Judgements

Inspector Avtar Singh Parmar S/O … vs Union Of India (Uoi) Through Govt. … on 23 October, 2007

Central Administrative Tribunal – Delhi
Inspector Avtar Singh Parmar S/O … vs Union Of India (Uoi) Through Govt. … on 23 October, 2007
Bench: V Bali, J A L.K.


ORDER

V.K. Bali, J. (Chairman)

1. Avtar Singh Parmar, holding the post of Inspector in Delhi Police, applicant herein, was SHO of P.S. Tilak Marg at the relevant time on 18.04.2007, when he was issued a show cause notice as to why his conduct should not be censured and if he wanted to file reply he should do so within 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice aforesaid. The conduct of the applicant that required to be censured, as per the case of the respondents, is that a meeting of SHO and Inspector Investigation/P.S. Tilak Marg was called in the office of Additional Deputy Commissioner of Police, New Delhi Range at 4.30 p.m. on 13.04.2007 to discuss the pending investigation cases. The meeting was attended by the SHO/Inspector Investigation, P.S. Tilak Marg but in the said meeting the applicant could neither explain the present status nor give satisfactory reply to the query pertaining to details of cases. As per the show cause notice, this would reflect a causal attitude of the applicant regarding investigation of cases, which was a serious lapse on his part. The applicant responded to show cause notice but the same was not found to be satisfactory and, therefore, vide orders dated 22.05.2007 the conduct of the applicant has been censured. The relevant part of the order dealing with the reply of the applicant and finding the same to be unsatisfactory, reads thus:

I have gone through the written reply submitted by Inspr. Avtar Singh Parmar, No. D-I/486, SHO/Tilak Marg as well as documents placed on file. He was also heard in O.R. on 21.05.2007. He has stated in his reply that on 13.04.2007 he was busy in the Hon’ble Court of Dr. Kamini Lau ACMM, New Delhi and while in court he received a telephonic message at about 3.30 PM about the meeting to be held at 4.30 PM. There was no time for him to obtain inputs/feedback from the concerned I.Os regarding old pending cases especially cheating cases, due to which he could not reply queries made in the meeting. He has further added in his reply that he gave satisfactory reply in response to pending investigation cases when he was called on 27.04.2007 by the undersigned especially the cheating cases. He has further stated that for specific purpose of supervision of investigation an Inspr. has been deputed. The plea taken by the Inspr. is not tenable as it is a reflection of his negligent attitude. The SHO cannot absolve himself from the responsibility of properly monitoring the investigation of cases. Hence, I have no option except to confirm the notice. The conduct of Inspr. Avtar Singh Parmar, No. D-I/486 is hereby censured for his above laps.

2. The applicant has challenged the show cause notice dated 18.04.2007 and the order dated 22.05.2007 in this Application filed by him under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985.

3. Mr. Sachin Chauhan, learned Counsel representing the applicant, contends that the allegation made against the applicant would not fall within the definition of `misconduct’ as no loss is caused due to the alleged act of the applicant. He further contends that the impugned order is bad in law as the show cause notice and order of punishment have been issued by the same authority. On merits of the controversy, it is urged by the learned Counsel that the applicant received message of the meeting at 3.30 p.m. and within a short time of one hour, he could not prepare himself to give satisfactory reply to the queries put to him during the course of the meeting.

4. We have heard the learned Counsel representing the applicant and with his assistance examined the records of the case. We do not, however, find any merit in either of the contentions of the learned Counsel as noted above. The plea raised by the counsel that the allegations made against the applicant would not partake the character of misconduct as no loss has been caused to the department needs to be summarily rejected. Carelessness and dereliction in duty may not cause loss to any one but, nevertheless, may be a misconduct. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel that show cause notice and the impugned orders could not be issued and passed by the same authority is concerned, the counsel relies upon D.G., P.&T., Memo No. 6/64/64-Disc., dated the 27th January, 1965 quoted in Swamy’s Compilation of CCS (CCA) Rules in its 28th Edition-2003 under the caption ‘Swamy’s Compilation of Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules (incorporating orders received up to June, 2003), reads as follows:

(ii) When the Competent Authority is unable to function as the Disciplinary Authority.- In a case where the prescribed appointing or Disciplinary Authority is unable to function as the Disciplinary Authority is in respect of an official, on account of his being personally concerned with the charges or being a material witness in support of the charges, the proper course for that authority is to refer such a case to Government in the normal manner for nomination of an ad hoc Disciplinary Authority by a Presidential Order under the provisions of Rule 12 (2) of CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.

5. The O.M. reproduced above finds mention in Part (V) which deals with penalties and disciplinary authorities. The minor and major penalties have been mentioned in Rule 11 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. One of the minor penalties enumerated in the Rules is ‘Censure’. It is not in dispute that while inflicting minor penalties, no regular departmental enquiry is required to be conducted, even though a show cause notice has to be given. Insofar as O.M. dated 27.01.1965 is concerned, the same finds mention under Rule 12, which deals with disciplinary authorities. The President may impose any of the penalties specified in Rule 11 on any Government servant as per Sub-rule (1) of Rule 12. It is also not in dispute that the power exercisable by the President has been delegated, which is permissible under the orders issued by the Government from time to time. Perusal of the Memorandum reproduced above would only show that where appointing or disciplinary authority is unable to function as disciplinary authority for the reason that the said authority is personally concerned with the charges or being the material witness in support of the charges, the proper course would be to refer the matter to Government for nomination of an ad hoc disciplinary authority. In the context of the facts of the present case, it cannot be said that the Additional Commissioner of Police is in any manner personally concerned with the charges nor, in the admitted position that no enquiry is to be held, could he be a material witness. The mere fact that a meeting was called by Additional Commissioner of Police and the misconduct alleged against the applicant was committed in his presence would not make him personally concerned with the charge. He had convened the meeting in normal course of his duties.

6. Insofar as the contention of the learned Counsel that the applicant had a very limited time to equip himself for the meeting and, therefore, was not able to answer all the queries made by the Additional Commissioner of Police is concerned, suffice it to say that the Tribunal will not substitute its view on such aspects of the case which are better known to the authorities. Having said so, we may, however, hasten to add that knowledge/notice of cases under investigation or pending in Courts ought to have been known to the applicant who was holding the post of SHO as he was in-charge of the Police Station, and for these essential and elementary things, no preparations are required. The query made by the concerned authority did not pertain to such information, which an SHO may come to know only by preparing himself. It is not even the case of the applicant that the information required from him pertained to such matters, which are not known by an SHO in routine. No occasion arises, in the facts and circumstances of the case, to interfere with the impugned order.

7. Finding no merit in this Application, we dismiss it in limine.