ORDER
Srinivasan, J.
1. The civil revision petition is directed against the concurrent orders of the Rent Controller and Appellate Authority granting the prayer of the respondent herein for eviction of the petitioner, under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The petitioner contends that the findings of the courts below are wholly unsustainable for several reasons. The first submission made by learned Counsel for the petitioner is that there is no specific averment in the petition filed by the respondent that the respondent is not in occupation of any non-residential building for the purpose of carrying on his son’s business. In the absence of such an averment in the pleading, it is contended by learned Counsel that the bona fide requirement of the respondent ought not to have been accepted. I do not agree. Though there is no specific averment, it is clear from the petition that the respondent is seeking eviction of the petitioner herein on the footing that he requires the premises for the purpose of his son’s business, which is being carried on in a rented premises at No. 224,Thambu Chetty Street, Madras-1. Taking into consideration all the averments made in the petition, it is clear that the respondent prayed for an order of eviction only on the basis of bona fide requirement. The courts have to consider only the evidence on record and decide whether, the bona fide requirement has been made out. The absence of an express sentence in the pleading does not vitiate the proceedings before the courts below.
2. The second contention put forward by learned Counsel is that the petition under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act is not maintainable inasmuch as the respondent was having in his’ possession a portion in the very same building at No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street, in the rear, vacant. It is brought out in the evidence that the respondent was living in the said rear portion and he had shifted his residence to Mylapore two years prior to the deposition. According to learned Counsel, when a portion of the building is vacant and is in the control of the respondent, that would bring the matter under Section 10(3)(e) of the Act and it is not open to the respondent to seek eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. I am unable to agree with this contention. The portion occupied by the respondent was always used for residential purposes. After his vacating the same and shifting his residence to other place, he had not let out the same to any other person. That portion cannot be treated as a non-residential building. Section 2(2) of the Act defines a ‘building’ as any building let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purposes and includes the garden, grounds etc. In this case, the building that was let out was only the shop which was occupied by the petitioner herein and another teashop in the front portion of No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street. The rear portion was always in the occupation of the landlord for the purpose of his residence. Hence, there is a severance and carving out of the portion let out from the entire building. The portion let out has been used for non-residential purposes and the portion which was retained by the landlord was only used for his residential purpose. Even after he vacated it, it was not let out and it was kept vacant and therefore, it continued to be a residential building. Hence, it cannot be treated as a part of the building let out to the tenants within the meaning of Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act, a landlord may, subject to the provisions of Clause (d) apply to the controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of the building in case it is a non-residential building, if the landlord or any member of his family is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or any member of his family is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own. The language is quite clear and it cannot be said that the landlord is occupying a non-residential building of his own for the purpose of his son’s business.
3. It is a fact that the landlord was only residing in the portion as admitted by the petitioner herein as R.W.I. In his deposition he has stated that the respondent has changed his residence from No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street to Adyar.
4. It is next contended that the respondent’s son is carrying on business only in the suit premises in another portion and ii is false to contend that he is doing business in No. 224, Thambu Chetty Street. This contention is negatived by the admission made by the petitioner himself as R.W.I. In this deposition he stated that he did not know whether the respondent’s son was doing business in No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street. He also stated positively that the respondent’s son was doing business in No. 224 Thambu Chetty Street. Excepting to state that there was a board showing the name of the business of the respondent’s son in the suit premises, the petitioner had not stated anything to substantiate his version that the respondent’s son was doing business in the suit premises itself.
5. Reliance is placed by learned Counsel on the admission of P.W.2, the son of the respondent that the sales tax registration for his business is with reference to the suit premises. In the course of evidence, the respondent’s son stated that he had registered his business under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act and it has not so far been cancelled. It is also stated by him that the registration relates to the premises in No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street. It is contended by learned Counsel that under Section 21 of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, an application for registration shall be made to the prescribed authority and shall be accompanied by a fee of Rs. 100 for the principal place of business and an additional fee of rupees twenty-five in respect of each of his places of business other than the principal place of business. Learned Counsel also referred to Rule 24, Sub-rule (1) of the Rules framed under the Act which enjoins the dealer to submit to the registering authority of the area in which his principal place of business is situate an application for registration within 30 days of his total turnover reaching Rs. 75,000. Under Sub-rule (12) of Rule 24 of the Rules, when a registered dealer changes any place of his business, he shall intimate the fact to the registering authority, within thirty days of such change and get his certificate of registration amended accordingly. Under Sub-rule (14) of Rule 24 of the Rules, no registered dealer shall keep his goods in any place or godown not mentioned in the registration certificate.
6. If the respondent’s son had contravened the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act or the Rules framed there under, it is for the authorities under the Act to take appropriate proceedings against the respondent’s son. The fact that the respondent’s son is doing business in one place after obtaining the certificate of registration under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act for running the business in another place, would not mean that the requirement of the respondent of the building is not bona fide. Hence, reliance placed on the certificate of registration issued under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act to the respondent’s son would not take us far.
7. In view of the fact that the findings of the courts below are based on the admissions made by the petitioner himself that he did not know whether business was carried on in No. 62, Kandappa Chetty Street and that the respondent was carrying on business in No. 224, Thambu Chetty Street, the findings are not liable to be interfered with. I do not find any justification whatever to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.
8. The question of bona fide has to be considered only on the basis of all the circumstances available in the case. It is not possible to contend that the court should advert to one of such circumstances only and decide the question of bona fide. Here, the courts below had given regard to all the evidence on record and considered the contentions put forward by the petitioner herein fully and then only come to the conclusion that the requirement of the respondent is bona fide. There is no error in the appreciation or discussion of the evidence on record.
9. Learned Counsel for the petitioner invites my attention to the judgment of Ratnam, J., in Shelat Brothers v. Lord Narendradas . In that case, one of the contentions put forward by the revision petitioner was that the Appellate Authority had not considered the case of the tenant that certain portions in its occupation has been surrendered earlier and a finding on the evidence in relation to such a plea would have a possible bearing upon the bona fide of the requirement. The learned Judge found as a fact that such a surrender as pleaded by the petitioner before him had not been established and, therefore, there was no lack of bona fides on the part of the landlords in filing the application for an order of eviction under the provisions of the Act. The judgment does not help the petitioner. On the other hand, it is possible to contend that it goes against the contentions put forward by the petitioner.
10. Learned Counsel relics on the judgment in C.S. Pillai v. Captain M.A. Murugaraj . The learned Judge held that if a landlord is in judicial possession of the ground floor that would be enough to non-suit him concerning eviction under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and that if he wanted the entire premises for his own occupation, the remedy of the petitioner would be only to file an application under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. That is a case in which the tenants were using the portions let out for their residential purposes. The landlord was using the remaining portion for his own residence. Thus, the entire building was used only for residential purposes and it was quite possible in that case to take the view that a part of the building was in the occupation of the landlord when he applied for eviction. Rightly if I may so, the learned Judge held that Section 10(3)(c) of the Act would apply and not Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act. That judgment has no bearing on the present case.
11. My attention is drawn to a judgment of mine in Nandan Brothers v. Kamaladevi Chandak and Ors. (1989) 2 L.W. 25. That was a case in which a portion of the non-residential building was obtained by the landlord after filing the eviction petition. The building was being occupied by several tenants in several portions. When the petitions for eviction were filed, some of the tenants had vacated their portions and delivered possession to the landlord. The question was whether the bona fide requirement of the landlord ceased because of his occupying the portions vacated by the tenants. I found on the facts that the portions surrendered to him were not sufficient for the purpose of his business and the bona fide requirement was not in any way affected, thereby. That judgment has no relevance to the facts of the present case.
12. In the circumstances, I do not find any warrant to interfere with the concurrent conclusion of the courts below.
13. The civil revision petition fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.
14. Learned Counsel for the petitioner prays for time to vacate the premises. The respondent’s counsel has no objection for grant of two months time provided an affidavit of under taking is filed’ by the petitioner. Hence, the petitioner is granted time till 28,2.1991 for vacating the premises on condition that he files an affidavit in this Court on or before 21.1981 undertaking to vacate the premises by 28,2.1981 without driving the respondent to execution proceedings. If the affidavit of undertaking is not filed, the petitioner will not be entitled to the benefit of time granted.