IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICIATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 24.06.2008 C O R A M THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA A.S.NO.695 of 1994 Srinivasa Reddy .. Appellant Vs. 1.Karuppa Reddy 2.Periyasami 3.Ramasami Reddy . . Respondents The First Appeal is filed against the judgment and decree dated 23.11.1993 made in O.S.No.123 of 1988 on the file of the Sub Court, Vridhachalam. For Appellant : Mr.C.R.Prasanan For Respondents : Mr.K.Ravichandra Babu for R1 & R2 R3 No appearance JUDGMENT
Tersely and briefly, the case of the plaintiffs as stood exposited from the plaint could be portrayed thus;
The plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of title over the suit properties as set out in the ‘B’ Schedule of the plaint of which ‘A’ Schedule of properties forms part and for injunction as against the defendants and in the alternative they prayed for partition of ‘A’ Schedule property and for allotment of 1/3 share in it and for other incidental reliefs.
2. The properties mentioned in the ‘A’ Schedule of the plaint along with other properties originally belonged to Chinnaiya Reddy, the father of the first plaintiff and the grand father of the defendants. Chinnaiya Reddy had three sons namely (i)Kannaiya Reddy, the father of the first defendant ; (ii)Kuppa Reddy, father of the second defendant and (3)Karuppa Reddy, the first plaintiff. As such, the said Chinnaiya Reddy and his aforesaid three sons with their joint effort purchased the properties in the name of Kannaiya Reddy, who, happened to be the eldest son of Chinnaiya Reddy. The properties so purchased were treated as joint family properties. Some of them were also alienated. Chinnaiya Reddy died intestate 40 years ago. His wife Thangammal died 30 years ago. In those circumstances, the said Kannaiya Reddy being the eldest son of Chinnaiya Reddy managed the suit properties in his capacity as the Manager of the Hindu Joint Family. While so, 19 years anterior to the filing of the suit, the ‘A’ Scheduled properties were orally partitioned and the ‘B’ Scheduled properties were allotted in favour of the first plaintiff in the presence of five panchayatars. Consequently, mutation was effected in the revenue records in the name of the first plaintiff relating to the ‘B’ Scheduled properties. The first plaintiff has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit property in his own capacity as owner openly, peacefully and continuously to the knowledge of the defendants and also hostile to the ownership of the defendants for over twelve years and accordingly the first plaintiff became the owner of the suit properties. The first plaintiff’s aforesaid two brothers died a few years anterior to the filing of the suit. The defendants with an ulterior motive started disturbing the peaceful possession and enjoyment of ‘B’ Scheduled properties by the plaintiff since 09.10.1988. The second plaintiff is the grand son of the first plaintiff in favour of whom, the former executed in favour of the later Ex.A20 and Ex.A21 the settlement deeds dated 26.8.1987 and 20.04.1988 settling items 1 to 7 in the ‘B’ Schedule properties. Hence the suit.
3. Per contra, gainsaying and denying, contradicting and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint, the first defendant filed the written statement which was adopted by the second defendant, with the averments, the pith and marrow of them, would run thus:-
The ‘A’ Scheduled properties and other properties did not belong to Chinnaiya Reddy. There was no joint Hindu Family existed among Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons. The ‘A’ Scheduled properties were not purchased from and out of the joint exertion of Chinnaiyya Reddy and his three sons. The entire ‘A’ Scheduled properties were purchased by the first defendant’s father Kannaiya Reddy, from out of his own exertion and others had nothing to do with those properties. The first defendant’s father was in possession and enjoyment of the properties till his death on 27.8.1986, whereupon, the properties devolved upon the first defendant who started enjoying it on his own right. The first defendant’s father sustained injury in his stomach and consequently he took treatment in JIPMER Hospital and at that time just to oblige him, the first plaintiff paid the kist for and on behalf of the first defendant’s father. The Panchayat referred to in the plaint, is false and there was no partition much less any oral partition as alleged in the plaint. The settlement deeds alleged to have been executed by the first plaintiff in favour of the second plaintiff are all false. Accordingly, the defendants prayed for the dismissal of the suit.
4. The trial court framed the relevant issues. During trial on the side of the plaintiffs, the first plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 along with P.Ws 2 and 3 and Exhibits A-1 to A-30 were marked. The first defendant himself was examined as D.W.1 along with Chinnasamy. Ex.B.1 to Ex.B77 were marked.
5. The trial court ultimately decreed the suit declaring that the ‘B’ Scheduled properties belonged to first plaintiff and that the defendants should not interfere with the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same by granting an injunction as against the defendants. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court, the first defendant filed this appeal on various grounds, the pith and marrow of them would run thus:-
The judgment and decree of the trial court is against law, weight of evidence and all probabilities of the case. Relying on the receipts and the Chitta, the trial Court erroneously decreed the suit as prayed by the plaintiffs. Ignoring the sale deeds in the name of the first defendant’s father, Kannaiya Reddy, the trial Court decided the case in favour of the plaintiffs. There was no iota or shred of evidence to prove that joint family existed among Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons and that owing to joint family exertion only, the suit properties were purchased. The burden of proof was on the plaintiff, but, he failed to discharge the same. Accordingly, the first plaintiff prayed for decreeing the suit.
6. The points for consideration are:-
(1) Whether the suit properties were acquired due to the joint exertion of Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons;
(2) If so, whether there took place any oral partition in which the ‘B’ Scheduled properties were allotted to the share of the first plaintiff.
(3) Whether there is any infirmity in the judgment and decree of the trial court.
7. Points 1 and 2;-
The points 1 and 2 are taken together for discussion as they are inter-linked and inter-woven with each other. For convenience sake, the parties are referred to here under according to their litigative status before the trial Court.
8. The quintessence of the case of the plaintiffs in a nut shell is that the ‘A’ scheduled properties and other properties emerged out of the joint exertion of Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons namely
(i) Karuppa Reddy, the first plaintiff,
(ii) Kannaiya Reddy, the father of the first defendant and (iii)the Kuppa Reddy the father of the second defendant in the name of Kannaiya Reddy, the eldest among the sons of Chinnaiya Reddy and they enjoyed those properties, as their joint properties; subsequently an oral partition ensued, whereby the ‘B’ Scheduled properties which forms part of the ‘A’ Scheduled properties were allotted to the share of the first plaintiff, Karuppa Reddy.
9. Per contra, the defendants would deny in toto the plea of the plaintiffs and contend that the properties were acquired by Kannaiya Reddy from out his own funds and there was no oral partition at all.
10. The learned counsel for the first defendant would draw the attention of this Court to the effect that the trial Court has not framed specific issue relating to the prescriptive title, even then it gave a positive finding there on. No doubt it is a common or garden principle that there should be an issue relating to prescription, consequently evidence adduced, whereupon there should be a finding, after analysing the evidence. But here in this case, the plaintiffs clearly and categorically averred in the plaint that over the ‘B’ Scheduled properties, they acquired prescriptive title also after oral partition and they also adduced oral and documentary evidence in that regard. Based on that, the Court also gave a finding that consequent upon oral partition by virtue of their continuous enjoyment, the plaintiffs acquired prescriptive title over the ‘B’ Scheduled properties. Here, this is not a simple suit filed by the plaintiffs based on prescriptive title. The totality of the case, as discussed supra is that the properties were joint properties consequently, there was an oral partition and after such partition, they acquired prescription title also. In such a case non framing of the issue relating to prescriptive title is not all fatal to the case of the plaintiffs. Both the parties understanding the real controversies involved in the lis, adduced evidence also.
11. It is a trite proposition of law that preponderance of probabilities would govern the adjudication in civil cases. The plaint averments are specific that till the lifetime of the first defendant’s father, he had not chosen to disturb the possession. But only after the death of first defendants’ father during the year 1986 as revealed by Ex.B10 dated 26.08.1986, the defendants attempted to disturb the peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit properties of the plaintiff from the year 1988. Neither the defendants nor their respective fathers raised any dispute relating to the possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by the plaintiffs exclusively for such a long period as set out supra.
12. The learned counsel for the appellant/first defendant, would also try to argue that dragging the case as though the trial Court rendered its judgment belatedly based on the patta and tax receipts which are as per law not documents of title. No doubt there are catena of decisions of this Court to the effect that patta will not constitute title but no where it is found stated that patta and payment of tax receipts should not be taken as evidence coupled with other circumstances and evidence available on record. My discussion supra would demonstrate and exemplify as to how the oral and documentary evidence and the circumstances clearly support the plaintiffs’ case.
13. The learned counsel for the first defendant/appellant would advance his argument to the effect that absolutely there is no iota or shred of evidence to prove that out of the alleged joint exertion of Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons, the properties were acquired jointly in the name of Kanniya Reddy; simply based on the tax receipts for some period in the name of the first plaintiff, Karuppa Reddy, relating to some items of the properties and the patta also standing in his name, no presumption arises that the suit properties were joint properties. By way of buttressing and fortifying, strengthening and probabilising, his argument he would rely on the decision of this Court reported in 1996 1 L.W. 663 (KRISHNAMURTHY S. vs. S.VENUGOPAL & 13 OTHRS). An excerpt from it would run thus;
“30. The law is well-stated. Merely because there is a joint family, it does not follow that the family possessed any property. It is also well-settled that if a person wants to claim a property as family property, it is for him to substantiate the same. As held in A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 411 (Achuthan Nair v. Chinnammu Amma and other), under Hindu Law, when a property stands in the name of a member of a joint family, it is incumbent upon those asserting that it is a joint family property to establish it. On the admission of plaintiff himself, the father was managing the day-to-day affairs of the business till two years prior to his death. The first defendant had nothing to do with that. The father was the manager. If the first defendant had nothing to do with the property or business, it is for the plaintiff to prove why the family purchased the property in the name of the first defendant. The plaintiff has miserably failed in that attempt.”
14. He also relied on the decision of this Court reported in 1997 1 L.W. 482 (PUTHIAVINAYAGAM PILLAI v. SIVASANKARAN PILLAI). An excerpt from it would run thus;
“6. . . . .
That apart, there are materials on record to show that the plaintiff was working as a teacher from 1944 to 1946 and thereafter he was employed in 1948 and 1949 and that in addition to his regular employment as above, the plaintiff was also carrying on the profession of an artist, by drawing pictures and making sufficient earnings. No doubt, it is the common case, that after the sale of the house in 1945 and after some time thereafter the father disappeared from the family but returned after several years and during this time, apparently the plaintiff who was the eldest person was protecting and taking care of the other members of the family, particularly, the defendant also who was said to be of nine or ten years of age when the property in question was acquired in 1948 and thereafter when the same was improved also the defendant was only a minor and there is absolutely no evidence whatsoever to show that he was sufficiently of age to earn any income. From the fact that as a minor boy he was in the family and he might have been doing some odd jobs in the family, it will not give him the opportunity or right to claim that the earnings made by the plaintiff were the joint family earnings unless any concrete or positive materials were made available to show joint earnings at the relevant or material point of time which, in my view is conspicuously absent in this case.”
15. The Honourable Supreme Court in (2007) 3 MLJ 834 SCC (MAKHAN SINGH v. KULWANT SINGH) held as under.
“9. The query was answered in paragraph 18 in the following terms:
“The legal principle, therefore, is that there is no presumption of a property being joint family property only on account of existence of a joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove that the property is a joint family property. If, however, the person so asserting proves that there was nucleus with which the joint family property could be acquired, there would be presumption of the property being joint and the onus would shift on the person who claims it to be self-acquired property to prove that he purchased the property with his own funds and not out of joint family nucleus that was available”.
Absolutely there could be no second thought over the ratio decidendi as found set out in the above said verdicts. The onus probandi is on the plaintiffs to prove the case initially. The trial Court in its judgment elaborately analysed the oral evidence adduced on the side of the plaintiffs coupled with the documentary evidence and after furnishing reasons arrived at the conclusion that the suit properties were acquired out of the joint effort of Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons and that there was oral partition among the sons of Chinnaiya Reddy. It has to be seen as to whether the trial Court based its judgment on the admissible and reliable portion of the oral and documentary evidence, has to be seen.
16. P.W.3, Govinda Moopar, on the date of deposing before the trial Court during the year 1992 was 62 years old. He was Panchayat president for about 10 years. He is the resident of Kuthiraisandhal Village where the suit properties are situated. From out of his personal knowledge he deposed before the Court in support of the case of the plaintiffs. It is therefore clear that his evidence is having probative force of its own. During cross-examination of PW3 not even a suggestion had been put that he had any motive to depose in support of the plaintiffs’ case except the only one formal suggestion that his evidence was false. Nothing was suggested to him that he had axe to grind in the matter. The bedrock of the pleas of the plaintiffs themselves permits oral evidence. Under the Hindu law, the co-parceners are permitted to adduce oral evidence to prove that the property was purchased due to the joint exertion of the members of the joint family and in this case there was oral partition also. In such a case, the Court has to clearly consider the oral evidence. The deposition of PW3 is free from embellishment and infact it is in concinnity with the documentary evidence which would be discussed infra.
17. P.W.2, Kalia Moopar, on the date of deposing before the trial Court during the year 1992 was 65 years old. He also deposed in support of the plaintiffs’ case on the same line as deposed by P.W.3. During cross-examination of P.W.2 except the formal suggestion that he was deposing falsehood, not even any plausible suggestion had been put to him so as to discredit his testimony.
18. P.W.1, the first plaintiff, aged about 70 years, would reiterate the stand in the plaint. As such P.W.2 and P.W.3 had no animosity or antipathy as against the defendants, whereas on the defendant’s side, the first defendant, son of deceased Kannaiya Reddy who examined himself as D.W.1 aged about 44 years as on the date of his deposition before the trial Court, had no opportunity of knowing personally about the joint family status among Chinnaiya Reddy and his three sons. The first defendant’s father Kannaiya Reddy died on 26.08.1986 and Kuppa Reddy one of the brothers of Kannaiya Reddy died during the year 1963. The first defendant in the chief examination itself would admit that his grand father Chinnaiya Reddy died even before the birth of the first defendant. As such, he would also candidly without mincing words admit that the Panchayatars, in whose presence the oral partition was effected were dead. According to P.W.1, in the presence of five Panchayatars namely Kuppa Gounder, Thopula Gounder, Arumaga Gounder, Ramasami Gounder and Karutha Gounder, the PW1 and his two brothers, orally partitioned the joint properties about 23 years ago and in the plaint also there is reference to the said fact. The admission of the first defendant is to the effect that those Panchayatars died and hence absolutely there could have been no opportunity of examining them during trial. The first defendant/appellant cannot find fault with the plaintiffs over having not examined those Panchayatars to speak about the oral partition. However, P.W.2 and P.W.3, the elderly persons of the locality concerned, spoke clearly about the said joint family status and also the acquisition of those properties from out of the joint exertion of all brothers and also about the subsequent oral partition. As such the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 clearly corroborate the evidence of P.W.1.
19. P.W.1 placing reliance on Ex.A1 and Ex.A19 and the tax receipts would depose that the tax was paid by the first defendant relating to the ‘B’ scheduled properties after such oral partition. Both P.W.1 and P.W.3, while deposing before the Court during the second half of 1992 would categorically depose that 23 years ago, the said oral partition had taken place. Accordingly if viewed the said oral partition took place around the year 1970.
20. Ex.A1 dated 10.02.1974, the tax receipt in the name of Karuppan Reddy, for the fasli 1383 and Ex.A2 dated 05.03.1974, the tax receipt in the name of Karuppan Reddy, for the fasli 1383, support the contention of the plaintiffs that there was oral partition and subsequent to it, P.W.1 started paying tax. Both the receipts are referring to Patta No.285 relating to the items 1 to 4 of the ‘B’ Scheduled properties .
21. Ex.A3, dated 12.03.1976, the tax receipt in the name of Karuppan Reddy for the fasli year 1385; Ex.A4, dated 03.04.1978, the tax receipt in the name of Karuppan Reddy for the fasli year 1386-1387 and Ex.A5, dated 25.02.1980 tax receipt in the name of Karuppan Reddy for the fasli year 1385, are all relating to Patta No.285 so to say the items 1 to 4 of the suit schedule property.
22. Ex.A6, dated 21.02.1986, the tax receipt for the fasli 1385;Ex.A7, dated 03.01.1987 the tax receipt for the fasli 1386-1387;Ex.A8, dated 07.01.1987 the tax receipt for the fasli 1396; Ex.A9, dated 29.03.1975, the tax receipt for the fasli 1382; Ex.A10, dated 11.02.1974, the tax receipt for the fasli 1383; Ex.A11, dated 21.03.1976 the tax receipt for the fasli 1385; Ex.A12 dated 24.07.1978 the tax receipt for the fasli 1387; Ex.A13 dated 28.02.1980 for the fasli 1389; Ex.A14 dated 26.06.1982, the tax receipt for the fasli 1390-1391; Ex.A15 dated 06.04.1984, the tax receipt for the fasli 1393; Ex.A16 dated 06.03.1985 tax receipt for the fasli 1394; Ex.A17 dated 16.02.1986; Ex.A18 dated 16.02.1986 the tax receipt for the fasli 1395; Ex.A19 dated 02.04.1987 the tax receipt for the fasli 1396 are all standing in the name of Karuppa Reddy.
23. It is the categorical assertion of P.W.1 that those tax receipts are relating to the suit properties. During cross-examination of P.W.1, it is not the case of the defendants that those receipts are not at all relating to the suit properties. The trial Court in para number 18 made a thorough analysis of the tax receipts and the patta concerned and observed that Ex.A1 to Ex.A19 are the tax receipts relating to the suit property relating to the fasli years 1383 to 1396 so to say covering a period of 13 years; for the old patta No.285; the new Patta No is 59 and for some other properties the Old patta No. was 107 and the new patta No.is 194. Accordingly the trial Court clearly held that both the parties have agreed to the effect that the old Patta Nos.285 and 107 got changed with the new survey number 59 and 194 respectively. Accordingly if viewed it is clear that the aforesaid tax receipts are relating to the ‘B’ Scheduled properties. As such the finding of the trial Court is based on the objective facts, which warrants no interference. The trial Court also highlighted that after the execution of the settlement deeds Ex.A20 dated 26.08.1987 and Ex.A21 dated 20.04.1988 by P.W.1 in favour of the second plaintiff, Panjavarnammal, the guardian of the then minor second plaintiff, started paying tax as revealed by Ex.P22 dated 04.02.1988 and Ex.P23 dated 04.02.1988. Ex.A24 the patta pass book in the name of the second plaintiff relating to the properties covered under the settlement deeds. Ex.A25 is the chitta extract in the name of the second plaintiff relating to the properties covered under the settlement. Ex.A26, Ex.A27 and Ex.A28 are also the patta extracts in the name of the minor. It is therefore crystal clear that Ex.A1 to Ex.A28 unambiguously and clinchingly prove the first defendant’s contention. The clinching and authentic documentary evidence would clearly demonstrate and exemplify that there had been oral partition and consequent upon the same, the first defendant started paying tax and after execution of such settlement deeds the second plaintiff started paying tax and that for more than a period of 13 years the plaintiffs have been in possession and enjoyment of the ‘B’ scheduled properties consequent upon the oral partition.
24. During cross-examination of P.W.1 by the first defendant, it was suggested to him as though the first defendant’s father sustained injury and took treatment in Jipmer Hospital and at that time on behalf of the first defendant’s father, the first plaintiff paid the tax. However, such a suggestion is turned out to be a utter falsehood, in view of my discussion supra. There is nothing on record to demonstrate that for a period of 13 years the first defendant’s father was admitted in the Jipmer hospital and hence he requested the first plaintiff to pay the tax.
25. The trial Court also in paragraph number 19 observed that on the side of the defendant Ex.B1 to Ex.B77 were marked and out of those documents Exs.B17, 18, 20, 25, 28, 32, 38, 41, 44, 48, 52, 54, 55, 59, 61, 64 to 66 were standing in the name of the first defendant’s father relating to old patta no.285 and the new patta no.59; for the same period the first defendant also paid tax relating to those patta numbers. Exs.B23, 24, 27, 31, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 45 to 47, 49, 50, 51, 53 and 56 to 58 are relating to Patta No.194. Exs.B21, 22, 29, 30, 33, 60, 62 and 63 no patta number is found specified.
26. It is the case of P.W.1 that there are 7 items in the ‘A’ Scheduled properties and in each of those 7 items, was divided individually into three portions and P.W.1, being the younger one such eastern portion was allotted to him. In such circumstances, there could be possibility of tax receipts emerging even after oral partition in the name of all or one or more of the divided brothers.
27. Ex.B1 is the sale deed dated 19.05.1942 in the name of Kannaiya Reddy relating to the I item of the suit property. Ex.B2 dated 13.05.1943 is not relating to the suit property. Similarly Ex.B3 dated 01.08.1943 is also not relating to the suit property. Ex.B4 dated 17.06.1946 is relating to the item number 7 of the suit property. Ex.B5 dated 26.05.1949 is not relating to the suit property. Ex.B6 dated 01.07.1950 is the sale deed executed in favour of Kannaiya Reddy relating to the sixth item of the suit property. Ex.B7 dated 21.10.1970 is relating to the fifth item of the suit property. Ex.B8 dated 03.02.1984 is the usufructuary mortgage deed executed by one Pachamuthu Moopar in favour of Annamalai Moopar and nothing has been shown as to how the first defendant’s father was concerned with this deed. Ex.B9 dated 19.11.1978 is the sale deed executed by the first defendant’s father Chinnaiya Reddy in favour of Thangammal and it is not relating to the suit property.
28. The trial Court therefore clearly given a finding that from the documents filed on the defendant side as discussed supra, some of the suit properties were purchased in the name of the first defendant’s father.
29. The deposition of D.W.1 is only a self-serving statement for the reason that he had no competence at all to speak about the facts which his father alone could have known. D.W.2 (Chinnasamy) who was examined on the defendants’ side is none other than the first defendant’s sister’s husband aged about 65 years. He would come forward with a cryptic deposition as though he had knowledge about the alleged factum of the first defendant’s father having purchased the suit property from out of his own income.
30. During cross-examination he would candidly and supinely depose that he had no personal knowledge as to how the first defendant’s father purchased the property. As such as against the clinching and disinterested testimony of P.W.2 and P.W.3, the interested testimony of D.W.2 is having no legs to stand. D.W.1 in his deposition would submit that only in the immovable property referred to in Ex.B9; there are three houses and each house belongs to each of the brothers, the first plaintiff, the first defendant’s father and the second defendant’s father. He would also candidly depose that out of the immovable property, an extent of 22 cents, was allotted to the share of the first defendant’s father and and out of that he sold one cent as per Ex.B9 dated 19.11.1978. It is just and necessary to extract the relevant portion of his deposition.
“v/th/rh/M/9 brhj;jpy; vd; je;ijapd; rnfhjuh;fSf;F jyh 8 ghfk; vd;why; mJ rhpay;y/ Mdhy; mjpy; K:tUf;Fk; K:d;W tPLfs; cs;sd vd;why; rhp// mg;go mth;fs; me;j tPLfis vj;jid Mz;Lfshf mDg;tpf;fpwhh;fs; vd;W bjhpahJ/ vd; je;ijfF fpilj;j 22 brd;l; epiyj;ijj;jhd; v/th/rh/M/9 fpuak; 1 brz;l; fpuak; bfhLf;fg;l;Ls;sJ vd;why; rhpay;y/@
31. The above extract from the deposition of D.W.2 clearly torpedo the entire defence of first defendant’s case as though the first defendant’s father and his brothers were not in joint status and there were no joint exertion in purchasing the property. No doubt the said house referred to in his deposition is not the subject matter of this suit. But that would speak volumes that the first plaintiff, the first defendant’s father and the second defendant’s father lived in Hindu joint family and due to their joint exertion they purchased the properties and that was why out of those three houses, one house was allotted to the first plaintiff. In fact the first defendant himself would state that in that vicinity three houses situated, an extent of 22 cents were allotted to his father and out of which one cent was sold by the first defendant’s father in favour of Thangammal. Therefore D.W.1 clarified what is contained in Ex.B9. Further more as per Ex.B9 the extent sold was one cent out of 23, which the first defendant’s father described it as one not his self-acquired property, but as the property which came to his enjoyment. As such D.W.1 without any embellishment came with a true case that over and above some of the properties purchased based on the joint exertion of the brothers in the name of the first defendant’s father, they owned other properties also as found set out in his deposition. Hence, it is therefore crystal clear that the trial Court au fait with the law and au courant with the facts after analysing the evidence in extenso arrived at the correct conclusion in decreeing the suit, which requires no interference. In view of the reasons cited supra, the judgment and decree of the trial Court is confirmed and the appeal is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the respective parties are directed to bear their costs.
24.06.2008
Index:Yes/No
Internet:Yes/No
jikr
G.RAJASURIA,J
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Pre Delivery Judgment in
A.S.NO.695 OF 1994
24.06.2008