IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS
DATED: 01.11.2010
CORAM:
THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE R.MALA
Second Appeal No.1954 of 2004
Rangaswamy .. Appellant
Vs.
1. Rajeswari
2. Aruvathiyammal
3. Mani
4. Janaki
5. Duraiswamy
6. Rukmani .. Respondents
Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 20.8.2003 in A.S.No.41 of 1999 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge's Court (Principal Subordinate Judge-Additional Charge), Gobichettipalaym, against the fair and decretal order dated 12.3.1999 in I.A.No.87 of 1987 in O.S.No.87 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sathyamangalam.
For appellant : Mr.V.Nicholas
For respondents : Mr.N.Manokaran for R-1
JUDGMENT
Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 20.8.2003 in A.S.No.41 of 1999 on the file of the First Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court (Principal Subordinate Judge-Additional Charge), Gobichettipalaym, confirming the fair and decretal order dated 12.3.1999 in I.A.No.87 of 1987 in O.S.No.87 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sathyamangalam.
2. Short facts leading to the filing of the Second Appeal are:
Originally, the suit properties belong to Periya Apachi Gounder and Chinna Apachi Gounder and Periya Apachi’s wife is Marakkal; Periya Apachi died intestate and so, the said Marakkal as plaintiff filed the suit in O.S.No.87 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sathyamangalam, for partition of ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties and preliminary decree of partition in respect of half share in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties had been granted by the trial Court and in pursuance of the same, the said Marakkal filed I.A.No.87 of 1987 for passing a final decree; at that time, R7 Rangaswamy, who was the purchaser of ‘B’ schedule property, during the pendency of the suit for partition in O.S.No.87 of 1987, from Chinna Appachi Gounder, was impleaded as party to the final decree proceedings, in which the trial Court granted half share in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties as per the Commissioner’s report/plan to the first respondent/second petitioner in I.A., against which, the subsequent purchaser, namely seventh respondent in the final decree proceedings, preferred a First Appeal, which was dismissed, against which, the present Second Appeal has been filed by the said R7/Rangaswamy.
3. At the time of admission of the present Second Appeal, this Court framed the following substantial question of law:
“Whether the absence of challenge to the preliminary decree passed by filing the appeal, would disable in law the purchaser pending suit, to work out his rights in equity in the final decree application?”
4. Learned counsel for the appellant/R7/subsequent purchaser, submitted that it is true that the suit properties belong to both Chinna Apachi Gounder and Periya Apachi Gounder. A preliminary decree for partition was passed. The appellant/R7 does not dispute the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.87 of 1987. Learned counsel for the appellant/R7 fairly conceded that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant/R7 purchased ‘B’ schedule property and since the deceased first plaintiff-Marakkal died, R1 as adoptive daughter, impleaded herself as the second petitioner in the I.A. (final decree proceedings), and the appellant/R7, by stepping into the shoes of Chinna Apachi Gounder, purchased the properties from Chinna Apachi and after the death of the said Chinna Apachi Counter, her legal heirs were impleaded as respondents 2 to 6 in the I.A. filed for passing the final decree proceedings and they were set ex-parte and have not contested the final decree proceedings, and hence, it is contended by learned counsel for the appellant/R7/subsequent purchaser that the appellant is entitled to get the share of Chinna Apachi Gounder in the entire suit property instead of ‘B’ schedule property and hence, he prayed for allowing the Second Appeal and wanted a decree in respect of the entire suit property. Learned counsel for the appellant relied on the various decisions of Supreme Court in support of his contentions.
5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/second petitioner (i.e. the legal heir of the deceased Chinna Apachi Gounder), submitted that the second plaintiff’s mother, namely Marakkal, the deceased first plaintiff, filed the suit for partition and obtained preliminary decree in the suit for partition in respect of half share in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties and during the pendency of the suit, the appellant/R7 purchased the property under Ex.B-1 and before he purchased the property, he was a tenant under Chinna Apachi Gounder and Periya Apachi Gounder and thus, the appellant/R7/the subsequent purchaser, is in possession and enjoyment of ‘B’ schedule property; that admittedly, as soon as he purchased the property, he filed a suit in O.S.No.127 of 1987 on the file of the District Munsif Court, Sathyamangalam (decree is Ex.A-1) for injunction in respect of ‘B’ schedule property in the present suit in O.S.No.87 of 1987. He also filed an application to record himself as a cultivating tenant, but subsequently he has not pressed the said suit in O.S.No.127 of 1987 and filed A.S.No.115 of 1985 challenging the preliminary decree passed in O.S.No.87 of 1987, and the said A.S.No.115 of 1985 was dismissed on 7.3.1988 on the ground that the appellant/R7 is not a bona-fide purchaser for value which has become final, as he did not file any Second Appeal against the judgment and decree in A.S.No.115 of 1985; as soon as the preliminary decree was passed, the appellant/R7 filed an application to implead himself as a party to final decree proceedings, which was allowed only on the basis of the endorsement made by the appellant/R7 that he will not question the preliminary decree; he further submitted that the appellant/R7 purchased the property during the pendency of the suit and hence, the sale deed Ex.B-1 is hit by the principles of “Lis Pendens” and even in equity, the appellant/R7 is not entitled to get final decree in respect of his share of Chinna Apachi Gounder. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the appellant/R7 relied on various decisions of Courts.
6. Considering the rival submissions made by the learned counsel for either parties, it is seen that admittedly, the suit properties are joint family properties of Chinna Apachi Gounder and Periya Apachi Gounder and the said Periya Apachi Gounder died and his wife Marakkal, the deceased first plaintiff, filed the suit for partition; during the pendency of the suit, the appellant/R7 purchased ‘B’ schedule property under Ex.B-1 on 15.9.1982; further, the appellant/R7 also filed the suit in O.S.No.127 of 1987 for bare injunction and subsequently, the same was dismissed as not pressed; he challenged the preliminary decree and preferred A.S.No.115 of 1985, which was also dismissed and the same had become final as he has not preferred any Second Appeal. Furthermore, the appellant/R7 also filed an application for recording himself as a cultivating tenant, which was also dismissed as not pressed.
7. It is true that during the pendency of the proceedings in the suit, if any third party purchases the property, it is hit by Doctrine of Lis Pendens, i.e. the provisions of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.
8. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the appellant/R7 in support of his contention that since the appellant stepped into the shoes of the other sharer, i.e. Chinna Apachi Gounder, he is entitled to equity.
(a) 2008 (7) SCC 144 (Usha Sinha Vs. Dina Ram):
“17. …. Bare reading of the Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC makes it clear that it is based on justice, equity and good conscience. A transferee from a judgment-debtor is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before a court of law. He should be careful before he purchases the property which is the subject-matter of litigation. It recognises the doctrine of lis pendens recognised by Section 52 of Transfer of Property Act. Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC thus takes into account the ground reality and refuses to extend helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation is pending. If unfair, inequitable or undeserved protection is afforded to a transferee pendente lite, a decree-holder will never be able to realise the fruits of his decree. Every time the decree-holder seeks a direction from a court to execute the decree, the judgment-debtor or his transferee will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer resistance or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation, the Rule has been enacted.”
(b) 2007 (10) SCC 719 : (Dhanalakshmi Vs. Mohan) :
“5. Section 52 deals with a transfer of property pending suit. In the instate case, the appellants have admittedly purchased the undivided shares of Respondents 2, 3, 4 and 6. It is not in dispute that the first respondent P.Mohan has got an undivided share in the said suit property. Because of the purchase by the appellants of the undivided share in the suit property, the rights of the first respondent herein in the suit or proceeding will not affect his right in the suit property by enforcing a partition. Admittedly, the appellants, having purchased the property from the other co-sharers, in our opinion, are entitled to come on record in order to work out the equity in their favour in the final decree proceedings. In our opinion, the appellants are necessary and proper parties to the suit, which is now pending before the trial Court. …”
(c) 1983 (1) SCC 18 : (Khemchand Vs. Vishnu Hari Patil):
“6. … A transferee pendente lite of an interest in an immovable property which is the subject-matter of a suit is a representative in interest of the party from whom he has acquired that interest. The transferee has a right to be impleaded as a party to the proceedings and to be heard before any order is made by virtue of Rule 10 of Order 22, CPC. He can also prefer an appeal against an order made in the said proceedings but with the leave of the appellate court where he is not already brought on record. A person on whom any interest has devolved on account of a transfer during the pendency of any suit or a proceeding can participate in the execution proceedings even though is name may not have been shown in the decree, preliminary or final. The Collector may proceed to make allotment of properties in an equitable manner instead of rejecting his claim for such equitable partition on the ground that he has no locus-standi. A transferee from a party of a property which is the subject-matter of partition can exercise all the rights of the transferor. Since a party can ask for an equitable partition, a transferee from him can also do so.”
9. The above citations go to show that the appellant/R7 admittedly, who pur-chased the undivided share of Chinna Apachi Gounder and the Chinna Apachi Gounder, is having undivided half share in the property and so, he is entitled to work out equity in his favour in the final decree proceedings. As per the decision reported in 1983 (1) SCC 18 (cited supra) and 2007 (10) SCC 719 (cited supra), even during the pendency of partition suit, the appellant/R7 in the final decree proceedings, purchased the share of Chinna Apachi in respect of ‘B’ schedule property by stepping into the shoes of Chinna Apachi Gounder and hence, he is entitled to equity. Admittedly, the said Chinna Apachi Gounder died during the pendency of suit and even though the legal heirs of the deceased Chinna Apachi Gounder were impleaded as R2 to R6/D2 to D6, they were set ex-parte in the final decree proceedings and they did not agitate the final decree proceedings.
10. Now, it is appropriate to consider the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents herein, (i.e.R1/the legal heir of the deceased first plaintiff and R2 to R6) reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539 (Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh), in which the Supreme Court held as follows:
“6. Moreover, the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the Court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation would be hit by the Doctrine of Lis Pendens by operation of Section 52 (of Transfer of Property Act). Under these circumstances, the respondents cannot be considered to be either necessary or proper parties to the suit.”
11. In this regard, it is worthwhile to quote Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act:
“Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act: Transfer of property pending suit relating thereto.– During the pendency in any Court having authority within the limits of India excluding the State of Jammu and Kashmir or established beyond such limits by the Central Government of any suit or proceedings which is not collusive and in which any right to immovable property is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceeding so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the Court and on such terms as it may impose.
Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, the pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a Court of competent jurisdiction, and to continue until the suit or proceeding has been disposed of by a final decree or order and complete satisfaction or discharge of such decree or order has been obtained, or has become unobtainable by reason of the expiration of any period of limitation prescribed for the execution thereof by any law for the time being in force.”
12. As the appellant/R7 purchased the property in question during the pendency of the suit, the same is hit by the Doctrine of Lis Pendens as enunciated under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and hence, as held in the decision reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539, he is neither a necessary party, nor proper party to the suit, but the said decision reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539 (cited supra) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the said case (1996 (5) SCC 539), the suit was filed for declaration of title that the plaintiff is the owner of the property on the basis of a registered Will, and during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the proposed parties purchased the property and subsequently he filed an application under Order 1 Rule 10 CPC; the trial Court therein dismissed the same holding that the proposed party is neither necessary party nor proper party to the suit and the High Court, in Revision Petition, impleaded them as defendants to the suit.
13. But, in the case on hand, the suit was filed for partition and the appellant/R7 purchased ‘B’ schedule property from one of the sharers and stepped into the shoes of Chinna Apachi Gounder, who is one of the sharers, and hence, the appellant/R7 is entitled to equity. So, the said decision reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539 (cited supra), is not applicable to the facts of the present case.
14. Relying on a Division Bench decision of this Court, reported in 2003 (1) LW 772 (Vijayalakshmi Leather Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. K.Narayanan and others), learned counsel for the first respondent/the legal heir of the deceased first plaintiff, submitted that during the pendency of the suit, the appellant/R7 purchased the property without obtaining permission from Court, and hence, the sale deed itself is non-est in the eye of law. In the said decision reported in 2003 (1) LW 772 (cited supra), the Division Bench held as follows:
“6. We carefully considered the above contentions of the learned senior counsel as well as the written argument. There is a fallacy in the argument of learned senior counsel. Though Order 21, Rule 98 and 102 refer to the ‘transferee from the judgment debtor’, in our considered view, the term ‘transferee from the judgment debtor’ would also include the transferee of a transferee from the judgment debtor. If the words ‘transferee of the judgment debtor’ mentioned in these Rules are to be given such a narrow interpretation, then the purpose of the restriction on transfer pendente lite and also the purpose of making certain provisions of C.P.C. inapplicable to such transfer will become redundant. It is the duty of the court to give full effect to the meaning of every word for the purpose for which the statute is enacted. In fact Rules 98 and 102 of Order 21 C.P.C. must be read along with Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads follows:
….
From the above provision, it could be seen that during the pendency of the proceedings, in any court, in which any right to immovable property is in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit so as to affect the right of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein except under the authority of the court.
7. It is a clear statutory bar on the parties to the proceedings from transferring any property which is the subject matter of the litigation. In view of such statutory bar, any transfer made by any of the parties to the proceeding pendente lite is non-est in the eye of law because the transferee will be entitled for the right of his transferor alone and nothing more. The restriction imposed also includes that the transfer should not be made in such a manner to effect the right of other party. From the words ‘under the authority of the court’ it is needless to explain that the party who wants to transfer the property pendente lite must get the prior permission of the court.
7-A. It may be worthwhile to refer the judgment of the Apex Court in Sarvinder Singh Vs. Dalip Singh (1996 (5) SCC 539) where the learned Judges held as follows:
“It would therefore, be clear that the defendants in the suit were prohibited by operation of Section 52 to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the appellant except with the order or authority of the court. Admittedly, the authority or order of the court had not been obtained for alienation of those properties. Therefore, the alienation obviously would be hit by the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52.”
When such statutory restriction or prohibition is there and inspite of the same if any party to the litigation transfers any of the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding, then the purchaser is getting the property subject to the result of the litigation and only the right of his transferor.
8. We are unable to appreciate the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the appellant was not a party to the proceeding and he was not impleaded as a party and consequently the decree is not binding on him. The learned senior counsel for the appellant totally forgot that the appellant purchased the property from the transferee of the party to the litigation. He, at the best, can step into the shoes of his vendor and cannot have any independent claim or right. In such circumstances, it is not open to the appellant to claim that he is a bona fide purchaser without notice of the litigation.
“9. A single Judge of this Court in Chenchulakshmi Vs. Janardan Singh (2000 (1) MLJ 349) (para 17) held as follows:
“Before I refer to the judgment of the lower court and the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant, I would refer to the fact that under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act where any suit or proceedings is pending with reference to a property, which is directly and specifically in question, the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit or proceedings so as to affect the rights of any other party thereto under any decree or order which may be made therein, except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. Therefore, there is no scope for a purchaser of property, pendente lite to contend that he is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice or to say that he was not aware of the proceeding and had no notice of the pendency of the proceeding. It has become necessary to point out this aspect for the reason that in his evidence, P.W.1 would say that he was not aware of the pendency of the proceeding and had no notice. Even assuming for a moment that the evidence tendered by him is true, even then that will not save him from the tentacles of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Equally, the contention that property was purchased paying valuable consideration, is of no avail since Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act does not purport to exclude purchaser of the property for value from its operation. On the other hand, the section is emphatic in its terms that the property cannot be transferred or otherwise dealt with by any party to the suit except under the authority of the court and on such terms as it may impose. I have also referred to absence of pleadings on the aspect of fraud and collusion.”
We respectfully endorse the view of the learned single Judge. When that be the case, it is also not open to the appellant herein who purchased the property from the transferee of a party to the litigation to plead that he has made the huge investment in the property and on that basis he should be allotted the portion which is under his occupation or he is entitled for any equity as of right.”
15. Nextly, learned counsel for the first respondent [the legal heir of the deceased first plaintiff], relied on the decision of the Patna High Court reported in AIR 2009 Patna 83 (Sumitra Devi Vs. Sitasharan Bubna), in which, the Patna High Court held as follows:
“7. …. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Sarvinder Singh v. Dalip Singh, reported in 1996 (5) Supreme Court Cases 539, has specifically held that parties to the partition suit are prohibited by operation of Section 52 of the Act to deal with the property and could not transfer or otherwise deal with it in any way affecting the rights of the other party except with the order or authority of the Court. In this case, admittedly the authority or order of the Court had not been obtained for alienation of the said properties. Therefore, the said alienation would obviously be hit of the doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52 of the Act. This aspect of the matter has been completely overlooked by the learned counsel below.
8. The principle of law is well settled that if a person has purchased a property knowing about the litigation, his fate could be with the fate of his vendor and as such opposite parties 3rd Set will get an appropriate portion from the lands/premises given to his share in the final decree of partition. In the instant case the opposite parties 3rd Set had full knowledge and information of the partition suit, but in spite of that he purchased the suit property during the pendency of the final decree proceeding, hence they had taken the risk and should be bound by the provisions of law as mentioned above.”
16. In the said decision of the Patna High Court, the suit was filed for partition and preliminary decree was passed on the property purchased by the third party during the pendency of the final decree proceedings, and prior permission of the Court was not obtained and hence, based on the decision of the Supreme Court in 1996 (5) SCC 539 (cited supra), the Patna High Court held that the alienation is hit by the Doctrine of Lis Pendens. There is no quarrel over the proposition laid down in the above two decisions and the appellant/R7 is entitled to equity, since he purchased the property from one of the sharers of the property.
17. Learned counsel for the first respondent [the legal heir of the deceased first plaintiff], further relied on the decision of the Madurai Bench of this Court reported in 2005 (2) CTC 254 {Dhanalakshmi Vs. P.Mohan}, in which, it was observed as follows:
“12. In the present case the purchases by the petitioners are clearly hit by lis pendens. They are not entitled to be impleaded, since any right that they may have cannot be larger than the right of their vendors, assuming that they are bona fide purchasers. ….”
18. In the said decision reported in 2005 (2) CTC 254 [cited supra], the petition was filed by the purchasers to implead themselves in the partition suit, and it was held by the Division Bench that the purchase is hit by the principles of “Lis Pendens” and they are not entitled to be impleaded and they cannot have their right accrued on them through their vendors. Admittedly, in the present case, the appellant/R7 was impleaded as party to the final decree proceedings and hence, he is entitled to equity as he purchased the property from one of the sharers who is having half share in ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties.
19. In the other decision of this Court, relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents reported in 2003 (3) LW 180 {Rajammal Vs. Periyanayagam}, it was held as follows:
“7. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act reads as under:-
… …
This section is so clear that it would operate during the pendency of any suit before any court. The explanation to this section also clearly indicates that “Pendency of a suit or proceeding shall be deemed to commence from the date of the presentation of the plaint or the institution of the proceeding in a court of competent jurisdiction.”
8. It is, therefore, clear that the section starts to operate or commence from the date of presentation of the plaint itself. In our case, the suit in OS.No.1987/1980 was filed in the year 1980 and Rajaratinam appears to have purchased only on 24.2.1981 and that therefore, his purchase is hit by Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act and therefore, he is not a necessary party even to the final decree proceedings.
9.The petitioner also relied upon the case of Bakthavatsalam Vs. Anjapuli and 5 others (2001-1-CTC-19), wherein it was held, “10. It is clear that a person is not to be added as a defendant merely because he or she would be incidentally affected by the judgement. The main consideration is whether or not the presence of such a person is necessary to enable the court to effectually and completely adjudicate upon and settle and questions involved in the suit. If the question at issue between the parties can be worked out without any one else being brought in, the stranger should not be added as a party. In the light of the language used in Order 1, Rule 10(2) CPC as well as various decisions and in the light of factual position in our case that preliminary decree has already been passed and application for passing of final decree is pending before the court below, I am of the view that purchasers of properties during the pendency of the suit are neither necessary nor proper parties inasmuch as they would be bound by the decree in the suit in view of the principle enunciated in Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act……… It is settled law that any alienation subsequent to the filing of the suit is hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The subsequent purchasers are aware of the proceedings and they are definitely bound by the decision in the suit and the proceedings.”
20. There is no quarrel over the proposition laid down in the said decision reported in 2003 (3) LW 180 (cited supra) that during the pendency of the suit, without permission of the Court, if a purchase is made, the purchaser is not a necessary and proper party to the suit, as had been held by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in 1996 (5) SCC 539 (cited supra).
21. While applying the decisions referred to above, since the appellant/R7 purchased the property during the pendency of the suit, Ex.B-1 sale deed is hit by the principles of “Lis Pendens” under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, but however as he stepped into the shoes of his vendor, he is entitled to equity. But as per Ex.B-1 sale deed, the appellant/R7 purchased ‘B’ schedule property from the deceased first plaintiff Appachi Gounder and one Duraisamy and as the appellant/R7’s vendor (Appachi Gounder) is having only half share in the property, the appellant/R7 is entitled only to half share in ‘B’ schedule property, and as he stepped into the shoes of his vendor/Appachi Counter, the appellant is also entitled to equity.
22. Learned counsel for the appellant/R7 submitted that as the appellant/R7 purchased the entire suit property, he is entitled to half share in ‘A’ schedule property also, but the above argument does not merit acceptance, since the appellant/R7 has every right to work out his remedy against the legal representatives of the deceased Chinna Apachi Gounder. In the present case, I am of the view that the appellant/R7 who stepped into the shoes of his vendor (Chinna Apachi Gounder), even though he purchased the entire ‘B’ schedule property, but as per the preliminary decree, he is only entitled to half share in ‘B’ schedule property. The substantial question of law is answered accordingly.
23. In the result, the appellant/R7-Rangasamy and the first respondent-Rajeswari, each are entitled to half share in ‘B’ schedule property. As per the final decree, the first respondent-Rajeswari is also entitled to ‘A’ marked portion (of Commissioner’s plan) in both ‘A’ and ‘B’ schedule properties and ‘C’ and ‘D’ portion marked (in Commissioner’s plan), is for common enjoyment of both of the appellant/R7/Rangaswamy and the first respondent/Rajeswari and the remaining portion of ‘B’ schedule property is allotted to the appellant/R7/Rangasamy. The Second Appeal is liable to be dismissed as far as ‘A’ schedule property is concerned.
24. For the reasons stated above:
(a) The Second Appeal is allowed only to the extend indicated above.
(b) In respect of ‘A’ schedule property, the Second Appeal is dismissed.
(c) No costs.
cs
To
1. The First Additional Subordinate Judge’s Court
(Principal Subordinate Judge-Additional Charge), Gobichettipalaym,
2. The District Munsif Court, Sathyamangalam.
3. Record Keeper, V.R. Section, High Court,
Madras