ORDER
1. When the WP MPs. came up for hearing, the learned Counsel for both parties have addressed arguments on the main writ petition itself. As such the writ petition is being finally disposed of after hearing the learned Counsel for all the parties.
2. This is a writ petition filed by 27 persons questioning the proceedings initiated by the respondents under the Land Acquisition Act for the acquisition of an extent of Acs.34-11 guntas of land belonging to the petitioners herein for thr purpose of expansion of export promotional industrial park by the A.P. Industrial Infra-structure Corporation (A.P.I.I.C.), the 5th respondent herein. The notification under Section 4(1) was published in the Gazette on 4-3-1996 and also in two daily newspapers dated 25-4-1996. The substance of the 4(1) notification was published in the locality on 6-5-1996. Invoking the urgency clause the enquiry under Section 5-A was dispensed with and the declaration under Section 6 was published in the Gazette on 6-3-1996. The same was also published in two daily newspapers on 27-4-1996 and the local publication was made on 6-5-1996. The notices under Sections 9 and 10 were issued on 4-4-1998. The award enquiry was conducted on 4-6-1998 in which five of the petitioners are stated to have participated. The award was passed on 9-9-1996. Notice of the award under Section 12(2) was also issued on 9-9-1998. The present writ petition was filed on 25-9-1996 and this Court, while admitting the writ petition on 30-9-1996 granted an interim direction not to dispossess the petitioners from the land if they have not already been dispossessed and further directed that the land acquisition proceedings shall proceed in accordance with law in other respects.
3. The petitioners seek to challenge the acquisition proceedings on several grounds. Firstly that simultaneous issuance of the notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6 on 24-2-1996 is bad. It is, however, conceded that it is now the settled legal position that there is no bar against the simultaneous issuance of 4(1} notification and 6 declaration in cases where the urgency clause is invoked.
4. It is next submitted that the lands of the petitioners have been acquired earlier twice in 1980 and 1984 for the benefit of the5th respondent and by reason of the instant acquisition proceedings the petitioners will be uprooted and deprived of their livelihood which is violative of their rights guaranteed under Articles 21 and 300-A of the Constitution. Reliance is sought to be placed on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in K. Ramulu v. State of A.P., 1988 (1) APLJ 494, wherein it has been held that the State in subjecting one particular person’s property to repeated acquisitions is acting contrary to Article 14 of the Constitution, and that by resorting to such acquisitions the State is imposing social burden of the Land Acquisition Act on selected individuals and is, therefore, violating the equality rule of Article 14. A perusal of the said judgment, however, shows that the Court came to that conclusion on the peculiar facts and circumstances of that case in which the petitioner, who originally owned Acs.20.00 of land, was left with only Acs.2.15 guntas after repeated acquisitions and even the remaining extent of Acs.2.15 guntas was sought to be acquired for the purpose of providing house-sites to Harijans. But in the instant case, the acquisition is for the purpose of the expansion and development of the existing industrial park. I do not, therefore, think that the said decision of the Division Bench has any application to the present case. That apart, in Venkataswamappa v. Spl. Dy. Commissioner (Revenue), , the apex Court held that the fact that on an earlier occasion also the land of the land-owner was acquired for such or other public purpose does not make the acquisition mala fide. The learned Counsel for the petitioners seeks to distinguish this case by submitting that the petitioners are not questioning the proceedings on the ground of mala fides, but they are questioning the validity of the proceedings on the ground that their rights under Articles 21 and 300-A of the Constitution are violated. The law, however, recognises the right of the State, in exercise of its power of eminent domain, to acquire the land of any person when it is needed for public purpose. Such acquisition cannot be questioned on the ground of hard-ship and inconvenience, private interest must always yield to publicinterest. Though the learned Counsel for die petitioner also sought to contend that the acquisition in the instant case is not for a public purpose, I do not find much substance in the same. It cannot be said that the acquisition for the purpose of expansion and development of an industrial park, which is established for the purpose of setting up export-oriented industries, is not for a public purpose. The park is sponsored by the Central Government.
5. It is next contended that there was an agreement or understanding- between the petitioners on the one hand and the 5th respondent on the other on 21-12-1994 whereby the 5th respondent agreed to provide alternative lands to the petitioners in excliangc for the land under acquisition. It is stated that pursuant to the said understanding or agreement, the petitioners have also given a consent letter on 21-12-1994 and that the alternative land, which is offered by the 5th respondent in exchange was also got surveyed and demarcated. The alleged agreement or understanding is, however, denied in the . counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 5th respondent wherein it is stated that the said proposal, which was mooted by the petitioners, was negatived by the concerned authorities of the 5th respondent. I am afraid that in a writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court cannot enter into such a disputed fact. The learned Government Pleader appearing for the Land Acquisition Officer has placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Jaipur Development Authority v. Radhesyam and others, 1994 LACC 524, wherein it has been held that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to allot land in lieu of compensation.
For all the aforesaid reasons this contention of the petitioners also fails.
6. It is next contended that the petitioners have acted upon die said offer made by the 5th respondent and as such the 5th respondent is precluded from resiling from the same by the principle of promissory estoppel. As the 5th respondent denied having made any such offer and that the petitioners also having not shown that they have altered their position to their detriment by reason of any such offer, I am of the view mat the principle of promissory estoppel has no application.
7. It is finally contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the invocation of the urgency clause and dispensing with Section 5-A enquiry is bad as possession of the lands was not taken within three months from the date of the notification as required under Section 17(5) of the Act. In V. Adamma v. Dist.Collector, Srikakulam, 1991 (1) APLJ 330, a Division Bench of this Court held that sub-section (5) of Section 17 introduced by the State Amendment has become repugnant and void after the Central Amendment Act 68 of 1984 and cannot be enforced. In view of this decision, the last submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner also fails. Further after completing all formalities the award also was passed in this case on 9-9-1998 and Section 12(2) notices were also issued to the petitioners on the same date.
8. Though the award has been
passed during the pendency of this writ petition, for all the aforesaid reasons I do not find any valid grounds to interfere with the land acquisition proceedings. However, having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, I feel that it would be just and proper to give an opportunity to the petitioners to file an application before the Land Acquisition Officer for making reference to the Civil Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act with regard to the proper compensation payable to them. The petitioners are granted four weeks’ time from today for that purpose. If any such application is made by the petitioners within that time, the Land Acquisition Officer shall make reference under Section 18 without being constrained by the question of limitation.
9. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of. No order as to costs.