ORDER
Nirmal Yadav, J.
1. Vide this petition, petitioners seek quashing of the order dated 20-11-2002 (Annexure P-l) passed by Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Faridabad whereby the petitioners have been summoned to face trial along with other accused on the application moved by prosecution under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and also the order dated 7-1-2005 (Annexure P-2) passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad vide which the revision filed by the petitioners has been dismissed.
2. The allegations as mentioned in the complaint filed by respondent No. 2 are that she was married to Bholi Sah. At the time of marriage, sufficient dowry articles were given by the parents of the complainant. However, her husband and in laws were not happy with the dowry articles and she was being harassed and tortured by her husband and other relatives. On the basis of afore-said complaint, FIR No. 46, dated 6-3-1999 “under Sections 406, 498-A, IPC was registered at Police Station Chhainsa. During investigation, petitioners Rani, sister of Bholi Shah, Mullah Latif alias Abdul Latif, father-in-law of Rani, Reshina, wife of younger brother of Bholi Shah, Lain alias Lalu Shah, elder brother of Bholi Shah and Sham Lal, father of Bholi Shah were not challaned by the police and the challan was only filed against Rehmi, mother-in-law, Anil, brother-in-law and Bholi Shah, husband of the complainant.
3. After framing of charge, the evidence of the complainant was recorded and she made statement with regard to involvement of the present petitioners. The Judicial Magistrate 1st Class summoned the petitioners on the ground that reasonable prospects appear for their conviction. The petitioners filed revision against the order of the Judicial Magistrate. It was pleaded that petitioners have no role to play in the commission of the offence for which summoning order has been issued against them. The learned Magistrate passed the impugned order in a mechanical manner. The complainant has roped in all the family members of her husband. The learned Magistrate did not appreciate the fact that during investigation, the police after thorough inquiry, had found the petitioners innocent. The Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Faridabad dismissed the revision filed by the petitioners holding that revisionists could not point out any grave illegality which calls for interference in the impugned order,
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners argued that petitioner No. 1 Rani is sister of Bholi Shah. She was married in the year 1995 and she has been residing with her husband away from the matrimonial home of the complainant. Petitioner No. 2 is father-in-law of Rani. He is in no manner concerned with the family affairs of the complainant and her husband. Reshma, petitioner No. 3 is wife of younger brother of Bholi Shah. Petitioner No. 4 Lalu alias Lalu Shah is elder brother of Bholi Shah and he is also residing separately. Petitioner No. 4 Sham Lal is father of Bholi Shah and there is no specific allegation against him. It is argued that the Courts below have failed to appreciate that all the petitioners were placed in column No. 2 by the investigating agency as their involvement was not found. There is no fresh evidence except the statement of the complainant, who is an interested witness to involve the entire family of her husband. He further argued that generally it is tendency on the part of wife in matrimonial litigation, to falsely involve the entire family of her husband. In support of his arguments, learned Counsel relied on a decision of this High Court in Manoj Kumar v. Prabhu Ram 2004 (1) RCC 479 wherein it was held that since other family members were living separately from the complainant and her husband, the allegation made against them could not be substantiated and they had been unnecessarily dragged in the matrimonial litigation.
5. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents argued that petitioners have already availed the remedy of revision. By filing this petition, the petitioners want to avail the remedy of second revision after dismissal of the first one by the Sessions Court and, therefore, this petition is not maintainable. In support, the learned Counsel relied on a judgment of this Court in Smt. C.V. Kaushala A. Warrier v. Raj Kumar 2004(2) RCR (Criminal) 386 : 2005 Cri LJ 594.
6. There is no doubt that the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482, Cr. P.C. have no limit, but such powers must be exercised by the High Court sparingly so as to avoid needless multiplicity of procedure and unnecessary delay in trial. In Pepsi Food Limited v. Special Judicial Magistrate 1998 (5) SCC (Cri) 1400 : 1998 Cri LJ 1 the Apex Court held that jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code could not be inflexible or laying formulae to be followed by the Court. Exercise of such powers would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case, but with the sole purpose to prevent the abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. In Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra , the Apex Court observed that for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary and nothing contained in Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court.
7. In the present case, undisputedly, the petitioners were found to be innocent during investigation by the police and they were placed in Column No. 2 in the challan submitted by the police. There is no fresh evidence against the petitioners except the statement of Meena, complainant wherein the allegations are similar to that of the complaint filed by her. All the petitioners except Sham Lal were residing separately from the complainant and her husband. Even in her statement before the Court no specific allegations as to how the complainant was harassed by the present petitioners, have been made. The complainant: herself stated that she has gone to her in laws house only three times after the marriage. The powers under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be used sparingly and only if there is convincing evidence against the persons sought to be arraigned as accused. The Apex Court in Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation has observed as under:
11. The basic requirements for invoking the above Section is that it should appear to the Court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, had committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is enough that the Court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the Court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused.
12. But even then, what is conferred on the Court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words “the Court may proceed against such person”. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the Court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that another person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the Court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the Court, to proceed against other persons.
Similar view has been expressed by this Court in Manoj Kumar’s case (supra) and in Gurpal Sngh v. State of Punjab 2001 (2) RCR (Cri) 580. It is well established that sweep of Section 319 is limited as it is an enabling provision which can be invoked only if evidence surfaces in the course of an inquiry or a trial disclosing the complicity of person (s) other than the person(s) already arraigned. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code do not apply to all situations and cannot be interpreted to repository of all powers for summoning such persons to stand trial along with others arraigned before the Court, who were found to be innocent during the inquiry/investigation conducted by the investigating agency. The provisions of Section 319 of the Code confer an extraordinary power and should not be easily resorted to. During the investigation, all the petitioners were found innocent and accordingly, they were placed in Column No. 2. Complainant Meena in her statement could not substantiate, beyond reasonable doubt, involvement of the petitioners.
8. Keeping in view the facts arid circumstances of the present case, the orders passed by the trial Court and revisional Court appear to be mechanical and without application of judicious mind. Even the revisional Court has not taken into consideration the basic fact that petitioner Nos. 1 to 4 who were residing separately, could not have interfered in the matrimonial life of the complainant and her husband. Moreover, the investigating agency also found them to be innocent. The complainant has levelled vague and general allegations against all the petitioners. Even in her statement before the Magistrate, she has simply stated that one table and a chair is with Sham Lal and one almirah is stated to be with Reshma, petitioner.
9. From the above facts, it is quite evident that there appears to be no substance in the allegations made by the complainant against the present petitioners. They appear to have been dragged in the matrimonial litigation unnecessarily and without any reason.
10. Accordingly, the petition is allowed and summoning order qua the present petitioners, as well as the revisional order are quashed.