ORDER
K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.
1. Tenant is the revision petitioner in both the cases. R.C.P. No. 62 of 1998 was filed by the landlord for eviction under Sections ll(2)(b), 11(3) and ll(4)(ii) of Act 2 of 1965. Eviction was ordered by the Rent Control Court under Section ll(2)(b). Eviction sought for under Section 11(3) was rejected since tenant could claim protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). Eviction sought for under Section ll(4)(ii) was also disallowed. Aggrieved by the same tenant preferred R.C.A.No. 176 of 1999 before the Appellate Authority. Aggrieved by the order rejecting the claim under Section 11 (3) as well as Section 11 (4)(ii) landlord preferred R.C.A. No. 119 of 2000 before the Appellate Authority. Both the appeals were heard by the Appellate Authority and a common judgment was delivered on 30.6.2001. Appellate Authority allowed the revision filed by the landlord and eviction was ordered under Section 1 l(2)(b) and 11(3). Appellate Authority found that tenant could not establish the claim for protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). Counsel on both sides submitted that landlords have given up their case under Section 1 l(4)(ii).
2. We may first examine the ground urged by the landlord under Section 11(3) and examine the protection claimed by the tenant under the second proviso to Section 11(3). Petition schedule building originally belonged, to one Sankaran, husband of first respondent and father of respondents 2 to 4. Sankaran died on 21.2.1984 and petition schedule building devolved upon the respondents at his legal heirs. Third respondent was in Gulf countries. He came back from Gulf and wanted to start stationary business in the petition schedule building for his livelihood. Second respondent is now working as Secretary in a Co-operative Printing Press. PWs. 1 and 2 gave oral evidence on the side of the landlords and projected their need. They also deposed that respondents have the financial ability to conduct the business and they have no other building of their own to conduct business. It has also come out in evidence that late Sankaran had conducted stationary business in the petition schedule building at an earlier point of time. All these facts would indicate that the need projected by the landlords is bonafide. There is nothing in evidence to show that landlords have got any other building in their possession or in their ownership so as to defeat their claim under the first proviso to Section 11(3).
3. Now we will consider the cardinal point urged by the counsel for the tenant. Counsel for the tenant Sri. Anil Sivaraman submitted that Appellate Authority has not properly appreciated the evidence and applied the dictum laid down in Xavier v. Krishnakumary, 2000 (3) KLT 809 = 2000 (2) KLJ 804. Counsel submitted that the decision which is applicable is the one in Krishnankunju Raveendran v. Sukumara Pillai (1999 (3) KLT 373) Rent Control Court declined protection under the second proviso to the tenant relying on the above decision. Counsel appearing for the landlord on the other hand submitted that Appellate Authority has rightly rejected protection claimed under the second proviso to Section 11(3).
4. Before we deal with the rival contentions, we will examine the scope of second proviso to Section 11(3) which reads as follows:
“(3) A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him.
Provided further that the Rent Control Court shall not give any direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession, if such tenant is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on in such building and there is no other suitable building available in the locality for such person to carry on such trade or business.”
The aforementioned proviso makes it clear even if the landlord bonafide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him, Rent Control Court shall not give any such direction to a tenant to put the landlord in possession if the tenant could establish that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from any trade or business carried on the said building. Tenant has therefore to establish that he is depending for his livelihood mainly on the income derived from the trade or business. The word ‘mainly’ means chiefly, absolutely and entirely, firstly, principally, largely etc. Mere statement that tenant is getting income from the business would not be sufficient. He has to prove that he is principally and chiefly depending upon the income derived from the business or trade carried on in the petition schedule building. Tenant has also to establish second limb of the second proviso as well. Tenant has to establish that there is no other suitable building available in the locality to carry on such trade or business. If the tenant fails to establish second limb of the second proviso the Rent Control Court is bound to give a direction to the tenant to put the landlord in possession if the ground alleged under Section 11(3) is established by the landlord.
5. Tenant has got a contention that even though certain buildings are available those buildings are not within the reach of the tenant. Payment of large amount by way of security and higher rent would make it difficult for the tenant to shift his business to such premises. Contention that higher rent demanded as well as the higher security insisted by the landlords would be the bottleneck of the tenant to start his trade or business in the premises available, in our view, is not a ground to defeat the claim of the landlord for bonafide need under Section 11(3). Legislature only postulates the availability of suitable building. Suitable would naturally mean suitable for the needs of the tenant. Once buildings are found to be suitable for his need, it is entirely for the tenants’ look out to get those premises for starting the trade or business. Whatever impediment or obstacle or trouble he has to face by various reasons, like exorbitant rent, demand of high security are all matters to be settled by the tenant with the prospective landlord. Those factors cannot be put against the landlord so as to defeat his claim under Section 11(3). In Krishnankunju Raveendran’s case, 1999(3) KLT 373, this Court held as follows:
“If the vacant building will be available only on payment of huge deposits and on very high rent, then it may not be said that a suitable building was available in the locality where the tenant can carry on his trade or business.”
We may hasten to add that the above principles laid down by the Court are confined to the facts of the said case alone. The Division Bench in Xavier’s case, 2000 (3) KLT 809 = 2000 (2) KLJ 804 held with reference to Krishnakunju Raveendran’s case, as follows:
“We do not see anything in the decision of this court in Krishnankunju Raveendran v. Sukumara Pillai (1999 (3) KLT 373) which compels us to take a different view. The use of the expression “suitable building” can only mean suitable for his needs. It cannot be understood as a building for which the tenant need pay rent only at the rate that was prevailing twenty or thirty years ago. It will be an unrealistic interpretation of the statute. If the above decision has laid down any such proposition, with respect, we must say that we cannot find our way to agree with the same. But, for the purpose of this case, it is not necessary to pursue that aspect further”.
We are in agreement with the view expressed by the Bench in Xavier’s case. We hasten to add that the principles laid down in Krishnankunju Raveendran’s case is not applicable to the case on hand since buildings are available in the locality which are suitable for his requirement.
6. In any view, in this case tenant miserably failed to show that he was mainly depending on the income derived from the business carried on in the petition schedule building. He could not establish non-availability of any building suitable for conducting his business or trade. On the other hand landlord has produced Exts. A 6 to A 10 extract of building tax assessment which would show that there are several vacant buildings available in the locality for conducting the business of the tenant. Reference was also to building belonged to Marali Balakrishnan, Kanhirali Kunhabdulla Haji, Puthenpurayil Rehman, Elambilahyil Kunhikannan Master, Vengakaniyil Ammed etc. We are of the view tenant has not discharged the burden for claim protection under the second proviso to Section 11(3). We are in agreement with the judgment of the Appellate Authority ordering eviction under Section 11(3). We also find no reason to disturb the said finding under Section ll(2)(b) of Act 2 of 1965. In such circumstances we are inclined to dismiss both the appeals. However, in view of the facts and circumstances of the case, tenant is given three months time to vacate the premises.