JUDGMENT
R.M. Lodha, J.
1. The concurrent orders passed by Labour Court, Nashik, on May 15, 1997 and by Industrial Court, Nashik, on July 23, 1997 are under challenge at the instance of the present petitioner.
2. The respondent herein, namely, Mustaq AH Amjad Ali Shaikh (for short employee) was employed as driver by the petitioner, namely, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation (for short employer). On November 29, 1992 while the employee was driving the bus of the employer on Chopda-Satana Road and when the bus was near the village Fagne, a girl about 10 years old met with an accident and died. It is the case of the employer that the employee was driving the bus rashly and negligently with a very high speed and as a result thereof hit a young girl of 10 years, who died due to the accident. The chargesheet was served upon the employee setting out therein that the employee was guilty of misconduct under Clauses 11, 22 and 39 of Sch. A of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure. The substance of the charges against the employee was that he caused substantial loss to the employer by his gross negligence; committed breach of administrative orders and for driving the vehicle in a fast and negligent manner. The employee appeared before the inquiry officer and submitted his reply on April 11, 1993. Inquiry was conducted and after recording evidence, inquiry officer held that the charges of misconduct were proved against the employee. The employer then issued a show cause notice on the employee on September 6, 1994 calling upon him to show cause why he should not be dismissed from service. The reply was found unsatisfactory and the employee was dismissed from service with effect from September 8, 1994 vide order, dated September 30, 1994.
3. Aggrieved by his dismissal, the employee filed a complaint before the Labour Court under items (1)(a), (1)(b), (1)(c), (1)(d), (1)(f), (1)(g) of Sch. IV of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 (for short M.R.T.U & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971). The complainant submitted in the complaint that dismissal order was not at all proper and that there was no material against him before the inquiry officer proving the charges. In the complaint the complainant also averred that though the criminal case was registered against him in respect of the said incident, he has been acquitted by VI Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dhule, of the charge of rash and negligent driving. The complainant submitted that the dismissal order was erroneous and that the employer had indulged in unfair labour practice under various items referred to above. The complaint was contested by the employer. The employer justified the employee’s dismissal and accordingly produced before the Labour Court, the inquiry proceedings including chargesheet, documentary and oral evidence recorded in the inquiry proceedings, finding of inquiry officer, accident report and also copy of the judgment of criminal Court. The complainant produced the order of termination. Both the parries informed the Court that they do not intend to lead the oral evidence by filing purshis and relied on documents placed on record. The Labour Court, after hearing the parties, vide its judgment, dated May 15, 1997, held that the complainant has not been able to establish unfair labour practice under items (1)(a), (1)(d), (1)(f) and (1)(g) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, but held that unfair labour practice under item (1)(b) of Schedule IV was established. The Industrial Court also confirmed the said finding. The findings concurrently recorded by Labour Court and Industrial Court against the employee that unfair labour practice under items (1)(a), (1)(d), (1)(f) and (1)(g) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, was not established are not under challenge before me at the instance of the employee. Therefore, the only question that arises in this writ petition is whether the finding recorded by the Labour Court that employer had indulged in unfair labour practice under item (1)(b) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act 1971, and confirmed by Industrial Court in revision application is justified or not.
4. The only ground given by the Labour Court and confirmed by the Revisional Court in holding that the employer has indulged in unfair labour practice under item (1)(b) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P Act, 1971, is that since the employee was acquitted by the criminal Court of the offence of rash and negligent driving in respect of the same incident, dismissal of the employee from the service cannot be said to be in good faith but rather has been exercised by the employer in colourable exercise of its power. I am afraid the reasoning given by the Labour Court and the Industrial Court in holding that the employer has indulged in unfair labour practice under item (1)(b) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. and P.U.L.P. Act, 1971, is wholly erroneous and cannot be sustained. The disciplinary proceedings against an employee and the prosecution of an employee for an offence are distinct and stand on a different footing and merely because the employee has been acquitted by the criminal Court, that by itself may not absolve the employee from a disciplinary action. The nature and scope of the criminal case cannot be equated with that of a departmental proceedings. In a criminal case, needless to emphasise, the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused to the hilt and beyond reasonable doubt which is not the case in departmental proceedings. While in a criminal case the scope of standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt while in the departmental proceedings, the misconduct may be proved on preponderance of probabilities. Since the nature and scope of the criminal case and departmental proceedings are different, the decision of criminal Court cannot affect the departmental proceedings. The Courts have not approved the proposition that disciplinary proceedings could not be continued if the criminal case against the delinquent has resulted in acquittal. A fortiori, the acquittal of delinquent in criminal case cannot conclude the departmental proceedings against him. I am fortified in my view by the judgment of the Apex Court in Senior Superintendent of Post Offices, Pathanarnthitta and Others v. A. Gopalan reported in AIR 1999 SC 1514 : 1999-I-LLJ-1313. In Para 6 of the said report the Apex Court held thus at 1315 of LLJ:
“6. We have heard Sri V.C. Mahajan, the
learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri K.M.K. Nair, the learned
counsel for the respondent. Sri Nair has
submitted that since the respondent has been
acquitted by the criminal Court on the charge
of withdrawal of Rs. 8,000 the Tribunal was^
right in holding that the finding regarding the
first charge could not be sustained. Sri Nair has
placed reliance on the decision of this Court in
Nelson Motis v. Union of India 1992(2)L.L.N.
1059. The said decision does not lend support
to the said submission of Sri Nair. In that case
the Court has rejected the contention that
disciplinary proceedings could not be
continued in the case of acquittal in the criminal
case and has held that the nature and scope of;
the criminal case are very different from those
of a departmental disciplinary proceedings and
an order of acquittal, therefore, cannot
conclude the departmental proceedings. This is
so because in a criminal case the charge has to
be proved by the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt while in departmental
proceedings the standard of proof for proving
the charge is preponderance of probabilities.
The Tribunal was, therefore, in error in holding.
that in view of the acquittal of the respondent
by the criminal Court on the charge relating to
withdrawal of Rs. 8,000 the finding on the first
charge in the departmental proceedings cannot
be upheld and must be set aside…….”
5. The Labour Court as well as Industrial Court committed grave error, therefore, in holding that since the employee was acquitted by criminal Curt of rash and negligent driving, his dismissal by the employer was not in good faith and in colourable exercise of the employer’s right. The Labour Court and the Industrial Court overlooked the aforesaid legal position and further ignored the fact that before the inquiry officer the charges levelled against the employee were proved on the basis of the material placed on record. The Labour Court and the Industrial Court also overlooked the material aspect that though the judgment of the criminal Court only related to the criminal act of the employee in respect of rash and negligent driving, but the charges of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings related to causing loss or damage to the Corporation and for breach of administrative orders in addition to that the employee was guilty of driving the bus in fast and negligent manner. The misconduct under Clauses 11 and 22 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure were not at all involved in the criminal case against the employee. The charges of misconduct under Clauses 11, and 21 of the Discipline and Appeal Procedure having been found proved in the inquiry proceedings and the Labour Court having held that inquiry was conducted in accordance with the principle of natural justice, there was no justification for the Labour Court and the Industrial Court to interfere with the dismissal order and holding the employer guilty of unfair Labour practice under item (1)(b) of Schedule IV of M.R.T.U. & P.U.L.P. Act, 1971. The order passed by the Labour Court directing the employer to take the complainant as driver on fresh employment on time- scale was palpably erroneous and which has wrongly been confirmed by the Industrial Court and, therefore, both the orders passed by the Labour Court on May 15, 1997 and Industrial Court on July 23, 1997 deserve to be quashed and set aside.
6. Writ Petition is accordingly allowed. The order passed by the Labour Court on May 15, 1997, and the order, dated July 23, 1997, passed by the Industrial Court, Nashik, are quashed and set aside. Rule is made absolute in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.
7. Certified copy expedited.