JUDGMENT
Hima Kohli, J.
1. The respondent Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. (BHEL) raised a preliminary objection in its counter affidavit with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition in this Court on the ground that the entire cause of action has arisen in Bhopal in the State of Madhya Pradesh, and therefore this Court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to try and entertain the petition. By this order, the court proposes to decide the preliminary objection raised by the respondent with respect to the maintainability of the writ petition in this Court on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction.
2. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner herein seeking inter alia issuance of a writ of mandamus to the respondent directing it to promote him from grade E3 to E4 w.e.f. 25th June, 2005 on the basis of reservation provided under Section 33 of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as `the Disability Act’) and for directing the respondent to provide the petitioner non-handicapping environment at work place as per Section 38(1)(d) of the Disability Act.
3. Briefly stated, facts of the case are that the petitioner was inducted through open advertisement issued by the respondent as Deputy Manager (Finance) at a basic pay of Rs. 16,000/- in the pay scale of Rs. 16,000-640-20800. He was posted in the Bhopal Unit of the respondent company and he joined the said Unit on 15th May, 2002. It is the case of the petitioner that he was eligible for promotion as on 24th June, 2005 from his existing post of Deputy Manager (Finance) (E3) to Manager-Finance (E4). It is pertinent to note at this juncture that during the pendency of the present petition, vide letter dated 25th June, 2007, issued by the General Manager (Finance) of the Bhopal Unit of the respondent, the petitioner has been promoted from his existing post of Deputy Manager (Finance) (E3) to Manager-Finance (E4) with retrospective effect from 25th June, 2006. However, the petitioner claims that his grievance still subsists as he was entitled to be promoted w.e.f. 24th June, 2005.
4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that this Court has the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition in view of the fact that the Corporate Office of the respondent is situated in Delhi which is the seat of authority in the matters of appointments, transfers and promotions and is responsible for issuing promotion policies and guidelines. It is stated that since the dispute in question relates to the non-promotion of the petitioner and since the petitioner is challenging the promotion policy and guidelines of the Respondent, therefore this Court would have the territorial jurisdiction. In support of this contention, reliance was placed on the letter of appointment of the petitioner dated 15th April, 2002, the letter of transfer dated 12th October, 2004 by which the petitioner was transferred from Bhopal to Jhansi, and the letter dated 26th October, 2004 recalling the aforesaid transfer letter and it was argued that all the said letters were issued from the Corporate Office of the respondent situated at Delhi and hence this Court had the territorial jurisdiction.
5. It was also submitted that the Reservation Policy of the respondent that governs promotion for the physically challenged as laid down by the Corporate Office of the respondent at Delhi is ultravires of the Disability Act, the same not being in consonance with the provisions of Section 33 thereof, and for the said reason also, the writ petition is maintainable in this Court.
6. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Oil and Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu to state that High Courts have very wide jurisdiction in entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that in the instant case, this Court has the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the writ petition on the basis of the averments made in the petition, which are sufficient in law to establish that a part of the cause of action had arisen within the jurisdiction of this Court, the truth or otherwise whereof being immaterial.
7. Per contra, it was urged by the counsel for the respondent that this Court does not have territorial jurisdiction, with respect to employees working at its Bhopal Unit as no cause of action has arisen in Delhi. The attention of the Court was drawn to the prayer clause of the petition, to state that all the three reliefs prayed for in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) relate to the petitioner’s request for promotion and matters connected therewith for which no cause of action had arisen in Delhi. He submitted that neither any records of performance of the petitioner, nor any roster for such promotion of physically challenged persons in category E3 is maintained in the Corporate Office at Delhi.
8. It was submitted that the respondent has a strength of about 60,000 employees, working in 14 units located all over India and implementation of the Promotion Policy of the respondent is decentralized Unit wise for all posts up to the level of E5. He canvassed that the entire writ petition revolves around the grievance of the petitioner with respect to his non-promotion, which cause of action accrued in Bhopal. Thus, the petitioner being in grade E3 and claiming promotion to grade E4, his promotion was to be regulated by the Bhopal Unit itself and the Corporate Office situated at Delhi had no role to play in his promotion. In a nutshell, counsel for the respondent contended that since no cause of action has arisen in Delhi, therefore this Court ought not to exercise its jurisdiction in entertaining the present writ petition and in support of his contention, he relied on the following judgments:
(1) Aligarh Muslim University and Anr. v. Vinay Engineering Enterprises (P) Ltd. and Anr. .
(2) Utpal Kumar Basu (supra)
(3) Bhagat Ram Sharma v. Union of India and Ors. .
9. Counsel for the respondent also relied on Utpal Kumar Basu’s case (supra), to urge that while seeking to demonstrate that a part of cause of action had arisen in Delhi, the petitioner cannot be permitted to refer to the synopsis, or even the rejoinder filed by him, and that the cause of action is to be determined strictly on the basis of the averments made in the writ petition alone.
10. Lastly, it was submitted that the petitioner had wrongly relied on the provisions of the Disability Act since it is not applicable to the respondent and that merely because the said Act is a central legislation, it does not automatically vest jurisdiction on this Court. Reliance in this regard was placed on the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India and Anr. .
11. I have heard the counsels for both the parties and in the light of the relevant material placed on record, have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments addressed by both the sides.
12. It is settled law that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits. The Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. Reliance in this regard may be placed on the judgment rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. (supra), wherein it was held as under:
30. We must, however, remind ourselves that even if a small part of cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be considered to be a determinative factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merit. In appropriate cases, the Court may refuse to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of forum conveniens. (See Bhagat Singh Bugga v. Dewan Jagbir Sawhney , Madanlal Jalan v. Madanlal (1995) 49 CWN 359, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Jharia Talkies and Cold Storage (P) Ltd. (1997) CHN 122, S.S. Jain and Co. v. Union of India and Ors. (1994) CWN 445 and New Horizons Ltd. v. Union of India .
13. In another case entitled National Textiles Corporation Ltd. and Ors. v. Haribox Swalram and Ors. , while interpreting Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India in relation to cause of action and territorial jurisdiction and while relying on its earlier judgment in the case of Union of India v. Adani Exports Ltd. , the Supreme Court held as under:
10. …Cause of action as understood in civil proceedings means every fact which, if traversed, would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove in order to support his right to a judgment of the Court. It is the bundle of facts which taken with the law applicable to them, gives the plaintiff a right to relief against the defendant. Each and every fact pleaded in the writ petition does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that those facts give rise to a cause of action within the court’s territorial jurisdiction unless those facts pleaded are such which have a nexus or relevance with the lis that is involved in the case. Facts which have no bearing with the lis or dispute involved in the case, do not give rise to a cause of action so as to confer territorial jurisdiction on the court concerned.
14. The aforesaid position of law has been followed and reiterated by this High Court in various cases, including the following:
(i)West Coast Ingots (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise
(ii) Ex. Rect./GD Vinod Kumar v. Union of India and Ors. 2007 (I) AD (Delhi) 284
15. In the case of Om Prakash Srivastava v. Union of India while determining as to what would constitute cause of action, the Supreme Court held as under:
12. The expression “cause of action” has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense “cause of action” means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the reaction. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but also the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously, as noted above, the expression means every fact, which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the court. Every fact, which is necessary to be proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence, which is necessary to prove each fact, comprises in “cause of action”. (See Rajasthan High Court Advocates’ Assn. v. Union of India (2001) 2 SCC 294).
13. The expression “cause of action” has sometimes been employed to convey the restricted idea of facts or circumstances which constitute either the infringement or the basis of a right and no more. In a wider and more comprehensive sense, it has been used to denote the whole bundle of material facts, which a plaintiff must prove in order to succeed. These are all those essential facts without the proof of which the plaintiff must fail in his suit (See Gurdit Singh v. Munsha Singh .
14. The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more basis of suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person (see Black’s Law Dictionary). In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary a “cause of action” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. In Words and Phrases (4th Edn.) the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf. (See Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra ).
16. The law as laid down in the above mentioned judgments is clear on the issue that even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territory of a High Court, that does not mean that the said High Court is compelled to exercise jurisdiction in that respect. Keeping the aforesaid guidelines in mind and applying the same to the facts of the present case, it has to be observed that merely because the Corporate Office of the respondent is located in Delhi or that the appointment letter of the petitioner, or his letter of transfer from Bhopal to Jhansi, or the subsequent letter cancelling the said transfer from Bhopal to Jhansi, were issued by the Corporate Office at Delhi, is not sufficient for this Court to entertain the present writ petition.
17. There are not enough grounds made out in the present case, so as to vest territorial jurisdiction on this Court. The determining cause of action which has given birth to the present petition hinges on the non-assessment of the petitioner for the purposes of promotion. Thus the legality of the assessment process of the petitioner has a direct nexus with his promotion. Fact remains that the petitioner was posted right from the time of his initial appointment at Bhopal. The memo of parties bears out the fact that the petitioner is a resident of Bhopal and there is no dispute to the fact that even today he is residing and working for gain at Bhopal. A perusal of paras 2.1 and 3 of the Promotion Policy of the respondent shows that promotion for grade E3 was to be regulated by the Unit Management, which in this case is at Bhopal. The petitioner’s promotion was to be decided by the Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) at Bhopal, which was to be constituted at the unit level falling under the purview of the Unit Manager and, the Executive Director, Bhopal, consisting of 7 officers including the Executive Director himself, all of whom were posted at Bhopal. As a matter of fact, the petitioner has himself stated in para 7 of the writ petition that the cause of action arose in his favor when he was tested under e-PMS system and graded wrongly for non-performance in respective three tasks over completion of which, allegedly, he had no control and that it further arose when he was not promoted despite the reservation provided under the Disability Act. Since both the alleged grievances arise from events that took place in Bhopal, it is only logical to deduce that the petitioner himself admits the cause of action to have arisen in Bhopal.
18. It is also to be taken note of that the letter of promotion issued to the petitioner during the pendency of the present proceedings by which he was promoted from grade E3 to grade E4 was also issued to him by the unit at Bhopal. Needless to mention that in view of the law laid down by the various judgments as stated above, even if a small part of the cause of action arises within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same by itself may not be a factor compelling the High Court to decide the matter on merits and writ jurisdiction being discretionary in nature, the High Court may refuse to exercise the same.
19. Reliance placed by the counsel for the petitioner on the judgment in the case of Utpal Kumar Basu (supra), is of no help to him. In fact in the said judgment, the Supreme Court while dealing with a case where the petitioner therein became aware of an advertisement inviting tenders at Calcutta, and made representations from Calcutta after its offer was rejected, but the bids were scrutinized and decision taken in Delhi, held that the same was not enough to vest jurisdiction in the Calcutta High Court. It was further observed therein that the question of territorial jurisdiction must be decided on the facts pleaded in the petition. But in the present case, a perusal of the petition does not establish that a substantial cause of action has arisen in Delhi.
20. A perusal of the writ petition also makes it evident that the relief sought by the petitioner, as incorporated in the prayer clause, relates primarily to the promotion of the petitioner, and certain other benefits under the Disability Act, but no relief has been sought with regard to the promotion policy of the respondent itself. It is not for the Court to delve into the body of the petition to see as to what other reliefs, if any, could the petitioner claim and be granted or to conduct a roving and fishing enquiry at his behest so as to bestow territorial jurisdiction on this Court. Even assuming that the petitioner has challenged the promotion policy of the respondent in this petition, there is no bar on challenging the same in the State of Madhya Pradesh, where he is posted. Same holds true for the reliefs sought by the petitioner under the Disability Act also, as the dispute regarding the same also lies in the State where the petitioner is presently posted.
21. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondent with respect to the lack of territorial jurisdiction of this Court is upheld. As a result, this Court declines to entertain the present petition. The writ petition is dismissed with liberty granted to the petitioner to vent his grievances raised in the present petition by approaching an appropriate Court vested with the territorial jurisdiction. No orders as to costs.