ORDER
Reddeppa Reddy, J.
1. This writ petition is for quashing the order dated 22nd September, 1992 in I.A.No. 782/1992 in L.G.C. No. 99/1989 of the Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act (for Short ‘the Special Court’), I.A. No. 782/1992 was an application under Order 1, Rule 10, C.P.C., filed by the petitioners 1 to 23 and respondents 24 to 28 herein (hereinafter referred to as ‘the petitioners’), claiming to be the purchasers of land from respondents-land grabbers in L.G.C.No. 99/1989, to implead themselves as respondents in the said case.
2. L.G.C. NO. 99/1989 relates to the Land bearing R.S.No. 54/2 (Survey No. 27/ 1, 2, 3) measuring 7.22 acres situated in Pedda Waltair Revenue village, Visakhapatnam and the same has been filed by the Commissioner of Visakhapatnam Municipal Corporation (hereinafter called ‘the respondent’) against 21 persons belonging to ‘Duvvu’ family before the Special Court. The Special Court at Hyderabad having taken cognizance of the same as L.G.C. 99/ 89 cause a notice in Form IIA presecribed under Rule 7(1) of the A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Rules, 1988 (for short ‘the Rules’) published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, Part II, Extraordinary, dated 2nd August, 1989, providing opportunity to any person to file objections on or before 28th of August, 1989 in addition to notices to 21 named interested persons in the land in Form III-A, prescribed under Rule 8 of the Rules.
3. The 21 respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89 entered their appearance through a counsel and filed their objections. Thereafter, the case was taken up for trial. Recording of evidence was over. Arguments were also heard and the matter was posted for judgment. At that stage, I.A.No. 782/1992 was filed by the petitioners on 14th September, 1992 and the same was dismissed by the impugned order, which reads as follows:-
“Application is filed on 14-9-1992 for bringing the persons, who purchased the land from the respondents, on record. At this stage, we cannot permit them for impleading and for filing written statements, taking advantage of the fact that the matter is now reopened for limited purpose of hearing the respondents’ counsel after the Judgment was reserved on 28-7-1992. As the proposed parties claim through the respondents, their presence is not necessary for adjudicating the questions raised. Application is dismissed.”
4. Elaborate arguments have been advanced on either side. Sri C. Poornaiah, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the petitioners in I.A.No. 782/ 1992 are the bona fide purchasers of the land in question from its original owners who are the respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89 and thus they are successors-in- interest of the persons interested in the land. Therefore, they come within the definition of “Land Grabber” as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act. He maintains that they are the persons really interested in the land and as such the Special Court should have issued them notices in Form III-A, prescribed under Rule 8. At any rate, he submits, their application for impleading should not have been dismissed. He asserts that the respondent was fully aware that an extent of 10,000 square yeards was purchased by the petitioners and as such it should have impleaded them as respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89. He also urges that it had come in evidence that the land in question was sold to the petitioners and therefore, the Special Court ought to have issued notices to them as contemplated under 3rd proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act. Section 9 of the Act provides that the Special Court shall be deemed as a Civil Court and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code, 1908, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court, if they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. It is submitted by him that the reasons given by the Special Court for dismissing the impleading petition are totally unsustainable. In opposition, it is contended by Sri P. Rajagopala Rao, learned Standing Counsel for the Municipal Corporation of Visakhapatnam that the petitioners having failed to file their objections in response to the notice in Form II-A published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, Part II, Extraordinary, dated 2nd August, 1989, have forfeited their right to file objections. He also submits that their interests have been very well looked after by the original owners of the land. He urges that the application filed by the petitioners was highly belated and as such it was rightly dismissed.
5. In view of these rival contentions, the following points will fall for consideration in this writ petition:
(1) Whether the petitioners fall within the definition of “Land Grabber” as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act?
(2) Whether the respondent should have impleaded the petitioners as respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89?
(3) Whether the Special Court has got a duty to cause a notice to the petitioners as contemplated under third proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act?
(4) Whether the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, have application to the proceedings under the Act? (5) Whether the notice in Form II-A published in the Andhra Pradesh Gazette, dated 2nd August, 1989 shall be treated as sufficient notice to the petitioners; and
(6) Whether the impugned order is sustainable in the present facts and circumstances of the case?
6. “Land Grabber” as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act, reads as follows:-
“”Land Grabber” means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorised structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest”.
7. It is clear from the above definition that successors-in-interest also come within the definition of “Land Grabber”. It is not in dispute that the petitioners have purchased about 10,000 square yards from the original owners under various sale deeds. Therefore, it must be held that they come within the definition of “Land Grabber”.
8. It is specifically averred in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition that by the time L.G.C.No. 99/89 was filed, the respondent was “fully aware that the extent of about 10,000 square yards of this land has been sold to the 28 petitioners before this Court; they were aware of all the names of the purchasers as they have applied for a lay out”. This averment has been answered as follows in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent:
“……It is submitted that the allegation that the Duvvi Family people who sold the plots to the petitioners applied for approval of lay out and the Corporation and its officials never questioned the title or possession in respect of the Scheduled property is highly incorrect, and in fact admittedly the lay out was not approved.”
9. It is clear from the above that the allegation that the respondent was aware of the names of the petitioners is not denied. The answer that the lay out was not approved is no ground to say that the respondent was not aware of the names of the petitioners. I am of the view that when the petitioners have applied for permission, by the time the respondent filed the case before the Special Court in respect of the very same land, the respondent should have treated them as persons interested in the land and consequently impleaded them as respondents in L.G.C. 99/89.
10. To appreciate the third point it would be useful to refer to 3rd proviso to sub-section (6) of Section 8 of the Act and Rule 8 of the Rules, which read as follows:-
“…. Provided that also that the Special Court shall cause a notice of taking cognizance of the case under the Act, served on any person known or believed to be interested in the land, after a summary enquiry to satisfy itself about the persons likely to be interested in the land.”
Rule 8 of the Rules:
“8. Notice to persons interested in land:-
(1) The Special Court shall give notice in Form III-A to the persons known or believed to be interested in the land.
(2) The Tribunal shall give a notice in Form III-B to the persons known or believed to be interested in the land.”
11. As per the above provisions, that it is obligatory for the Special Court to give notice of taking cognizance of the case under the Act to any person known or believed to be interested in the land. But in the instant case, it is merely averred in the affidavit that
“Duvvi People have stated in the Land Grabbing Court specifically that they have sold large extent of their land to various persons.”
12. I have gone through the deposition of Sri Duvvi Tata Rao, who was examined as R.W.I; but it is not there in his evidence that 10,000 square yards of land was sold to the petitioners. Thus, there was no material before the Special Court to show that the petitioners were interested in the land in question. In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the Special Court failed in its duty of giving notices to the petitioners in Form III-A.
13. To appreciate the fourth point, it is necessary to refer to Section 9 of the Act, which reads as follows:-
“Save as expressly provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court and for the purposes of the provisions of the said enactments, Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court, or as the case may be, a Court of Session and shall have all the powers of a Civil Court and a Court of Session and the person conducting a prosecution before the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Public Prosecutor.”
14. From the above, it is clear that the provisions of Civil Procedure Code shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court insofar as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Act. It is not brought to my notice that the provisions of Order I, Rule 10 C.P.C., 1908 are in any way inconsistent with any provisions of the Act. However, Sri P. Rajagopala Rao placing reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner v. Rama Krishna, and a decision of a learned single Judge in Y. Chandraiah v. District Munsif-Cum-Election Tribunal, endeavoured to persuade me to accept his contention that the provisions of Order I, Rule 10 cannot be applied to the proceedings before the Special Court. The question for consideration before the Supreme Court in (1) supra was whether in the Administrative Proceedings under U.P. Encumbered Estates Act, technical rules of the First Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding impleading of parties should be involved or not. The proceedings under U.P. Encumbered Estates Act were administrative in nature. Further, it does not appear that a provision similar to Section 9 of the Act was there in U.P. Encumbered Estates Act. Therefore, I am of the view that this decision is of no help to the respondent.
15. The point that fell for consideration in (2) supra was whether in an election petition filed under R.5(l) of the A.P. Gram Panchayats (Conduct of Elections) Rules, 1978 is it open to the Election petitioner to file an application under Order 1, Rule 10 C.P.C., for impleading the other contested candidates who were not impleaded as parties to the election petition at the time of its filing. The learned Judge having reviewed the entire case law on this subject in the light of various provisions of the Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 and decisions of the Supreme Court, held that,
“…. The non-joinder of other contesting candidates i.e., respondents 4 and 5 in the writ petition is fatal to the election petition and the mandatory provisions of Rule 5(2) cannot be circumvented or defeated by filing an application under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC for impleading them as parties to the election petition at a later stage…..” (para 18)
On careful examination of the said decision, I am of the view that the ratio decidendi of that case has no application to the present case.
16. Also relying upon Rule 13 of the Rules, the learned counsel submits that the Special Court shall exercise powers under the Code of Civil Procedure for the purpose of (a) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath; (b) compelling the production of documents and material objects; and (c) issuing Commission for examination of witnesses. I cannot accept this argument for the reason that the said rule cannot override the provisions of Section 9 of the Act. Therefore, there is no bar on the Special Court to apply the provisions of Order 1, Rule 10 CPC, 1908 to any case it has taken cognizance of.
17. Coming to the fifth point, Sri Rajagopal Rao learned Standing Counsel for the respondent vehemently contends that the notice in Form II-A published in the A.P. Gazette, dated 2nd August, 1989 shall be treated as a sufficient notice to the petitioners. Further he asserts that the petitioners having failed to file their objections in response to the above mentioned notice have forfeited their right to come on record. I find it difficult to accept this argument in view of my finding that the petitioners come within the definition of “Land Grabber” as defined in Section 2(d) of the Act and the respondent was aware by the time he filed L.G.C.99/89 before the Special Court that the petitioners were the persons interested in the land in question.
18. The next point for consideration is whether the Special Court was justified in dismissing the application filed by the petitioners on two grounds: (1) their presence is not necessary as they claim their rights through the respondents and (2) they cannot be permitted for impleading and for filing written statements at the belated stage when the matter was reopened for the limited purpose of hearing the respondents’ counsel. At this juncture, it would be useful to refer to Order 1, Rule 10(2), CPC, 1908 which reads as follows:- “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without
“the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party imporperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out; and that the name of any person who ought to have been joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added.”
19. It needs no emphasis that the object of this provision is to enable the Court to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the proceeding effectually and completely. In Razia Begum v. Anwar Begum, the Supreme Court observed as follow:
“(13) As a result of these considerations, we have arrived at the following conclusions:
(1) That the question of addition of parties under Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is generally not one of initial jurisdiction of the Court, but of a judicial discretion which has to be exercised in view of all the facts and circumstances of a particular case; but in some cases, it may raise controversies as to the power of the court in contradistinction to its inherent jurisdiction, or, in other words, of jurisdiction in the limited sense in which it is used in Section 115 of the Code;
(2) That in a suit relating to property, in order that a person may be added as a party, he should have a direct interest as distinguished from a commercial interest, in the subject-matter of the litigation;
(3) Where the subject-matter of litigation, is a declaration as regards status or a legal character, the rule of present or direct interest may be relaxed in a suitable case where the court is of the opinion that by adding that party, it would be in a better position effectually and completely to adjudicate upon the controversy;
(4) The cases contemplated in the last proposition, have to be determined in accordance with the statutory provisions of Section 42 and 43 of the Specific Relief Act;
(5) In cases covered by those statutory provisions, the court is not bound to giant the declaration prayed for, on a mere admission of the claim by the defendant, if the court has reasons to insist upon a clear proof apart from the admission;
(6) The result of a declaratory decree on the question of status, such as in controversy in the instant case, affects not only the parties actually before the court, but generations to come, and in view of that consideration, the rule of ‘present interest’, as evolved by case law relating to disputes about property does not apply with full force; and
(7) The rule laid down in Section 43 of the Specific Relief Act, is not exactly a rule of res judicata. It is narrower in one sense and wider in another.”
20. In the present case, it is not disputed that the petitioners are the purchasers of the land, which is the subject matter of enquiry before the Special Court. Thus, they have direct interest in the matter. Therefore, in normal course, the respondent ought to have joined the petitioners as respondents in L.G.C.No. 99/89; but that has not been done for the reasons best known to the respondent. In the circumstances, it is to be seen whether the reasons given by the Special Court for dismissing the petition for impleading are sustainable. One reason that weighed with the Special Court is that the interests of the petitioners are looked after by their vendors who are the respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89. I am unable to appreciate this reason. It is hard to expect the vendors of the petitioners who have already collected the sale consideration from the petitioners to look after the interests of the petitioners. Let us assume a situation where the case before the Special Court is decided against the respondents and the respondents do not propose to prosecute the matter further. In New Jaji Labour Society v. Haji Abdul Rahaman Sahab, a Division Bench of this Court held that the judgment of Special Court as to land grabbed is binding on all persons having interest in such land whether they are parties before the said Court or not. If the principle laid down in this decision is applied to the situation mentioned above, necessarily it results in deprivation of petitioners’ right to prosecute their case.
21. Then remains only the question of delay in filing the petition for impleading. True, there was some dealy in filing the said petition. In this regard, Sri P. Rajagopala Rao, learned Standing Counsel for the respondent places strong reliance on the provisions of Sections 8(4) and 17-B of the Act. Section 8(4) provides that every case shall be disposed of finally as far as possible within a period of six months. Section 17-B provides that the schedule containing the statement of objects and reasons shall constitute the guidelines for the interpretation and implementation of the Act. The statement of objects and reasons given in the Schedule also refer to delays in disposal of cases pending in Civil and Criminal Courts. It cannot be denied that there is a statutory mandate on the Special Court to dispose of the cases as expeditiously as possible. But, the present case is pending before the Special Court for more than three years. Therefore, it may not be appropriate to use the provisions of Sections 8(4) and 17-B of the Act as a circumstance against the petitioners. Sri Rajagopala Rao also relies upon a decision of the Supreme Court in Inderpal Singh v. Kuljit Singh, 1992 (2) SCALE 100 to substantiate his contention that an application filed under Order 1, Rule 10 at the stage when the case was fixed for final argument is liable to be rejected. In that case, the appellant before the Supreme Court was the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale said to have been executed by the third respondent. When the said suit was posted for arguments, respondents 1 and 2 filed an application for impleading them as defendants in the suit on the ground that they have joint interest in the property which the third respondent has agree to sell to the plaintiff under the suit agreement of sale. It is stated in the said judgment that respondents 1 and 2 filed another suit against the third respondent for partition of the very same property. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court directed the dismissal of the application filed by the respondents 1 and 2 under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC making it clear that they shall not be dispossessed from the suit property till their suit for partition is finally decided. Thus, the interests of the respondents 1 and 2 who filed the application under Order 1, Rule 10, CPC at a belated stage were well protected by the Surpeme Court. But, in the present case, if the petitioners are not impleaded as respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89, they will be put to serious hardship in case the Special Court decides the case in favour of the respondent. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the delay in filing the application for impleading should not come in the way of the petitioners.
22. Another important factor that should be taken into consideration in the present case is, the land in question is in possession of the respondent. R.W.1 also admitted in his deposition that the respondent has put up fence around the land in question. In these circumstances, even if there is some delay in disposing of the case pending before the Special Court, the respondent is not going to suffer any loss. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the firm view that the Special Court was not justified in dismissing I.A.No. 782/1992 filed by the petitioners herein.
23. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed and the first respondent, namely, the Special Court is directed to implead the petitioners 1 to 23 and respondents 24 to 28 herein as respondents in L.G.C. No. 99/89. There will be no order as to costs.