JUDGMENT
Anjaneyulu, J.
1. Dronamraju Satyanarayana of Visakhapatnam is the petitioner herein. In the affidavit filed supporting the writ petition the petitioner states that his occupation is agriculture and he is also the Organizing Secretary, Coastal District of Andhra Pradesh Congress Committee (1). He describes himself as an active public worker and states that he is deeply interested, both personally and politically, in the subject matter of the writ petition. The prayer in the writ petition is somewhat involved. It is good to extract the same below :
“For the reasons and in the circumstances mentioned in the writ petition and in the affidavit filed in support thereof it is just and necessary that this Honourable Court may be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to invoke and exercise its constitutional power and discharge its constitutional duties by exercising its constitutional function under Articles 355,356, and 357 of the Constitution of India,. and decide whether conditions enumerated in the said provisions of the Constitution are existing in State of Andhra Pradesh and if so satisfied to initiate constitutional action by taking into consideration, the breakdown of the constitutional machinery in Andhra Pradesh and to invoke and exercise its power by imposing Presidential Rule forthwith under the above constitutional provisions, in Andhra Pradesh or pass such other appropriate order and orders as this Honourable Court may deem fit in the circumstances of the case.”
Sri Ramachandra Rao. learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, explaining the scope of the prayer in the writ petition hastened to state that he is not seeking any mandamus to the constitutional authorities for imposing Presidential rule in the State of Andhra Pradesh. He fairly admitted such a direction could not possibly be given by this Court. According to him the constitutional machinery in the State of Andhra Pradesh broke down and a situation has arisen in which the governance of the State cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. According to him, the Central Government is fully aware of the situation and even so, no action is being taken in terms of Art. 356 of the Constitution of India to impose Presidential rule as the Centre does not want to displease the non-Congress (1) Government and for various other extraneous considerations. In the alternative, Sri Ramachandra Rao claims that the Centre is indifferent and is not demonstrating any anxiety to enquire into the existing situation for the same reasons as above mentioned. In either event, contends the learned Counsel. the Central Government has disregarded so far its constitutional obligations and refused to exercise the functions under Arts. 355, 356 and 357 of the Constitution. Learned Counsel, therefore, prays that a mandamus be given inthe Central Government to enquire into and decide whether the conditions enumerated in Art. 3-56 of the Constitution are existing in the State of Andhra Pradesh, and if so satisfied, the Central Government should irnpo.4e Presidential rule. This briefly is the relief sought for by the petitioner in the present writ petition.
2. For the sake of completeness of facts it may be mentioned that the petitioner filed four separate writ petitions and a combined affidavit for all the four writ petitions. The present writ petition is one of them. The three other writ petitions bear Nos. WP 12425/87, 12805/87 and 12426187. Writ Petition No. 12425/87 is a Writ for Quo Warranto against Sri N. T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of the State. Writ Petition. No. 12805/87 seeks a mandamus to the authorities concerned to take penal action, including prosecution against Sri N. T. Rama Rao, for violations under the Income-tax Act, Wealth-tax Act, Prevention of Corruption Act and Foreign Exchange Regulations Act. Finally, Writ Petition. No. 12426/87 is for a mandamus for appointing a Commission of Enquiry under S. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, to enquire into various charges against Sri N. T. Rama Rao, Chief Minister of the State.
3. In the combined affidavit filed running about 180 pages, the petitioner had set out in detail a number of matters. These are not chronologically arranged for the purpose of identification with each one of the writ petitions. In most cases, there are overlappings. If one may say so, it is a mixed- bag from which each item has to be taken out and examined.
4. When these writ petitions came up for normal admission it was felt by a Division Bench of this Court that Rule Nisi should not ” issued by applying the ordinary rule of a triable issue or an ‘arguable point’, but that .Rule Nisi should be issued only if the petitioner made out a substantial prima facie case.
5. Notice of motion was accordingly issued to all the respondents to show cause why the writ petitions should not be admitted and the matters were placed before a Full Bench for consideration. Notice was issued to the learned Attorney-General of India to assist this Court in view of the very peculiar nature of these writ petitions and matters of grave importance involved. Learned Attorney-General Sri K. Parasaran, appeared in response to this notice and spent considerable time in the Court dealing with the various issues and explained the implications thereof. Eminent jurist. Sri Nani Palkhiyala entered appearance on behalf of the Chief Minister, respondent No. 1 and we have heard him at length. Learned Advocate- General of the State appeared for the State Government and made his submissions which we have taken note. We have also heard the Counsel on behalf of some interveners. namely, Sri K. Rama Krishna Reddy, Sri M. Narasaiah and Sri K. R. K. Vara Prasad etc. As the four writ petitions dealt with different aspects of the matters, the question concerning the directions if any to be given to the Central Government relating to the alleged breakdown of the constitutional machinery warranting imposition of Presidential rule in the State under Art. 356 of the Constitution, shall be considered in this writ petition.
6. Obviously because of the preliminary nature of the bearing, none of the respondents in the writ petition filed any counter except Sri N. T. Rama Rao, respondent 1. The counter filed is short. Basically the contention is that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this writ petition and it is, not. therefore. maintainable. Referring to the various contentions it was stated that “the- factual aspect is not being dealt with at this stage. Suffice it to state that they are all frivolous. -scandalous and ill-merited.” It is worthwhile extracting below para 4 of the counter :
“4. 1 state that the petitioner on his own showing belongs to Congress-1 Political Party. In all the elections conducted in the State. the candidates belonging to this party were successively defeated by the candidates set up by the Telugu Desam Party of which 1 am the President. The petitioner belongs to the political, pressure group of the Congress-1 Party which having failed in its attempts to destabilise the party in power through democratic process is in abuse of the process of the court trying to further its aims which it could not do so otherwise. I submit that in filing the writ petitions the petitioner has not acted bona fide, but was actuated by political motives. It is relevant to state that the petitioner was set up by the Congress-1 party, as a candidate for the Mayorship of the Visakhapatnarn Municipal Corporation in the recently conducted elections and he defeated by a large margin by the candidate belonging to the Telugu Desarn Party and his writ petition filed for setting aside the election was dismissed on 8-7-87. I state that the issues raised in the writ petitions are not justiciable as they are all political questions which are not within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the courts. The petitioner does not have judicially enforceable legal right and he cannot he satin to be a person aggrieved and hence he has with locus standi to maintain the writ petitions. For these reasons all the writ petitions are liable to he rejected in limine”
7. Taking up the present writ petition, No. 12427/87 in particular the petitioner (respondent’?), states :
“In this writ petition, the petitioner is seeking for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus for the imposition of President’s Rule in Andhra Pradesh State.The petitioner has no locus standi to seek such a relief nor this Honourable Court has any power or jurisdiction to issue such a writ.”
8. Basically, the contention of Sri. Nani Paikhivala appearing for respondent 1 is that the petitioner has no locus standi to file this writ petition and is a busy body. It is pointed out that he is an important Member of she Congress-I Party in the State which is the principal ritual of the ruling Telugu Desam Party. It is said that the petitioner is a disgruntled and frustrated politician and in a state of despondency filed this writ petition along with others to settle political with respondent 1. Inviting attention to what is popularly known as “the Judge’s case” in S. P. Gupta v. President of India , learned Counsel reminded us that this Court has to he careful to see that the member of the public who approaches the Court is acting bona fide and not for personal gain or profit or political motivation or other oblique consideration. Learned Counsel urged that this Court must not allow its process to be abused by politicians and others to delay legitimate administrative action or to gain a political objective. Even though the frontiers of public law are expanding far and wide and new concepts and doctrines which will change the complexion of the law are beginning to be Horn, courts mug ensure that in the guise of public interest litigation politicians are not allowed to enter Courts to settle individual political scores. inviting attention to the affidavit filed, learned Counsel pointed out that the petitioner himself does not consider this as public interest litigational all and does not Say so in the affidavit. Sri Palkhivala contends that the writ petition avowedly does not constitute public interest litigation but surely political interest litigation.
9. Sri Palkhivala further urges that in a public interest litigation there is no adversarial rule see Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, . There is no political motivation (see the Judges’ case) public interest litigation cannot he permitted to d-five out good litigation from the Court (see Sachinandand Pandey v. State of W. B., AIR 1987 SC 1109 at p. 1134). It is further urged that the Court shall not admit a petition which required the Court to perform an administrative or executive function – (see Sachidanand Pandey’s case (supra)). It is finally urged by Sri Paikhivala that public interest litigation is entertainable covering one or two specific instances. A petition like the present one containing several hundreds of charges is unprecedented in public interest litigation. It is submitted that for obvious reasons this Court cannot go into the several hundreds of questions which are raised by the petitioner, and the petitioner should, therefore, he asked to seek relief elsewhere.
10. Learned counsel further pointed out that in order to grant the relief prayed for by the petitioner this court will have to encroach upon the spheres reserved for the legislature and the Executive. Learned Counsel pointed out that it is the function of the President of India to impose Presidential Rule under Art. 356 of the Constitution. Appointment of an Enquiry Commission is a function of the appropriate Government under S. 3 of the Commissions of Enquiry Act. Prosecuting a person for violations of laws is a matter within the purview of the authorities administering the relevant Acts. A writ for Quo Warranto is not maintainable unless the person holding the office is shown to have incurred any disqualification to continue to hold the office. In order to grant these reliefs to the petitioner this Court has to necessarily encroach upon the spheres reserved for others and this Court cannot compel or issue a direction to adopt a particular course howsoever desirable.
11. Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner invited our attention to a catena of cases in support of 6is contention that the traditional approach towards public interest litigation has undergone enormous changes in Eighties and the frontiers of public interest litigation are now so enlarged that if a matter concerning any definite public importance is brought to the notice of the Court, the Court is bound to act.
12. We have also had the benefit of the learned Attorney General explaining how the public interest litigation has come to stay in this country and the salutary results flowing from out of the Courts considering public interest litigation. Learned Attorney General agreed with Sri Palkhivala that enlarging the scope of the public interest litigation would open up the floodgates of litigation. Learned Attorney General pointed out that on grounds of inconvenience and hardship courts cannot refuse to open floodgates of public interest litigation and halt the progress of public good. Learned Attorney General characteristically relied on the observations of Sri Palkhivala himself in his book, “We, The People”. Our attention has been invited to the following remarks of Sri Palkhivala at page 224 concerning this aspect :
“The argument that such a liberal extension of the doctrine of Locus Standi would open up the floodgates of litigation was nailed by Prof. K. E. Scott in words which were approved by the Australian law Reforms Committee :
“The idle and whimsical plaintiff, a dilettante who litigates for a lark, is a spectre which haunts the legal literature, not the court room.
As Krishna Iyer, J., in Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union's case AIR 1981 SC 344 had observed, "if a citizen is no more than a wayfarer or officious intervener without any interest or, concern beyond what belongs to any one of the 660 million people of this country, the door of the Court will not be ajar for him. But if he belongs to an organization which has special interest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper than that of a busybody, he cannot he told off the gates, although whether the issue raised by him is justiciable may still remain to be considered." Learned Attorney General has also invited our attention to a number of cases bearing on the point. We do not consider it necessary to catalogue all these cases in the view that we are taking.
13. There is no doubt that the petitioner belongs to a rival political party. There may also perhaps be no doubt that the writ petition is filed out of political considerations. The question for consideration is whether the petitioner can be thrown off the portals of this Court for the above reasons. If the allegations contained in the writ petition are vague, unsubstantial, political in character and roving in nature, it might lend sufficient justification for the Court not to entertain the petition. We have, therefore, critically looked into the various contentions raised in the writ petition. Whether or not true, several of the allegations are grave. It is alleged that the first respondent secured exemptions under the Urban Ceiling Regulation Act contrary to the provisions of that Act by using his official position as Chief Minister. Several documents in support of these allegations were filed. Allegations were made that the first respondent secured for himself and his relations exemptions from the levy of entertainment tax on wholly untenable grounds, clearly violating the provisions of the Entertainment Tax Act. There are allegations that enormous public funds were spent on properties belonging to the first respondent and his relations. A large number of Government Orders were filed to fortify this plea. It is further alleged that on the official residence of the first respondent. which does not belong to him, but to one of is sons, several lakhs of Rupees were spent n renovation and remodelling contrary to ales governing the matter. Copies of orders passed by the Government from time to time were filed. There are also allegations of burning of villages with the connivance and under instructions from the Police Department killing of various persons in false encounters and annihilation of several villages consisting of Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled by the people belonging to the community of the first respondent. There is a further allegation that in making appointments to high offices, persons belonging to the community of the first respondent were elected. A detailed account of such appointments was given in the affidavit. It is alleged that these appointments violate Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Various other acts of the Executive were questioned with supporting details on the ground that all hose acts were performed by the Government at the behest of the first respondent.
14. The above allegations which are merely illustrative and not exhaustive, give in account of some, of the serious allegations made against the first respondent. It is not possible to know at this stage whether these Allegations are true or not, because the first respondent in the affidavit filed by him did not choose to deny the allegations. He only Characterized them as “frivolous, scandalous and ill-merited.” The counter-affidavit must cave been drafted by expert legal advisers of he first respondent and it is not as if the first respondent omitted to deny these allegations by accident. As matters stand, we have to take it that the first respondent did not advisedly choose to deny the allegations made against him. May be if a counter is filed by him after the admission of the writ petition something may be said about these allegations, but just now we are not in a position to throw but the allegations contained in the affidavit as of no consequence. In our opinion, a writ petition containing serious allegations touching upon matters of great public importance cannot be thrown out on the short ground that it is filed by a political rival and for political considerations. The best course as suggested by the learned Attorney General, is to look into the allegations critically and if this Court is impressed that the allegations are serious in character and stand uncontroverted at the present time, the locus standi of the petitioner may not be open to question at this stage. Having loocked into the allegations we are prima facie satisfied that this writ petition is not liable to be thrown off on the ground of locus standi. We need not, however, pronounce upon this issue finally inasmuch as we feel the writ petition could be disposed of on other grounds as we shall presently indicate below.
15. We have already referred to the allegation of the petitioner that a situation has arisen in the State of Andhra Pradesh in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. According to the petitioner there is a breakdown of the constitutional machinery. In support of this plea the petitioner refers to the following events :
(a)Persons who show hostility to the ruling party are locked up in police custody on one pretext or the other and as many as 25 persons (details furnished) died in police custody while in lock-up between January, 1985 and August, 1986. No investigation worth the name was ordered into these lock-up deaths.
(b) In fake encounters as many as 27 persons (details furnished) were killed between January, 1985 and June, 1986. According to the petitioner, these people were ruthlessly killed by the police in the guise of ‘political encounters’, and no enquiry, worth the name, was ordered.
(c) Tribal villages were en masse, burnt on suspicion that extremists and Naxalites were being harboured in these villages, rendering people homeless, Several hamlets in Visakhapatnam, East Godavari and Adilabad Districts, were burnt. Representations made by the Andhra Pradesh Civil liberties Committee and other voluntary Organizations received no attention.
(d) The State is endeavouring to extern the tribal population in Adilabad District on the ground that they illegally crossed into the border District of Adilabad from the State of Maharashtra.
(e) In July 1987, thousands of villages in Chintapalli area were burnt down and the Samanta tribals were being hunted down and their villages were being burnt. The petitioner refers to a police Radio Message flashed to the combing party stating:
“……… this is to inform you that under the directions of the Chintapaili DSP villages where Bagata and Gadaba are living should not be disturbed and you are allowed to burn only the villages where the Kodu tribals (Samantas) are living. These directions were given by the DSP …….”
(a)The petitioner refers to a statement reportedly made by the State Director General of Police on 2-7-87 and published in the Indian Express admitting the correctness of the above Radio Message, adding that:
“it may have been done because tribals were sheltering Naxalites.”
(b)In Padiri Kuppam village of Chittoor District, the entire Harijan colony was razed to the ground and people were killed for their failure to support the ruling party. No action, worth the name. is taken till now.
(c)In July 1985, several hundreds of Harijans were massacred in Karamehedu village of Prakasam District by the rich landlords belonging to the cornnnunity of the first respondent. No action, worth the name, is taken so far to book the offenders.
(d)In Neerukonda village, rich landlords.. belonging to the community of the first respondent, killed the Harijans and injured several other Harijans. They attacked the harijans with axes, spades, sticks and mercilessly beat them. No action whatsoever is taken so far.
(e) Closely following the above incident, the entire Harijanwada of Neerukonda village was reduced to ashes by fire on 25-7-87. Complaints made by various persons that the houses were set on fire had not received attention.
(f) In Dechavaram village of Guntur District persons belonging to Reddy community were attacked and several persons were killed.
(g) In Dontaili village of Nellore District rich landlords belonging to the community of the first respondent axed to death a Backward
Class labour leader vide report in the Indian Express dt. 29-8-87. The situation grew tense and in the scuffles that followed, the legs of another Harijan leader were chopped off in broad day-light.
(a)In Rayachoti village of Cuddapah District the Muslim population are being harassed on the alleged ground that they supported the Congress-I in the Mandal and other elections.
(b)Persons belonging to weaker sections in Krishnapuram village in Gorantia Assembly Constituency, Anantapur District, were attacked by the Telugu Desam Party workers. About 1 5 houses, including 4 pucca buildings, food grains and currency notes were burnt in the attack. Bombs were freely used.
(c)Confrontation threatens between the Legislature and the High Court on account of a resolution passed by a majority of the legislators at the instance of the first respondent to disobey the High Court’s orders. There is a threat to the cordial relations till now existing between the High Court and the State Legislature.
16. Apart from the above allegations the petitioner has referred to in his affidavit the alleged acts of misrule by the Government and the acts of alleged dishonesty and corruption by the first respondent and his relations. It is alleged that public funds are being diverted for the benefit of the first respondent and his relations. It is also urged that at the instance of the first respondent exemptions under the Urban Ceiling Regulation Act were being granted tb the relations of the first respondent and others. It is further urged that appointments to high offices in the State were made or are being made from among the persons belonging to the community of the first respondent and persons belonging to other communities are ignored.
17. Sri Palkhivala appearing for respondent 1, urged that the petitioner has no right to ask for the imposition of President Rule in the State and much less could this Court exercise jurisdiction to give any directions to the Central Government in this regard. Inviting attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, Sri Palkhivala urged that Art.356(1) of the Constitution calls for an assessment of a situation. As Art. 356(1) embraces matters if political and executive policy and Expediency courts cannot interfere with these unless and until it is shown what constitutional provision the President has contravened on admitted grounds of action under Art. 356(1) if the Constitution. It is pointed out that the satisfaction of the President under Art. 356(1) ; a subjective one and cannot be tested by reference to any objective test. In such an vent, the decision must necessarily be left to he executive branch of the Government. It cannot, by its very nature, be a fit subject- matter for judicial determination. Sri Palkhivala has also invited our attention to another decision of the Supreme Court in Bhut Nath v. State of West Bengal, . One of the questions raised in this case was whether the continuance of Emergency proclamation issued by the President of India is valid and he citizen’s fundamental right could remain suspended. It was claimed that actually no circumstances existed justifying the reclamation of Emergency and consequently the fundamental rights of a citizen cannot be suspended in the guise of Emergency. Dealing with this contention, the Supreme Court observed :
“We have to reject summarily the last submission as failing outside the orbit of judicial control and wandering into the para- political sector. It was argued that there was o real emergency and yet the proclamation remained unretracted with consequential peril fundamental rights. In our view, this is a political, not justiciable issue and the appeal could be to the polls and not to the Courts ….. True, an emergency puts a broad blanket blindfolding of the seven liberties of Art. 19 and its baseless prolongation may devalue democracy. That is a political matter dehors our ken. for the validity of the reclamation turns on the subjective satisfaction of the President that a grave emergency, of the kind mentioned in Part XVIII. or its imminent danger exists.”
Relying on the aforesaid observations. Sri Palkhivaia submitted that this Court cannot go into the question whether a situation exists in the State justifying the imposition of the President Rule.
18. Learned Attorney General of India, assisting this Court, pointed out that the exercise of power under Art. 356 is largely coloured by political considerations and it is not open to this Court to give any mandamus in the terms prayed for by the petitioner. Learned Attorney General invited our attention to a decision of this Court in In Re A. Sreeramulu,. . Dealing with the question of satisfaction for the purpose of Art. 356(1), Chinnappa Reddy J., (as he then was) observed that the issue of President’s satisfaction under Art. 356 is basically a political issue and consequently the Court cannot go into the question whether circumstances exist justifying the imposition of President’s Rule. Learned Attorney General agreed with Sri Paikhivala that the ‘satisfaction’ required for the purpose of Art. 356(1) of the Constitution should be that of the President and it would be impermissible for this Court to go into the merits of the various matters urged by the petitioner and to record its opinion thereon.
19. Having given our careful consideration to the matter in issue, we must uphold the objections raised by Sri Palkhivala and the learned Attorney General of India to the issuance of a mandamus. While we have set out in some detail the events referred to by the petitioner as justifying the imposition of the President Rule, it is not for us to express any opinion on the same. For the purpose of Art. 356(1) of the Constitution, the ‘satisfaction’ regarding the existence of a 1situation’in.the State is that of the President of India, and this Court cannot encroach upon the constitutional functions of the President of India.
20. We have already referred to the petitioner’s allegation that the Union Government remained grossly indifferent about the alleged happenings in the. State and took no action whatsoever under Am. 355, 356 and 357 of the Constitution. We have also referred to the petitioner’s plea that even if the alleged happenings are within the knowledge of the Union Government, still the Union Government has failed to exercise its constitutional power for fear that it would antogonise the non-Congress (1) Government in the State. We have, therefore, asked the learned Counsel for the petitioner to state if the petitioner, belonging as he does to the Party-in-power at the Centre, had occasion to bring to the notice of the Union Government and other constitutional authorities the alleged situation prevailing in the State of Andhra Pradesh and sought any action to be taken. We were told that on 19-8- 87 the petitioner submitted a representation to the Honourable Prime Minister of India, inviting the Prime Minister’s attention to the various happenings in the State and prayed for imposition of President Rule. Along with the representation the petitioner filed a copy of the consolidated affidavit filed in the four writ petitions. It may be pointed out that while the aforesaid representation was filed before the Hon’ble Prime Minister on 19-8- 87, this writ petition was filed on 24-8-87. If the Union Government did not take any action on the representation filed by the petitioner, it is entirely understandable as the matter is pending consideration by this Court.
21. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, Sri S. Ramachandra Rao, however, contends that this Court can issue a mandarnus directing the Union Government to exercise its constitutional power and to discharge its constitutional obligations by making appropriate enquiry into the various matters bearing upon the imposition of the President’s Rule. We do not think so. The question concerning the imposition of the President’s Rule is a matter entirely within the jurisdiction of the President of India who may act upon the advice tendered to him by the Union Government. There are no ground to think that the Union Government is unaware of what has been happening in the State of Andhra Pradesh or that the Union Government failed to take any action even though it is satisfied that condition exist in the State justifying the imposition of the President’s Rule. Having made a representation to the Union Government on 19-8-1987, the petitioner should have given sufficient time to the Union Government to examine the representation and come to an appropriate decision in the matter. Without doing so, the petitioner rushed to file this writ petition in this Court within four days after, giving a representation to the Union Government. While we refuse to give any direction to the Central Government in the terms prayed for by the petitioner, we have no doubt that the representation filed by the petitioner as well as the details set out in this judgment will receive consideration of the Central Government and an appropriate decision will be taken.
22. The writ petition is accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid observations. There shall be no order as to costs.
23. We have beard all the four writ petitions together, upon a notice of motion, to make up our minds whether a rule nisi should be issued or declined. in each one of the four cases. As pointed out by Sri Palkhivala these writs have no parallel in the country. Substantial time was spent in unravelling intricate problems that have cropped up and innumerable judicial precedents had to be considered. We had to go through this exercise at considerable personal inconvenience because we are conscious that rules should not be issued in these writ petitions unless a strong prima facie case is made out. Upon notice of motion, the learned Attorney General, Sri K. Parasaran, assisted this Court sitting through the proceedings for considerably long time. We are benefited by his wise counsel. We express our sincere gratitude to the learned Attorney General of India for the assistance given. Deeply exercised by the feeling that the reflections .of these writ petitions may be experienced elsewhere in the country, eminent jurist Shri Nani Palkhivala, appearing for respondent 1, took considerable pains in inviting the attention of this Court to the relevant aspects of the matter. We convey our high appreciation to Sri Palkhivaia for the assistance given to this Court. The learned Advocate General, appearing for respondent 2, has also ably assisted us in the matter. It was a pleasure watching Shri D. Gopala Subrahmanyam assisting so ably the learned Attorney General of India. We are very impressed by his thoroughness on facts and law and we place on record our appreciation of the assistance given by him.
Sri S. Ramachandra Rao the learned counsel for the petitioner, presented the petitioner's case with his usual thoroughness, fairness and ability. We appreciate his services. We are greatly benefited by the arguments of the learned counsel for the interveners, Sarvasri K. Ramakrishna Reddy, M. Narsaiah and K. R. K. Vara Prasad, who enthusiastically . participated in the deliberations. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the learned counsel for the Petitioner made an oral submission that leave to appeal to the Supreme Court might be granted. We have adverted to the relevant Provisions of the Constitution, which are clear. We find no substantial question of general importance which requires to be settled by the Supreme Court involved in this case; Hence leave declined. 24. Petition dismissed.