JUDGMENT
V.M. Sahai, J.
1. The petitioner was appointed on 8.8.1968 as Lecturer English in Ambika Prasad Intermediate College. Moradabad (In brief Institution). He was confirmed on 9.8.1969. He was a member of Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh and Bhartiya Janta Party. He was elected District Secretary of the Bhartiya Janta Party in 1987. From 14.8.1975 to 30.7.1977, he was detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act. From 1.11.1980 to 10.12.1980 and from 11.7.1987 to 11.7.1988 he was detained under the National Security Act. He was arrested on 11.7.1987 from the gate of Government Inter College, Moradabad, while he was going to attend his training under the new education policy. It is stated that when the petitioner was arrested Principal of the Institution and Mr. Khangiri. Assistant Teacher in L.T. Grade were along with the petitioner. The petitioner, after his arrest, told the Principal to inform the manager about his arrest. The manager issued notice on 24.7.1987 calling his explanation for absence from the institution without any information. On 27.7.1987 the petitioner informed the Manager that while he was going to take part in the training scheme, he was arrested by the police, therefore, he was unable to attend the institution. The reply of the petitioner dated 27.4.1987 was sent by the management to the District Inspector of Schools who on 14.8.1987 directed the management to take administrative action. The management passed a resolution on 4.9.1987 and gave notice to the petitioner as to why he be not dismissed from service as he was absent from 11.7.1987 without any leave and in pursuance of the resolution the management issued a notice on 10.9.1987 to the petitioner. On 3.10.1987 the petitioner replied to the notice dated 10.9.1987 and
informed that he was in Jail under the National Security Act and requested for sympathetic consideration of his case. The management by resolution dated 20.10.1987 appointed the manager of the institution as inquiry officer and authorised him to issue the charge-sheet. The inquiry officer, on 9.12.1987, issued charge-sheet to the petitioner framing two charges against him on 2.1.1988, the petitioner requested the inquiry officer to meet him in jail, but his prayer was not accepted. The inquiry officer issued another letter on 13.1.1988 to the petitioner giving opportunity to him to submit his reply to the charge-sheet which was replied on 23.1.1988 and the petitioner again requested the manager to meet him in jail and permit him to lead oral evidence. Thereafter the inquiry officer met the petitioner in jail on 15.2.1988 and gave questionnaire to the petitioner for answering it. The petitioner replied to the questionnaire that he had been detained in jail under the National Security Act without any reason by the district administration. Apart from the questionnaire given to the petitioner, no enquiry proceedings were held by the inquiry officer and he submitted his report to the management of the institution. The management on 8.7.1988 suspended the petitioner and forwarded it to the District Inspector of Schools for approval. The petitioner was released from Jail on 11.7.1988. The District Inspector of Schools did not grant approval to the suspension order, which lapsed on 6.9.1988 after expiry of 60 days. The petitioner, after expiry of suspension period, went to join on his post but the Principal did not permit him to join under the Instructions of the management of the institution. The resolution of the Committee of Management proposing to dismiss the petitioner from service was sent to U. P. Secondary Education Service Commission, Allahabad (In brief Commission). The petitioner sent a letter dated 24.2.1989 denying all the charges. Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 by order dated 28.7.1989 granted approval to the proposal of the Committee of
Management of the institution for dismissing the petitioner from service. The management, on 31.8.1989, decided to dismiss the petitioner from service and directed the manager to issue letter of dismissal to the petitioner. The manager, by letter dated 1.9.1989, dismissed the petitioner. The order of the Commission dated 28.7.1989 passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and consequential resolution of the Committee of Management dated 31.8.1989 and dismissal order dated
1.9.1989 (Annexures-17 and 18 respectively to the writ petition) are under challenge in the instant writ petition.
2. I have heard Sri Ashok Khare learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and the learned standing counsel, appearing for other respondents.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the entire enquiry proceeding is vitiated in view of the fact that while the petitioner was in Jail, the enquiry proceeding was carried out by the management in which he did not have reasonable opportunity to participate due to his confinement in jail. He further urged that the petitioner was arrested on
11.7.1987 under the National Security Act and was released from jail on 11.7.1988. The petitioner was arrested being a member of Rashtriya Swyamsewak Sangh and Bhartiya Janta Party and the State Government in a high-handed manner arrested the petitioner for no reason. He lastly urged that the petitioner was not wilfully absent from the institution but was prevented to attend the institution due to his detention under the National Security Act and the charges against the petitioner were not proved.
4. On the other hand. Sri Rajesh Tandon, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that adequate opportunity of hearing was given to the petitioner as a questionnaire was provided to him in jail to which he submitted a reply. He further urged that the petitioner was
rightly dismissed from service as the teaching work was suffering.
5. The petitioner was District Secretary of Bhartiya Janta Party. He was detained under the National Security Act as a preventive measure. He has been dismissed from service mainly because of his detention and the consequences flowing from it. Two charges were framed against him one that the petitioner was primarily appointed for teaching English to Intermediate classes and he was not permitted by the management to carry on any other occupation, therefore, he could not do any work except teaching. But the petitioner was regularly Indulging in such activities that the Government under stringent legal provisions had to detain him for long which resulted in disruption of teaching work. And in petitioner’s absence, the education department did not permit appointment of any other teacher. Further there was no member in the staff who could teach English, which affected result of the college. It was also mentioned that for earlier detention from 14.8.1975 to 30.3.1977 and 10.11.1980 to 10.12.1980, the management took a sympathetic view and paid the entire salary including increment and revised pay scale but yet there was no change in attitude of the petitioner and ultimately he was detained in July 1987, therefore, he was deliberately doing work other than teaching which amounted to gross dereliction of duty and personal benefit, unsatisfactory conduct and doubtful integrity due to which the students remained deprived of their teaching. Second charge was that the petitioner did not inform of his arrest nor he applied for leave. And even when the manager/inquiry officer called for an explanation, then he gave information of arrest but did not apply for leave. Later on, the enquiry officer served a questionnaire when he was under detention. The reply of the petitioner to query Nos. 10 to 13 respectively was that he was arrested by the administration without any reason and there was no relation in his arrest with any member of the managing committee : that the petitioner never obtained any
permission to do any other work than teaching ; that he did not inform about his arrest as he was arrested in presence of the Principal of the college : that the petitioner did not apply for leave as he could not understand what type of leave he could apply.
6. The Committee of Management held that both charges as recommended by the inquiry officer were proved and send the resolution for dismissing the petitioner from service to the commission for approval. The commission held that from the documents on the record, it was proved that the petitioner had been detained by the administration for his activities due to which there was serious obstruction in teaching and the reply of the petitioner was unsatisfactory. The Commission held that when the inquiry officer asked the petitioner to file his reply the petitioner requested him for meeting him in jail. This action of a permanent teacher in making such request, instead of giving reply, according to the commission was gross indiscipline. The commission observed that the reply of the petitioner to the questionnaire shows that the answers given by him were strange. It could not be believed that the petitioner did not know that when no leave was available he should have applied for leave without pay. The commission observed that the petitioner during hearing before it did not accept that the management was sympathetic in 1975. 1977 and 1980 as he was marked absent and his salary was paid only on the direction of the Government. The explanation of the petitioner that unlike earlier, this time the management was against him as he had fought against removal of the Principal of Swarswati Shishu Mandir which was under the same Committee of Management. The commission observed that when petitioner was asked the reasons for his detention in 1987, he stated that it was the high handedness of the administration which was against him as once or twice he had made demonstration for closure of liquor shop. The commission also observed
that the petitioner admitted that an agitation was made against the manager of the college by ‘Bhartiya Yuva Janta’. From this the commission inferred that there was a suspicion that the petitioner was responsible for the agitation as he admitted that he was general secretary of ‘Bhartiya Janta Party’ of which ‘Yuva Janta’ was a part. The commission held that it was clear that the petitioner violated the law and committed breach of peace due to which the administration arrested him. According to commission it was clear that the petitioner was deliberately disregarding his duties. It held that in these circumstances it would be difficult to believe that the petitioner was not spreading indiscipline in the institution. And since the petitioner had admitted that he was successful in his light against the manager and getting the wine shop closed it was clear that neither he was attentive towards his work of teaching nor towards the students. The commission then considered the fall in the result of different years and held that the teaching in English was not going on properly which was a matter of concern and retention of a teacher who was not attentive to his duties would be being careless towards students. The commission held that the petitioner’s stand that the absence from duty due to detention did not require him to make any application shows his indiscipline and insubordination. The commission agreed with the petitioner that political activity did not fall within the meaning of any other occupation and the petitioner was free to take part in any political activity but taking part in any political or illegal activity did not permit him not to do his duty in the institution. And if any teacher acts in a manner which affects his duties gravely then proceedings for indiscipline can be taken against him. The commission after a long discussion came to conclusion that it was established : (1) that the petitioner for his activities was detained several times : (2) that due to the activities of the petitioner the teaching was disturbed as a result of
which the percentage of result came down considerably ; (3) that the petitioner did not give any application for leave nor he was aware as to what type of leave was to be applied ; (4) that the petitioner used to sign over the cross made in the attendance register showing him absent for which he had to apologise to the management committee : (5) that the petitioner instead of giving reply to the charges made a request to the manager to meet him in jail and when he met him he did not give any application for leave. Therefore, it was clear from the discussion and the evidence on record that the charges against the petitioner were proved. The commission held that the charges levelled against petitioner of grave dereliction of duty, unsatisfactory conduct, doubtful integrity and indiscipline were fully proved. The commission further held that it was clear that retaining such an employee was harmful to the atmosphere and discipline of the institution and it was not only improper but detrimental to education. The commission with these findings granted approval to petitioner’s dismissal from service.
7. The questions, that arise on the findings recorded by the commission and the inquiry officer are, whether the services of a teacher detained under law for preventive detention could be terminated, whether the inquiry against the petitioner was violative of principle of natural justice and whether the findings recorded by the commission were vitiated as it went much beyond the charge-sheet and the inquiry.
8. The Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rama Shanker Raghuvanshi and another, AIR 1983 SC 374, observed as under :
“India is not a police State. India is a democratic republic. More than 30 years ago, on January 26. 1950 the people of India resolved to constitute India into a democratic republic and to secure to all its citizens “Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship, equality of status and opportunity” ; and to promote
“fraternity, assuring the dignity of the Individual”. This determination of the people let us hope, is not a forgotten chapter of history. The determination has been written into the articles of the Constitution in the shape of Fundamental Rights and they are what makes India a democratic republic and what marks India from authoritarian or police States. The right to freedom of speech and expression, the right to form associations and unions, the right to assemble peaceably and without arms, the right to equality before the law and the equal protection of the laws, the right to equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State are declared Fundamental Rights.”
9. India is a democratic republic whose citizens enjoy basic liberties and fundamental freedom. Indian Constitution guarantees its subject the rule of law. Under the Constitution, every citizen has been assured of certain Fundamental Rights. One of them and the most important is the right to freedom. From different clauses of Article 19, it is clear that the rights guaranteed by it are civil rights. These are natural rights. A natural right is one, which is inherent and belongs to every citizen. It cannot be taken away or abridged. But in social interest, restrictions may be imposed on its exercise. Since freedom is fundamental to democracy, therefore, in our Constitution freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to form association and union is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution. These rights are, however, subject to reasonable restrictions. The right to freedom of speech and expression is subject to reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2). Such restrictions can be in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or enticement of an offence. Similarly. Article 19(1)(c) is subject to reasonable restrictions
under Article 19(4) of the Constitution. Such reasonable restrictions can be made, inter alia, in the interest of public order or morality. A teacher thus has a fundamental right to form association. Being a member of a political party is not prohibited by Article 19.
10. In State of Madhya Pradesh, (supra), services of a teacher in Government institution were terminated because he had taken part in RSS and Jan Sangh activities. The Court held that to deny employment to an individual because of his political affiliation would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court, however, observed that once he becomes a Government servant, he becomes subject to the various rules regulating his conduct and his activities must naturally be subject to all rules made in conformity with the Constitution. The observation was made because it is open to the employer to frame rules debarring an employee from taking part in political activity. Such a rule would be a reasonable restriction on the exercise of the right under Article 19. It thus stands settled by the Apex Court that services of an employee cannot be terminated or dismissed for his past association with a political party.
11. In a recent decision in M.H. Devendrappa v. Karnataka State Small Industries Development Corporation, AIR 1998 SC 1064, where the Apex Court was concerned with a rule which prohibited any employee from being a member of any political party or otherwise associate in politics or take part or subscribe in and of or assist in any political movement or activity. It was observed that it was implicit in joining Government service to observe certain code of conduct necessary for the proper discharge of functions as a Government servant. That code cannot be flouted in the name of other freedoms and any reasonable code designed to promote discipline and efficiency can be enforced by the Government and any one who flouts it can be subjected to disciplinary action. This decision, therefore, settles where service rules
prohibit an employee from being a member of political party or taking part in political activity. It would be reasonable restriction on exercise of the right under Article 19 unless the Court finds that it was so widely framed as to become unreasonable.
12. The Committee of Management pertaining to a private recognised and Government aided educational institution does not have the status of a statutory body. It or the society creating it is not an instrumentality or agency of the State. The objective of it is to promote smooth running of the institution at the hands of management. Every society running the institution has to formulate a scheme of administration under the Act. 1921. The scheme is subject to the approval by the Director. The State Government has no pervasive control over the affairs of the Committee of Management. The power exercised by the State Government is intended to safeguard against maladministration and to promote excellence of education. The Committee of Management exercises all powers subject to supervision of State Government.
13. Politics is not a crime. It is an art or a science of governance. In democracy, a political activity by a group or party formed with certain ideal is designed to achieve it’s objective of political power for governance of the country in accordance with its ideals. It is not an occupation but a conviction or opinion. Unless the service rules debar a teacher from engaging himself in any political activities, he is free to pursue his activities political or otherwise unless it is against social or national interest and it does not disturb the balance of interest of an individual as a citizen with his duties towards a welfare state. The Apex Court in M. H. Devendrappa (supra) explained the ambit of Article 19 by observing :
“If freedom of speech of an individual Government employee is circumscribed by the need for efficiency or discipline or confidentiality in public interest, the individual exercises his freedom
of speech conflicting with these requirements at the risk of facing disciplinary action. This does not mean that legitimate action discreetly and properly taken by a Government servant with a sense of responsibility and at the proper level to remedy any malfunction in the organisation would also be barred. However, such is not the case here. Also, a person who legitimately seeks to exercise his rights under Article 19 cannot be told that you are free to exercise the right, but the consequences will be so serious and damaging, that you will not in effect, be able to exercise your freedom. For example a person may be told that you are free to express your opinion against the State but if you do so, you will be put behind bars. This is clearly deprivation of freedom of speech.”
14. However, the present case does not relate to a Government servant but relates to a teacher working in a recognised institution. It is not disputed that there is no provision either in the act or regulations or Commission Act or Rules which prohibit a teacher from becoming a member of a political party. Section 16G (5) (c) of the U. P. Intermediate Education Act. 1921 (In brief Act). Regulation 32 of Chapter III of the regulations framed under U. P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921 (in brief Regulations) and Rule 6 of the Uttar Pradesh Secondary. Education Services Commission Rules, 1995 (In brief Rules 1995) provide for termination of service of a teacher on conviction for a crime or an offence involving moral turpitude. No doubt even teachers of private institutions are required to maintain moral discipline in the school as well as in the discharge of their duties as teacher of the institution but unless the Government framed a rule laying down observance of certain code of conduct necessary for proper discharge of their function as teacher in private aided institution and a reasonable code is designed to promote discipline and efficiency by the teachers in private colleges debarring him from being a member of political party, till then a teacher
in a private recognised institution can enjoy political affinity with political parties and can take part actively in politics as he is not holding an office of profit. The fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioner under Article 19 could not be curtailed and the petitioner could not be dismissed on the ground of taking part in politics.
15. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently argued that a teacher in an institution cannot be permitted to participate in any political activity as it hampers the studies of the students, it has been held by this Court that under the Representation of People Act that the teachers of institutions do not hold any office of profit under the State Government within the meaning of Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution, therefore, they are not debarred from contesting the elections to the State Assembly or Parliament. In Sarnam Singh v. Smt. Pushpa Devi. 1986 (1) UPLBEC 348, this Court held as under:
“In the light of the aforesaid discussion my conclusions are that the control of the State Government though expanding vis-a-vis the Committee of Management constituted under the Scheme of Administration framed in accordance with the Scheme of Administration framed in accordance With the provisions of the Intermediate Education Act or the Commission created under the U. P. Act No. 5 of 1982 is not such as might give rise to any conflict between the personal interest of a person placed in the position of the respondent No. 8 as teacher in a Higher Secondary School and his duties as a member of the Legislature and in this manner defeat the central object underlying the statutory disqualification. The acceptance of his nomination was, therefore, not misproper.”
16. Though the case before this Court in Sarnam Singh (supra), was with regard to Representation of Peoples Act but the principles can be applied gainfully to the present case also. The petitioner was a teacher in
a private aided institution. Under the Act, Regulations and Rules, there was no bar that the petitioner could not join any political party, even after joining as teacher. The arrest of the petitioner under the National Security Act by the administration was beyond the control of the petitioner and he was confined in Jail, which was also beyond his control. The arrest of the petitioner by itself cannot be construed as hampering studies in an institution without any further material in this regard.
17. The petitioner was a member of Bhartiya Janta Party. He was arrested under the National Security Act as a preventive measure. The petitioner has earlier been arrested under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act and National Security Act but no action was taken against him and he was paid salary on Intervention of the Government. There has to be a distinction between a criminal activity and political activity. An employee charged with criminal offence or convicted for an offence may be dismissed from service. However, an employee who is arrested or detained as preventive measure being a political leader cannot be dismissed from service unless he is convicted for any offence. The Apex Court in Anukul Chandra Pradhan v. Union of India and others. AIR 1997 SC 2814, held as under :
“…..preventive detention
differs from imprisonment on conviction or during investigation of crime of an accused which permits separate classification of detenus under preventive detention. Preventive detention is to prevent breach of law while imprisonment on conviction or during investigation is subsequent to the commission of the crime. This distinction permits separate classification of a person subjected to preventive detention.”
18. Merely because the petitioner was arrested under the National Security Act and could not attend the institution due to his detention could not be a ground for dismissing him from service there is no such provision. If a teacher is arrested and
sent to jail as preventive measure, then a short term vacancy arises and the management could have filled the short term vacancy under the Removal of Difficulties Order. If the education department did not permit appointment of another teacher in petitioner’s place during his detention, then it could not be construed as a valid ground for dismissing him from service. Therefore, the allegation of the management that since it could not appoint any other person on short term due to which interest of the students was jeopardised cannot be accepted. The Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), while dealing with the political faith of an employee observed that :
“Politics is no crime. Does it mean that only true believers in the political faith of the party in power for the time being are entitled to public employment? Would it not lead to devastating results, if such a policy is perused by each of the Governments of the constituents States of India where different political parties may happen to wield power, for the time being? Is public employment reserved for “the cringing and the craven” in the words of Mr. Justice Black of the United States Supreme Court? Is it not destructive of the dignity of the individual mentioned in the preamble of the Constitution?”
19. Right of free speech has been construed widely so as to protect a teacher for criticising the institution during service even by American Supreme Court in Marvin L. Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School. 391 US 563 : 20 L Ed 2d 811 (1968), action was taken against a public school teacher for criticising the Board of Education and Superintendent of School for handling past proposal to raise new revenue. The teacher claimed protection under constitutional right of free speech. The United States Supreme Court set aside the order of dismissal of the teacher as the latter did not make any personal allegation but it was critical of policy.
20. The principle that an employee has freedom of speech and
expression during service provided he is not debarred from any rule or regulation and his activity is not violative of service discipline has been settled by our Apex Court. Similarly, the right to form association or being a member of association is permissible under Article 19 under the rule or regulation impose reasonable restriction. Therefore, merely being a member of a political party in absence of any rule or regulation could not be a ground for terminating services of a teacher.
21. The submission that Inquiry was violative of principles of natural Justice is also well founded. Both the charges framed against the petitioner required proof of certain basic facts. For instance, dereliction of duty, insubordination or indiscipline had to be proved. Mere allegation was not sufficient nor it could be inferred from detention of the petitioner. The allegation in paragraph 24 of the writ petition that the petitioner wanted to produce oral evidence is not denied. The inquiry officer adopted a novel procedure of serving a questionnaire on petitioner and recommending his dismissal without any inquiry. The request of the petitioner to inquiry officer to come to jail to enable the petitioner to produce oral evidence annoyed the inquiry officer as it appeared to him indiscipline and even when he went to meet, he served a questionnaire and did not fix any date for oral evidence. Even if the petitioner would not have filed any reply, although in fact he did on 3.10.1987, it was the duty of the inquiry officer to hold the inquiry in accordance with law and principles of natural justice. The petitioner had stated from the very beginning that he was arrested before the Principal of the institution but the inquiry officer preferred to believe the F.I.R. and did not care to examine the Principal or give an opportunity to petitioner to prove it by producing evidence. The allegation that arrest and detention of petitioner was in knowledge of the manager as it was published in the newspaper having wide circulation and the members of the Bar Association of the district had passed
a resolution and one of the important members of the Committee of Management was Vice President of the Bar Association are not denied but it is alleged that the institution was not concerned with it. All this required opportunity. The grievance of the petitioner that he was not afforded opportunity to defend is Justified.
22. The first charge was framed on basis that the petitioner was engaged in the occupation of politics without permission. The entire premise was erroneous and founded against the meaning and understanding of the words ‘politics and political activity’. No permission was needed for something, which is permitted by the Constitution.
23. The other charge was that the petitioner did not make any application for leave. It cannot be disputed that the management had knowledge of the fact that the petitioner had been arrested under the National Security Act. Therefore, even if the petitioner had applied for grant of leave, no useful purpose would have been served as it is doubtful if the management could have granted leave for detention under National Security Act.
24. As regards finding of commission, it is true that the degree of proof required in a departmental disciplinary proceeding need not be of the same standard as the degree of proof required for establishing the guilt of an accused in a criminal case. However, the law is settled now that suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot be substituted for proof even in the departmental disciplinary proceedings. The inquiry officer and respondent No. 2 have considered the arrest of the petitioner under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act from 14.8.1975 to 30.3.1977 and under the National Security Act from 1.11.1980 to 10.12.1980 though for these charges the petitioner had been exonerated earlier by the management and he was also paid salary. The only charge which could survive was with regard to the arrest of the petitioner under the National Security Act from 11.7.1987 to
11.7.1988. The respondent No. 2
while considering the two charges
against the petitioner observed that
the request of the petitioner to the
Inquiry officer for meeting in jail
amounted to insubordination. Further
a finding has been recorded that he
was arrested as he took part In two
agitations one for getting the wine
shops closed and other removal of
Principal due to which the district
administration was annoyed with him
and he was arrested under the
National Security Act. It was further
observed that some agitation was
made against the management of the
institution by Bhartiya Yuva Janta
which gives rise to suspicion that the
petitioner was behind the agitation.
The respondent No. 2 accepted that the political activities of the petitioner did not come within the definition of other works nor the petitioner is barred from participating In political activities but it did not give right to the petitioner not to discharge his duties in the institution and, therefore. disciplinary proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner if he did not carry out his teaching work. He recorded a finding that due to political activities of the petitioner, the result of the institution was affected, the petitioner used to sign even on the cross when he was absent and he asked the manager to come to jail for giving reply to the charges but did not give any application for leave. Therefore, the charges against the petitioner were proved and he was found guilty of misconduct, dereliction of duty, doubtful integrity and indiscipline. On these grounds, the approval was granted by the commission. There was no charge against the petitioner with regard to signing on cross while he was absent or the result of the institution was affected. Demonstration against removal of Principal or closure of wine shops could not by itself result in a finding against the petitioner unless it was found that it was done during school hours in neglect of his duty. The commission in recording the finding that since Yuva Janta was a party of Bhartiya Janta Party of which the petitioner was Secretary, therefore, a suspicion arose that he was responsible for it is against primary rule of evidence. The finding of spreading indiscipline in the institution is based on no material. The commission has not referred to any material as there was none, but has imagined that since petitioner was indulging in such activities, he was guilty of spreading indiscipline. The finding of insubordination, misconduct, doubtful integrity are based on no material. Even the finding that the result went down on figure of certain years without any further evidence is unsustainable. Therefore, the commission could not have taken into account these grounds for granting approval. So far as the other two charges are concerned, there is total dearth of evidence to bring home the charges that the arrest of the petitioner due to preventive detention by the administration and his not giving application for leave was such which was in any manner unbecoming of a teacher of an institution. The commission is expected to be objective in its approach but a perusal of the order, the gist of which has been mentioned earlier demonstrates that it based its finding on extraneous material and went beyond the charges framed against the petitioner. It has recorded findings on issues which were not even raised before the inquiry officer. In personal hearing granted to the petitioner, the commission asked him certain questions which were not the subject-matter of inquiry and recorded findings on it which was contrary to well-settled principles of service law. The findings recorded by the commission give an impression that it was more keen to dismiss the petitioner than the Committee of Management. The finding that petitioner violated the law and committed breach of peace is not based on any material. Mere detention under National Security Act without any proof or any material
could not result into a finding of violation of law and breach of peace in disciplinary proceedings. Nor the commission was justified in inferring that the petitioner was not attentive towards his work of teaching or towards students without any evidence that the petitioner took part in agitations against closure of wine shop or removal of Principal during school hours or after missing the classes to be held by him. Once the commission found that the petitioner is being a member of political party was not undertaking any occupation, it could not have held the petitioner guilty of personal benefit or doubtful Integrity, etc. In fact the finding of doubtful Integrity which is considered quite serious matter in service being based on the petitioner’s being a member of political party or due to his political activity is wholly fallacious. The order passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 granting approval to the resolution of the management for dismissing’ the petitioner from service was against law. Therefore, the entire inquiry proceedings were contrary to principles of natural Justice and the approval granted by the commission on its basis and the dismissal of the petitioner was contrary to law and cannot be upheld.
25. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 28.7.1989 passed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2 Annexure-17 to the writ petition and order dated 1.9.1989 passed by respondent No. 3 Annexure-18 to the writ petition are quashed. The respondents are directed to reinstate the petitioner in service and pay his entire arrears of salary with all consequential benefits within two months from the date a certified copy of this order is produced before them.
26. There shall be no order as to
costs.