JUDGMENT
R.L. Anand, J.
1. Delay in filing the application is condoned.
2. In the interest of justice the order dated 24.5.2000 is recalled and the appeal is restored to its original number.
3. On merits, I have heard the counsel for the appellant, who tried to convince to me that the property in dispute was ancestral qua the appellant- plaintiff, but I am not in a position to approve his argument in view of the reasons given by the first appellate Court, as contained in para-10 of the judgment, which read as under :-
“At this stage of arguments the learned counsel for appellant argued that Jatinder Singh, plaintiff was the son of Bachan Singh, who is turn was the son of Naghia. Naghia was the son of Sarju. He men contended that the property in dispute has devolved upon Jatinder Singh. The learned counsel for the appellant could not show from the documentary evidence led by him, except Ex. 1 that certain land had devolved upon Bachan Singh from his father Naghia, father’s father Sarju which can be considered co-parcenary property qua his own son Jatinder Singh. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that Mutation No. 189, 210, 229, 275, 283, 39, 60, 326, 324, 353, 419, 481, 484, 492, 531, 564, situated in village Sarwarpur, Tehsil Samrala, District Ludhiana has passed on to Naghia, who was the minor son of Sarju and under the guardianship of his mother Devo. He further contended that he continued owing these khasra Nos. right upto 1909-1910, which was evident from the jamabandi for the year 1909-1910 and that property at the time of consolidation had gone into common pool at mutation No. 648 and Naghia had got some other property in lieu of the property which fact according to him is evident from the copy of jamabandi Ex. PI 7 for the year 1936-39. He further contended that Naghia had sold the land measuring khasra No. 2044/1939 to Lachhman Singh vide mutation No, 816, but one Deva who was member of the family of one Sarju who happened to be a co-sharer with one Naghia had filed suit for possession against Lachhman Singh and had obtained the decree for pre-emption, for which mutation No. 1020 was entered from Lachhman Singh for Deva regarding the said property. Meanwhile Surjit Singh, who was the minor at the time of the transaction between Naghia and Lachhman Singh became major and he filed a suit for possession as owner of his land challenging the alienation in favour of Lachhman Singh and subsequently in favour of Deva that suit filed by Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh was decreed resulting into mutation No. 1392
whereby the property previously mutated in the name of Deva was mutated in the name of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh in equal shares. The documents referred to in this context were Ex. P-8 and Ex. P-10, The learned counsel for the appellant had to concede that the property in dispute or the property in lieu of which the property in dispute was carved out had not devolved directly upon Surjit Singh from his father Naghia or his father Sarju by inheritance, but he contended that decree of pre-emption obtained by Deva was a decree for substitution of Deva in place of Lachhman Singh and the decree was obtained by Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh against Deva is in recognition of the right of Surjit Singh and Bachan Singh as the progeny of Naghia. The learned counsel for the appellant thus had to concede that no property had directly devolved upon Banchan Singh from his father’s father or father’s father’s father and the property, whatsoever, was got by Bachan Singh was by filing the suit for pre-emption. The learned counsel could not show any law according to which the property obtained by decree of pre-emption could be treated as ancestral property. On the other hand he could not controvert that such property got in a suit for preemption is for consideration and such property cannot be said to have devolved upon the person from his ancestors.
Many dates were taken by the learned counsel of the appellant. In the absence of documentary evidence to prove the fact that the property had devolved upon Bachan Singh from his father’s father’s father which could be termed as co- parcenary property qua his son’s, son’s sons, the ocular version of Gurcharan Singh, Kapur Singh, Amrik Singh, plaintiff to the effect that the property in dispute was ancestral property cannot be given any consideration. The findings of the lower court on issue No. 1 thus cannot be criticised on any score, whatsoever, and the findings are upheld.”
4. In this view of the matter, I do not see any illegality or impropriety in the impugned order as no substantial question of law is involved in this case.
5. Appeal dismissed.