JUDGMENT
Amareswari, J.
1. Those two revision petitions arising out of rent control proceedings are preferred by the tenants occupying two different portions or a building located in Visakhapatnam town. The respondent-landlord filed H.R.C. Nos. 33, 34 and 35/68 against the tenants occupying three different portions of the house bearing No. 26-15-180 on the grounds of wilful default in payment of rent and bona fide requirement of the landlord for personal occupation for doing business. The learned Rent Controller negatived both the grounds and dismissed the eviction petitions. The Lower Appellate Court, however, allowed the appeals and ordered eviction. In one of the three cases, the tenant has not preferred a revision while the tenants occupying two portions have preferred these two revision petitions.
2. When those revision petitions came up before our learned Brother Jagannadha Rao, J., he referred the matter to a Division Bench expressing the view that the decision of P. Rama Rao, J. in Arjundas v. Madan Lal Madi, (1982) 2 APLJ (HC) 235 was in way overruled by a Division Bench of this Court in CR. P. Nos. 7721 and 7784 of 1979, but the ruling of the Supreme Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. Shanmugham Chetty, supports the view taken by P. Rama Rao, J. in Arjundas case (supra).
3. The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that eviction is sought in respect of a building bearing Municipal No. 79 in Visakhapatnam; that according to the landlord his father has let out three portions of that building to three different tenants; that those portions were allotted door Nos. 178, 179 and 180; that the portions were let out to the petitioners in the two C.R.Ps. for residential purpose; that the landlord is carrying on business in a rented premises and that he is not entitled to seek eviction of the tenants from the residential premises for non-residential purpose.
4. Prior to filing H.R.C. Nos. 33 and35 of 1968 out of which those revision petitions
arise, the landlord filed eviction petitions in
H.R.C. Nos. 59/67 and 64.87 which were
thrown out for want of notice under Section 106 of
T.P. Act. Subsequently in view of the decision
of the Supreme Court that notice under Section 106
of T.P. Act is not required to seek eviction of
a tenant under the provisions of the Rent
Control Act (hereinafter referred to as “the
Act”), the landlord had to again file H.R.C.
Nos. 33 and 35 of 1968. The learned Rent
Controller holding that there is ho wilful
default in payment of rent by tenants and
that the requirement of the landlord for the
suit premises is not bona fide, dismissed both
the eviction petitions. Aggrieved by the said
decision, the landlord preferred R. A. Nos. 12
and 13 of 1975. The learned Subordinate
Judge on a consideration of the oral and
documentary evidence adduced in the case
and after an elaborate discussion of the various
contentions put forth by the parties, arrived
at the findings of fact that the suit premises
were let out for non-residential purpose only
and that the delayed and irregular payments
amount to wilful default. The learned
Subordinate Judge held that in
R.C.A. No. 12/75 Exs. B-18 to B-21 show that
the tenant paid rent to the landlord for the
months of Oct., 1965 to Jan., 1966 only on 30-
3-1966; that Exs. B-22 and B-23 show that the
rents for the months of Feb., and Mar., 1966
were paid on 6-7-1966; that Exs. B-24 and B-
25 show that the tenant paid rent for the
months of April, 1966 and May, 1966 on 22-7-
1966 and that there is no explanation offered
by the tenant as to why he was paying those
rents irregularly with a delay of 3 to 8 months.
The learned Appellate Judge observed that
the tenant in R.C.A. No. 13/75 did not file
any receipts obtained from the landlord
showing as to when the rents for Nov., 1976
and subsequent months were actually paid to
the landlord though R. W. 7 admitted that
receipts were obtained by paying rents. He
relied upon Ex. B-52 showing that the rent
for the months of February and March, 1967
was remitted to the landlord by money order
which was refused on 6-9-1967 and held that
it is evident from the above document that
the rent for February and Mar., 1967 was
sent by money order in Sept., 1967 only. He
did not place reliance upon Exs. B-53, B-55
to B-57, B-59 to B-63 and B-68 to B-73 as they do not indicate for which months the rents were remitted. The tenant did not produce any documents to show that he was regular is paying the rents to the landlord. The learned Subordinate Judge observed that the rents for June, July and August, 1966 were remitted by money order only subsequent to the issue of Ex. B-3 notice.
5. In the absence of any explanation offered by the tenants for not paying the rents within time, the learned Subordinate Judge rightly held that the irregular and delayed payments on the part of the tenants without offering any convincing explanation for such delays, amount to wilful default. This is a finding of fact arrived at by the learned Appellate Judge on proper appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence in the case and that finding cannot be interfered with in a revision petition. Since the ground of wilful default has been made out by the landlord, the tenants (the petitioners herein) are liable to be evicted.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently argued that what has been leased out to the revision petitioners are residential premises and that the respondent cannot seek their eviction for non-residential purpose. First of all the specific plea in the eviction petitions that what has been let out to the tenants are small portions out of the non-residential building situate on the main road bearing No. 26-15-178 belonging to the landlord, is not denied in the counters filed by the tenants. As such, that plea is deemed to have been admitted.
7. That apart, P. W. 1 deposed that the suit premises consisted of three contiguous portions abutting the main road which were from the beginning used for non-residential purpose only and that they were not fit for residential purpose as there was no provision for kitchen, latrine etc. The said evidence is corroborated by P. W. 2. As against that evidence let in on behalf of the landlord, the R. Ws. tried to depose that the, tenanted premises were both residential and non-residential premises. But their admissions in the cross-examination support the case of P. Ws. 1 and 2. R. W. 1 categorically admitted
that R. Ws. 4 and 6 (the respondents in R. C. A. Nos. 12 and 13 of 1975) have taken the shops for running business in cigars and hotel respectively. It is further elicited from him that there were no kitchens, bathrooms and latrines for those shop-rooms when they were taken on lease. The mere fact that the tenants have later on arranged latrines and kitchens on their own accord, does not convert the non-residential premises into residential promises. The evidence of R. W. 2 is of no value because he admitted that he does not know for what purpose the tenants took the premises on lease. He, however, admitted that the tenants have constructed bathrooms, latrines and kitchens. So also the evidence of R. W. 3 who admitted in the cross-Ex animation that he does not know whether the tenants took those portions for residential or non-residential purpose, does not advance the case of the tenants any further. It is elicited from R. W. 4 in the cross-examination that he took the suit premises to open the hotel and therefore he constructed kitchen for preparing eatables and that he did not take any written consent from the house owner either to construct the kitchen or latrine. The Lower Appellate Court is perfectly correct is not placing reliance upon the evidence of R. N. 6 that she has taken the suit premises on rent for residential purpose and that 5 or 6 years thereafter she opened the pan shop because that version contradicts the allegation in the counter that from the inception of the tenancy, the front Varandah of the suit premises was used to run the pan shop. R. W. 7, who is the son of R. W. 6, deposed that some time after the suit premises was taken on rent they have constaructed a kitchen in the suit premises. It follows, therefore, that for the premises concerned with R. C. A. No. 13/75 there was no kitchen and latrine at the inception of the tenancy. This evidence that the kitchens, latrines and bathrooms were constructed by the tenants subsequent to the commencement of the tenancy supports the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 that the premises were let out only for non-residential purpose but not for residential purpose. We, therefore, confirm the finding of the learned Appellate Judge in this regard.
8. The next question to be considered is whether a landlord who is not in possession of any non-residential building of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled can simultaneously seek eviction of tenants in more than one non-residential unit of accommodation even though all the said units may be structurally located in the same building and whether for the purposes of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) a part of building can be taken to be a building as defined under Section 2(iii) of the Act. In fact, this is the question referred to the Bench.
9. Mr. Sharif Ahmed, the learned Counsel for the petitioner-tenant contended that the landlord can seek eviction of only one Block or Unit arid cannot seek eviction of all the three units simultaneously. According to him, each of the portions in possession of the tenants is a building for purposes of tenancy and the landlord cannot seek for possession of more than one such premises.
10. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. P. V. Seshaiali, the learned Counsel for the landlord-respondent that there is no prohibition in the Act for the landlord seeking possession of more than one building for his non-residential purposes and it depends on the need and requirement of the landlord.
11. In Arjun Das v. Madanlal Madi, (1982) 2 APLJ(HC) 235, Rama Rap, J., held that the landlord is not entitled to eviction in respect of all blocks though they form part of a composite building and he has to choose one of the blocks as every block is a self contained unit. The correctness of this decision was doubted by Ramanujulu Naidu, J., in CR.P. Nos. 7721 and 7784 of 1979 and referred the same to a Division Bench. The said C.R.Ps. came up before the Division Bench consisting of Raghuvir and Rama Rao, JJ., The Bench observed that it was open for the landlord to seek eviction on the ground that he required all the three premises or any one or more than one among the three and remanded the matter for fresh consideration,
12. When the present case came up before Jagannadha Rao, J., in the first instance, Mr.
P. V. Seshaiah, the learned Counsel for the landlord relied upon the Division Bench decision and contended that the view of Rama Rao, J., in Arjun Das v. Madanlal Madi,(1982) 2 APLJ (HC) page 235 was not approved by the Division Bench of which Rama Rao, J., himself is a member and as per the Bench decision, the landlord can seek eviction of all the premises. The learned single Judge referred the question once again to a Division Bench on the ground that the observations of the Supreme Court in Shri Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. Shanmugham Chetty, lend support to the view expressed by Rama Rao, J., in Arjun Das v. Madanlal Madi, (1982) 2 APLJ (HC) 235. We will presently consider the relevant provisions of the Act and the decisions referred to above.
13. Section 2 (iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 hereinafter called the Act defines ‘building’ as any house or hut or part of a house or hut, let or to be let separately for residential or non-residential purpose. Thus it is seen that any structure or house or a part thereof let or to be let is a building for the purpose of the Act.
14. Section 10 deals with eviction of tenants and Sub-section (3) empowers the Controller to put the landlord in possession of the building let out to tenants under certain circumstances. Section 10(3)(a) says that if the landlord applies for possession of a residential building it can be given to him only if he does not scoupy a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned and he requires it for his own occupation. Section 10(3)(b) provides that if the landlord has more than one building and if he is in occupation of one such building and he bona fide requires another building instead, for his own occupation, he can seek eviction. Section 10(3)(a)(ii) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii) deal with non-residential buildings. Section 10(3)(a)(iii) says that if the landlord requires a non-residential building, the Controller can put him in possission provided the landlord is not occupying a non-residential building in the city which is owned or to the possession of which he is entitled (a) for the purpose of
business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application and (b) for the purpose of a business, which he bona fide proposes to commence.-Thus Section 10(3)(a)(i), Section 10(3)(a)(ii) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii) speak of a building. An already seen a building is defined under Section 2(iii) of the Act as a house or a hut or a portion of a house or hut let or to be let.
15. A reading of these Sections does not in any way lead to an inference that the building which is structually one and the same ceases to be a building when it is leased out in portions to more than one tenant. If the building is such as can be conveniently divided into three portions by making some arrangements temporarily or otherwise, it may be leased cut in portions. But the unit as a whole does not cease to be a building. Every premises let, or to be let is a building within the meaning of the Act. Hence even if each portion of a house let out is a building for purposes of the Act, the entire building as an integrated unit is also a building and if the requirement is for the integrated unit, there is no prohibition in law, subject of course to the restrictions or conditions mentioned in Section 10(3)(a)(i) or Section 10(3)(a)(iii). Under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) a landlord can seek for possession of the entire unit even though it is let out in portions provided he proves that he is not in occupation of any other building either in its entirety or a portion thereof or for the possession of which he is entitled to for the purposes mentioned in Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 10(3)(a)(iii) viz., for a business which he is carrying on, on the date of the application or for a business which he proposed to commence.
16. The definition of a building contained in Section 2(iii) would only mean that a part of a building which has been let out or which is to be let out separately can also be construed as a separate and independent building without reference to the other portion or portions of the building. In fact, Section 2 starts by saying ‘unless the context otherwise requires’. The definition is thus subject to contexatual position. Therefore, it follows that where the context requires, the entire building being construed as one integral unit, it would not
be appropriate to view the building as consisting of several units and not as one single integrated unit or structure. There is nothing in Section 10(3)(a)(i) or Section 10(3)(a)(iii) which precludes a landlord seeking possession of the entire building let out to different tenants if his requirement is bona fide. Whether the requirement is bona fide or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in each case. If the context in a particular provision requires that the word building should not be understood as defined under Section 2(iii) of the Act certainly it is open to the Court to give the normal, natural and ordinary meaning which it is capable of. We are therefore of the view that the landlord can seek possession of the entire building or any one of more portions of the building depending upon his requirement and if the competent authority is satisfied that the requirement is bona fide, he can be put in possession of the integrated unit.
17. We will now refer to the decisions cited in this regard.
In Arjun Das v. Madanlal Madi, (1982) 2 APLJ (HC) 255 the landlord sought possession of different blocks bearing different Municipal Numbers simultaneously under Section 10(3)(a)(i) for residential purposes. The argument before the learned Judge was that the landlord was not entitled to eviction in respect of all blocks and he has to choose one of the blocks as every block is a self-contained unit. The landlord contended that all the blocks form part of the same building and the question of parceling them out was not permissible. The Courts below have held that the bona fide requirement of ;the landlord was established in respect of each of the blocks and they have not decided whether taken as a single unit, the blocks in question are required bona fide. The learned Judge observed that if each block is considered as a building, the landlord was entitled for eviction of one of the blocks only and directed the matter to be reconsidered by the Tribunal. With great respect to the learned Judge, we are unable to agree with this view. Even if each of the blocks is a building within the meaning of the Act if the landlord is able to establish that he requires
the integrated unit for his occupation, in the context the entire integrated unit must be taken as a building and the application would therefore be maintainable;
18. In C.R.P. Nos. 7721 and 7784 of 1979 which were referred to a Bench by justice Ramanujulu Naidu, disagreeing with the view of Rama Rao, J., the Division Bench consisting of Raghuvir and Rama Rao, JJ., did not approve of the view expressed by Rama Rao, J., in Arjun das case (1982-2 APLJ (HC) 235). The following observations in C.R.P. Nos. 7721 and 7784 of 1979 are relevant :-
“The question for consideration is whether the landlord required all the three premises, or does he require one premises or more than one among the three. For one reason or the other, they were not considered; may be because the two cases were considered separately.
This Court (a Single Judge) considered the
facts of this case and referred the matter to a
Division Bench having regard to the decision
in Arjun Das v. Madanlal Madi, (1982) 2
APLJ (HC) 235. On a consideration of facts,
that case need not be considered as we deem
it expedient to remit the subjects to the
Appellate Authority. It is open for the
landlord to seek for eviction on the ground
that he requires three premises for residential
purposes or any one or more than one among
the three before the appellate authority.”
The last sentence in the above order of the
Division Bench clearly indicates that the
landlord can seek eviction of all the three
units or any one or more than one among the
three units. The view of Rama Rao, J. in
Arjun Das case is impliedty disapproved. In
our considered opinion, the decision of the
Division Bench in C.R.P, Nos. 7721 and 7784
of 1979 represents the correct legal position
though there is not much of discussion in the
judgment.
19. However, our learned brother Jagannadha Rao, J., referred the matter once
again to the Bench on the ground that some observations in a recent decision of the
Supreme Court in Shri Balaganesah Metals
v. M. N. Shanmugham Chetty, lend support to the view expressed in Arjun Das case. We do not think so. In the above Supreme Court case, the question related to interpretation of Section 10(3)(c) of the Madras Rent Control Act which corresponds to Section 10(3)(c) of the Andhra Pradesh Rent Control Act. 11 related to the requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation of a portion of the same building. The landlord was living in the upstairs, while the tenants were living in the downstairs portion. The landlord sought for eviction of the ground floor for additional accommodation under Section 10(3)(c) of the Act. The tenant contended that the said petition was not maintainable in as much as the portion in the occupation of the tenants on the ground floor was a separate unit of accommodation and was a separate building and that the landlord should have applied under Section 10(3)(a)(i) of the Act and not under Section 10(3)(c). The provisions of Section 10(3)(a)(i), Section 10(3)(a)(iii) and Section 10(3)(c) of the Madras Act are similar to the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Act. The Supreme Court referred to the definition of a building and noticed that the definition includes even a part of the building. Their Lordships observed that having regard to the words employed in Section 10(3)(c) and the context of that Sub-clause, the definition of a building in Section 2 and as including a building could not he imported into Section 10(3)(c). The Supreme Court observed that the definition would only mean that a part of a building also can be construed as a separate and independent building, but the definition was held to be subject to the contextual position and if the context warrants the entire building can be taken as one integral unit. The Court held that when a landlord applies for additional accommodation the context requires that the entire building should be taken as one unit. The Supreme Court held that the definition in Section 2 must be subject to the contextual position. The Supreme Court gave another reason for construing Section 10(3)(c) in the manner it could, namely, that Section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building and the said Section empowers a landlord to apply for ah order of eviction of a tenant occupying
the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building. In that context, the Supreme Court referred to Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) as contra distinct from Section 10(3)(c). The relevant passage in the judgment is as follows (at p. 1671 of AIR) :-
“Secondly I here is vast difference between the words “residential building” and ‘non-residential building used in Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) on the one hand and Section 10(3)(c) on the other. While Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) refer to a building only as residential or non-residential, Section 10(3)(c) refers to a landlord occupying a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential.”
20. No doubt, the Supreme Court pointed out the difference in language between Section 10(3)(a)(i) and (iii) and Section 10(3)(c) and proceeded to consider the applicability of Section 10(3)(c). But the Supreme Court never said that for the purpose of Section 10(3)(a)(i) and Section 10(3)(a)(iii) each portion of the building alone must be construed as a separate building in all contextsand the integrated unit cannot be treated as a building. On the other hand. In Para 8, the Supreme Court observed that “the application of the definition is subject to the contextual position and if the context warrants the entire building being construed as one integral unit, it can be taken as one integral structaure.”
21. We are, therefore, of the view that the Supreme Court in Balaganesan Metals v. M. N. Shanmugham Chetty, did not hold that the entire building cannot be considered as one integral unit when it is let out in portions or that the building must be viewed as several disintegrated units.
22. For all the above reasons, we hold that under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) a landlord who is not in possession of any non-residential building of his own or to the possession of which he is entitled can simultaneously seek eviction of tenants in more than one non-residential unit of accommodation where all the units are structurally located in the same building. The landlord can seek eviction of the entire building or any one or more than one unit of the same building. While portion
is a separate building, the entire unit consisting of several portions also can be taken as a building depending upon the context. We may make it clear that in this case, we are not concerned with the question of the landlord seeking accommodation of three separate, different and distinct buildings that do not form part of one structure.
23. For all the above reasons, we do not find any merit in the Civil Revision Petitions. They are accordingly dismissed, but in the circumstances without costs. Time for eviction three months.