CASE NO.: Original Suite 6 of 1996 PETITIONER: STATE OF HARYANA RESPONDENT: STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04/06/2004 BENCH: RUMA PAL & P. VENKATARAMA REDDI JUDGMENT:
JUDGMENT
2004 Supp(2) SCR 849
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
RUMA PAL, J. : Consequent of the creation of the State of Haryana from the
erstwhile State of Punjab, the question of appointment of the river waters
made available to the erstwhile State of Punjab between Haryana and Punjab
arose. A notification was issued by the Union of India on 24th March, 1976
under Section 78 of Punjab Reorganisation Act. 1966, inter alia dividing
the river waters between the two States. The Sultej-Yamuna Link Canal
Project covering about 214 KMs. was to be constructed through the States of
Punjab and Haryana. Out of the 214 KMs, 122 KMs were to run through the
territory of Punjab and 92 KMs through Haryana. The cost of completion of
the canal was to be met by the Central Government. Haryana’s portion of the
canal was completed by June 1980. The State of Punjab had not completed its
share of the canal although it had been paid the amount necessary for the
purpose as also for the recurring expenditure towards maintenance of the
canal.
A suit was filed by the State of Haryana in 1979 being Suit No. 1 of 1979
in this Court under Article 131 of the Constitution seeking completion of
the construction of the canal. The State of Punjab also filed a suit being
Suit No. 2 of 1979 inter alia challenging Section 78 of the Punjab
Reorganisation Act and the notification dated 24th March 1976 by which the
river waters were directed to be shared between Haryana and Punjab. During
the pendency of the suits, an agreement was entered into between the States
of Haryana, Punjab and Rajasthan in the presence of the Prime Minister of
India on 13th December 1981. The agreement, in so far as it is relevant,
provided that the Sutlej-Yamuna Canal Project would be implemented in a
time bound manner. The canal and appurtenant works in the Punjab territory
were to be completed within a maximum period of two years from the date of
the signing of the agreement. On the basis of and after recording this
agreement, the suits were allowed to be withdrawn by this Court on 12th
February, 1982.
The date for completion of the canal by Punjab in terms of the agreement
dated 13th December, 1981 expired. The Punjab portion of the Canal remained
incomplete. The agreement was sought to be repudiated by the State. A
settlement was then arrived at on 5th November 1985 known as the ‘Punjab
Settlement’ which dealt with the several disputes between the State of
Haryana and Punjab. For the present, we need only note clause 9 of the
settlement. It reads :
“9. Sharing of River Waters
9.1. The farmers of Punjab, Haryana and Rajasthan will continue to get
water not less than what they are using from the Ravi-Beas system as on
1.7.1985 waters used for consumptive purposes will also remain unaffected.
Quantum of usage claimed shall be verified by the Tribunal referred to in
para 9.2. below.
9.2. The claims of Punjab and Haryana regarding the shares in their
remaining waters will be referred for adjudication to a Tribunal to be
presided over by a Supreme Court Judge. The decision of this Tribunal will
be rendered within six months and would be binding on both parties. All
legal and constitutional steps required in this respect be taken
expeditiously.
9.3. The construction of SYL Canal shall continue. The canal shall be
completed by 15.8.1986.”
In approval of the settlement and in terms of the first two clauses of
clause 9 of the Settlement, Section 14 was added to the Inter-State Water
Disputes Act, 1956 and issues relating to the usage, share and allocation
of the Ravi-Beas waters were referred to the adjudication of the Waters
Tribunal by the Union of India under Notification dated 2nd April 1986. The
Tribunal submitted its report on 30th January 1987 inter alia allocating
the Ravi-Beas Waters between Punjab and Haryana. An application was made by
Punjab before the Waters Tribunal for review of its decision. That
application is pending.
However, Clause 9.3. of the Settlement which was kept distinct from the
water disputes under Clauses 9.1. and 9.2. continued to operate. The State
of Punjab completed about 90% of the construction of the canal, but about
10% of the construction remained incomplete. The State of Haryana then
filed a second suit being suit No. 6 of 1996 for :
(a) a decree declaring that the order dated 24.3.1976, the agreement of
31.12.1981 and the settlement of 24.7.1985 are final and binding inter alia
on the State of Punjab casting an obligation on Defendant No. 1 to
immediately restart and complete the portion of the Sutjej-Yamuna Link
Canal Project as also make it usable in all respects, not only under the
aforesaid order of 1976, agreement of 1981 and settlement of 1985 but also
pursuant to a contract established by conduct from 1976 till date.
(b) a decree of mandatory injunction compelling Defendant 1 (failing which
Defendant 2 by or through any agency) to discharge its/their obligations
under the said notification of 1976, the agreement of 1981 and the
settlement of 1985 and in any case under contract established by conduct,
by immediately restarting and completing that portion of the Sutlej-Yamuna
Link Canal Project in the State of Punjab and otherwise making it suitable
for use within a time bound manner as may be stipulated by this Hon’ble
Court to enable the State of Haryana to receive its share of Ravi and Beas
waters”.
A written statement was filed by the State of Punjab questioning the
jurisdiction of this Court under Article 262 of the Constitution of India.
It was also contended that the suit was barred under Order XXIII Rule 1 of
the Code of Civil Procedure and under Order XXXII Rule 2 of the Supreme
Court Rules, 1966. According to the State of Punjab the agreement dated
31st December 1981 was superseded by the settlement dated 24th July 1986
which did not bind the State. It was averred that the SYL canal was
unnecessary because the State of Haryana was to get additional water supply
from other rivers and that the State of Haryana had no right to the water
from the river Ravi.
The Union of India in its written statement, apart from affirming the facts
as noted by us earlier, also stated that it was essential that the Punjab
portion of the SYL canal be completed at the earliest.
After considering the material on record, on 15th January, 2002 this Court
decreed the suit in favour of the State of Haryana and issued a mendatory
injunction directing the State of Punjab to complete the construction of
the canal and make it functional within one year from the date of the
judgment. If within that period the canal was not completed by the State of
Punjab, the Union Government was directed to get it done through its own
agency as expeditiously as possible.
The State of Punjab did not comply with this Court’s decree and the canal
remains incomplete. On 8th January 2002, it filed an application for review
of the judgment and decree of this Court which we dismissed on 5th March
2002.
On 22nd March 2002, a writ petition under Article 32 was filed by Bharatiya
Kisan Union (W.P. No. 94 of 2004) claiming to be a registered association
of Indian citizens and seeking to question the decree and purporting to
raise issues relating to the availability of water of the Ravi-Beas for
allocation to the State of Haryana. An interlocutory application was also
filed for stay of the decree dated 15th January 2002. The writ petition was
dismissed by this Court on 10th Februry 2004.
On 18th December 2002, an application was filed by Haryana for
implementation of the judgment and decree dated 15th January 2002. This
application was registered and numbered as I.A. No. 1 of 2002 in Suit No. 6
of 1996.
On 13th January 2003, the State of Punjab filed a suit being Suit No. 1 of
2003 for the following reliefs :
(a) discharge/dissolve the obligation to construct SYL Canal imposed by
the mandatory injunction decreed by this Hon’ble Court in its
judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS No. 6/ 1996 for the reasons set out
in the plaint;
(b) to declare that the judgment/decree dated 15.01.2002 in OS No.
6/1996 is not binding or enforceable since the issues raised in that Suit
could only have been decided by a Constitution Bench in terms of Article
145(3) of Constitution of India.
(c) To declare that Section 14 of the Act, 1956 is ultra-vires the
Constitution of India;
(d) to declare that Section 14 of the Act 1956 is no longer enforceable
for the reasons set out in the plant:
(e) to declare the Punjab Settlement (Rajiv-Longowal Accord) is not
enforceable under the changed circumstances as set out in the Plaint : in
the alternative in case it is held by this Hon’ble Court that the Punjab
Settlement dated 24.07.1985 is an enforceable Agreement then direct
enforceability and compliance of other 10 issues and to keep in abeyance
obligation to construct SYL canal till other conditions set out in the
settlement are implemented and/or the Water Disputes arising from the
reallocation of Ravi-Beas waters are resolved under the Act, 1956.
(f) Declare that Section 78(1) of the Act, 1966 is ultra vires of the
Constitution of India, and that all acts, deeds and things done pursuant
thereto or in consequence thereof including all Notifications, Agreement,
etc. are null and void including the notification dated 24.03.1976 and the
Agreement dated 31.12.198l as non-est and void ab initio.
The State of Haryana then filed an application under Order XXIII Rule 6
read with Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 for rejection
of the plaint alternatively for summary dismissal of the suit. The
application, which has been numbered as I.A. No. 1 of 2003 has been opposed
by Punjab inter alia contending that Order XXIII Rule 6(a) of the Supreme
Court Rules is unconstitutional.
Haryana’s application for enforcement of the decree (I.A. 1 in O.S. No. 6
of 1996) was sought to be amended in I.A. No. 3. The State of Punjab sought
to file a counter affidavit to I.A.No. 1 in O.S. No. 1 of 1996 which was
numbered as I.A. No. 2. On 13th August 2003, the State of Haryana filed a
second application for a direction on the Union of India to carry out its
obligation under the decree since the period of one year fixed by the
decree had expired. This has been numbered as I.A. No 4 in OS 1 of 1996. In
view of this last application of Haryana, I.A. Nos. 1, 2 and 3 in O.S. No.
1 of 1996 were dismissed as infructuous on 17th December 2003.
At this stage, the State of Punjab filed a Writ Petition No. 30/2004 for a
declaration that Rule 6(a) of Order XXIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966
is ultra-vires the Constitution alternatively for a declaration that Rule
6(a) of Order XXIII cannot be invoked in suits filed under Article 131 of
the Constitution of India. This writ petition was not entertained in view
of the fact that the same issues had been raised by the State of Punjab in
answer to the application of the State of Haryana under Order XXIII Rule 6
of the Supreme Court Rules.
Therefore, out of this welter of litigation what survives for disposal is :
(1) Haryana’s application for enforcement of the decree dated 15th
January 2002 (LA. No. 4 in O.S. 6/1996);
(2) Punjab’s suit inter alia challenging the decree dated 15th January
2002 (O.S. 1/2003); and
(3) Haryana’s application for rejection of the plaint in Punjab’s suit
(I.A. 1 in O.S. 1/2003).
Necessarily the last proceeding is required to be disposed of at the outset
because on the outcome of this application will depend the fate of the
second proceeding which may in turn have an impact on the first.
I.A. No. 1 in O.S. 1 of 2003.
Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 under which I.A. 1 of
2003 has been filed provides :
“The plaint shall be rejected :
(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action.
(b) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred
by any law.”
According to Haryana, a suit to set aside a decree of this Court, as Suit
No. 1 of 2003 purports to do. is not maintainable under Article 131 of the
Constitution. It is also submitted that the suit seeks to raise water
disputes which are not capable of being entertained by this Court by virtue
of Article 262 of the Constitution and that the prayer (c) to (f) were
barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Additionally, it has been urged
that the State of Punjab could not competently challenge the vires of
Section 78 of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1986, apart from the fact that
under Order XXXII Rule 2 of the Rule the issue having been raised in OS 2
of 1979 could not after its withdrawal, be raised again. Punjab’s challenge
to Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 is also stated to
be barred by estoppel because Punjab had submitted to the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal, suffered an Award and made an application under Section 5(3)
of the Act before the Tribunal which was still pending. It has been
submitted that the plaint did not disclose any cause of action and had been
filed in abuse of process of this Court and that this Court should not
countenance such frivolous and vexatious litigation and should dismiss the
suit under Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Rules.
In answer, the State of Punjab has submitted that it had a legal right to
resist execution of the decree by reason of changed circumstances which
right could only be enforced under Article 131 by way of a suit. It is said
that the constitutional remedy available to the States or Union under
Article 131 was extraordinary in character and the requirement of a cause
of action could not be imported into Article 131. It is submitted that
Order XXIII Rule 6(a) of the Supreme Court Rules which allowed the
rejection of the plaint on the ground of non-disclosure of a cause of
action was ultra vires Article 131. Reliance has been placed on the
decisions of this Court in State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4
SCC 609, p. 690, 709 as well the decision in State of Karnataka v. State of
A.P., [2000] 9 SCC 572 in support of this submission. The ground that Rule
6(a) suffers from “over exclusive classification” and was otherwise
violative of Article 14 was however not pressed. It is further submitted
that the judgment of this Court dated 15th January 2002 decided a water
dispute and that the decision of this Court in dismissing the review
application filed by the State of Punjab was wrong. As far as the question
of res judicata is concerned, it is submitted that that is an issue to be
decided in the suit and not by way of an application under Order XXIII Rule
6 of the Rules. Punjab has also submitted that Haryana’s application for
rejection of the plaint should be heard by the Bench of three Judges. It
may be mentioned that by an Order dated 1st January 2004, Haryana’s
application was directed by the learned Chief Justice to be listed before a
Bench of which one of us (Ruma Pal, J.) is a member. By a subsequent order
date 14th January 2004, the question whether the application for rejection
of the plaint should be heard by Bench of three judges was left to the same
Bench to decide.
There is no legal provision by which the issues raised by Haryana in its
application is required to be heard by a Bench of three judges. On the
other hand the suit filed by Punjab seeks modification of a decree. That
decree was passed by a Bench of two judges. The normal rule is that an
application for modification of the decree or order is to be made before
the Bench which passed the decree or order. Merely because the litigating
parties are States, would not alter this position. In any event we are not
of the view that any such issue has been raised which requires
determination by a larger Bench. This submission of the State of Punjab,
therefore, is rejected.
It is also our opinion that Punjab’s challenge to Order XXIII Rule 6(a),
even if successful, would not result in dismissal of Haryana’s application
because the grounds made out for rejection under Order XXIII Rule 6 pertain
not only to clause (a) but also to clause (b) thereof. Haryana has also
invoked this Court’s powers under Order XLVII Rule 6 which provides that :
“Nothing in these rules shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the
inherent powers of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for
the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
Besides the challenge to clause (a) of Rule 6 of Order XXIII is
unsustainable. Article 131 of the Constitution which has clothed this Court
with exclusive original jurisdiction to decide any dispute (a) between the
Government of India and one or more States or (b) between the Government of
India and any State or States on one side and one or more States on the
other, or (c) between two or more States, has laid down as a condition for
the exercise of such jurisdiction, that the dispute must involve any
question (whether of any law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a
legal right depends. It is evident that the phrase “cause of action” as
occurring in Order XXIII Rule 6(a) does not appear in Article 131. The
phrase, which occurs in Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure and is
commonly used in connection with ‘ordinary’ suits, has, in that context,
“acquired a judicially-settled meaning. In the restricted sense cause of
action means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the
immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the
necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only
the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right
itself. Compendiously, the expression means every fact which it would be
necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his
right to the judgment of the Court. Every fact which is necessary to be
proved, as distinguished from every piece of evidence which is necessary to
prove each fact, comprises in cause of action”1.
Doubtless, a suit under Article 131 is not an ‘ordinary’ suit, and the
phrase “cause of action” is conspicous by its absence in the Article. But
the argument that by the use of the phrase in Order XXIII Rule 6(a), the
burden and limitations created by judicial interpretation of the phrase in
connection with ‘ordinary’ suits are necessarily introduced, shackling an
otherwise exclusive jurisdiction, is unacceptable. The phrase, in our
opinion, as occurring in Order XXIII Rule 6(a), will have to be read and
construed in the context of Article 131 unimpaired by the meaning
judicially given to it in other contexts. Literally, the phrase means
nothing more than the ‘ground to sue’. Construed in this sense can it be
said that there is no requirement of disclosing a ground to sue in a suit
under Article 131?
Article 131 has been the subject matter of interpretation by this Court in
several decisions of which Punjab has sought to rely on two. The first is
the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, [1977] 3 SCC 592
1. Rajasthan High Court Advocates’ Association v. Union of India. [2001]
2 SCC 204. which pertained to six suits filed by the States of Rajasthan,
Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh and Orissa challenging a
letter written by the Union Home Minister to the Chief Ministers of those
States on the ground that the letter constituted a threat of action under
Article 356 of the Constitution. The Union of India raised a preliminary
objection that on the allegations made in the plaint, no suit would lie
under Article 131 of the Constitution. All six suits were dismissed by a
majority of six of the seven Judges constituting the Bench. Among the six,
four (Beg CJ, Goswami, Untwalia, and Fazl Ali, JJ.) upheld the preliminary
objection of the Union of India. Two (Chandrachud and Bhagwati, JJ.) held
that the suit was maintainable but decided against the plaintiff on merits.
We are bound by the majority view. The reasons for holding that the suit
was not maintainable given by Beg, C.J. were :
“Having considered the cases set out in the plaints and the petitions
before us, from every conceivable angle, I am unable to find a cause of
action for the grant of any injunction or a writ or order in the nature of
a Mandamus against any of the Defendants Opposite parties”.
The Learned Chief Justice went on to say :
“In my opinion, perhaps the technically more correct order, in the
situation before us would have been, on the findings reached by me, one
rejecting the plaints under Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Rules of this Court,
and rejecting the writ petitions in limine. After all, we had not proceeded
beyond the stage of hearing certain preliminary objections put forward by
Mr. Soli Sorabji, Additional Solicitor General, to the maintainability of
the suits and petitions before us. Although, we heard very full arguments
on these preliminary objections, we did not even frame any issues which is
done, under the provisions of Part III of the Rules of this Court,
applicable to the exercise of the Original Jurisdiction of this Court,
before we generally formally dismiss a suit. However, as the form in which
we have already passed our orders, dismissing the suit and petitions, which
was approved by us on April 29, 1977, has substantially the same effect as
the rejection of the plaints for failure to disclose a triable cause of
action”. The majority view dismissed the suit under clause (a) of Rule 6 of
Order XXIII. The phrase “cause of action” was considered with reference to
Article 131 as meaning a dispute involving a question of fact or law on
which the existence or extent of a legal right depends.
The Second decision relied upon by the State of Punjab in this context is
the State of Karnataka v. Union of India, [1977] 4 SCC 608. The decision
followed within a few months of the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Union
of India (supra). The subject matter of controversy was a notification
issued by the Central Government constituting a Commission of Inquiry under
the Commission of Inquiry Act, 1952 to inquire into charges of corruption,
nepotism, favourtism and misuse of Government power against the Chief
Minister and other Ministers of the State of Karnataka. The Union of India
raised the preliminary objection that the suit was not maintainable under
Article 131 because the inquiry was against the Chief Minister and other
individuals and not against the State. Although the suit was dismissed on
merits by a majority opinion of the Judges, there was again a division
within the majority on the question whether the preliminary objection of
the Union of India should be upheld. Beg, CJ, Chandrachud and Bhagwati JJ.
held the suit was maintainable. Untwalia Shinghal and Jaswant Singh JJ.
held it was not. There was a division of opinion on the question as to
whether there was a dispute within the meaning of Article 131. But all the
Judges considered the question of maintainability of the suit filed by the
State of Karnataka under Order XXIII Rule 6(a) by reading “cause of action”
in the context of Article 131 as meaning ‘a dispute involving any question
on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends’ or as the pre-
condition subject to which the suit could properly be filed under that
Article. In other words, the phrase ’cause of action” in the context of
Article 131 was read as nothing more than ‘the ground or basis to sue’.
Chandrachud, J. makes this clear when he expounded the scope of Article 131
and said :
“The jurisdiction conferred on the Supreme Court by Article 131 of the
Constitution should not be tested on the anvil of banal rules which are
applied under the Code of Civil Procedure for determining whether a suit is
maintainable. Article 131 undoubtedly confers “original jurisdiction’ on
the Supreme Court and the commonest form of a legal proceeding which is
tried by a Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction is a suit.
But a constitutional provision, which confers exclusive jurisdiction on
this Court to entertain disputes of a certain nature in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, cannot be equated with a provision conferring a
right on a Civil Court to entertain a common suit so as to apply to an
original proceeding under Article 131 the canons of a suit which is
ordinarily triable under Section 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure by a
Court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Advisedly, the Constitution
does not describe the proceeding which may be brought under Article 131 as
a ‘suit’ and significantly, Article 131 uses words and phrases not commonly
employed for determining the jurisdiction of a Court of first instance to
entertain and try a suit. It does not speak of a ’cause of action’, a
expression of known and definite legal import in the world of witness
actions. Instead, it employs the word ‘dispute’, which is no part of the
elliptical jargon of law. But above all, Article 131 which in a manner of
speaking is a self contained code on matters falling within its purview,
provides expressly for the condition subject to which an action can lie
under it. That condition is expressed by the clause : “if and in so far as
the dispute involves any question (whether of law or fact) on which the
existence or extent of a legal right depends”. By the very terms of the
article, therefore the sole condition which is required to be satisfied for
invoking the original jurisdiction of this Court is that the dispute
between the parties referred to in clauses (a) to (e) must involve a
question on which the existence or extent of a legal right depends”.
This ’cause of action’ under Order XXIII Rule 6(a) is this ‘sole condition’
which is required to be satisfied before the jurisdiction of this Court can
be invoked under Article 131. If the plaint does not ex facie show the
fulfilment of that condition, it would not be maintainable. This follows
from the language of Article 131 itself. Therefore merely because the
phrase “cause of action” has been used in order XXIII Rule 6(a) does not
mean that principles enunciated in the context of Section 20 of the Code of
Civil Procedure are imported. Order XXIII Rule 6(a) only gives effect to
limitations implicit in Article 131 itself. It follows that it does not
violate Article 131 or any other provision of the Constitution. The
application under Order XXIII Rule 6 of the Rules is by way of demurrer.
The question whether the plaint should be rejected must therefore be
decided on the basis of the allegations contained in the plaint.2
Paragraphs 2 and 7 of the plaint record the substance and content of a
complaint filed by the plaintiff on 11th January, 2003 under Section 3 of
the 1956 Act relating to reallocation of the Ravi-Beas waters. Both
paragraphs conclude with the identical statement –
“The Plaintiff has every chance of success in the re-allocation to reduce
the share of Haryana and therefore, the question of SYL construction may
not arise for consideration at all”.
In paragraph 3, the plaintiff has said that the obligation to construct the
Canal Basin had been imposed on the plaintiff on the basis of the Punjab
settlement but neither the State of Haryana nor the Union of India had
performed any of the other obligations imposed upon them under the
settlement. Paragraph 4 which has as many as 18 sub-paragraphs sets out the
historical background to the facts claimed to be relevant for the purposes
of the present suit. Similarly, paragraph 5 records the proceedings O.S.
6/96 culminating in the decree. Paragraph 6 says that the directions in the
decree dated 15.1.2002 were liable to be discharged by reason of changed
circumstances, the changed circumstance being “the allocation of water made
hithertobefore is liable to be reviewed”. Up to this stage, there is no
other “change of circumstance” pleaded apart from the filing of a complaint
under the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 and the change of success.
In paragraph 8, the plaintiff has given the grounds for seeking discharge
of the injunction granted on 15.1.2002. These pertain to the availability
of water for appointment between the Punjab and Haryana. It is stated that
there is no water available for transfer through the SYL Canal. The second
ground is a decision of this Court in writ petition No. 512/2002 on
31.10.2002 by which it is claimed, this court had directed completion of
the net working of the rivers. Among the projects identified by the Union
of India was the Sharda-Yamuna Link, as a result of which, according to
2. See: D.Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman [1999] 3 SCC 267, 271. the
plaintiff, Haryana would get more water and there was no question of
burdening the “deficit Ravi-Beas Basin.” The third ground is that an issue
had been raised in the complaint filed by the plaintiff under Section 3 of
the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, as to the rights of Haryana and
Rajasthan to the rivers waters as non riparian States. The next ground is
that Haryana had declined to abide by the other terms of the Punjab
settlement. The last ground is that water allocations were subject to
review. This is followed by arguments in support of the last submission
with reference to diverse authorities.
In paragraphs 9, 10 and 17 the plaintiff has challenged the decree dated
15th January, 2002 on the ground that it was violative of Articles 145(3)
and 262 of the Constitution and Pragraph 18 questions the correctness of
the order dismissing, the plaintiffs Review Petition. Paragraph 19 contains
an assertion that the construction of the SYL Canal was a water dispute.
Paragraphs 11, 12, 13 and 14 set out the grounds for challenge to Section
78(1) of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966. Paragraph 15 gives grounds
for claiming the invalidity of Section 14 of the Inter-State Water Disputes
Act, 1956. Paragraph 16 refers to correspondence exchanged with the Chief
Ministers of the two States relating to the “changed circumstances” being
the “remaining aspect” of the Punjab Settlement. Paragraph 20 contains
arguments as to why this Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
Paragraph 21 relates to the dates on which the alleged cause of action
arose and paragraph 22 relates to the question of limitation.
An analysis of the averments in the plaint shows that the entire thrust of
the suit filed by the State of Punjab is aimed at the decree dated 15th
January 2002 in O.S. No. 6 of 1996. One portion of the plaint relates to
the discharge of the injunction granted by the decree by reason of “changed
circumstances”. The second portion challenges the decree as being
unconstitutional.
The first question to be answered is: do these disputes involve any
question (whether legal or factual) on which the existence or extent of a
legal right of the plaintiff depends? If it does then the next question is,
whether the raising of such disputes is barred by any law? If any of these
questions is answered in the affirmative then the plaint must be rejected
as a whole. On the other hand, if any part of the dispute crosses both
hurdles, the suit must survive because there cannot be a partial rejection
of the plaint. (See D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Janakiraman, [1999] 3 SCC 267).
The primary consideration in answering the first question is the legal
right claimed by the plaintiff. Unless the plaintiff can establish that
there is such a right in law, there would be no question of this Court
deciding any dispute regarding the extent or existence of such right under
Article 131. As was said by Bhagwati, J. (as His Lordship then was) in
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (supra) :
“Now, plainly there are two limitations in regard to the dispute which can
be brought before the Supreme Court under Article 131. One is in regard to
parties and the other is in regard to the subject
matter……………………The (other) limitation as to subject matter
flows from the words “If and in so far as the dispute involves any question
(whether of law or fact) on which the existence or extent of a legal right
depends”. These words clearly indicate that the dispute must be one
affecting the existence or extent of a legal right and not a dispute on the
political plane not involving a legal aspect. It was put by Chandrachud,
J., very aptly in his judgment in the State of Rajasthan v. Union of India,
(supra) when he said : “Mere wrangles between Governments have no place
under the scheme of that article…..:. It is only when a legal, as
distinguished from a mere political, issue arises touching upon the
existence or extent of a legal right that the article is attracted. Hence
the suit in the present case would obviously not be maintainable unless it
complies with both these limitations.”
The plaintiff in the present case claims that the legal right in question
is the right to have an injunction modified by reason of changed
circumstances. Several decisions both Indian and of the United States have
been cited in support of this proposition. Before we consider these
authorities it must be kept in mind that as far as this country is
concerned the general law relating to injunctions is contained in Sections
36 to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Although these
provisions may not limit the powers of this Court under Article 131
nevertheless they provide valuable guidelines as to the nature of this form
of equitable relief. An injunction may be permanent (perpetual) or
temporary3. A permanent injunction is final and conclusive of the facts in
the context of which the injunction is granted. A temporary injunction by
contrast is granted on a prima facie view of the facts and, as the word
‘temporary’ itself indicates, is an interim order pending a final
adjudication of the rights of the parties. This distinction is not to be
confused with the distinction between a prohibitory or preventive
injunction on the one hand and a mandatory injunction on the other. In the
first case a party is prevented from doing a particular thing or continuing
with a particular action4. A mandatory injunction on the other hand
commands an act to be done and is provided for under Section 39 of the
Specific Relief Act, 1963 which reads :
“Mandatory injunctions – When, to prevent the breach of an obligation, it
is necessary to compel the performance of certain acts which the court is
capable of enforcing, the court may in its discretion grant an injunction
to prevent the breach complained of, and also to compel performance of the
requisite acts”.
This command may direct the restoration of status-quo ante or may direct
the performance of a positive act altering the existing state of things5. A
mandatory injunction like a preventive injunction may be temporary or
final.
All the decisions cited by Punjab in its plaint pertain to cases where the
decree sought to be modified was a perpetual or continuing preventive
injunction.
Thus, in Albert H. Ladner v. Clarence R. Siegel, 68 ALR 1172 at the
instance of adjoining landowners, a decree had been passed preventing the
defendant, Siegel, from using the building proposed to be constructed by
him for garage purpose. The injunction was granted on the basis that the
area was exclusively residential and that the-proposed business would give
rise to gases and odour affecting the neighbourhood. Subsequent to the
decree, Siegel applied for modification on the ground that he did not wish
to operate the garage but merely wished to use the premises to park the
3. Specific Relief Act, 1963 Section 36
4. (ibid) Section 38.
5. Kerr on Injunctions 6th Edn. p.40. cars of his tenants. The lower
Court modified the earlier decree. The adjacent landowners’ appealed. The
U.S. Supreme Court rejected the appeal and said :
“There are many equitable proceedings that illustrate the general rule,
such as specific performance, bills to reform instruments, and others. A
final decree in such equitable proceeding is unchangeable, except possibly
through gross mistake to be corrected by a bill of review, and not then if
any intervening right has appeared since entering the decree. In all such
proceedings the decree calls for definite action, and the law presumes much
action to follow the order.
“But though a decree may be final, as it relates to an appeal and all
matters included or embodied in such a step, yet, where the proceedings are
of a continuing nature, it is not final. These are exceptions to the
general rule, and to determine them the nature and character of the
equitable action must be considered : that is, whether, the decree is final
for the purpose of execution, or contemplates other and further steps in
the administration of justice “.
“An injunction is the form of equitable proceeding which protects civil
rights from irreparable injury, either by commanding acts to be done, or
preventing their commission, there being no adequate remedy at law.
Granting an injunction rests in the sound discretion of the court, that
discretion to be exercised under well-established principles, and there are
no statutory limitations on the power of the court in relation thereto.
While the decree in such action is an adjudication of the facts and the law
applicable thereto, it is none the less executory and continuing as to the
purpose or object to be attained; in this it differs from other equitable
actions. It operates until vacated, modified, or dissolved. An injunction
contemplates either a series of continuous acts or a refraining from
action. A preventive injunction constantly prevents one party from doing
that which would cause irreparable damage to his neighbour’s property
rights. The final decree continues the life of such proceedings, not only
for the purpose of execution, but for such other relief as a chancellor may
in good conscience grant under the law.
The modification of a decree in a preventive injunction is inherent in the
court which granted it, and may be made, (a) if, in its discretion
judicially exercised, it believes the ends of justice would be served by a
modification, and (b) where the law, common or statutory, has changed, been
modified or extended, and (c) where there is a change in the controlling
facts on which the injunction rested”.
(Emphasis supplied)
The next decision cited is United States of America v. Swift & Company, 286
US 105, 76 L.ed. 999 where the Government had filed proceedings against
five meat packers to dissolve a monopoly on, inter-alia, the ground that
the defendants had not only suppressed competition but were speading their
monopoly into other fields of trade. A consent decree was passed preventing
the defendants from maintaining a monopoly and entering into or continuing
in combination in restraint of trade and commerce. There were further
clauses which prevented the defendants from carrying out the specified type
of activity severally and jointly. The decree closed with a provision
whereby jurisdiction of the court was retained for the purpose of taking
such other action or such other relief “as may become necessary or
appropriate for the carrying out and enforcement” thereof, “and for the
purpose of entertaining at any time hereafter any application which the
parties may make” with reference thereto. An application was made before
the lower Court by an intervenor for vacating the decree on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. The operation of the decree was suspended by an
interim order. On an appeal preferred by the Government and by the
wholesale grocers, the U.S. Supreme Court allowed the appeals. In the
course of the judgment it was said :
“Power to modify the decree was reserved by its very terms, and so from the
beginning went hand in hand with its restraints. If the reservation had
been omitted, power there still would be by force of principles inherent in
the jurisdiction of the chancery. A continuing decree of injunction
directed to events to come is subject always to adaptation as events may
shape the need”. (114) A distinction was made between restraints that give
protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be
substantially impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision
of changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and tentative.
The Court, however, made it clear that in proceedings for modification of a
decree, the decree itself be impeached and that the Court is “not at
liberty to reverse under the guise of re-adjusting”.
Santa Rita Oil Company v. State Board of Equalization, 126 ALR 757 was a
case in which a decree of injunction had been granted restraining the
computation, assessment, levying and collection of certain taxes on oil and
gas products” under a lease of trust patent Indian lands on the ground that
the plaintiff was an instrumentality of the Federal Government and was,
therefore immune from taxation by the State. The decision was based upon
earlier decisions of the US Supreme Court. In other words, the injunction
granted was a continuing on one the basis of the law as it then stood. The
US Supreme Court subsequently took a contrary view and overruled the
earlier decisions. The question was whether with the change in the legal
basis of the earlier decree, the earlier decree would continue to operate.
In that context it was held :
“A final or permanent injunction is a continuing process over which the
equity court necessarily retains jurisdiction in order to do equity. And if
the court of equity later finds that the law has changed or that equity no
longer justifies the continuance of the injunction, it may and should free
the defendant’s hands from the fetters by which until then its activities
have been prevented, thus leaving it free to perform its lawful duties.”
(Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the decision in Coca Cola Company v. Standard Bottling Company,
138 F.2d 788 was in Connection with the power of Court to modify a decree
which sought to prevent the defendant from carrying on business in a
certain manner.
In System Federation No. 91, Railway Employees Dept. v. O. V. Wright, 364
US 642, 5 L.ed. 2d 349, 81 S Ct. 368, a decree was passed at the instance
of non-union rail employees against the railroad and railroad labour union
from discriminating against them by reason of the plaintiffs’ refusal to
join or retain membership in any labour organisation. Here again, a decree
was passed against the defendants perpetually preventing a course of action
in the light of a statutory prohibition. There was a subsequent change in
the statute. On the basis of this change, the union made an application for
modification of the decree. The application was allowed and it was said.
“The source of the power to modify is of course, the fact that an
injunction often requires continuing supervision by the issuing court and
always a continuing willingness to apply its powers and processes on behalf
of the party who obtained that equitable relief. Firmness and stability
must no doubt be attributed to continuing injunctive relief based on
adjudicated facts and law, and neither the plaintiff nor the court should
be subjected to the unnecessary burden of re-establishing what has once
been decided. Nevertheless the court cannot be required to disregard
significant changes in law or facts if it is “satisfied that what it has
been doing has been turned through changing circumstances into an
instrument of wrong” United States v. Swift & Co. Supra (286 US at 114,
115). A balance must thus be struck between the policies of res judicata
and the right of the court to apply modified measures to changed
circumstances”.
Coming to the Indian cases cited by the respondent, the first is a decision
of the Lahore High Court in Khazan Singh v. Ralla Ram, AIR (1937) Lahore
839. In that case, a decree had been passed protecting by way of injunction
an easement in respect of a window and a “parnala”. An easement by
definition implies continuity. The house of the plaintiff was re-built and
the window was re-located. In view of this changed circumstance, it was
held that the easement did not continue in respect of the window but
continued in respect of the “parnala”.
Yashpal Singh v. VIII Addl. District Judge and Others, [1992] 2 SCC 504,
was a case arising oat of two conflicting orders of injunction. The
respondent No. 3 had in that case obtained a decree injuncting the Forest
Department and the State of U.P. from interfering with the rights to cut
trees on a plot of land which he claimed belong to him. The decree
therefore continuously prevented the defendants from interfering with the
respondent No. 3’s right. A third party filed a civil suit against the
respondent No. 3 and obtained an interim injunction restraining the
respondent No. 3 from cutting trees from the plot of land which she claimed
belonged to her. The respondent No. 3 allegedly disobeyed the order of
interim injunction. The plaintiff in the second suit obtained the help of
the local police to restrain the respondent No. 3 from removing the trees.
The respondent No. 3 filed an application for execution of the decree
obtained by him in his suit and in the execution proceedings an order of
attachment was passed in respect of the property of the local police
officer under the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 32 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. This Court set aside the order of the Executing Court on the
police officer’s appeal on two grounds, first because the police officer
was no longer present in the District to obstruct or continue obstructing
the legal process, and second, because the police officer could not be said
to be a party against whom the decree for injunction had been passed merely
because he was an employee of the State of U.P.
The next decision cited by the plaintiff is Surinder Kumar v. Ishwar Dayal,
[1996] 3 SCC 103 also pertained to a right under a decree perpetually
injuncting the defendant from constructing a window on a common wall. On
the finding that a new wall was constructed, it was held that the
injunction did not continue to operate.
The final decision cited by the plaintiff is Municipal Board, Kishangarh v.
Chand Mal, [1999] 9 SCC 198. In this case a lessee had filed a suit to
restrain the Municipal Board from interfering with the construction on
leasehold land. Subsequent to the suit, the lease was terminated and the
land was included within the municipality. This Court was of the view that
in such circumstances, the original decree permanently injuncting the Board
from interfering with the construction to be made by the lessee could be
considered.
The principles that emerge from these decisions are that
(a) There is a distinction between a final peremptory injunction and a
final decree which requires a continuous course of action.
(b) A decree granting a preventive injunction continuously operates to
prevent a course of action and
(c) Such a decree may be modified prospectively if the circumstances,
whether of fact or law on which the decree is based, are substantially
altered and
(d) Such a decree cannot be impeached or reopened.
It is only if the decree is one which grants a continuous injunction and if
conditions (b), (c) and (d) are fulfilled that proceedings for modification
of the decree can be maintained.
In the present case the decree granted a final mandatory injunction.
Punjab’s contention is that the injunction granted by this Court was
temporary merely because in the course of the judgment the Court said
“We have examined the materials from the standpoint of existence of a prima
facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss and injury and we
are satisfied that the plaintiff has been able to establish each one of the
aforesaid criteria and as such is entitled to the injunction sought for.
This issue is accordingly answered in favour of the plaintiff and against
the defendants”.
A decree cannot reach a prima facie conclusion. The use of the phrase
‘prima facie’ was clearly an accident of language and does not detract from
the conclusiveness of the finding and the finality of the mandate. It
directed the construction of a canal as a final adjudication of rights.
This is apparent from the following passage :
“……..we unhesitatingly hold that the plaintiff-State of Haryana has
made out a case of issuance of an order of injunction in the mandatory from
against the State of Punjab to complete the portion of SYL Canal, which
remains incomplete and in the event the State of Punjab fails to complete
the same, then the Union Government-Defendant 2 must see to its completion,
so that the money that has already been spent and the money which may
further be spent could least at be utilized by the countrymen.” The
operative portion of the judgment resolves any doubt as to the finality of
the injunction by holding :
“We, therefore, by way of a mandatory injunction, direct the defendant-
State of Punjab to continue the digging of Sutlej-Yamuna Link Canal portion
of which has not been completed as yet and make the canal functional within
one year from today. We also direct the Government of India-Defendant 2 to
discharge its constitutional obligation in implementation of the aforesaid
direction in relation to the digging of canal and if with him a period of
one year SYL Canal is not completed by the defendant-State of Punjab, then
the Union Government should get it done through its own agencies as
expeditiously as possible, so that the huge amount of money that has
already been spent and that would yet be spent, will not “be wasted and the
plaintiff-State of Haryana would be able to draw the full quantity of water
that has already been allotted to its share.”
The mandate in the decree was to carry out the obligations under agreement
dated 31st December, 1981. It did not envisage a “continuing process over
which the equity court necessarily retains jurisdiction in order to do
equity”. Principle (b) relating to modification of decrees enunciated
earlier is therefore absent.
In any event there has been no change in the circumstances on the basis of
which the decree was passed. Although there is a discussion on the various
issues while rejecting the submissions made by Punjab, ultimately the
reasons for issuing the injunction were two. The first was the agreement
dated 31st December 1981 and the order of this Court permitting the
withdrawal of the two cross suits filed by Haryana and Punjab (OS 1 of 1979
and OS 2 of 1979). This is apparent from the following passage :
“The State Government having entered into agreements among themselves on
the intervention of the Prime Minister of the country, resulting in
withdrawal of the pending suit in the Court, cannot be permitted to take a
stand contrary to the agreements arrived at between themselves. We are also
of the considered opinion that it was the solemn duty of the Central
Government to see that the terms of the agreement are complied with in
toto.”
The second was “(T)he (a)dmitted fact that for construction of the Punjab
portion of SYL Canal, more than Rs. 560 crores have already been spent, as
is apparent from Ext. P-13 and the entire money has been paid
by the Government of India………..(M)ore than Rs. 700 crores of public
revenue cannot be allowed to be washed down the drain, when the entire
portion of the canal within the territory of Haryana has already been
completed and major portion of the said canal within the territory of
Punjab also has been dug, leaving only minor patches within the said
territory of Punjab to be completed”.
The decree was not based on the quantum of water that may be made available
to Haryana. Therefore the fact that Punjab’s complaint is pending under
Section 3 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956 or that Haryana may ,
in the future, be entitled to more water is immaterial. For the same reason
the principle (if any of the right to ask for a review of water allocations
would not apply.
Nor was the decree based on the Punjab Settlement. It was noted that the
parties had acted on the agreement and that despite the fact that Punjab
sought to reopen the agreement dated 31st December, 1981 in so far as it
related to the quantum of water to be shared between the two States under
Paragraphs 9.1. and 9.2. of the Punjab Settlement, the construction of the
SYL canal under paragraph 9.3. canal remained undisputed. The Court
accepted Punjab submission that the Punjab Settlement was not binding on
the State but said :
“having regard to the fact that in terms of paragraphs 9.1. and 9.2, a
Tribunal was constituted and even the provisions of the Inter-State Water
Disputes Act were amended, thereby granting parliamentary recognition to
the sub-called agreement, the terms of the said agreement cannot be thrown
out as a piece of paper only”
It is evident that the Punjab Settlement was referred to as a piece of
evidence that the parties had kept the construction of the canal distinct
from the disputes relating to the sharing of river waters between the two
States. If the other clauses in the Punjab settlement are allegedly not
being complied with by Haryana that is not a change of circumstance or
ground for modification of the decree passed on 15th January, 2002. The
challenge to Section 14 of the Inter State Water Disputes Act, 1956 is also
inapposite to the question of modification of the decree. The section
related to and was in enforcement of paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the Punjab
Settlement and relates to the resolution of the water disputes between the
States by the Tribunal. Paragraph 9.3 which is related to the canal and
referred to by the Court does not form part of Section 14. It has not been
averred that either of the two grounds which founded the decree have in any
sense of the word ”changed”. Principle (c) is therefore unfulfilled.
And finally Principle (d): the suit for modification of the decree dated
15th January, 2002 will not lie because the decree itself has been sought
to be impeached. “The injunction, whether right or wrong, is not subject to
impeachment in its application to the conditions that existed at its
making’.
In other words since the plaint in the present suit does not even ex facie
fulfil all four conditions subject to which a decree may be modified, there
is no legal right to apply for modification of the decree dated 15th
January, 2002 within the meaning of Article 131. We can therefore only
conclude that there is no “cause of action” within the meaning of Article
131 as far as the prayers relating to the discharge of the injunction
granted by the decree dated 12th January, 2002 is concerned.
We then take up the direct challenge to the decree itself as being
unconstitutional. Two grounds have been pleaded in the plaint in this
connection :
(1) That it was a decision of two Judges whereas Article 145(3) of the
Constitution requires a minimum of five Judges “for the purpose of deciding
any case involving a substantial question of law as to the interpretation
of the Constitution……”. 6 Per Cardozo. J. United States v. Swift &
Co. (supra).
(2) The second ground is that the decree sought to resolve a water dispute
in contravention of Article 262 of the Constitution.
Both the submissions are inter related. Article 145(3) was relied on
because it was said that the scope of Article 131 and 262 had to be
interpreted. We had said in the judgment dated 15th January, 2002, that in
the Constitution Bench decision in Stats of Karnataka v. State of A.P.,
[2000] 9 SCC 572 this Court had considered the provisions of Article 262(2)
of the Constitution and Section 11 and Section 2(c) of the Inter-State
Water Disputes Act and its impact on a suit filed under Article 131 of the
Constitution. By that decision two cross suits were disposed of (O.S. No.
1/1997 by the ‘State of Karnataka v. State of A.P. and O.S. No. 2/1997 by
the State of A.P. v. State of Karnataka). Two separate judgments were
delivered. The State of A.P. had prayed for 14 reliefs but, the Court
observed, the reliefs essentially related to the construction of the
Almatti Darn on the river Krishna by the State of Karnataka to a height of
524,056 metres. Several issues were framed (at p. 627). Issue No. 2 related
to the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain and try the suit under the
provisions of Article 262 of the Constitution and Sections 11 and 2(c) of
the Inter-State Water disputes Act, 1956, The issue was conceded by the
State of Maharashtra which had raised the issue. Over and above that, the
Court was independently of the view (p. 640) that this Court had the
jurisdiction to entertain and hear the suit and answered issue 2 in the
affirmative.
Punjab’s review petition was dismissed by us on the ground that the “so-
called vital question with regard to the interpretation of Article 131 and
Article 262 has been answered in the Constitution Bench decision and we are
bound by the same,” In the impugned judgment, we merely applied the
interpretation of the Constitution Bench of the provisions of Article 135
and 262 to the facts of the case. There was no further interpretation of
Article 131 and 262 to be done in the case before us which required the
decision of a bench of five Judges under Article 145(5).
The objection as to the jurisdiction of this Court on the basis of Article
262 was specifically negatived in the judgment dated 15th January 2002 when
it was held :
“………..the construction of SYL Canal has absolutely no connection with
the sharing of water between the States and as such is not a ”water
dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(c) and consequently the question
of referring such dispute to a Tribunal does not arise. In this view of the
matter, howsoever wide meaning the expression “water dispute” in Section
2(c) of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act be given, the construction of
the canal which is the subject-matter of dispute in the present suit cannot
be held to be a “water dispute” within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the
Act and as such. such a suit is not barred under Article 262 of the
Constitution read with Section 11 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act”.
Can the State of Punjab raise these issues again? Or is it barred by the
principles of res judicata assuming that the principles of res judicata are
‘law’ within the meaning of Order 26 Rule 6(b)?
The doctrine of res judicata and Order XXXII Rule 2 are not technical rules
of procedure and are fundamental to the administration of justice in all
Courts that there must be an end of litigation. Thus, when this Court was
called upon in Daryao v. State of U.P., to hold that res judicata could not
apply in connection with proceedings before this Court under Article 32
because of the extraordinary nature of the jurisdiction, it was said :
“But is the rule of res judicata merely a technical rule or is it based on
high public policy? If the rule of res judicata itself embodies a principle
of public policy which in turn is an essential part of the rule of law then
the objection that the rule cannot be invoked where fundamental rights are
in question may lose much of its validity. Now, the rule of res judicata as
indicated in s. 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has no doubt some
technical aspects, for instance the rule of constructive res judicata may
be said to be technical; but the basis on which the said rule rests is
founded on considerations of public policy. It is in the interest of the
public at large that a finality should attach to the binding decisions
pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in
7. [1962] 1 SCR 574, 582, 583 the public interest that individuals should
not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. If these two
principles form the foundation of the general rule of res judicata they
cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with
fundamental rights in petitions filed under Art. 32……….
The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of competent
jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule
of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the
Constitution lays so much emphasis8.”
This opinion was followed in the matter of Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal,
[1993] 1 SCC 96 (II) and applied to suits under Article 131. The factual
background of that case was a dispute over the usage of the waters of the
river Cauvery between the States of Tamil Nadu and Karnataka. The Union
Government constituted the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal and referred the
disputes between the two States to the Tribunal. The State of Tamil Nadu
filed an application for interim relief. This was rejected by the Tribunal
on the ground that it did not have the jurisdiction to grant any interim
relief because that dispute had not been referred to it by the Central
Government. Being aggrieved, the State of Tamil Nadu approached this Court
under Article 136. The Special Leave Petitions were converted into Civil
Appeals and disposed of by Order dated 26th April, 1991 by holding that the
order of Reference showed that the Central Government had in fact referred
the issue relating to interim relief to the Tribunal. The Tribunal then
granted interim relief on Tamil Nadu’s application. Karnataka subsequently
issued an Ordinance relating to the utilization of water of the Cauvery and
gave it overriding effect over any interim order of any Court or Tribunal.
The Ordinance was replaced by an Act. In the meanwhile a suit was filed
under Article 131 by the State of Karnataka against the State of Tamil Nadu
contending that the Tribunal’s order granting imterim relief was without
jurisdiction and, therefore, null and void etc. In the context of these
developments, the President referred three questions to this Court for its
opinion under Article 143 of the Constitution. Of the three questions,
question No. 3 raised the issue whether a Water Disputes Tribunal
8. ibid at p.584. constituted under the Inter-state Water Disputes Act,
1956 was competent to grant any interim relief to the parties in the
dispute. This Court approached the question from two angles namely: (1)
when no reference of grant of interim relief is made to the Tribunal and
(2) when such reference is made it.
The Court held that by its earlier decision of 26th April, 1991 it had been
specifically held that the Central Government had made a reference to the
Tribunal for consideration of the claim for interim relief prayed for by
the State of Tamil Nadu. Implicit in the said decision was the finding that
the Central Government could refer the matter of granting interim relief to
the Tribunal for adjudication. Although the Court had in such earlier
decision kept open the question whether the Tribunal would have the power
to grant interim relief when no reference was made, it was held that the
earlier decision had in terms concluded the second aspect of the question.
A submission was then made on behalf of the State of Karnataka that the
earlier directions in the Court’s order dated 26th April, 1991 should be
declared as being without jurisdiction and void. This Court’s decision in
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, [1998] 2 SCC 602, was relied on to contend that
this Court could rehear the issue earlier concluded. The decision was
distinguished by this Court and it was held that the facts in A.R. Antulay
are “peculiar and the decision has to be confined to those special facts”.
It was then held.
“It cannot be said that this Court had not noticed the relevant provisions
of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act. The Court after perusing the
relevant provisions of the Act which were undoubtedly brought to its
notice, has come to the conclusion that the Tribunal and jurisdiction to
grant interim relief when the question of granting interim relief formed
part of the Reference. There is further no violation of any of the
principles of natural justice or of any provision of the Constitution. The
decision also does not transgress the limits of the jurisdiction of this
Court. We are, therefore, of the view that the decision being inter partes
operates as res judicata on the said point and it cannot be reopened.”
Since the doctrine of res judicata is an “essential part of the rule of
Law” it follows that if the issues in the suit are barred by res judicata
ex facie then this Court is required to reject the plaint in terms of Order
XXIII Rule 6(b). There is no substance in the submission of Punjab that
even when there is no dispute of fact the issue of res judicata should be
left for consideration at the trial of the suit. The decision cited viz.
Surayya v. Balagangadhar, AIR (1948) PC 5 is an authority for the
proposition that the issue of res judicata must be specifically pleaded and
is inapposite to the questions raised in this case. Here the earlier
proceedings have been referred to in the plaint and are matters of record.
As we have said both issues pertaining to the Court’s jurisdiction under
Article 145(3) and 262 have been considered and decided by this Court. The
issues have been concluded inter partes and cannot be raised again in
proceedings inter panes.
The same objection relates to the challenge to Section 78 of the Punjab
Reorganization Act, 1966. In paragraph 18 of the written statement filed by
the State of Punjab in O.S. No. 6/96 there is an express challenge to
Section 78 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act for want of legislative
competence.
But there is an additional ground apart from res judicata for holding that
the issue as to the constitutional validity of Section 78 cannot be raised.
The State of Punjab had earlier filed a suit, being O.S. No. 2 of 1979 in
this Court challenging the validity of section 78 of the Punjab
Reorganisation Act, 1976. In paragraphs 3 to 11 of the plaint, the
constitutional validity of Section 78 of the Punjab Re-organisation Act,
1966 had been specifically challenged. The following prayer among other
prayers was made :
“(a) Declaration that the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966
in so far as they purport to authorise the Central Government to make
determination with respect to the waters of the river Beas Project and
allocation or distribution of such waters is ultra vires the competence of
Parliament and violative of Article 24(3) of the Constitution.
As far as OS No. 2/79 is concerned it was unconditionally withdrawn in view
of the agreement dated 13th December, 1981 as has been noted earlier. Rules
1 and 2 of Order XXXII of the Supreme Court Rules which relate to the
withdrawal and adjustment of suits provide :
1. “Rules 1, 2 and 3 of Order XXXII in the First Schedule to the Code
with respect to the withdrawal and adjustment of suits shall apply in suits
instituted before the Court.
2. No new suit shall be brought in respect of the same subject-matter
until the terms or conditions, if any. imposed by the order permitting the
withdrawal of a previous suit or giving leave to bring a new suit have been
complied with.”
Rule 2 therefore allows a plaintiff to file a fresh suit in respect of the
same subject matter as the earlier withdrawn suit only if
(i) the order of withdrawal imposed conditions and those conditions have
been complied with; or
(ii) the order of withdrawal granted leave to the plaintiff to bring such
fresh suit.
In the order allowing OS 2 of 1979 to be withdrawn no such conditions are
present. Consequently a fresh suit in respect of the same subject matter
viz., the validity of section 78 of the 1966 Act does not lie. We leave
open the question as to whether it is open to the State of Punjab to
question the vires of the statute by which it was created.
Similarly the challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act must be ejected at
the threshold. The section reads :
“Constitution of Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal.- (1) Notwithstanding
anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Act, the Central
Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, constitute a
Tribunal under this Act, to be known as the Ravi and Beas Waters Tribunal
for the verification and adjudication of the matters referred to in
paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 respectively of the Punjab Settlement.
(2) When a Tribunal has been consituted under sub-section (1), the
provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 4, sub-section (2), (3)
and (4) of Section 5 and Section 5A to 13 (both inclusive) of this Act
relating to the constitution, jurisdiction, powers, authority and bar of
jurisdiction shall, so far as may be, but subject to sub-section (3)
hereof, apply to the constitution, jurisdiction, powers authority and bar
of jurisdiction in relation to the Tribunal constituted under sub-section
(1).
(3) When a Tribunal has been constituted under sub-section (1), the
Central Government alone may suo motu or at the request of the concerned
State Government refer the matters specified in paragraphs 9.1, and 9.2 of
the Punjab Settlement to such Tribunal.
Explanation – For the purpose of this section “Punjab Settlement” means the
Memorandum of Settlement signed at “New Delhi on the 24th day of July,
1985.”
In paragraph 51 of Punjab’s Written Statement in OS 6 of 1996, it was
admitted that the issues referred to in paragraphs 9.1 and 9.2 of the
Punjab settlement were referred to the Ravi-Beas Tribunal by Government
notification dated 2nd April 1986 and the affirmation of the continued
availability of water from the Ravi-Beas system as on 1.7.85 referred to in
the notification was relied upon. The notification dated 2nd April 1986 was
issued under Section 14 of the Inter-States Water Disputes Act. As far as
the report of the Tribunal is concerned, paragraph 8 of the written
statement says that it could not be relied upon because it had not become
final and that Punjab did not accept the correctness of “most of its
findings”. There was no dispute raised as to the constitutionality of
Section 14 at any stage. Even in the course of arguments, when Section 14
was specifically referred to in elaborate written notes on the scope,
purport and effect of Section 14, it was submitted that the effect of
Section 14 is four-fold :
(A) To overcome procedural hurdles that no dispute had been raised and to
by pass the mandatory requirement of negotiations.
(B) To deem matters referred under Section 14 to be a ‘water dispute’
and place this beyond challenge.
(C) To constitute this special section 14 Tribunal under this Act and
not any other provision or statute and make the other provisions
applicable.
(D) To oust the jurisdiction of all Courts including the Supreme Court
by making Section 11 applicable to this dispute.
(E) To leave all other disputes relating to the Punjab settlement to be
decided under the amended Act of 1958.
This Court in the judgment dated 15th January 2002 considered the arguments
of the parties relating to Section 14 and negatived Punjabs’ submission as
to the construction of section 14. Punjab could have challenged the
constitutional validity of Section 14 in its written statement. It did not
then. It cannot do so now being barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
In this suit Punjab has claimed that the section is ultra vires because
”(i) the raison-d’etre for the introduction of Section 14 in the Act, 1956
was the assumption of the validity of Punjab Settlement i.e. Memorandum of
Settlement dated 24.07.1985, which is incorrect as the said Settlement is
not a valid or binding Agreement;
(ii) The enactment of Section 14 is beyond the competence of Parliament
since on the face of it, it is against the constitutional Scheme as set out
in the Constitution under Article 262 read with entry 56 of 7th Schedule,
List I.
(iii) The special enactment has the effect of making a general legislation
specific to Ravi-Beas Waters. This is discriminatory to the inhabitants of
Punjab living in the Ravi-Beas Valley and is therefore, constitutionally
invalid.
(iv) There can be no legislative enactment by Parliament in respect of an
invalid Agreement………….
(v) In any event and without prejudice to the foregoing, no Agreement can
be executed in part to the exclusion of other obligations imposed
thereunder, as each obligation is an inter-connected and dependant bargain;
(vi) Because in any event and without prejudice to the foregoing, the
Punjab Settlement has become incapable of being performed under the changed
circumstances as also for the reasons that the State of Haryana has resiled
therefrom and is unwilling to abide by the letter and spirit of the said
Settlement. From these reasons it also follows that Section 14 which is
nothing but a statutory adjudication has no efficacy in law.
(vii) In any event and without prejudice to the foregoing the purposes for
which Section 14 was incorporated in the act. 1956 have become redundant in
the light of the facts and circumstances set out above and as the said
provision is no longer capable of meeting the objectives for which it was
purportedly enacted :
The challenge to Section 14 of the 1956 Act has been made “without
prejudice to Punjab’s pending application under Section 5(3) of the Act”.
Assuming such a reservation is legally possible, the ground for submitting
Section 14 of the 1950 Act is “unsustainable” is legally impermissible. It
is well established that constitutional invalidity (presumably that is what
Punjab means when it uses the word “unsustainable”) of a statutory
provision can be made either on the basis of legislative incompetence or
because the statute is otherwise violative of the provisions of the
Constitution. Neither the reason for the particular enactment nor the fact
that the reason for the legislation has become redundant, would justify the
striking of the legislation or for holding that a statute or statutory
provision is ultra vires. Yet these are the grounds pleaded in sub-
paragraphs (i), (iv), (v), (vi) and (vii) to declare section 14 invalid.
Furthermore merely saying that a particular provision is legislatively
incompetent [ground (ii)] or discriminatory [ground (iii)] will not do. At
least prima facie acceptable grounds in support have to be pleaded to
sustain the challenge. In the absence of any such pleading the challenge to
the constitutional validity of a statutory provisions is liable to be
rejected in limine.
The grounds given in support of Punjab’s challenge to Article 14 are ex-
fade no grounds in law and no “cause of action'” has been disclosed to
challenge the constitutional validity of Section 14 of the Inter-State
Water Disputes Act, 1986. Not only does the plaint filed by Punjab in OS 1
of 2003 not disclose any cause of action, but it is also evident from the
statements in the plaint that the suit is barred by law. The plaint is
accordingly rejected leaving open the other issues raised by Haryana in
support of its application.
Additionally and in the ultimate analysis, it is manifest that the suit has
been filed only with a view to subvert the decision of this Court with all
the disingenuousness of a private litigant to resist its execution. We
have, in the circumstances, no compunction whatsoever in dismissing the
suit under Order XLVII Rule 6 of the Rules.
I.A. No. 1 of 2003 filed by the State of Haryana in O.S. 1 of 2003 is
accordingly allowed. The plaint is rejected and Suit 1 of 2003 (State of
Punjab v. State of Haryana) is dismissed with costs.
LA. No. 4 In O.S. 6 of 1996
Haryana has asked for enforcement of the decree dated 15th January, 2002
under Article 142 of the Constitution read with clause 2(b) of the Supreme
Court (Decrees and Orders) Enforcement Order 1954 (hereinafter referred to
as the 1954 Order) praying that the Court may :
(a) Issue directions to the Union of India (Defendant No. 2) to carry
out its obligations under the decree and for the purpose :
(i) nominate Border Roads Organisation (BRO) as the construction agency
charged with the task of completing and making functional the SYL canal as
expeditiously as possible, and in any case within a period of one year from
the date of this Hon’ble Court’s order on this application;
(ii) Nominate the Central Water Commission (CWC) as the agency to provide
technical guidance and supervision to the construction agency;
(iii) Appoint a High Court Powered Committee consisting of the Secretaries
referred to in paragraph 16-H (iii) to monitor the function of the above
agencies and to submit progress reports to this Hon’ble Court on a monthly
basis.
(b) In the event the Union fails to carry out the above directions
within a period of four weeks, issue order nominating and appointing the
agency for construction, the agency for providing technical guidance and
the High Powered Committee and direct all of them to carry out their
respective tasks as specified in prayer (a) above.
(c) Press such other or further order or orders or such directions as
this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances
of the case and to meet the ends of justice.
The basis of the application is the failure of the State of Punjab to
either continue or complete the incomplete portion of the SYL canal in the
Punjab territory within the period specified in the Decree and the
subsequent failure of the Union of India to take any steps to complete the
canal through its own agencies.
The State of Punjab has filed a counter affidavit in which it has asked for
deferring the application for execution on the ground that OS l of 2003 has
been filed, that a prayer in the suit had been made for discharge from the
mandatory injunction and that a letter of complaint had been filed under
Section 3 of the Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956. Punjab has also
submitted that the application for execution was not maintainable, because
Haryana had not applied for orders in terms of Clause 2(b) of the 1954
Order, that draft issues had been filed by Haryana and Punjab in Suit 1 of
2003 pursuant to an order passed by this Court dated 24.11.2003 in that
suit, that water disputes were to be resolved on the basis of Punjab’s
complaint under Section 3 of the 1956 Act, that the Decree sought to be
executed was liable to be modified under the changed circumstances, and
that the Decree was a nullity. On the merits it is denied that nothing was
done by the State of Punjab to continue or complete the portion of the
canal within its territory and that the Border Roads Organisation (BRO) did
not have the requisite experience for constructing SYL canal and finally
that the Haryana’s prayer for appointment of a High Power Committee showed
that the Decree dated 15th January, 2002 is not executable in the ordinary
course.
The Union of India has also filed a counter affidavit in which it has
stated that it has already taken steps to implement and comply with the
Decree within the “constitutional limitations”. It has referred to several
meetings held and also the correspondence exchanged between the parties. It
has however, submitted that the BRO was committed to carrying out work in
border areas and in Jammu and Kashmir in particular till the year 2016 and
that it would not be possible to deploy BRO for the purpose of construction
of the canal. It has said that it has asked for the engineering details
from the State of Punjab, who had executed the works and in whom the
control of the works are vested at present. It has also submitted that the
possession of the SYL canal works needs to be handed over by the State of
Punjab to the agencies as may be selected by the Union of India and that
Budget estimates would have to be made for completion of the canal.
According to the Union an action plan has been prepared in which provision
has been made for setting up a High Powered Committee, but, it is
submitted, there was no necessity for the High Power Committee to report
back to this Court. As far as nomination of the Central Water Commission is
concerned, it says that this might cripple the chances of other more
suitable agencies. It has finally been submitted that the State of Punjab
should be directed to extend it fullest cooperation and protection for the
completion of the work by the Union of India. The Union’s affidavit
although filed in answer to LA No. 1 and 3 in O.S. No. 6 of 1996 was, at
its instance, directed to be treated as its answer to LA. No. 4 (vide this
Court’s order dated 17th December, 2003).
Punjab was required to complete the canal by 15th January, 2003 by the
decree. Instead of accepting the decree in good grace, every possible step
has been taken to thwart the decree. The minutes of the meetings and the
correspondence exchanged between the parties during this period shows that
the State of Punjab did not comply with this Court’s directives on the
ground that :
(1) Punjab would await the final report of the Ravi-Beas Water
Tribunal;
(2) the farmers of the State had filed a review petition in this Court
in which the Government was a party. The matter was subjudice and Punjab
was not in a position to start the digging of the canal.
(3) the Government of Punjab intended to file another revision petition
before this Court.
(4) that the construction of SYL canal was likely to produce strong
advise reaction among the people of Punjab and may also provide an emotive
issue to secessionists/militant elements and the construction of SYL canal
would lead to drying up of 9 lakh hectares land in the Punjab; and
(5) Suit No. 1 of 2003 had been filed.
Incidentally, the fourth ground is almost a verbatim reproduction of
Punjab’s stand in the proceedings filed by it earlier. There was no stay
granted by this Court at any stage of any of the various proceedings filed
assailing the decree. Even when the final assault was made by the filing of
Suit No. 1 of 2003 we did not grant any stay and it is basic law that the
mere filing of proceedings does not operate as a stay. The correspondence
and the record of minutes show that the Chief Minister as well as the
Government officials named in the correspondence have arrogated themselves
the power of sitting as a super-judicial body over this Court.
The Constitution provides for an ordered polity within this country to
promote integrity of the country. When disputes arise between States there
are usually political underpinnings. The resolution of such a dispute in
favour of one party will invariably have a political impact. Article 131 of
the Constitution has therefore given this Court the exclusive jurisdiction
to decide such a dispute strictly on legal considerations and in keeping
with the provisions of the Constitution. To resist the execution of the
decree on the ground that it would have a political fall out would result
in subversion of the Constitution, an endorsement of anarchy and the
disintegration of the country. Apart from rendering the provisions of
Article 131 a dead letter such a stand is contrary to Article 144 which
requires all authorities, civil and judicial, in the territory of India
shall act in aid of the Supreme Court. It is not in the circumstances
expected, that Governments whether at the Centre or in the States, will not
comply with the decree of this Court. By refusing to comply with the decree
of this Court under Article 131 not only is the offending party guilty of
contempt but the very foundation of the Constitution which the people
governing the State have sworn to uphold when assuming office and to which
this country owes its continued existence, is shaken. It is, we repeat, the
Constitutional duty of those who wield power in the States to create the
appropriate political climate to ensure a respect for the constitutional
processes and not set such processes at naught only to gain political
mileage. As was observed by the Constitution Bench, in Cauvery Water
Disputes Tribunal (supra) when an Ordinance was passed by a State seeking
to nullify the order of this Court.
“Such an act is an invitation to lawlessness and anarchy, inasmuch as the
Ordinance is a manifestation of a desire on the part of the State to be a
judge in its own cause and to defy the decisions of the judicial
authorities. The action forebodes evil consequences to the federal
structure under the Constitution and opens doors for each State to act in
the way it desires disregarding not only the rights of the other States,
the orders passed by instrumentalities constituted under an Act of
Parliament but also the provisions of the Constitution. If the power of a
State to issue such an Ordinance is upheld it will lead to the breakdown of
the constitutional mechanism and affect the unity and integrity of the
nation”.
These observations appositely reflect what can be said with regard to the
conduct of the State of Punjab. In any event there is now no question of
deferring Haryana’s application for execution because the suit itself,
namely, O.S. No. 1 of 2003 has been dismissed. The vague plea relating to
the possible rise of militancy by the construction of the canal is not an
acceptable defence at all. The fact that a letter of complaint has been
filed under Section 3 of the 1956 Act is immaterial as that pertains to a
water dispute within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the 1956 Act and we
have already held that the construction of SYL canal is not a water dispute
within the meaning of the 1956 Act read with Article 262 of the
Constitution. We have already held that the decree cannot be said to be a
nullity. In any event this is not a question which can be raised while
opposing an application for execution. What remains of Punjab’s opposition
is its submission that the application of Haryana is not maintainable under
the 1954 order.
The 1954 Order has been issued by the President in exercise of powers under
Article 142(1) of the Constitution. Punjab’s objection to the
maintainability of Haryana’s application for execution because of alleged
non-compliance with paragraph 2(d) of the 1954 Order is unsustainable. We
quote paragraph 2 before giving our reasons in support of this conclusion :
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law in force at the
commencement of this Order, any decree passed or order made by the Supreme
Court whether before or after such commencement, including any order as to
the costs of, and incidental to, any proceedings in that Court shall be
enforceable :
(a) where such decree or order was passed or made in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction – in accordance with the provisions of law for the
time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of the
Court or Tribunal from which the appeal to the Supreme Court was preferred
or sought to be preferred; and
(b) in any other case, – in accordance with the provisions of law for
the time being in force relating to the enforcement of decrees or orders of
such Court, Tribunal or authority as the Supreme Court may specify in its
decree or order or in a subsequent order made by it on the application of
any party to the proceeding.
The decree passed by this Court, under Article 131 being an original
proceeding would not be covered by clause 2(a). Clause 2(b) empowers this
Court to specify the law according to which the decree may be enforced. The
phrase used is “in accordance with” and not “under”, “in accordance with”
in the context similarity or harmony but not identity. The mode of
enforcement which may be specified under clause 2(b) may therefore be
similar to the methods of execution legally provided in respect of decrees
or orders of any Court, Tribunal or Authority. The specification of the
mode may be done in the decree itself or by a subsequent order made on an
application of any party to the proceeding. The decree in this case had not
specified the mode of execution. Haryana’s application is expressed to be
under clause 2(b) of the 1954 Order. Doubtless Haryana has suggested the
passing of directions to ensure implementation of the decree which may not
be acceptable to us, but it has in prayer (c) prayed for “such other or
further order or orders or such directions as this Hon’ble Court may deem
fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case and to meet the
of justice”. That prayer is sufficient to meet even the entirely technical
objection of Punjab and it cannot be said that Haryana’s application is not
maintainable/As to the mode of execution section 51 of the Code of Civil
Procedure provides:
“51. Power of Court to enforce execution. – Subject to such conditions and
limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the
decree-holder, order execution of the decree –
(a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed;
(b) by attachment and sale or by the sale without attachment of any
property;
(c) by arrest and detention in prison for such period not exceeding
the period specified in section 58, where arrest and detention is
permissible under that section;
(d) by appointing a receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may
require.” The residuary power under Section 5 l(e) allows a Court to pass
orders for enforcing a decree in a manner which would give effect to it.
The period specified in the decree for completion of the canal by Punjab is
long since over. The Union of India has said that it had worked out a
contingent action plan during this period. The contingency, in the form of
expiry of the one year period in January 2003 has occurred. We have not
been told whether the contingency plan has been put into operation.
Although it appears that the Cabinet Committee on Project Appraisals had
approved the proposal for completion of the SYL canal by the BRO and at a
meeting convened as early as on 20th February 1991, the then Prime Minister
directed that the BRO take over the work for completion of the SYL Canal in
the minimum time possible, the BRO is not now available for the purpose.
After the decree the Central Water Commission Officials have inspected the
canal on 9th October 2002. The report has assessed a minimum period of
about two years for removing silt deposits, clearing of trees and bushes,
completing the damaged and balance works and making the canal functional
and has estimated an amount of about Rs. 250 crore for this purpose
excluding the liabilities of Punjab. In the circumstances we direct the
Union of India to carry out its proposed action plan within the following
time frame:
(1) The Union of India is to mobilize a Central agency to take control
of the canal works from Punjab within a month from today.
(2) Punjab must hand over the works to the Central Agency within 2
(Two) weeks thereafter.
(3) An empowered committee should be set up to coordinate and
facilitate the early Implementation of the decree within 4 (four) weeks
from today. Representatives of the States of Haryana and Punjab should be
included in such Committee:
(4) The construction of the remaining portion of the canal including
the survey; preparation of detailed estimates and other preparatory works
such as repair, desilting, clearance of vegetation etc. are to be executed
and completed by the Central Agency within such time as the High Powered
Committee will determine.
(5) The Central and the Punjab Government should provide adequate
security for the staff of the Central Agency.
We conclude this chapter with a reminder to the State of Punjab that “Great
states have a temper superior to that of private litigants, and it is to be
hoped that enough has been decided for patriotism, the fraternity of the
Union, and mutual consideration to bring it to an end9”
Application 4 of 2003 in OS 6 of 1996 is thus allowed on the aforesaid
terms without any order as to costs.
9. Commonwealth of Virginia v. State of West Virginia, 55 L.ed 353.