JUDGMENT
1. The plaintiffs in Original Suit No. 10 of 1905 claim to be members of the Vaiyal Kotavalli illom. The 1st plaintiff claims to be adopted or affiliated to this illom and the 2nd plaintiff is the widow of a male member of the illom. The suit is brought by them for a declaration that they have the Uraima of certain temples along with certain of the defendants. The third issiie in the case raises the question, “whether the Uraima of the 2nd plaintiff’s illom is extinguished on account of exclusive adverse possession by the 5th defendant’s illom of the plaint devaswoms.” As the plaintiffs Nos. 1 and 2 claim to be the sole members of the plaintiff’s illom, we understand the issue to mean “whether the right of the 1st plaintiff and of the 2nd plaintiff is extinguished by the lapse of the statutory period.” As regards the 2nd plaintiff’s claim, there is a further issue raised, which is No. 2, and on that issue the District Judge has found that, being a widow, she has no right to exercise Uraima right according to law or valid custom. This finding of the District Judge has not been attacked before us. It is sufficient, therefore, to dispose of her appeal upon the finding on the 2nd issue.
2. As regards the 1st plaintiff, the case has been dealt with in paragraph Nos. 12 and 13 of the District Judge’s judgment. In the year 1875, there was a suit by the predecessors of the present 4th and 5th defendants, who were the Urallots of the plaint temples, to remove a Samudayi. They then set up the claim that they were the sole Urallars of the temples. The Samudayi, who was the 1st defendant, pleaded that there were four other Urallars entitled to be joined as parties to the suit. An application was made by a widow of the plaintiffs’ illom, both on her own account and on behalf of the present 1st plaintiff, td be joined as parties to the suit. The Munsif who decided that case dismissed the application as regards the claim of the present 1st plaintiff to join and allowed the joinder of the lady. She was then placed on the record as the 3rd defendant. There is no doubt that both in the plaint and in the subsequent proceedings there was a distinct denial of the right of the present 1st plaintiff to joint management. It is stated before us that the 1st plaintiff attained majority in 1886. But in 1881, the 4th and 5th defendants as Urallars of the temple gave a power of attorney to a brother of the 5th defendant to manage the temples as Samudayi. He was answerable to them and he was liable to be removed by them. This again was a distinct assertion of the sole right to management on the part of the 4th and 5th defendants and an actual management of the property on their behalf by a samudayi appointed by them. In 1884, the 4th defendant instituted a suit for the recovery of certain property from a tenant and he made the 5th defendant a party-defendant to the suit together with the female representative of the plaintiffs’ illom already mentioned. Her Uraima was admitted, but so far as the judgment in the case shows, there was no admission of the right of the present 1st plaintiff.
3. We come next to Exhibit XVII, which is in the year 1892. That is the judgment in a suit by the 6th defendant against the 4th defendant and a tenant of certain properties belonging to the Devaswom. The 4th defendant, who was then impleaded as the 2nd defendant, set up the right of the present 1st plaintiff as Urallar of the plaint Devaswoms. Stopping here we find that from the year 1875 down to the year 1892, when the 4th defendant for the first time changed front, there has been a consistent denial on the part of the 4th and 5th defendants or their predecessors of the right of the 1st plaintiff to participate in the, management of the plaint temples. This denial, coupled with the actual exclusion of the 1st plaintiff from all management, is sufficient in law to put an end to his right. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the acknowledgment by the 4th defendant in the year 1892 would, if coupled with enjoyment on the part of the 4th defendant down to the date of the plaint, give the 1st plaintiff any fresh title, we have no hesitation in saying that, having regard to what the 4th defendant himself has pleaded in 1889 and 1900 as per Exhibits XVIII to XIX, what the 4th defendant stated in 1892 was a mere device on his part to checkmate the 5th defendant. The 4th defendant has not been consistent in his assertion of 1892. He has clearly averred in later years that the present 1st plaintiff had no right to the property for he actually stated that the right of the plaint illom had lapsed to him. We may, therefore, dismiss Exhibit XVII as of no value at all in connection with the question of exclusion of the 1st plaintiff. We must hold that the 1st plaintiff’s right has been extinguished by the statute of limitation. It was argued by Mr. Rosario that the denial of 1875 would give no cause of action to the 1st plaintiff to institute a suit. He said that the 1st plaintiff could not institute a suit for a declaration that he was a member of the plaint illom as he came into possession of all the illom properties in i£86. He could not institute a suit, according to him, in respect of the plaint temples in consequence of the denial of 1875. We cannot accept this argument. It was perfectly open to the plaintiff to institute a suit if he chose that he was entitled to the joint Uraima of the plaint temples immediately after the denial of 1875 by virtue of his being a member of the plaint illom. The question as to whether he was a member of the plaint illom would, no doubt, have to be in issue, but that issue could only be for the purpose of determining whether the 1st plaintiff had any right to the Uraimaship in the plaint temple. We must, therefore, express our concurrence with the District Judge in his finding that the 1st plaintiff has lost any right that he might have had in 1875 to the joint Uraima with defendants Nos. 4 and 5. We dismiss the appeal with costs.