PETITIONER:
RATAN LAL ADUKIA & ANR.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA
DATE OF JUDGMENT19/07/1989
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
BENCH:
VENKATACHALLIAH, M.N. (J)
MISRA RANGNATH
CITATION:
1990 AIR 104 1989 SCR (3) 440
1989 SCC (3) 537 JT 1989 (3) 148
1989 SCALE (2)28
CITATOR INFO :
R 1990 SC2072 (31)
ACT:
Indian Railways Act, 1890: Section 80--Suits for compen-
sation against Railways--Choice of forum for cognizance of
suits--Whether limited by the section itself or provisions
of Section 20 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18
of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 are also
applicable.
Statutory Interpretation--Doctrine of implied repeal--Ap-
plicability of.
HEADNOTE:
Under Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890, prior
to its substitution by the Amendment Act, 1961, the choice
of forum for filing suits for compensation for loss, de-
struction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of goods
etc. carried by the Railways was regulated by Section 20 of
the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Presidency
Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be. However,
the new section, besides making specific reference to a
certain class of suits, to be dealt with under the section
and identifying the Railways Administrations which were
liable to the claim, also specifically provided the places
where such suits may be instituted.
The appellants filed two separate suits in the courts at
Alipore and Calcutta for recovery of certain amounts from
the Railways for short deliveries of consignments booked by
them. The respondent contended that in view of Section 80 of
the Indian Railways Act, 1890, the trial courts concerned
had no jurisdiction. The trial courts rejected the objection
and decreed the suits.
In the revisions filed by the respondent, the Full Bench
of the High Court, by its common order, held that the trial
courts had no jurisdiction. It was of the view that the new
Section 80, was a complete and self-contained special law,
as to the place of suing, respecting suits envisaged by the
section derogating from the generally of the provisions of
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1890 and Section
18 of the Presidency Town Small Cause Courts Act, 1882 and
that it brought about an implied repeal of those provisions
as to the jurisdiction of
441
courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to those suits.
In the appeals before this Court it was contended on
behalf of the appellants that the legislative intent was
clear: that it did not render Section 80 over-riding, by not
expressly excluding Section 20 of the Code of Civil Proce-
dure, 1890, and that even if the provisions of Section 80
were held to be a later special law, the principle of im-
plied repeal could not be invoked, as there was no incon-
sistency between the two provisions and, on the contrary,
both sets of provisions could exist and prevail.
Dismissing the appeals,
HELD: The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the
postulate that the legislature which is presumed to know the
existing state of the law did not intend to create any
confusion by retaining conflicting provisions..Courts in
applying this doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect
to the legislative intent by examining the object and scope
of the two enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very
existence of two provisions may by itself, lead to an infer-
ence of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of provi-
sions is by itself a complete code with respect to the same
matter. In such a case, the actual detailed comparison of
the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. [452F-G]
It is a matter of legislative intent that the two sets
of provisions were not expected to be applied simultaneous-
ly. [452H]
Section 80 is a special provision dealing with certain
class of suits distinguishable on the basis of their partic-
ular subject-matter. It made a conscious departure on the
law as to the place of suing in respect of suits envisaged
by that Section, and is a self-contained provision in regard
to the choice of fora for such suits. There was no need for
the legislature to specify the places of suing which would
otherwise be covered by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special
prescription as to places of suing was considered to be
necessary in derogation to the general law as the matter
contained in Section 20 C.P.C. or the provisions in the
Small Cause Courts Act. [453B-C]
Assam Cold Storage v. Union of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69;
Hindustan Machine Tools v. Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras
130; Oghamal Chaudhury v. Union of India, [1974] CLJ 420 and
Union of India v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay
414, approved.
442
New India Assurance Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1981
Delhi 135 and Union of India v. C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977
132, over-ruled.
Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jaya Ben D. Kania and another,
[1982] 1 SCR 187; Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph
and others, [1964] 2 SCR 87; Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State of
Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 752; Union of India v. Ladu Lal Jain,
[1964] 3 SCR 624 and Union of India v. The Steel Stock
Holders Syndicate, Poona, AIR 1976 SC 879, referred to.
JUDGMENT:
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 224 &
734 of 1988.
From the Judgment and Order dated 17.6.87 of the Calcut-
ta High Court in Ref. No. 1/83 from C.R. Case No. 2938-40/81
& Civil Order No. 2537/81, C.R. Case No. 75/81, Civil Order
No. 362/82, & C.R. No. 3803 of 1980.
Dr. Shankar Ghosh, Badar Durrez Ahmed, Parijat Sinha,
A.K. Sarkar, A.K. Sahay for the Appellants.
Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, A ,K. Gan-
guli, C.V. Subba Rao, A. Subba Rao and Hemant Sharma for the
Respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
VENKATACHALIAH, J. These appeals, by certificate, pre-
ferred against the common order dated 17.6.1987 of the High
Court of Calcutta in Full Bench Reference 1 of 1983 raise a
short and interesting question, of some general importance,
whether the choice of the forum for the cognizance of suits
envisaged in Section 80 of the Indian Railways Act, 1890 (As
substituted by Section 14 of the Indian Railways (Amendment)
Act, 1961 (Act 39 of 1961) is limited by Section 80 itself
or whether provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and Section 19 of the Presidency Small Cause
Courts Act, 1882, as the cases may be, in regard to places
of suing, are also applicable to the suits referred to in
the said Section 80.
The question, in other words, is whether the said Sec-
tion 80 is a complete, self-contained, exhaustive Code in
regard to the place of suing respecting suits constituting a
special law for such suits excluding, by necessary implica-
tion, the operation of provisions of Section 20 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 and Section 18 of the Presidency
443
Small Cause Courts Act, 1882. The Full Bench, resolving the
earlier conflicts of Judicial opinion in the High Court on
the points has held Section 80 as containing within it a
self-contained scheme for suits envisaged by it and that
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 18 of
the Presidency Small Cause Courts, Act 1882 stand excluded
from operation. The Full Bench, however, has left open the
question whether Section 80 also over-rides clause 12 of the
letters patent.
2. In the original proceedings from which C.A. 224 of
1988 arises, appellant instituted Money Suit No. 35 of 1978
against the Respondent in the Court of the 6th Sub-Judge at
Alipore, Distt.–24 Parganas, West Bengal, seeking recovery
of Rs. 13,200 respecting an alleged short delivery of a
consignment booked with the Respondent on 94.4.1975 Ex-
Ernakulam to Ranchi, a station under the South Eastern
Railway Administration. Respondent contested the suit on
grounds, inter-alia, that having regard to the said Section
80, the Court at Alipore had no jurisdiction. The trial-
Court by its order 22.5. 1981 having rejected this objection
as to jurisdiction, Respondent preferred C.R. 2938 of 1981
under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, before the
High Court to have that order revised. The matter was re-
ferred to a Full-Bench, culminating in the order now under
appeal.
3. In C.A. 734 of 1988, appellant instituted a Suit No.
3831 of 1985 in the Court of the Small Causes, Calcutta, for
the recovery of a sum of Rs.6,573.50p. on account of snort
deliveries of two consignments booked with the Respondent on
27.4.1984 and 24.7.1984 respectively, Ex-Saugar in Central
Railway to Ramkrishtopur in Eastern Railway. Similar objec-
tion as to jurisdiction having been urged, the trial Court
rejected that objection and decreed the suit. This was
assailed before the High Court by the Respondent. The Full-
Bench, by its common-order, has held that the trial Court
had no jurisdiction and directed the return of the plaint
for presentation to the proper Court.
4. In order that the contentions of Dr. Shankar Ghosh
urged in support of these appeals are apprehended in their
proper perspective, it becomes necessary to refer to and
notice the legislative history of the provision. Section 14
of the Indian Railways (Amendment) Act, 1961, substituted
the old Section 80 by a new provision. The old Section
reads:
“Section 80: suit for compensation for injury
to through booked traffic:
444
Notwithstanding anything in any agreement
purporting to limit the liability of Railway
Administration with respect to traffic while
on the Railway of the another Administration,
a suit for compensation for loss of the life
of, or personal injury to, a passenger, or for
loss, destruction or deterioration of animals
or goods where the passenger was or the ani-
mals or goods were booked through over the
Railways of two or more Railway Administra-
tions, may be brought either against the
Railway Administration from which the passen-
gers obtained his pass or purchased his tick-
et, or to which the animals or goods were
delivered by the consignor thereof, as the
case may be, or against the Railway Adminis-
tration on whose Railway the loss, injury,
destruction or deterioration occurred.”
The new Section 80 substituted in 1961 by the
amending Act provides:
“80. Suits for Compensation: A suit for com-
pensation for loss of the life of, or personal
injury to, a passenger or for loss, destruc-
tion, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of
animals or goods may be instituted.
(a) if the passenger was, or the
animals or goods were, booked from one station
to another on the railway of the same railway
administration against that railways adminis-
tration;
(b) if the passenger was, or the
animals or goods were, booked through over the
railway of two or more railway administration
against the railway administration from which
the passenger obtained his pass or purchased
his ticket or to which the animals or goods
were delivered for carriage, as the case may
be, or against the railway administration on
whose railway the destination station lies, or
the loss, injury, destruction, damage or
deterioration occurred;
and, in either case the suit
may be instituted in a Court having jurisdic-
tion over the place at which the passenger
obtained his pass or purchased his ticket or
the animals or goods were delivered for car-
riage, as the case may be, or
445
over the place in which the destination sta-
tion lies, or the loss injury, destruction,
damage or deterioration occurred.”
The changes brought about in the scheme of the provisions
are quite marked. The old Section did not deal with–liabil-
ity for claims in respect of goods carried by a single
Railway. It concerned itself with goods etc., carried by
more than one Railways or what, in the concerned jargon, is
called “through booked traffic” and provided that a suit
inter-alia for loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or
nondelivery could be brought against the Railway Administra-
tion with which the booking had taken place or against the
Railway Administration of the delivery station. The old
section spoke nothing of the places where such suits could
be laid. The choice of the forum was regulated by Section 20
of the Code of Civil Procedure or the relevant provisions of
the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, as the case may be.
This Court in Union of India v. Ladu Lal Jain, [1964] 3 SCR
624 observed that the principal place of Railway Administra-
tion can be said to be the place where the Railways can be
said to carry on business for purposes of clause (a) of
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held:
“The principle behind the provisions of Cls.
(a) and (b) of S. 20 is that the suit be
instituted at a place where the defendant be
able to defend the suit without undue
trouble.”
” ….. Union of India carries on the busi-
ness of running railways and, can be sued in
the Court of the subordinate Judge of Gauhati
within whose territorial jurisdiction the
head-quarters of one of the railways run by
the Union is situated.”
This was said in a case governed by the old Section. Does
the position continue to hold good even after the new Sec-
tion 80 was substituted in place of the old?
the new Section 80 (substituted by Act 39 of 1961),
however, brought about far reaching changes in its scheme,
the notable amongst them being three. The new Section made
specific reference to a certain class of suits having regard
to their subject-matter, to be dealt with under that Sec-
tion. Secondly, the new Section also dealt with identity of
the Railway Administrations which were made liable to the
claim
446
and, thirdly, the section specifically provided the places
where such suits “may be instituted”. Referring generally to
the scope of the changes brought about by the 1961 amendment
to Chapter VII of the Railways Act, 1890, this Court, in
Union of India v. The Steel Stock Holders Syndicate, Poona,
AIR 1976 SC 879 observed:
“The history and the object with which the
radical provisions of the new Act were intro-
duced bear testimony to change of the nature
of the liability of the railway administra-
tion.”
“We, therefore, agree with the learned counsel
for the respondent that under the new Act the
liability of the Railway has been increased so
as to take upon itself the responsibility of a
common carrier.”
The new comprehensiveness of the scheme of the amend-
ments was one of the circumstances that commended itself to
the High Court to persuade it to hold that the new Section
80 in Chapter VII, constituted a complete and self-contained
special law as to the place of suing respecting suits envis-
aged by that Section derogating from the generality of the
provisions of Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or
the provisions touching the jurisdiction of the Small Cause
Courts and that with the enactment of the new Section 80
there was an implied repeal of those other provisions re-
specting such suits.
5. The High Court took due notice of the fact that the
new Section did not expressly provide that in respect of
suits envisaged by it, the provisions of Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of the Presidency
Small Cause Courts Act, 1882, as the case may be, shall no
longer be applicable. The High Court took due note of the
situation emerging from this omission. It noticed:
“the new Section 80, no doubt, did not ex-
pressly provide that the said provision of
Section 80 of the Act would override all other
laws. But Section 80 of the Indian Railways
Act is in the nature of the special provision
applicable only to suits for compensation
against the Railways.”
“The point is whether by enacting” …. the
suit may be instituted” in the Courts having
jurisdiction over the places mentioned in the
last part of Section 80 of the Indian Railways
Act, 1890, the said Section of the Railways
Act by
447
implication overrides section 20 of the Civil
Procedure Code, 1908 and Section 18 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act, 1882.”
The High Court took into consideration what, according
to it, was the real intention in enacting the new Section 80
and was persuaded to the view that the Section brought about
an implied repeal of the other provisions as to the juris-
diction of Courts by itself providing a jurisdiction to
these suits. It was observed:
“By mentioning the Courts in which the suits
for compensation may be filed, Section 80 of
the Railways Act purports to deal with matters
which have been dealt with in Section 20 of
the Code and Section 18 of the Presidency
Small Causes Courts Act. These two sets of
laws deal with the same subject of territorial
jurisdiction of Courts. We are, therefore,
required to ascertain whether in respect of
suits for compensation against the Railways,
the intention was to override the general
law.”
“We have already indicated that Section 80 of
the Railways Act was a particular or special
legislation. Section 80 of the Railways Act
purports to deal with the subject of places
for instituting particular class of suits
which was previously covered by Section 20 of
the Code which was a general enactment. Two
statutes cover the same field, i.e., territo-
rial jurisdiction. Mentioning for the first
time in Section 80 of the Railways Act of the
places where suits for compensation may be
instituted was itself introductive of a new
law implying a negative. When the same subject
of territorial jurisdiction has been dealt
with in the subsequent legislation (i.e.,
Section 80 of the Railways Act) the prior laws
(Section 20 of the Code and Section 13 of the
Presidency Small Cause Courts Act) on the same
subject were not intended to subsist.”
“In other words, Section 80 of the Indian
Railways Act by requiring something special to
be done repealed by necessary implication the
former general statute relating to territorial
jurisdiction of Courts in so far as the suits
for compensation against the Railways were
concerned.”
Any other construction, according to the High
Court, would lead
448
to anomalies and render Section 80 a surplus-
age. High Court said:
“If it was to be held that clause (c) of
Section 20 of the Code still applied to suits
for compensation against the Railways, then
the cause of action for the purpose of juris-
diction of Courts would arise not only at the
three places mentioned in Section 80 of the
Act but at several other places. In other
words, the provisions of Section 80 of the Act
relating to places where the suits for compen-
sation may be instituted, would be, in that
event, surplusage and unnecessary.”
6. In the view of the High Court, the distinction be-
tween provisions in the New Section 80 on the one hand and
Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure or Section 18 of
the Small Cause Courts Act on the other, assumed particular
significance as qualifying the Court’s jurisdiction in
respect of a particular subject-matter as distinct from
those that relate to a Court’s territorial jurisdiction or
pecuniary jurisdiction. The High Court observed:
“Section 80 of the Railways Act, in effect,
limits the application of Section 20 of the
Code by specifying the Courts which shall have
jurisdiction over the suits whose subject
matter is the claim for compensation against
the Railways for loss of life or personal
injury to a passenger or loss, destruction,
damage, deterioration or non-delivery of
animals or goods. We have already held that
Section 80 of the Act, in other words is in
the nature of a special provision in respect
of classes of suits mentioned in Section 80 of
the Indian Railways Act.”
7. Dr. Shankar Ghosh assailing the soundness of the High
Court’s view, urged that the proposition on which its con-
clusions rest, if accepted, would render what was intended
as a mere an enabling entitlement to lose its character as
such and become, on the contrary, a limiting factor and
convert a right into a liability. Dr. Ghosh said that the
legislative intent was clear; it did not render Section 80
over-riding by not expressly excluding Section 20 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. It expressly supplied, says Dr.
Ghosh, an enabling provision when it chose the
expression” ….. may be instituted”. It is further con-
tended that the doctrine of implied repeal was, clearly
inapplicable to the situation.
449
Dr. Ghosh commended for acceptance the reasoning of the
Assam and Madras High Courts, in Assam Cold Storage v. Union
of India, AIR 1971 Assam 69 and Hindustan Machine fools v.
Union of India, AIR 1985 Madras 130, respectively, in pref-
erence to the views of the Calcutta, Bombay, Delhi and
Karnataka High Courts in Oghamal Chaudhury v. Union of
India, [1974] CLJ 420; Union of India v. Indian Hume Pipe
Co. Ltd., AIR 1981 Bombay 414; New India Assurance Co. v.
Union of India, AIR 1981 Delhi 135 and Union of India v.
C.R. Prabhanna, AIR 1977 132 respectively.
8. The thrust of the arguments of Dr. Ghosh is that the
construction placed by the High Court ignores the crucial
aspect that while the old Section 80 did not render the
destination railway as such, liable to be sued if loss was
not proved to have occurred there, the new Section, however,
renders the destination Railway also liable even though no
loss occurred there. The provision in the new Section 80
enabling the suit to be instituted at the place of the
destination Railway, where no part of the cause of action
might otherwise be shown to have arisen, was, it is urged, a
mere consequential provision–to give effect to the substan-
tive provision, that the destination Railway was also li-
able. Dr. Ghosh emphasised the expression “may be institut-
ed” in Section 80 to reinforce his contention that Section
80 did really expand the rights of and not seek to restrict
therein suitors. Learned counsel also emphasised that sec-
tion 80 did not contain any words expressly excluding
clauses (a) and (b) of Section 20, Code of Civil Procedure,
in so far as suits contemplated by Section 80 were con-
cerned. The new Section 80, it is contended, did not intend
to impair the choice of the forum afforded by Section 20 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and that any contrary view,
offends settled principles of statutory construction guiding
the matter. Learned counsel invited attention to the follow-
ing observations in Ajay Kumar Banerjee & Others etc. v.
Union of India & Others etc., [1984] 3 SCR 252 at page 282:
“The general rule to be followed in case of
conflict between two statutes is that the
later abrogates the earlier one. In other
words, a prior special law, would yield to a
later general law, if either of the two fol-
lowing conditions is satisfied:
(i) The two are inconsistent with each other;
(ii) There is some express reference in the
later to the earlier enactment.
450
If either of these two conditions is ful-
filled, the later law, even though general,
would prevail.”
and submitted that even if, conversely, the provisions of
Section 80 are held to be a later special law, the principle
of implied repeal could not be invoked as there was no
inconsistency between the two provisions and that, on the
contrary, both set of provisions could co-exist and prevail.
Learned counsel invited our attention to and relied upon the
following passage in Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jaya Ben D.
Kania and Another, [1982] 1 SCR 187:
“We find ourselves in complete agreement with
the arguments of Mr. Sorabjee that in the
instant case S. 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1
does not in any way abridge, interfere with or
curb the powers conferred on the Trial Judge
by Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. What
Section 104 read with Order 43, Rule 1 does is
merely to give an additional remedy by way of
an appeal from the orders of the Trial Judge
to a larger Bench.”
The learned counsel also placed reliance on the following
observations of this Court in Municipal Council, Palai
v.T.J. Joseph and Others, [1964] 2 SCR 87 at page 98:
“In order to ascertain whether there is repug-
nancy or not this Court has laid down the
following principles in Deep Chand v. The
State of Uttar Pradesh,:
1. Whether there is direct conflict
between the two provisions;
2. Whether the legislature intended to
lay down an exhaustive code in respect of the
subject matter replacing the earlier law;
3. Whether the two laws occupy the same
field.”
9. Reliance was also placed on Section 21-A inserted by
Section 4 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts (West Bengal
Amendment) Act, 1980 which provides:
“21A. Act to override other laws including
Letters Patent: The provisions of this Act
shall have effect notwithstanding
451
anything to the contrary in any other law,
including in particular the Letters Patent of
the High Court.”
to contend that the construction opted for by the High Court
would run in the teeth of this express provision.
10. Lastly, learned counsel invited our attention to the
following passage in Crawford on Statutory construction:
“All laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation, and with full knowledge of all
existing cases on the same subject, it is but
reasonable to conclude that the Legislature,
in passing a statute, did not intend to inter-
fere with or abrogate any former law relating
to the same matter,unless the repugnancy
between the two is irreconcilable. Bowen v.
Lease, 5 Will 225. It is a rule, says Sedwick
that a general statute without negative words
will not repeal the particular provisions of a
former one, unless the two acts are irrecon-
cilably inconsistent.”
(p.
633)
“And, as we have already suggested, it is
essential that the new statute cover the
entire subject matter of the old; otherwise
there is no indication. of the intent of the
Legislature to abrogate the old law. Conse-
quently, the latter enactment will be con-
structed as continuation of the old one.”
(624)
It was urged that repeal by implication is not to be pre-
sumed and that, on the contrary, there is always presumption
against a repeal by implication. In order that there be a
repeal by implication, there should be a clear, irreconcila-
ble conflict between the two sets of provisions and the
later enactment should be an exhaustive code in itself in
respect of the subject matter. On these submissions, Dr.
Ghosh says that the view taken by the High Court is clearly
unsustainable in law.
11. The contention emphasised is that where a statute
merely recognises a right pre-existing in common-law and
provides a remedy, such a remedy, unless the statute ex-
pressly bans or excludes other remedies, could only be an
additional or concurrent one open to an election.
It is true that where a statute does not itself bring into
being a
452
new right not a pre-existing right and also provides a
remedy therefore so however that the right and the remedy
cannot be said to have been brought into existence for the
first time uno-flatu, such a remedy would not generally be
held to be exclusive but only an additional and concurrent
one, along with the pre-existing remedies, unless there are
express indications to the contrary in the statute itself.
In Municipal Council, Palai v. T.J. Joseph, [1964] 2 SCR
87, this Court considered the tests of repugnancy applied
under Article 254(2) of the Constitution, relevant in the
examination of circumstances bringing about an implied
repeal. Strictly speaking the examination of the question
whether an act of Parliament prevails against the law enact-
ed by a State under Article 254, does not really involve any
question of repeal. In Zaver Bhai Amaidas v. State of Bom-
bay, AIR 1954 SC 752 this Court applied the test conversely,
of the principle of implied repeal to cases of repugnancy
under Article 254(2). It was observed:
“It is true, as already pointed out, that on a
question under Art. 25(1) whether an Act of
Parliament prevails against a law of the
State, no question of repeal arises, but the
principle on which the rule of implied repeal
rests, namely, that if the subject-matter of
the later legislation is identical with that
of the earlier, so that they cannot both stand
together, then the earlier is repealed by the
later enactment, will be equally applicable to
a question trader Art. 254(2) where the fur-
ther legislation by Parliament is in respect
of the same matter as that of the State law.”
The doctrine of implied repeal is based on the postulate
that the legislature which is presumed to know the existing
state of the law did not intend to create any confusion by
retaining conflicting provisions. Courts, in applying this
doctrine, are supposed merely to give effect to the legisla-
tive intent by examining the object and scope of the two
enactments. But in a conceivable case, the very existence of
two provisions may by itself, and without more, lead to an
inference of mutual irreconcilability if the later set of
provisions is by itself a complete code with respect to the
same matter. In such a case the actual detailed comparison
of the two sets of provisions may not be necessary. It is a
matter of legislative intent that the two sets of provisions
were not expected to be applied simultaneously. Section 80
is a special provi-
453
sion. It deals with certain class of suits distinguishable
on the basis of their particular subject-matters.
The High Court has come to the conclusion that new
Section 80 made a conscious departure on the law as to the
place of suing in respect of suits of a particular subject-
matter envisaged by that Section. The High Court has held
that the new Section 80 is a selfcontained provision in
regard to the choice of fora for such suits. According to
the High Court, there was no need for the legislature to
specify the places of suing which would otherwise be covered
by Section 20 C.P.C. unless the special prescription as to
places of suing was considered to be necessary–in deroga-
tion to the general law as contained in Sec. 20 CPC or the
provisions in the Small cause Courts Act.
As to the words “may be instituted” occurring in that
Section, the High Court observed:
“The use of the expression ‘may be instituted’
in Section 80 of the Railways Act was equiva-
lent to ‘shall be instituted’. Section 80
conferred right to institute suits for compen-
sation against the Railways for breach of
their obligations for carrying passengers,
animals or goods specified in Chapter VII of
the Indian Railways Act. Both the obligation
on the part of the Railways and the right of
the consignor and the consignee to institute
suits are now statutory in their nature. The
clear intendment of the Legislature was that
it would be obligatory for the plaintiffs to
institute suits only in the Courts mentioned
in Section 80 of the Railways Act for enforce-
ment of the claims for compensation against
the Railways.”
12. After a consideration of the matter, we are inclined
to the view that the reasoning of and the conclusion reached
by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court that the new
Section 80 is a selfcontained provision are sound and re-
quire to be preferred to the view expressed by the Assam and
the Madras High Courts. The view of the Full-Bench is to be
preferred having regard to the weight and preponderance of
the relevant interpretatory criteria. No appeal, in our
opinion, could be made to Section 21A of the State Amendment
to the Small Cause Courts Act either, in as much as, that
provision cannot be understood to have been intended to
cover a situation of the present
454
type. It does not exclude a special law applicable to and
governing a distinct class of subject matter intended to be
covered by that special law.
In the result, for the fore-going reasons, these appeals
fail and are dismissed; but in the circumstances, without
any directions as to costs.
N.P.V. Appeals dismissed.
455