JUDGMENT
Fazl Ali, J.
1. This appeal arises out of an action for defamation which was decreed by the Court of first instance but dismissed on appeal. The case of the plaintiffs is that they were defamed by the defendant on two separate occasions, first, by a letter written by him on July 28, 1913, to one Appal Narasaiya at Kharagpur, and secondly, by his making the alleged defamatory statement to the general public at Jamshedpur. The lower Appellate Court has disbelieved the evidence adduced by the plaintiffs with regard to the latter part of their case and the finding of that Court on that point has not been challenged in appeal. The only question is how far the finding of the Court below can be held to be conclusive on the first part of the case. The letter which was written by the defendant to Appal Narasaiya runs as follows:
When this state of things was going on daughter of Padma Raju of C. Town in the daytime was in illicit intrigue with toddywalla and at that time the neighbours and other people collected round the house. Mother of toddywalla and others made hulla…. After hearing of this occurrence I kept quiet. From that date they did not come to my house nor I went to theirs.
2. It is not disputed that this letter was written by the defendant nor is it denied that the daughter of Padma Raju referred to in the letter is plaintiff No. 2, the wife of plaintiff No. 1. It must also be stated that the defendant has totally failed to establish the truth of the allegations that plaintiff No. 2 was in illicit intrigue with a toddywala. In ordinary circumstances therefore, the statements made in the letter would have been held to be defamatory and if no explanation were given of the circumstances under which the letter was written, the law would, from its contents, imply it to have been published with a malicious motive against the plaintiff, But the view taken by the learned Judge in the Court below is that having regard to the circumstances of the case and especially the fact that plaintiff No. 1 is a relation of the defendant and Appal Narasaiya is the son of the defendant’s own younger, brother, the statement in question was made by the defendant in good faith and must be held to be privileged. The learned Judge sums up his conclusions in these words:
I am of opinion, therefore, that as regards the letter sent to Kharagpur on July 28, 1933, there was no intention by the defendants to lower the plaintiff in the ,estimation of his caste people and the public in general. He was simply informing a very near relation of his of the conduct of another relation and this kind of communication is naturally a privileged one as it is normally given in confidence even if it is not expressly stated so in the letter itself.
3. Now it is well-settled that a communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has, or honestly believes he has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contains criminatory matter which without this privilege, would be slanderous and actionable: see Whitely v. Adams (1863) 15 C.B.(N.S.) 392 : 33 L.J.C.P. 89 : 10 Jur.(N.S.) 470 : 9 L.T. 483 : 12 W.R. 153 : 137 R.R. 572; Harrison v. Bush (1855) 5 E & B 344 : 25 L.J.Q.B. 25 : 1 Jur.(N.S.) 846 : 3 W.R. 474, at p. 348 Page of (1855) 5 E. & B.[Ed.]; Stuart v. Bell (1891) 2 Q.B. 341 : 60 L.J.Q.B. 577 : 64 L.T. 633 : 39 W.R. 612, at p. 354 Pages of (1891) 2 Q.B.[Ed.] and Hunt v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1891) 2 Q.B. 189 : 60 L.J.Q.B. 498 : 55 J.P. 648, at p. 191 Pages of (1891) 2 Q.B.[Ed.]. The learned Judge in the Court below was apparently of the view that the present case was governed by this principle and considering that the parties admittedly appear to be closely related to each other and that he has found that the defendant acted in good faith, I am unable to hold that the view taken by him is wrong in law. In these circumstances this appeal must be dismissed.
4. I should, however, like to observe that the character of plaintiff No. 2 has been fully vindicated by the finding of the trial Court which has not been reversed in appeal, that the defendant has failed to establish the truth of the statements made in the letter with regard to the character of plaintiff No. 2, and the learned Advocate for the respondent has also expressed his regret for having made these statements. He also does not, very properly press for his costs either in this Court or in the Courts below. In these circumstances, while dismissing the plaintiff’s suit, I direct that either party will bear their respective costs throughout.