JUDGMENT
S.S. Nijjar, J.
1. With the consent of counsel for the parties, the matter is taken up for final disposal at the motion stage.
2. At the outset, it deserves to be noticed in fairness to Mr. Girish Agnihotri that on the last date we had directed the counsel for the respondents to seek instructions as to whether the respondents are prepared to withdraw the order of premature retirement passed against the petitioner. We had adopted this course as it had been submitted by the learned counsel for the petitioner that a Vigilance enquiry had been ordered against the petitioner on the same allegations which pertain to the writing of the ACRs for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. It was stated that the petitioner had been completely exonerated in the vigilance enquiry. Today Mr. Agnihotri has submitted that the petitioner has been exonerated as claimed. He has also submitted that the respondents are prepared to re-consider the case of the petitioner with regard to premature retirement. They would, however,not withdraw the order of premature retirement. In view of the stand taken by the respondents, we have examined the writ petition on merits.
3. The petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, with a prayer for issuance of a writ in the nature of certiorari quashing the order dated 10.1.2003 (Annexure P10) passed by respondent No. 3- the Executive Committee, Haryana Warehousing Corporation, Panchkula (hereinafter referred to as “the Corporation). By this order, it has been observed that keeping in view the record of the petitioner, it has been found that it is not a fit case for completion of probation period. The Executive Committee has also ordered the premature retirement of the petitioner in public interest on his attaining the age of 55 years, in terms of the provisions contained in the note below Rule 5.32(A)(c) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume-II read with Rule 3.26(d) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules, Volume-I Part-I as applicable to the employees of the Haryana Warehousing Corporation. The petitioner has been ordered to be retired from service with effect from the date of the communication of the order, on payment of three months salary and allowances in lieu of notice as required by Rule 5.32(A)(c) of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Volume-II.Demand Draft No. 020658 dated 10.1.2003 amounting to Rs. 54492/- (Fifty four thousand four hundred and ninety two rupees only), drawn in favour of the petitioner on the Union Bank of India, Manimajra, towards payment of three months salary was enclosed, with the aforesaid order.
4. We may first notice the relevant facts as culled out from the pleadings of the parties.
5. The petitioner was appointed as Sub Divisional Engineer in the Corporation on 8.2.1980. By letter dated 28.1.1987, the petitioner was conveyed adverse remarks for the year 1984-85. The petitioner submitted a representation against the same on 27.4.1987 (Annexure P1). According to the respondents, the same was not entertained by the Corporation as time barred. By letter dated 19.2.1988, the petitioner was again conveyed remarks for the year 1985-86. Against the adverse remarks, the petitioner submitted representation dated 19.8.1988. According to the respondents, the representation was considered and rejected. The decision was conveyed to the petitioner by letter dated 4.5.1989. While perusing the file pertaining to his service, the petitioner came across two adverse remarks entered in the ACRs of the petitioner for the years 1988-89 and 1990-91. According to the petitioner, these remarks were never conveyed to him. However, on coming to know of the remarks, the petitioner made a representation with regard to the remarks contained in the ACRs for the year 1990-91. The Corporation, however, denies the claim of the petitioner. In the written statement, it is clearly averred that the ACRs for the years 1988-89 and 1990-91 were communicated to him by D.O. dated 26.4.1991 and 11.3.1992 respectively. The petitioner made no representation against the adverse remarks for the year 1988-89. He represented against the remarks for the year 1990-91 on 15.6.2000, which was filed again being badly time barred. In the meantime, the petitioner was promoted on the post of Executive Engineer by order dated 22.10.1999. Although the petitioner was not put on probation in the aforesaid order, but a maximum period of probation of three years is provided under Rule 10 of the Haryana Warehousing Corporation (Officer and Staff) Regulations, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as “the Staff Regulations”), the promotion case of the petitioner was considered by the Executive Committee of the Corporation in its meeting held on 23.4.2001, at Agenda Item No. 3. After considering the adverse remarks of the petitioner pertaining to the years 1984-85 and 1985-86, the Executive Committee approved the promotion of the petitioner. The petitioner claims that the aforesaid adverse remarks with regard to the years 1984-85 and 1985-86 cannot be taken into consideration by the Corporation for denying the benefit of confirmation. This claim of the petitioner is refuted by the respondents. The Corporation had the power not to confirm the petitioner. The respondents further claim that the criteria to adjudge one’s suitability and continuity on the promoted post beyond the expiry of probation period is the ACR of the employees concerned which he had earned during the period of probation. For the period 1.4.1999 to 14.12.1999 the petitioner was graded as “outstanding”. The reporting officer had seen the work of the petitioner as Sub Divisional Engineer from 1.4.1999 to 24.10.1999 and Executive Engineer from 25.10.1999 to 14.12.1999. Therefore, the report of the petitioner as Executive Engineer cannot be considered being less than three months. His work as Executive Engineer was thereafter seen by another Reporting Officer from 15.12.1999 to 7.1.2000 and thereafter by another Reporting Officer from 13.1.2000 to 31.3.2000. His reports for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 could not be finalised due to pendency of vigilance enquiry against him, The petitioner completed the age of 55 years on 29.6.2002. The petitioner came to know that on the review of the service record of the petitioner at the age of 55 years, he is likely to be prematurely retired. He, therefore, served a legal notice (Annexure P6) on 22.9.2002. The Corporation received the notice, but it is said to have been rejected by the competent authority. The petitioner then claims that the case of the petitioner was reviewed by the Executive Committee on 24.9.2002 and the decision was deferred. The petitioner claims that the respondents have misconstrued the instructions dated 6.12.2001 and treated the ACRs for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 as adverse. On this basis, the respondents have wrongly calculated the ACRs of the petitioner for the last 10 years as 60% instead of 70%. Missing ACRs are to be treated as blank. If the ACRs of the previous two years were to be taken into consideration, the petitioner is entitled to be retained in service after the age of 55 years. The case of the petitioner was re-considered by the Executive Committee of the Corporation on 8.1.2003 and the impugned order (Annexure P10) was passed.
6. The Corporation claims the right to consider the entire record of the petitioner for taking a decision as to whether the petitioner can be permitted to continue in service upto the age of 58 years. The assessment of the record of an employee at the stage of promotion is said to be substantially different from the assessment made for his retention in service after attaining a particular age. In the former case, record of a limited period is considered, but in the latter case overall record of service is required to be taken into account with general emphasis on record of previous ten years. Different factors are taken into consideration by the competent authority while granting officiating promotion and while deciding the issue relating to premature retirement. According to government instructions when integrity of an officer/official is found doubtful during his entire service period, then ACR of doubtful integrity for his entire service should be considered at the time of considering the case for extension in service beyond 50/55 years. For this reason, the Executive Committee only approved the promotion of the petitioner as Executive Engineer on 23.4.2001, but did not confirm him on the post. In order to review the case of the petitioner for retention in service of the Corporation beyond the age of 55 years i.e. on 29.6.2000, his last 10 years ACRs were required to be reviewed. Only final assessment of the work of the petitioner for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 could not be given due to the pendency of the vigilance enquiry. The other remarks with regard to these years speak volumes against the petitioner. It is the case of the respondents that the sole criteria to adjudge the suitability of the employee concerned for retention in service beyond the age of 55 years is 70% good reports during the last 10 years. There should also be no adverse remarks against the honesty and integrity during the period of the reports in question. In the case of non-availability of ACR for any particular year, the ACRs for the previous years are to be included for completing the period of 10 years. The relevant ACRs of the petitioner would be from 1992-93 to 2001-2002. However, the petitioner’s ACR for the year 1989-90 was treated as cancelled. ACRs for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95 were not recorded as the petitioner remained under suspension from 13.6.1991 to 28.4.1993 and 10.6.1994 to 27.6.1995. Therefore, counting the ACRs for the year 1988-89 onwards, the petitioner had earned two “Average”, six “Good/Above Good” reports. Remaining two reports, though written with various adverse remarks have not been formally conveyed to the petitioner for want of report of Vigilance Department. Thus, the petitioner earned only 60% “Good” reports.
7. Relying on the aforesaid factual as well as legal pleadings, learned counsel for the parties have made their submissions which we have duly considered.
8. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that even if one has to accept the ACRs of the petitioner as depicted by the respondents, on a correct interpretation of the instructions dated 19.11.1991 (Annexure P-11), the petitioner would have 70% “Good” or “Above Good” reports during the last ten years. The impugned order would, therefore, have to be quashed on this ground alone. Referring to Chart (Annexure P11A), learned Sr. Counsel submits that ACRs for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95, not being available, ACRs of the corresponding previous years should have been included for appraisal. Even the ACRs for the years 2000-2001 and 2001- 2002 were never finalised. Therefore, the reports cannot be said to be adverse. According to the learned Sr. Counsel, the respondents could not have taken into account the entry of “Integrity Doubtful” with regard to the year 1984-85. The petitioner was permitted to continue in service at the age of 50 years when his record was reviewed. Thereafter, the petitioner was promoted to the post of Executive Engineer on 25.10.1999. The promotion of the petitioner was approved by the Executive Committee on 23.4.2001. Any adverse report prior to 23.4.2001, therefore, cannot be taken into account either for confirming the petitioner on the post of Executive Engineer or for not granting extension to the petitioner to continue in service till the age of superannuation. In support of these submissions, the learned Sr. Counsel has relied on a number of judgments of this Court and the Supreme Court which are as under:-
1. Harbhagwan, Assistant of Deputy Commissioner’s Office v. State of Haryana, 1997(3) S.L.R. (Pb.&Hry.) 410;
2. Narasingh Patnaik v. State of Orissa, A.I.R. 1996 Supreme Court page 3223 (paras 5 & 6);
3. Sh. Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr., 1992(2) S.L.R. (S.C.) page 2 (Para 32);
4. State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001)3 Supreme Court Cases 314 (Para 11);
5. Badrinath v. Government of Tamil Nadu,5 (2000)8 Supreme Court Cases 395 Paras 47 & 58):
6. Daya Nandv. State of Haryana, 1995(2) Recent Services Judgments (F.B.) 55 (Paras 21 & 24);
7. Jugai Chandra Saikia v. State of Assam and Anr., 2003(2) S.C.T. 351 (Para 6) and;
8. Dr. Dharamvir Sharma v. State of Haryana, 2003(2) S.C.T. (P&H) 114 (Para 7);
9. Learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner having been promoted as Executive Engineer on 22.10.1999 stood automatically confirmed on 21.10.2002. The order dated 8.1.2003 is, therefore, liable to be quashed on the short ground that the respondents had no jurisdiction to pass the same. In support of this submissions, learned Senior Counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dharam Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1968 S.C. 1210.
10. On the other hand, Mr. Agnihotri, learned counsel appearing for the respondents has submitted that the respondents have rightly considered the entire service record of the petitioner while taking the decision to prematurely retire the petitioner. The petitioner had earned the remarks of “Integrity Doubtful” for the years 1984-85 and 1985- 86. These entries are relevant for assessing the performance of the petitioner. The promotion of the petitioner to the post of Executive Engineer is of no consequence as the respondents has found him “Not Fit” for promotion. According to the learned counsel, there can be no automatic confirmation. Even though the petitioner had completed the maximum period of probation no conscious decision had been taken by the respondents to permit the petitioner to continue on the promoted post of Executive Engineer. Mr. Agnihotri has further submitted that the case of the petitioner was considered on the basis of the instructions issued by the State of Haryana on 6.12.2001. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has relied on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. Vijay Kumar Jain, 2002(3) S.L.R. 363 and the judgment rendered by this Court in the case of State of Haryana and Ors. v. Thakar Das, 11 1998(1) R.S.J. 73.
11. It is not necessary for us to notice all the judgments which have been cited by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner as the principles have now been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Gujarat v. Umedbhai M. Patel, (2001)3 Supreme Court Cases 314 which are as under:-
(i) Whenever the services of a public servant are no longer useful to the general administration, he can be compulsorily retired for the sake of public interest.
(ii) Ordinarily, the order of compulsory retirement is not to be treated as a punishment coming under Article 311 of the Constitution.
(iii) For better administration, it is necessary to chop off dead wood but the order of compulsory retirement can be passed after having due regard to the entire record of the officer.
(iv) Any adverse entries made in the confidential record shall be taken note of and be given due weight in passing such order.
(v) Even uncommunicated entries in the confidential record can also be taken into consideration.
(vi) The order of compulsory retirement shall not be passed as a short cut to avoid departmental enquiry when such course is more desirable.
(vii) If the officer was given a promotion despite adverse entries made in the confidential record, that is a fact in favour of the Officer.
(viii) Compulsory retirement shall not be imposed as a punitive measure.”
In the case of Thakar Das (supra), it has been held as follows:-
“These adverse reports could legitimately be taken into consideration for forming an opinion that the petitioner was not fit to be retained in service poor that his retention was not in public interest/interest of service. His officiating promotion on 11.2.1980 as Sub Inspector cannot have the effect of washing out the adverse reports because the assessment of the record of an employee at the stage of promotion is substantially different from the assessment made for his retention in service after attaining age of specified length of service. In the former case record of a limited period is considered but in the latter case over all record of service is required to be taken into account with greater emphasis on the record of previous 10 years. Moreover, factors which weigh in the mind of the competent authority while granting officiating promotion are not the same which have to be kept in view while deciding the issue relating to premature retirement. In this case sufficient material was available with the competent authority to form an opinion that the retention of the respondent No. 1 in service was not in public interest and in view of the principles of law laid down in Sh. Baikuntha Nath Das and Anr. v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and Anr., 1992(2) S.L.R. 2, we do not find any legal justification to hold that the premature retirement of the petitioner is arbitrary or otherwise unjustified.”
12. A perusal of the above shows that the observations of the Division Bench are based on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in the case Sh. Baikuntha Nath Das (supra). Undoubtedly, the case of the petitioner has to be considered, keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by this Court in the case of Thakar Das (supra). In the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) the Supreme Court had laid down certain principles which are as under: –
“(i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour.
(ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government.
(iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This dose not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be a perverse order.
(iv) The government (or the review committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter of course attaching more importance to record of performance during the letter years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.
(v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a court merely on the showing that while passing it, uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interference.”
13. The aforesaid observations in Baikuntha Nath Das case (supra) were considered and approved by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Kumar Jain (supra). Proposition (iv) reproduced above, clearly shows that if a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority.
14. Since the petitioner has been exonerated by Vigilance Department, the ACRs for the years 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 would have to be recorded afresh. The entire basis of these ACRs were the allegations which were under investigation by the Vigilance Department. It is accepted by the counsel for the respondents that the petitioner has been exonerated in the investigation. Considering a similar set of facts, the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ramaswami v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1982(1) S.L.R. (S.C.) 690, observed in the words of O. Chinnappa Reddy, J., as unden-
“O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.- An order of premature retirement following close upon the heels of promotion and appointment to a coveted selection post is bound to perplex any right thinking man and make him wonder whether the right hand knows what the left hand has done. If in the month of May, a Government servant is found to possess such high merit and ability, which naturally includes integrity, as to entitle him not merely to be promoted to a selection post but to be appointed to a very responsible and much desired post in that cadre, what could have happened between May and September, to merit his being weeded out altogether from service in September, under the rule which enables the Government to retire a Government servant in the public interest after he has attained the age of 50 years or after he has completed 25 years of qualifying service? One would expect that some grave and grim situation had developed in the interregnum to warrant the pursuit of such a drastic course. But, surprisingly, we found nothing whatsoever had happened in this case during the period. Let us look at the totality of the facts…”.
4. So, what do we have? There was an adverse entry in the confidential file of the appellant in 1969. The basis of the entry was knocked out by the order dated 20th November, 1974 of the Government and the effect of the entry was blotted out by the promotion of the appellant as Deputy Commissioner..”
5. One curious feature of the case is that while the 1969 entry noted that an enquiry was pending the Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Department in regard to the allegations against the appellant, the ultimate result of the enquiry which was that the charges should be dropped was nowhere noted in the personal file of the appellant.
One wonders whether the failure to note the result of the enquiry in the personal file led to the impugned order.
6. In the face of the promotion of the appellant just a few months earlier and nothing even mildy suggestive of ineptitude or inefficiency thereafter, it is impossible to sustain the order of the Government retiring the appellant from service. The learned counsel for the State of Tamil Nadu argued that the Government was entitled to take into consideration the entire history of the appellant including that part of it which was prior to this promotion. We do not say that the previous history of a government servant should be completely ignored, once he is promoted. Sometimes past events may help to assess present conduct. But when there is nothing in the present conduct casting any doubt on the wisdom of the promotion, we see no justification for needless digging into the past.”
15. We are of the opinion that the observations of the Supreme Court apply with full vigour to the case of the petitioner.
16. The adverse entries in the record of the petitioner pertain to the ACRS for the year 1984-85 and 1985-86. Since then the petitioner had been promoted to the post of Executive Engineer on 25.10.99. The promotion was approved by the Executive Committee on 23.04.201. After looking into the record, the petitioner was permitted to continue in service at the age of 50years. The petitioner completed the maximum period of probation on 21.10.2002. By a composite order dated 10.1.2002, it has been decided that “it is not a fit case for completion of probation period and is also not a fit case for retention in service beyond the age of 55 years.” In our opinion the action taken by the respondents is rather incongruous. The respondents need to re-examine the whole issue keeping in view the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.
17. However, in our opinion, the ratio of law laid down in Dharam Singh’s case, would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances of this case. As noticed earlier, the petitioner was promoted on 25.10.1999. The promotion was approved on 23.4.2001. The case of the petitioner was reviewed on 24.9.2002. The Executive Committee introduced a supplementary Agenda Item No. 1 as follows:-
i) Completion or otherwise of the probation period of Shri B.R. Aggarwal, Executive Engineer.
ii) Review for retention of Shri B.R. Aggarwal, Executive Engineer at the age of 55 years.”
18. The Managing Director apprised the Committee about the pendency of the Vigilance Enquiry against the petitioner. It was stated that the petitioner had indulged in serious financial irregularities while getting released payment worth Rs. 3,55,53,733/- in violation of prescribed procedure. The Committee was also informed that no senior supervisor officer has observed the working of the petitioner from 25.10.1999 to 31.3.2000 for more than three months. It has been reported in the ACR for the year 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 that the Vigilance Department is conducting enquiry against the petitioner for indulging into serious financial irregularities. Therefore, his probation period cannot be completed in view of the pending Vigilance Enquiry. From the above, it becomes apparent that no final decision was taken with regard to the probation period of the petitioner, in view of the pending vigilance enquiry. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the respondents had been in any manner remiss in not considering the claim of the petitioner for confirmation within the maximum period stipulated under the rules. The decision with regard to the probation period should have been taken by the respondents on completion of the vigilance enquiry. As noticed at the outset, it was agreed between the counsel for the parties during arguments that the Vigilance enquiry has been concluded and the charges against the petitioner have been held to be not proved. The respondents, therefore, would have to take a fresh decision with regard to the probation period of the petitioner. The record produced before us makes it abundantly clear that the matter with regard to the grant of extension to the petitioner beyond 55 years was directly linked with the outcome of the vigilance enquiry. Two of the Annual Confidential Reports were to be finalised on the completion of the enquiry report. Therefore, in our opinion, the petitioner could not have been prematurely retired on the ground that seven out of ten entries were not “Good” as required under the instructions dated 6.12.2001. The summary of the ACRS of the petitioner has been given as follows:-
Sr. ACR for the year Assessment Remarks
No.
1. 1998-81 Very Good -
2. 1981-82 Very Good -
3. 1982-83 Very Good -
4. 1983-84 Good -
5. 1984-85 Below 1. Integrity doubtful
Average 2. Placed under
suspension on
30.11.84. Reinstated on
31.12.84. The suspension
period not treated as duty
period.
3. Awarded punishment
of stoppage of one increment
without cumulative effect.
6. 1985-86 Average 1. Integrity doubtful
2. Placed under suspension on
30.8.85. Reinstated on
24.9.85. Suspension period
not treated as duty period.
7. 1986-87 Good -
8. 1987-88 Average 1. Adverse remarks
conveyed on 5.9.89 and
representation rejected.
9. 1988-89 Average ACR conveyed on 26.4.91.
10. 1989-90 - ACR treated as cancelled did
not work for three months
under any authority.
11. 1990-91 Average ACR conveyed on 11.3.92.
12. 1991-92 Not recorded due
13. 1992-93 to having remained
under suspension
from 13.6.91 to
28.4.93.
14. 1993-94 Good Recorded warning Awarded
on 27.5.93
15. 1994-95 Not recorded due
to having remained
under suspension
from 10.6.94 to
27.6.95.
16. 1995-96 Good -
17. 1996-97 Very Good -
18. 1997-98 Outstanding -
19. 1998-99 Good -
20. 1.4.99 to Outstanding -
14.12.99
15.12.99 to - No initiating/reviewing/
31.3.99. accepting authority has seen
his work for at least 3
months during this period.
21. 2000-2001 - Various acts of omission and
commission as pointed out in
the ACR but final assessment
will be given on receipt of
vigilance report."
19. A perusal of the above shows that ACRs for the year 2000-2001 and 2001-2002 are to be finalised on the outcome of the vigilance report. The ACRS for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95 were not recorded as the petitioner remained under suspension. However, the petitioner has placed on record an order dated 22.9.1993 in which it has been ordered that the suspension period from 13.6.91 to 250.5.1993 should be treated as duty period for all intents and purposes. Similarly, by order dated 24.12.1996, it has been ordered that period of suspension of the petitioner from 10.6.94 to 3.7.1995 shall be treated as duty period for all intents and purposes. Having treated the period of suspension as duty period, it would be incumbent on the respondents to record afresh ACRS for the years 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95. It is only after the ACRS are recorded that the case of the petitioner can be considered under the instructions dated 19.11.1991. Under these instructions, the procedure to be followed is as follows:-
“It is with a view to assessing whether such expectations are being fulfilled or not that a procedure for reviewing the performance of Govt. servants, who have attained the age of 50/55 years or have rendered 30 years qualifying service, has been laid down for the retirement of these Govt servants who do not fulfill these expeditions, it is essential that employee must have earned at least 50%, 70% good or above reports during last 10 years, as the case may be and there is no entry regrading doubtful integrity during this period.”
20. With the exoneration of the petitioner in the vigilance enquiry, it would be necessary for the respondents to re-consider the entire matter after finalising the ACRs as noticed above.
21. In view of the above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order dated 10.1.2002 (Annexure P10) is quashed. The petitioner is ordered to be reinstated on the post of Executive Engineer with all consequential benefits. The respondents are at liberty to re-consider the entire matter, after finalising the ACRs as noticed above.
22. Let the necessary exercise be concluded within a period of two months of the receipt of a certified copy of this order.