JUDGMENT
R.S. Kejriwal, J.
1. In this appeal and the appeals shown in the annexed schedule, similar questions of fact and law are involved and as such they are decided by one common judgment. For the decisions of the appeals, the facts of Civil Second Appeal No. 176/93, are mentioned.
2. The plaintiff appellant was in the service of respondents as Conductor. The Respondent No. 2, i.e. the Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. Jodhpur, terminated his services vide order dated August 27, 1983. The appellant filed an appeal, which was also dismissed by the Respondent No. 3, vide order dated July 3, 1984. In such circumstances the plaintiff appellant filed a suit in the Court of A.M.J.M. No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur, and prayed that the aforesaid orders be quashed and set aside, being contrary to law and principles of natural justice. It was further prayed that the plaintiff appellant be directed to be entitled to remain in service with all consequential benefits from the date his services were terminated.
3. The respondents contested the suit by filing written statement. They also raised an objection that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. The plaintiff has remedy only under the Industrial Disputes Act.
4. The trial Court i.e., A.M.J.M. No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur vide its judgment and decree dated October 28, 1989, held that the termination of the services of the plaintiff appellant was contrary to the rules and principles of natural justice. It also came to the conclusion that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try the suit. The said Court declared the order dated August 27, 1983, passed by Respondent No. 2 and the order dated July 3, 1984, passed by Respondent No. 3 null and void and further held that the plaintiff appellant was entitled to remain in service from the date when his services were terminated with all consequential benefits. Being aggrieved with the said judgment and decree the respondents filed an appeal before the learned District Judge, Jaipur City, Jaipur, which was later on transferred to the Court of Additional District Judge No. 5, Jaipur City, Jaipur. The said Court decided the questions raised before the trial Court in favour
of the plaintiff appellant but allowed the appeal vide its judgment and decree dated July 26, 1993, only on the ground that the trial Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit, as the order of terminating services of the plaintiff was passed by Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C., Jodhpur.
5. Being aggrieved with the said judgment and decree the plaintiff appellant has filed the present Civil Second Appeal.
6. First submission of the counsel for the appellant is that the objection regarding want of territorial jurisdiction was not raised by the defendant-respondents before the trial Court and as such the appellate Court by allowing the objection has committed serious illegality. In support of this argument, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Sukh Dev Singh Rajpurohit v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. 1995 (1) RLW 379 and Anr. judgment of the Apex Court in R.S.D.V. Finance Company Private Limited v. Shri Vallabh Glass Works Ltd. AIR 1993 SC 2094.
7. His second submission is that the order of the Respondent No. 2, i.e. the Regional Manager, R.S.R.T.C. Jodhpur, was merged in the order of Deputy Manager (Karmik) Appellate Authority, R.S.R.T.C. Jaipur (Respondent No. 3). The plaintiff appellant also challenged the order of Respondent No. 3 in the suit. Part of cause of action also accrued to the plaintiff appellant at Jaipur. Under such circumstances, the Court of A.M.J.M. No. 3, Jaipur City, Jaipur, had jurisdiction to entertain & decide the suit. The Lower Appellate Court erred in holding that the said Court had no territorial jurisdiction to decide the suit. In support of his arguments he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Ladu Lal v. The State of Rajasthan in 1995 (2) W.L.C. (Raj) 180.
8. On the other hand, Mr. P.C. Jain and Mr. Manish Bhandari, counsel for the defendants respondents submit that the defendants in their written statement raised question of jurisdiction. The question of jurisdiction also includes want of territorial jurisdiction. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the defendants- respondents did not raise the question of territorial jurisdiction. The lower appellate Court was justified in holding that the trial Court had no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Their further submission is that the Apex Court in the case reported in The Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. Krishan Kant (1994-I-LLJ-136) has already held that Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit challenging the termination of services of a workman. The remedy of the workman whose services were terminated by the respondents is only under the Industrial Disputes Act. Under such circumstances, the appeal deserves to be dismissed.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the judgments cited at Bar by the parties.
10. In para No. 6 of the Written Statement, the defendants alleged as under:
^^;g fd okni= dk en uEcj 6 U;k;ky; dks bl okn
dks lquus dk vf/kdkj {ks= ugha gS A**
11. In Para No. 10 of the Written Statement, they alleged as under:
^^;g fd oknh ,d odZeSu gS ftlds fMlfely vkfn ds
fookn vkS|ksfxd fookn vf/kfu;e ds vUrxZr dh ifjHkk”kk esa vkrs gSa ftUgsa
lquus dk vf/kdkj {ks= ekU; vkS|ksfxd vf/kdj.k ,oa Je U;k;ky; dks gS A okn ekU;
U;k;ky; esa pyus ;ksX; ugha gksus ls e; [kpsZ [kkfjt fd;s tkus ;ksX; gS A**
12. On the basis of the aforesaid averments in the written statement the trial Court framed issue No. 3 which reads as under:
^^vk;k U;k;ky; Jheku~ dks oknh dk ;g okn lquus
dk {ks=kf/kdkj izkIr ugha gS A**
13. From reading the pleadings of the parties and the issue framed by the trial Court
it is apparent that the only objection raised by the defendants-respondents in the written statement was that the dispute raised by the plaintiff in the suit was an industrial dispute and as such the same should be resolved by a Labour Court or an Industrial Tribunal and the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Before the trial Court also there was no submission on behalf of the respondents that the Court of A.M.J.M. No. 3, had no jurisdiction to try the suit. Section 21 of the Civil Procedure Code prohibits an appellate Court from allowing an objection regarding place of suing, which was not raised at the initial stage in the trial Court. In such circumstances, in my opinion the lower appellate Court was not justified in entertaining an objection regarding want of territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court. In Sukhdev’s case (supra), this Court held as under:
“(6) In my opinion, the learned first appellate Court has committed an error while passing the impugned judgment. The appeal has been disposed of solely on the ground of jurisdiction by holding that the Court at Jodhpur had no jurisdiction to try the suit. It is too well known that when the parties appear and submit to the jurisdiction of the Court, join issues and whereafter the judgment and decree is passed, it shall not be open to any of the parties to the lis to object to the decree having been passed without jurisdiction. The matter relates to the territorial jurisdiction only. The learned trial Court discussed the pleadings, the evidence both oral as well as documentary placed by the parties on the record and after hearing the matter passed the judgment and decree. The issue of jurisdiction was decided in the main judgment itself. The appellate Court should not have taken recourse to this type of short cut. The learned first appellate Court should have decided the appeal on merits instead of deciding the matter of jurisdiction alone.”
14. It is further to be noted that the trial Court after considering the evidence of both the parties decided the case on merits. There is no failure of justice and as such the lower appellate Court should not have entertained the objection of place of suing as held by Apex Court in R.S.D.V. Finance Company (supra). Further more, the plaintiff in the suit challenged the order dated August 27, 1983, passed by Respondent No. 2 and also the order dated July 3, 1984, passed by Respondent No. 3. The office of the Respondent No. 3 is situated at Jaipur. Part of cause of action also accrued at Jaipur. The order dated August 27, 1983, was merged in the order dated July 3, 1984. Under such circumstances, also the A.M.J.M. No. 3 had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the suit. The matter is covered by the judgment of this Court in Ladu Lal’s case (supra). In that case a writ petition challenging the order of termination of services by S.P. Bhilwara and also the order passed in appeal by I.G. of Police at Jaipur, were challenged by filing a writ petition before the Jaipur Bench, Jaipur. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition only on the ground that the order of dismissal was passed by the Superintendent of Police, Bhilwara, which was within the territorial jurisdiction of the main seat of the High Court at Jodhpur and as such the Bench at Jaipur had no jurisdiction. Against the said order the petitioner filed an appeal before the Division Bench. The Division Bench allowed the appeal on the ground that since the appellate order was passed by the I.G. of Police at Jaipur, and therefore, part of cause of action arose at Jaipur and as such the Jaipur Bench had jurisdiction to hear the writ petition.
15. It is true that the Apex Court in the case of R.S.R.T.C. (supra), in Para No. 30 held
that where the dispute related to enforcement of rights flowing from general law of contract and not from Certified Standing Orders, the only remedy was to approach the forum created by the said Act.
16. In Para No. 32 the Apex Court held that the position of law regarding jurisdiction of the Civil Court was not clear till the passing of the judgment and as such it could not be said that the respondents in that case had not acted bonafide in instituting the suit. According to the judgment of the Apex Court it is clear that the question as to whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to try a suit challenging the termination of services of a workman or not by the Civil Court was not clear by that time and under such circumstances, the Apex Court was of the view that where the suits were already decided and the matters were pending before the appellate Court, they should be decided on their merits. The principle enunciated in Para No. 32 of the judgment will apply to those cases where suits were pending before the trial Court or were to be filed. Under such circumstances the argument that the decree passed by the trial Court deserves to be set aside only on the ground that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit and the remedy of the plaintiff appellant was only under the I.D. Act, has no force. Both the lower Courts have concurrently held the termination of the services of the plaintiff appellant was contrary to the rules and principles of natural justice. The finding recorded by both the lower Courts cannot be disturbed in Second Appeal.
17. Consequently, I allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by lower appellate Court and confirm the decree and judgment of the trial Court with costs of Rs. 5000/- in each appeal.