JUDGMENT
S.N. Pathak, J.
1. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 19th June, 1986 and decree dated 10th July, 1986, passed by the 6th Additional District Judge, Patna, in Title Appeal No. 144 of 1984, reversing the judgment dated 9th August 1984, passed by the Additional Sub-ordinate Judge-III, Patna, in Title Suit No. 60/ 161 of 1966/82.
2. The defendant of the suit is the appellant before this Court.
3. The plaintiff-respondent, known as ‘Bihar Vidyapith’ had come to the trial Court with the case that Plot No. 591 (wrongly described as Plot No. 581 in the sale-deed dated 8th April, 21 Ext-1/F) and Plot No. 596 belonged to it and so it has sought declaration and title over the aforesaid two plots and confirmation of possession over the same and, in the alternative, for recovery of possession. The defendant-appellant known as ‘Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee (in short, ‘BPCC’) had contested the plaintiff-respondent’s case on the grounds that these two plots were acquired by eminent members of the Congress Party and both the plots are amalgamated at the spot. Plot No. 596 was gifted by one Sheikh Khairuddin to Moulana Mazharul Haque in the year 1917 and Plot No. 591 was under the possession of defendant-appellant with leave and consent of its owner Deo Narayan Raut. The alleged sale-deed on the basis of which the plaintiff-respondent relied is a forged and fabricated document. The Bihar Vidyapith was established by eminent members of Congress Party and it was a wing of BPCC, defendant-appellant, and both the plots were under the adverse possession of the defendant-appellant.
4. The trial Court, on the basis of the evidence adduced, dismissed the plaintiff-respondent’s case. The appellate Court, after a detailed and careful consideration and discussion of the entire gamut of evidence, oral and documentary, reversed the judgment of the trial Court dismissing the suit and decreed the suit in full against which the defendant-appellant has come up before this Court.
5. The very perusal of the judgment of the appellate Court would show that the evidence on the record indicated clearly and without any ambiguity that Bihar Vidyapith was an independent entity and well registered and recognised under the Registration of Societies Act. So it was a juridic person capable of sueing or being sued, of course, through its Office bearers. The appellate Court discussed various documents and oral evidence and came to the conclusion that this Bihar Vidyapith was an educational Institution having its own funds and paying its teachers the salary from its independent income. The accounts of the Vidyapith were occasionally audited by Chartered Account. It was maintaining Registers and other papers to show that it was running its business independently and its management and control were never exercised by the BPCC. The appellate Court has referred to various sale-deeds acquired in the name of Vidyapith from its own fund and income. So on the basis of the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the appellate Court came to a definite and positive finding that the Vidyapith was an entity independent of the BPCC. The trial Court has ignored all these documents, receipts and the sale-deeds in the name of Vidyapith by a sweeping and general statement that these documents were of no help to establish the cases of either of the parties. Exhibits, such as, letters (Ext-2/B), sale-deeds (Ext-1 series), Cash Book (Ext-5), Pay Register (Ext-6), Result Register (Ext-7), Sankalp Patra (Ext-9) and letter (Ext-10 series) and audit Repot (Ext-11), Electric bills (Ext-12 series), Certified copies of the order-sheets (Ext-13 and 13/a) were the documents referred to by the appellate Court to show that the Vidyapith was running its own business independently and was acquiring lands in its own name, from its own fund. So the findings recorded by the appellate Court on the basis of evidence of ten witnesses and the documents referred to above were findings of fact and they are almost conclusive. This Court is under no legal obligation to interfere with the aforesaid findings of the appellate Court.
6. Now I shall advert to the contention of the appellant’s lawyer regarding connection of the BPCC with the Bihar Vidyapith. It was submitted before me by the appellant’s lawyer that Maulana Mazharul Haque was an eminent member of the Congress Party and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Ex-President of India, Acharya Badri Nath Verma and other important members of the Congress Party were associated with the Vidyapith in its establishment and its proper up-keep and were very much interested in its running smoothly and, therefore, it indicated that the Vidyapith was a wing of Congress party represented by the BPCC (appellant). In this connection, I am of the opinion that simply because some members of the Congress Party, including late Mahatma Gandhi were instrumental in setting up of the Vidyapith, I do not think that it will indicate that the Vidyapith was not an independent entity, rather it was a wing of the BPCC. When the Vidyapith was recognised as a juridicat person, under the Registration of Societies Act, I am of the opinion that it was very much an educational Institution having its own entity and independent status. This being the case, any acquisition of land by this Vidyapith would be for the benefit of the Institute and for its own use and under its own control. Of course, members of the Congress Party, from time to time, were collecting subscription from the public to meet the financial requirements of this Vidyapith, but this contribution would also not derogate from independent status of the Vidyapith. It is not uncommon that the educational and cultural institution receives grant and contribution from the Government or members of the public. That will never mean that it will come under patronage of all the persons who may make grant or collect subscription and contribution from the members of the public. The appellate Court has discussed the oral and documentary evidence in this connection at length and so it has come to the conclusion that Vidyapith was an educational and cultural Institution, of course, established by some well meaning members of the Congress Party and of great fame, such as Mahama Gandhi, Maulana Mazharul Haque, Acharya Badri Nath Verma, Dr. Rajendra Prasad, Ex-President. Bihar Vidyapith was one of various other Institutions established by the members of the Congress Party who had joined the Freedom Movement and who had given a call to the students to disassociate themselves from the Institution established by Britishers and they were advised to take their studies in the Institutions established by these members who were disposed towards public welfare, in order to prepare them for Freedom Movement and to free this country from the clutches of alien rule.
7. Under the backdrop of the aforesaid findings of the appellate Court, I shall examine the findings regarding the acquisition of Plot Nos. 591 and 596. Plot No. 591 was admittedly acquired by the sale-deed dated 8th April, 1921 (Ext-1/F) executed by Mostt. Harkalia, wife of Deo Narayan, in the name of Maulana Mazharul Haque, The fact that Plot No. 591 was wrongly mentioned as ‘581’ in the aforesaid sale-deed was not disputed. It was the case of the defendant-appellant that Mazharul Haque was the president of Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee at the relevant time and, therefore, sale-deed in his name was for the BPCC. But it is to be noted that the W.S. of the defendant-appellant was to the effect that the defendant had obtained this land from Deo Narayan Rout with his consent and it came in permissive possession. But it has also transpired from the evidence on the record that Maulana Mazharul Haque was appointed the first Chancellor of Bihar Vidyapith and earlier this Vidyapith was being run in a rented building somewhere else; but in the year 1921, it was shifted to Sadaquat Ashram. So the sale-deed in the name of Mazharul Haque who was the Chancellor of this Institution would mean that Mazharul Haque had obtained this land for Vidyapith. There is no dispute that Maulana Mazharul Haque was not the first Chancellor of Vidyapith and the appellate Court has referred to the documentary and oral evidence in this connection, including the evidence on behalf of defendant-appellant and held that Mazharul Haque was the Chancellor of vidyapith and Mahatma Gandhi was pleased that Vidyapith was shifted to Sadaquat Ashram and it got a permanent abode for running its business of educational, and cultural advancement of the general public. Since the defendant-appellant has given up the plea in the W.S. that this land was under its possession with consent of the owner Deo Narayan, the subsequent plea that Mazharul Haque had obtained this land for the BPCC was against the pleading. So that appellate Court negatived the case of the defendant regarding possession of this plot by the BPCC and, accordingly, its claim of title over the same. So far Plot No. 596 is concerned, it was obtained by Acharya Badri Nath Verma by a sale-deed dated 19th February, 1927. It was Acharya Badri Nath Verma who was referred to as the Registrar of the Vidyapith in the sale-deed (Ext-1/E). The appellate Court examined the Khatiyan in this connection and it came to the conclusion that the sale-deed was executed by the descendants of the recorded tenants, in favour of Acharya Badri Nath Verma, Registrar of the Vidyapith. This land was claimed by the defendant-appellant on the basis of the fact that Badri Nath Verma was a member the Congress Party and, therefore, when he was purchasing the land as the Registrar of the Vidyapith, he had purchased it not for the Vidyapith, but for the BPCC. This contention of the appellant’s lawyer was neither here nor there. When in the sale-deed Badri Nath Verma was referred to as the Registrar of the Vidyapith, it was a clear indication that he was making acquisition of the aforesaid land in the capacity of the Registrar of the Vidyapith and so the aforesaid acquisition would be for the benefit of the Vidyapith and by the Vidyapith. There was no evidence that consideration money for the aforesaid deed was paid by the BPCC. So in all circumstances, the sale-deed of the year 1927 would be deemed to be the sale-deed obtained by the Vidyapith and for its own benefit from its own income, whether it came from subscription or contribution or grant or from whatever source it might have come. The contention of the defendant-appellant in the W.S. that the sale-deed was forged, was later given up; because its claim shifted to a claim through Badri Nath Verma as a member of the Congress Party. The plea of the defendant in the W.S. was that this land was gifted by Sheikh Khairuddin in the year 1917 to Mazharul Haque. Mazharul Haque had shifted to this land in the year 1917 and built a hut known as Sadaquat Ashram and was living in this hut along with some students of the Engineering College who had revolted against the Principal of the College and had taken shelter and refuge under the guardianship and patronage of Maulana Mazharul Haque. But, when later in the year 1927, this land was given to Bihar Vidyapith through a sale-deed, it clearly indicated that Mazharul Haque was allowed permissive possession of the land and he, of course, was running Sadaquat Ashram. But, later on, the land was sold to Bihar Vidyapith through Badri Nath Verma, its Registrar. If at all, Mazharul Haque was holding this land being President of the BPCC and his land was acquired by a sale-deed for the Congress Party, it is not understandable why the sale-deed was not executed in the name of Mazharul Haque or any member of the Congress Party or in the name of BPCC, itself. So the very fact that the sale-deed was executed in the name of Vidyapith further confirmed the fact that Mazharul Haque was acquiring this land for the Vidyapith and so the name of Badri Nath Verma figured as a vendee in the sale-deed. It has already been seen above that Mazharul Haque was the Chancellor of the Vidyapith and, therefore, he was, perhaps, interested in making the acquisition in the name of Vidyapith and that will explain the name of Badri Nath Verma as the Registrar of the Vidyapith, being the vendee of the land. So the earlier permissive possession of the land by Mazharul Haque, would be converted into a title transferred to the Vidyapith by a willing consent of Mazhrul Haque, rather with his own efforts. The first appellate Court in its findings held that both the plots were the lands acquired by the Vidyapith and it had title over the same. Thus, the finding of the appellate Court were based on evidence afforded by documents produced by the plaintiff-respondent as also the oral evidence adduced by both the parties. I am, therefore, to opine that the findings which were findings of fact, cannot be interfered with by this Court.
8. The defendant-appellant had claimed the aforesaid lands on the basis of adverse possession as well. The basis for this adverse possession was firstly that both the plots were amalgamated with each other and the constructions thereon overlapped each other. Admittedly, Vidyapith was situated in the campus of Sadaquat Ashram which, of course, was shifted to some other building later. This claim of adverse possession was also based on the evidence that some members of the Congers Party were living in some of the rooms of the Vidyapith even by force on the basis of aforesaid factual aspect of the case, plea of adverse possession was advanced by the defendant-appellant The appellate Court has discussed the documentary evidence in this connection and it has come to the conclusion that some persons and members of the Congress Party who were living in the premises of the Institute, were paying rent to the Vidyapith and some documents in this connection were filed. So the appellate Court came to the conclusion that those who were living in the premises of Vidyapith were having permissive possession, electric bills etc. were also running in the name of Vidyapith. So the appellate Court was of the opinion that the defendant-appellant had failed to prove adverse possession. In this connection, I am to opine that adverse possession cannot be constituted by stray admission of some P.Ws. that some members of the Congress Party were occupying certain rooms of Vidyapith by force. To support a plea of adverse possession, the evidence and the pleadings must be specific and the evidence must also be positive and specific that from such and such point of time, a particular land is occupied by the adversary openly and to the knowledge of the title holder, with hostile posture and with avowed and declared intention of having the same in an open challenge to the title holder. Simply because some persons occupied the land of some person by force that does not mean that they are adversely prescribing against the land owner. If such a situation is given a recognition by law Courts, no body will be safe and every law abiding citizen would be at the mercy of bullies hooligans and scrupous muscle men who would be defeating the title of the rightful owner by unlawful acts. The circumstances of this case indicated that some members of the Congress Party, under political patronage, and with their influential clout with the Government, had occupied certain rooms of the Vidyapith and the officials of the Vidyapith were rot able to drive them out. This petition was worse confounded by the fact that the Vidyapith was earlier set up and looked after by some members of the Congress Party and so the successive members of the Congress Party were continuously associated with the Vidyapith. So subsequently some unscruplous members of the Congress Party must have acquired certain rooms of the Vidyapith. This position, in my opinion, cannot be allowed to constitute adverse possession in order to defeat the title of the Bihar Vidyapith which is of independent entity and not the wing of the Congress Party. Besides the above, there is a legal flaw in the pleading of adverse possession taken by the defendant-appellant, if its pleading was that Vidyapith was a wing of it (BPCC), in that case, the question of adverse possession against itself does not arise. In all circumstances, therefore, pleading of adverse possession was rightly rejected by the first appellate Court.
9. Before I part with the judgment, it would be relevant to refer to the questions of law formulated for decision of this appeal. The following substantial questions of law were formulated for decision of the appeal by order dated 27th April, 1987:
(1) Whether the lower appellate Court while upsetting the findings of the trial Court had failed to discuss the possession in favour of the plaintiffs is justified in law and on facts and the pleadings of the parties or in reality makes out a third case?
(2) Whether the sale-deed (Ext-I/E and I/F have been correctly interpreted and any other point that may be raised with the permission of the Court; and
(3) Whether the disputed plots on the evidence on the records can be held to belong to the plaintiff?
10. So far the first question of law, I am of the opinion that the first appellate Court is a Court of fact and law both. So it is free to advance its own reasonings in order to come to a finding on the basis of evidence on the record. It is not bound to meet the reasonings of the trial Court on each and every aspect of the case. This on the part of the learned appellate Court, could not, therefore, vitiate the decision of the appeal. Moreover, in this connection, I find that the trial Court by its judgment did not betray its knowledge of law and the judgment in itself indicated that the trial Court did not know ABCD of parameters of Civil Law. The trial Court has ignored various documents, such as, sale-deeds and receipts, letters, Sankalp etc. to which I have referred to above and laconically stated that the documents were not of any help to the cases of the parties. So I am of the opinion that there was nothing regarding the reasoning of the trial Court to be met by the appellate Court. Moreover, I find that here and there, the appellate Court has referred to the reasonings advanced by the trial Court for arriving at its decision. So the judgment of the appellate Court could not get vitiated on account of any omission to meet the reasoning of the trial Court here and there. The findings of the appellate Court regarding the plea of adverse possession was also well meritted on the entire gamut of evidence-oral and documentary, and findings did not, at all, introduce a third case. I am, further of the opinion that the findings in this connection were well justified on the evidence on the record. So far the 3rd issue is concerned, it was the trial Court which failed to interpret the recitals of the sale-deeds in its proper perspective. The trial Court rather referred to only a few recitals whereas the appellate Court referred to the recitals of the sale-deeds in all its ramifications and the circumstances unleashed by the recitals therein. The 4th issue was also oddious, because the appellate Court, on the basis of the evidence available on the record held that the plots in question belonged to the plaintiff-respondent of this appeal and it was a finding of fact.
11. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I am of the opinion that the judgment of the appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality or irregularity, warranting any interference by this Court.
12. In the result, this appeal is dismissed.