ORDER
H.K.K. Singh, J.
1. This writ appeal is against the judgment and order dated November 24, 1995 passed by the learned single Judge in Civil Rule No. 127 of 1989.
2. Mr. D.R. Chowdhury, the learned counsel for the appellants has submitted for reconsidering the judgment and order passed by the learned single Judge stating, inter alia, that the learned single Judge while exercising the power of jurisdiction under Article 226 of
the Constitution has gone beyond the accepted field within which the power of judicial review has to be exercised.
3. The admitted facts are that the respondent is a sub-staff i.e. Class-IV employee of United Bank of India, Teliamura Branch. On February 4, 1986 the respondent, while on leave, came to the said Branch of the Bank for withdrawal of his salary. As full salary for the month of January, 1986 had not been credited to his Account, he could not withdraw the full salary. Then he met the Branch Manager of the said branch of the Bank and demanded payment of his full salary which was needed for treatment of his ailing daughter. The Branch Manager was helpless as the full salary had not been credited to the Account due to non-sanctioning of leave for the period from January 6, 1986 to January 10, 1986 and from January 13, 1986 to January 28, 1986. As the full salary was not allowed to be withdrawn, the respondent started shouting and threatened the Branch Manager to be assaulted physically and created panic in the Bank and even attempted to assault the Branch Manager but the other staff members saved the Branch Manager. In this connection a report was made to the Teliamura Police Station against the respondent and after investigation charge sheet was filed and finally after trial the respondent was acquitted by a judgment and order dated March 15, 1988 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 2nd Class, Khowai, West Tripura in G.R. Case No. 34 of 1986. Thereafter the respondent was kept under suspension and a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. The charges levelled against him are as follows:
“(i) Committing an assault on superior officer on the premises of the Bank.
(ii) Drunkenness, disorderly and indecent behaviour on the premises of the Bank
(iii) Failing to show proper consideration and courtesy towards officer of the Bank
(iv) Doing an act prejudicial to the interest of the Bank.”
4. After enquiry charge Nos. II & III were found proved (though in respect of charge No. II the allegation of drunkenness was found not proved). Copy of the enquiry report was furnished to the respondent and after hearing him the Disciplinary Authority accepted the report and passed the following order of punishment which is reproduced below:
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Accordingly, I confirm the proposed punishments and the following punishments are hereby inflicted upon you with immediate effect:
(a) stoppage of next one increment with cumulative effect.
(b) Have an adverse remark entered against you.
You shall not be entitled to salary and allowances during the period of your suspension save and except what have been paid to you as and by way of subsistence allowance.
The order of suspension bearing No. NRC/ADM/S/02 dated February 5, 1986 is hereby revoked and you are directed to report at our Teliamura Branch immediately with this letter for the purpose of resuming your duty.”
5. The learned counsel of both sides have submitted that the matter relating to
disciplinary proceeding is contained in the Bipartite Settlement made between the Indian Banker’s Association and All India Bank Employees Association. For the purpose of the present case it is not necessary to go into the specific provision contained therein. This, we are not doing because Mr. Chowdhury, the learned counsel for the appellant has only made a grievance in respect of the observation and finding as recorded by the learned single Judge.
According to Mr. Chowdhury. the learned single Judge quashed the finding of the Disciplinary Proceedings only on the ground that the finding was based on the basis of the evidence of the witnesses who had already been dis-believed by the criminal Court. According
to Mr. Chowdhury. this is not a correct proposition of law.
6. It is settled that for the same set of facts both disciplinary action as well as criminal prosecution may lie and according to the nature of the case and ingredients of offence to be proved in a criminal trial qua the ingredients of matters to be proved in respect of a charge levelled in the departmental proceedings and also the method and manner of proof different findings may be recorded by the two fora i.e. Criminal Court and Disciplinary Authority. In this regard we only refer to the latest decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Senior Supdt. of Post Offices, Pathanaamthitta and Ors., v. A. Gopalan, in 1999-I-LLJ-1313 (SC).
7. In this reported case even though the delinquent officer was acquitted by the criminal Court on the ground of benefit of doubt, on the same set of facts a disciplinary proceeding was initiated and punishment was awarded and when the matter was challenged before the Central Administrative Tribunal, the learned Tribunal quashed the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority mainly on the ground that after the acquittal by the criminal Court which was confirmed in appeal by the High Court a punishment should not be imposed in the departmental proceedings. Against the decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal the Supreme Court held:
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in a criminal case the charge has to be proved by the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt while in departmental proceedings the standard of proof for proving the charge is preponderance of probabilities. The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding that in view of the acquittal of the respondent by the criminal Court on the charge relating for withdrawal of Rs. 8,000/- the finding on the first charge in the departmental proceedings cannot be upheld and must be set aside. The Tribunal was also not right in taking the view that
even though the second charge of misappropriation of sum of Rs. 379/- and Rs. 799/- realised the customs duty was established, the punishment of compulsory retirement that was imposed on the respondent could not be sustained. Having regard to the fact that the second charge related to misappropriation of funds for which the punishment of compulsory retirement could be imposed the Tribunal, in exercise of its jurisdiction, could not direct the appellate authority to review the penalty imposed on the respondent.
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8. We have heard Mr. D.K. Biswas. the learned counsel for the respondent. There is no challenge from the side of the respondent in respect of any error/defect of procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Authority. We have also anxiously gone through the relevant materials available before this Court, formal charges were framed and enquiry proceeded giving opportunity to the official for his defence. And the Enquiry Officer after appreciating the evidence including the statements of the witnesses who actually saw the otccurrence as they were present in the
office room and the occurrence took place just before them, submitted his report, the copy of which was furnished to the delinquent official and after hearing the respondent the aforesaid order of punishment was passed. We find no infirmity in the procedure adopted by the authority.
9. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution in respect of the decision of a departmental authority in the disciplinary proceedings interference by this Court is permitted if such authority conducted the proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such inquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that
no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority is the sole judge of the facts, if the inquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution See AIR 2000 SC 26.
10. This writ appeal is in the nature of in-house appeal which has been made available under Gauhati High Court Rules. Normally while exercising appellate jurisdiction, a Division Bench or any other larger Bench shall not interfere with the decision arrived at by the learned single Judge in exercise of the power of judicial review also under Article 226 of the Constitution unless ends of justice demands. In our case in hand we have found even in the judgment of the Criminal Court that the learned Magistrate found that the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt for not proving the full ingredients of the offence but it was further observed by the learned Magistrate that disciplinary action ought to have been taken against the accused and here appreciating the evidence collected by the Disciplinary Authority and having found the imputation of charge proved, punishment was awarded. The decision of the Disciplinary Authority cannot be faulted and with due respect we cannot persuade ourselves to agree with the learned single Judge in his reasonings for quashing the findings of the Disciplinary Authority as well as the punishment awarded by the authorities.
11. Lastly. Mr. D.K. Biswas has submitted that the respondent is a lowly paid Grade-IV employee and he became much disturbed when he could not get his full salary at the time he highly needed the same for treatment of his ailing daughter and as such in the heat of the moment that incident occurred and as such considering the entire facts and circumstances, the punishment awarded to him
is harsh, hence it should be reduced. The learned counsel has also submitted that by an interim order passed by this Court the operation of the penalty passed by the Disciplinary Authority was stayed and in case no modification is made thereby reducing the quantum of sentence unbearable hardship will be caused to the writ petitioner. In this regard, it is settled that the High Court in exercise of its power under judicial review does not interfere with the quantum of punishment penalty awarded by the departmental authorities except in rare cases when it is found that the penalty is grossly harsh that it shocks judicial conscience or the High Court finds that the order is irrational and unreasonable that any person informed in law should never have passed such an order and only in such cases the High Court interferes with the quantum of punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Authority only to do complete justice. Here in our case at hand applying any principle recognised by law we cannot hold that the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority is so irrational or unreasonable or harsh warranting interference by this Court. 1947 (2) ALL ER 680 : 1984 (3) All ER 935. 1994 (6) SCC 651 : 1995 (6) SCC 749 : 1997 (7) SCC 463.
12. In view of the settled provisions of law we are not inclined to interfere with the penalty awarded by the Disciplinary Authority.
13. The Writ Appeal is accordingly allowed. Civil Rule No. 127 of 1989 filed by the respondent is dismissed. No order as to costs.
14. Before parting, we still observe that dismissal of this Writ Petition filed by the respondent herein, will not be an impediment for the authority concerned to reconsider the quantum of penalty/punishment and pass any order as it deems proper in accordance with the relevant rules/regulations applicable in this regard.
15. Interim order, if any, stands vacated.