and the Act has come into force with effect from 1.1.1979 and I am fully satisfied that the petitioner has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the time prescribed, I am of the view that it is in the interest of justice and in the interest of both the parties, to examine the correctness of the order Annexure-B passed by first respondent on merits.
7. The first respondent has rejected the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the condition imposed in the grant order and also in the Saguvali Chit, prohibited the grantee from alienating the land in question only for a period of 10 years. The petitioner has produced the original Saguvali Chit Annexure-A. The said Saguvali Chit shows that late Doddaiah was prohibited from alienating the land in question permanently, that is, for ever. Sub-rule (8) of Rule 43 of the Mysore Land Revenue Rules, which governed the grant of land by the State upto 4th August 1953, prohibited the grantees, who belong to depressed classes, from alienating the granted lands for ever. The said rule reads as follows:
“43(8). Occupancies granted to applicants belonging to depressed classes under Rule 43(5) above and those granted by Government free of upset price or reduced upset price to poor and landless people of other communities or to religious or charitable Institutions, shall not be alienated and the grantees shall execute Mutchalikas in the form prescribed by Government. This shall not, however, prevent lands granted to depressed classes under Rule 43(5) being accepted as security for any loan which they may wish to obtain from Government or from a cooperative Society for the bonafide purpose of improving the land.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, the grantee of the land in question, aforesaid late Doddaiah, was permanently prohibited from alienating the land in question. The first respondent, without looking into the rule and also the original Saguvali Chit, has observed that late Doddaiah was prohibited from alienating the land in question only for a period of 10 years. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the order Annexure-B passed by the first respondent is also liable to be quashed.
8. Since I have examined the validity and correctness of the order passed by the first respondent and found that the said order is unsustainable in law, keeping in mind that the dispute between the parties has been pending consideration for a considerable length of time, I am of the view that it is appropriate to remit the matter to the first respondent for fresh consideration in the light of the observations made above. Therefore, I make the following:
ORDER
(i) The order Annexure-B dated 29th March 1983 passed by the first respondent and the order Annexure-C dated 2nd January 1990 passed by the second respondent are hereby quashed.
(ii) The matter is remitted to the first respondent for fresh consideration and the first respondent is directed to pass fresh orders in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made above, after giving an opportunity to the petitioner and the 4th respondent to have their say in the matter, as expeditiously as possible and at any event of the matter, not later than six months from the date of receipt of this order.
9. In terms stated above, this petition is disposed of.
10. Sri M. Siddaganagaiah, Learned High Court Government Pleader, is permitted to file his memo of appearance within four weeks from to-day.