Supreme Court of India

Miss Mohini Jain vs State Of Karnataka And Ors on 30 July, 1992

Supreme Court of India
Miss Mohini Jain vs State Of Karnataka And Ors on 30 July, 1992
Equivalent citations: 1992 AIR 1858, 1992 SCR (3) 658
Author: K Singh
Bench: Kuldip Singh (J)
           PETITIONER:
MISS MOHINI JAIN

	Vs.

RESPONDENT:
STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

DATE OF JUDGMENT30/07/1992

BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
BENCH:
KULDIP SINGH (J)
SAHAI, R.M. (J)

CITATION:
 1992 AIR 1858		  1992 SCR  (3) 658
 1992 SCC  (3) 666	  JT 1992 (4)	292
 1992 SCALE  (2)90


ACT:
    Constitution  of India, 1950-Articles 41,  45-Right	 to
education-Whether  a  constitutional  right-capitation	fee-
Whether unconstitutional.
     Karnataka	Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition	  of
Capitation Fee) Act, 1984-preamble-Object of.
     Karnataka	Educational  Institutions  (Prohibition	  of
Capitation  Fee)  Act,	1984-Sections  3,  5(1)-Notification
under-M.B.B.S. Course-Admission-Tuition fee-Different  rates
for  the  three categories  of	students-Legality  of-Excess
Tuition	  fee  other  than  Rs.	 2,000	 per   annum-Whether
Capitation fee-Whether permissible in law-Held, Notification
ultra vires.



HEADNOTE:
     The  respondent  No.1  -  State  Government  issued   a
notification  dated June 5, 1989 under section 5(1)  of	 the
Karnataka    Educational   Institutions	  (Prohibition	  of
Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 fixing the tuition fee, other fees
and deposits to be charged from the students by the  private
Medical Colleges in the State. The tuition fee per year	 for
the  candidates	 admitted against  "Government	 seats"	 was
Rs.2,000,  whereas  for the Karnataka students	(other	than
those  admitted against "Government seats") the	 tution	 fee
was  not exceeding Rs.25,000 and for the students  belonging
to the category of "Indian students from outside  Karnataka"
were  to  pay the tuition fee not  exceeding  Rs.60,000	 per
annum.
     The petitioner, who came under the category of  "Indian
students  from	outside	 Karnataka",  was  informed  by	 the
respondent No.3 - Private Medical College, that she could be
admitted  to  the  MBBS Course	in  the	 session  commencing
February/march 1991, provided she would deposit Rs.60,000 as
the  tuition  fee  for the first year  and  furnish  a	bank
guarantee in respect of the fees for the remaining years  of
the MBBS Course. When the father of the petitioner  informed
the  respondent No. 3 that he could not pay  the  exorbitant
annual	tution fee of Rs.60,000, the petitioner	 was  denied
admission.
						       659
     The   petitioner	has,  under  Article   32   of	 the
Constitution  of  India, challenged the	 notification  dated
5.6.1989  issued  by the respondent No.	 1,  permitting	 the
Private	 Medical Colleges to charge exorbitant	tution	fees
from   the  students  other  than those	 admitted   to	 the
"Government seats".
     Respondent	 No.3 contended that the students from	whom
higher tuition fee was charged belong to a different  class;
that those who were admitted to the "Government seats"	were
meritorious   and   the	 remaining   non-meritorious'	that
classification of candidates into those who possessed  merit
and   those   who  did	not  posses  merit   was   a   valid
classification and as such the college-management was within
its right to charge more fee from those who did not  possess
merit;	that  the object sought to be achieved by  the	said
classification	was  to collect money to meet  the  expenses
incurred  by the college in providing medical  education  to
the students.
     The   intervener-Karnataka	 Private  Medical   Colleges
Association argued that the Private Medical Colleges in	 the
State  of Karnataka did not receive any financial  aid	from
either the Central or the State Government; that the Private
Medical	 Colleges would incur about Rs. 5 lakhs per  student
as expenditure for 5 year MBBS course; that 40% of the seats
in  the colleges were set apart as "Government seats" to  be
filled	by  the Government; that the students  selected	 and
admitted  against Government seats would pay only Rs.  2,000
per  annum as such the rest of the burden was on  those	 who
were admitted against management quota; that the tuition fee
was  not  excessive  and as such there was  no	question  of
making	 any profit by the Private Medical Colleges  in	 the
State of Karnataka.
     Respondent	 No.3 and the intervener submitted  that  in
order  to  run	the medical colleges  the  managements	were
justified  in charging the capitation fee; that	 apart	from
the  Act, there was not provision under the Constitution  or
under  any  other  law which would forbid  the	charging  of
capitation fee.
     On	 the question: (1) Was there a `right to  education'
guaranteed to the people of India under the Constitution? If
so, did the concept of `capitation fee' infrasts the  same?;
(2) Whether the charging of capitation fee in  consideration
of  admissions	to educational institutions  was  arbitrary,
unfair,	 unjust	 and  as such violated	Article	 14  of	 the
Constitution?;	 (3)  Whether  the   impugned	notification
permitted the Private Medical Colleges to charge  capitation
fee in the guise of regulating fees under the
						       660
Act?  and (4) Whether the notification was violative of	 the
provisions  of the Act?, allowing the writ petition  to	 the
extent of striking down the capitation fee, this Court
     HELD: 1.01. The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the
duty  of  the State to respect and protect the same.  It  is
primarily the education which brings-forth the dignity of  a
man.  The framers of the Constitutions were aware that	more
than  seventy per cent of the people, whom they were  giving
the  Constitution of India, were illitrate. They  were	also
hopeful	 that within a period of ten years illiteracy  would
be  wiped out from the country. It was with that  hope	that
Articles  41  and  45  were brought  in	 Chapter IV  of	 the
constitution.  An  individual  cannot be  assured  of  human
dignity unless his personality is developed and the only way
to do that is to educate him. [667F]
     1.02.  Article  41 in Chapter IV  of  the	Constitution
recognises  an	individual's right "to education".  It	says
that  "the  State shall, within the limits of  its  economic
capacity and  development, make effective provision for	 the
securing  the right....to education...." Although a  citizen
cannot enforce the directive principles contained in Chapter
IV  of	the Constitution but these were not intended  to  be
mere pious declarations. [667H]
     1.03.   Without  making  "right  to  education"   under
Article	 41  of the Constitution a reality  the	 fundamental
rights	under Chapter III shall remain beyond the  reach  of
large majority which is illiterate. [668E]
     1.04.    The  "right  to  education",   therefore,	  is
concomitant  to the fundamental rights enshrined under	Part
III of the Constitution. The State is under a constitutional
mandate	 to provide educational institutions at	 all  levels
for   the   benefit  of	 the   citizens.   The	 educational
institutions  must  function to the best  advantage  of	 the
citizens.   Opportunity	 to  acquire  education	 cannot	  be
confined to the richer section of the society. [670A]
     1.05.   Every citizen has a `right to education'  under
the  Constitution.  The	 State is  under  an  obligation  to
establish educational institutions to enable the citizens to
enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its obligation
through	  state-owned	or   state-recognised	 educational
institutions.  When the State Government grants	 recognition
to the private educational institutions it creates an agency
to  fulfil  its	 obligation  under  the	 Constitution.	 The
students are given admission to the educational institutions
- whether state-owned or state-recognised in recognition  of
their
						       661
`right'	 to   education' under	the  Constitution.  Charging
capitation fee in consideration of admission to	 educational
institutions,  is  a patent denial of a citizen's  right  to
education under the Constitution. [672C-E]
     1.06.   Capitation	 fee  is nothing  but  a  price	 for
selling	 education.  The  concept  of  "teaching  shops"  is
contrary   to  the  constitutional  scheme  and	 is   wholly
abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage. [670C]
     1.07.   "Right to life" is the  compendious  expression
for  all those rights which the Court must  enforce  because
they  are  basic  to the dignified  enjoyment  of  life.  It
extends to the full range of conduct which the individual is
free  to pursue. The right to education flows directly	from
right  to life. The right to life under Article 21  and	 the
dignity	 of   an individual cannot be assured unless  it  is
accompanied by the right to education. The State  Government
is  under  an  obligation  to  make  endeavour	to   provide
educational  facilities at all levels to its citizens.	[669
F-G]
     1.08.    Capitation  fee  makes  the  availability	  of
education beyond the reach of the poor. The State action  in
permitting capitation fee to be charged by  State-recognised
educational  institutions  is wholly arbitrary and  as	such
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India [672G]
     1.09    The capitation fee brings to the fore  a  clear
class bias. It enable the rich to take admission whereas the
poor  has  to withdraw due to financial	 inability.  A	poor
student	 with better merit cannot get admission	 because  he
has  no money whereas the rich can purchase  the  admission.
Such  a	 treatment  is	patently  unreasonably,	 unfair	 and
unjust.	 There is, therefore, no escape from the  conclusion
that   charging	 of  capitation	 fee  in  consideration	  of
admissions  to educational institutions is wholly  arbitrary
and as such infracts Article 14 of the Constitution. [673 F-
G]
     Francis  Coralie  Mullin v.  The  Administrator,  Union
Territory  of Delhi, [1981] 2 SCR 516; Bandhua Mukti  Morcha
v. Union of India and Ors., [1984] 2 SCR 67; E.P. Royappa v.
State  of  Tamil  Nadu and Anr., [1974] 2  SCR	348;  Maneka
Gandhi	v. Union of India, [1978] 2 SCR 621; Ramana  Dayaram
Shetty	v. The International Airport Authority of India	 and
Ors.,  [1979]  3 SCR 1014; Ajay Hasia etc. v.  Khalid  Mujib
Sehravardi  and Ors. etc., [1981] 2 SCR 79 and	Dr.  Pradeep
Jain  etc.  v. Union of India Ors. etc., [1984] 3  SCR	942,
referred to.
						       662
     D.P.  Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat and  another,
[1955] SCR 1215, distinguished.
     Dr. Ambedkar - C.A.D. Vol. VIII P.476; IMA	 Resolutions
of  India Medical Conference held at Cuttak on December	 28-
30, 1980; Presidential Address of Dr. K.S. Chugh,  Chairman,
Department  of	Medicine and Head Department  of  Nephrology
Pastgraduate  Institute	 of Medical Education  and  Reseach,
Chandigarh  delivered  on  17.1.1992  at  the  47th   Annual
Conference  of the Association of Physicians in India,	held
at Patna, referred to.
     2.	     The    Karnataka	 Educational	Institutions
(prohibition  of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 has been  brought
into  existence by the Karnataka State Legislature with	 the
object of effectively curbing the evil practice of collecing
capitation  fee for admitting students into the	 educational
institutions in the State of Karnataka. The preamble to	 the
Act which makes the object clear. [679F]
     3.01.	The  State  Government	in  fulfilling	 its
obligation   under  the	 Constitution  to  provide   medical
education  to the citizens has fixed Rs.2,000 per  annum  as
tuition fee for the students selected on merit for admission
to the medical colleges and also against "Government  seats"
in private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by a
student	 admitted  to the private medical  college  is	only
Rs.2,000  per  annum. The seats other than  the	 "Government
seats"	which  are to be filled from outside  Karnataka	 the
management  has been given free hand where the	criteria  of
merit  is  not applicable and those who can  afford  to	 pay
Rs.60,000 per annum are considered at the discretion of	 the
management. [680 F-H]
     3.02.	If the State Government fixes  Rs.2,000	 per
annum  as  the tuition fee in government  colleges  and	 for
"Government  seats" in private medical colleges then  it  is
the  State-responsibility  to see that any  private  college
which  has  been set up with Government	 permission  and  is
being  run  with Government recognition is  prohibited	from
charging  more	than Rs.2,000 from any student	who  may  be
resident  of  any part of India. When the  State  Government
permits	  a  private  medical  college	to  be	set-up	 and
recognises its curriculum and degrees, then the said college
is  performing a function which under the  Constitution	 has
been assigned to the State Government. [681A]
     3.03.	 Capitation  fee  in  any  form	 cannot	  be
sustained  in the eyes of law. The only method of  admission
to the medical colleges in consonance
						       663
with  fair  play and equity is by ways of  merit  and  merit
alone. Charging of capitation fee by the private educational
institutions  as  a consideration for  admission  is  wholly
illegal and cannot be permitted. [674 B-C]
     3.04.	Rs.60,000 per annum permitted to be  charged
from Indian students from outside Karnataka in Para 1(d)  of
the notification is not tuition fee but in fact a capitation
fee  and  as such cannot be sustained and is  liable  to  be
struck down. [681C]
     3.05.	What is provided is paras 1 (d) and 1(c)  of
the  impugned notification dated June 5, 1989 is  capitation
fee  and  not  a tuition fee. It has to	 be  held  that	 the
notification  is  beyond the scope of the  Act	rather	goes
contrary  to Section 3 of the Act and as such has to be	 set
aside.	It  is not permissible in law  for  any	 educational
institution to charge capitation fee as a consideration	 for
admission to the said institution. [681E]



JUDGMENT:

ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ petition (Civil) No. 456
of 1991.

(Under Article 32 of the Constitution on India).
Vijay Pandia and R. Satish for the Petitioner.
Santosh Hegde, R. Jagannatha Gouley, M.K. Dua, K.H.
Nobin Singh, Manoj Sarup, C.S. Vaidyanathan, K.V. Mohan, Ms.
Anita Lalit and M. Veerappa for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
KULDIP SINGH. J. The Karnataka State Legislature, with
the object of eliminating the practice of collecting
capitation fee for admitting students into educational
institutions, enacted the Karnataka Educational Institutions
(Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1984 (the Act). The Act
which replaces the Karnatatak Ordinance No. 14 of 1983 came
into force with effect from July 11, 1983. Purporting to
regulate the tuition fee to be charged by the Private
Medical Colleges in the State, the Karnataka Government
issued a notification dated June 5, 1989 under Section 5(1)
of the Act thereby fixing the tuition fee, other fees and
deposits to be charged from the students by the Private
Medical Colleges in the State. Under the notification the
candidates admitted against “Government seats” are to pay
Rs.2,000 per year as tuition fee. The Karnataka students
(other than those admitted against “Government seats”) are
to be charged tuition fee not
664
exceeding Rs.25,000 per annum. The third category is of
“Indian students from outside Karnataka”, from whom tuition
fee not exceeding Rs.60,000 per annum is permitted to be
charged.

Miss Mohini Jain a resident of Meerut was informed by
the management of Sri Sriddharatha Medical College,
Agalokote, Tumkur in the State of Karnataka that she could
be admitted to the MBBS course in the session commencing
February/March 1991. According to the management she was
asked to deposit Rs.60,000 as the tuition fee for the first
year and furnish a bank guarantee in respect of the fee for
the remaining years of the MBBS course. The petitioner’s
father informed the management that it was beyond his means
to pay the exorbitant annual fee of Rs.60,000 and as a
consequence she was denied admission to the medical college.
Mohini Jain has alleged that the management demanded a
further capitation fee of repees four and a half lakhs but
the management has vehemently denied the same.

In this petition under Article 32 of the Constitution
of India Miss Mohini Jain has challenged the notification of
the Karnataka Government permitting the Private Medical
Colleges in the State of Karnataka to charge exorbitant
tuition fees from the students other than those admitted to
the “Government seats”.

Mr. Santosh Hedge learned counsel appearing for the
medical college respondent No. 3 has contended that the
students from whom higher tuition fee is charged belong to a
different class. According to him those who are admitted to
the “Government seats” are meritorious and the remaining
non-meritorious. He states that classification of condidates
into those who possess merit and those who do not possess
merit is a valid classification and as such the college-
management is within its right to charge more fee from those
who do not possess merit. He further states that the object
sought to be achieved by the said classification is to
collect money to meet the expenses incurred by the college
in providing medical education to the students. Mr. C.S.
Vaidyanathan, learned counsel appearing for the intervener
Karnataka Private Medical Colleges Association has argued
that the Private Medical Colleges in the State of Karnataka
do not receive any financial aid from either the Central or
the State Government. According to him the Private Medical
Colleges incur about Rs.5 lakhs per student as expenditure
for a 5 year MBBS course. 40% of the seats in these
665
colleges are set part as “Government seats” to be filled by
the Government. The students selected and admitted against
Government seats pay only Rs.2,000 perannum as such the rest
of the burden falls on those who are admitted against
management quota. He, therefore, contended that the tuition
fee is not excessive and as such there is no question of
making any profit by the Private Medical Colleges in the
State of Karnataka. Mr. Hegde and Mr. Vaidyanathan have
vehemently contended that in order to run the medical
colleges the managements are justified in charging the
capitation fee. According to them, apart from the act, there
is no provision under the Constitution or under any other
law which forbids the charging of capitation fee. Finaliy
they have relied upon the judgment of this Court in D.P.
Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat, and
another [1955] SCR
1215.

After hearing learned counsel for the parties and also
perusing the written arguments submitted by them the
following points arise for our consideration in this writ
petition:

(1) Is there a `right to education’ guaranteed to the
people of India under the Constitution? If so, does the
concept of `capitation fee’ infracts the same?

(2) Whether the charging of capitation fee in
consideration of admissions to educational institutions is
arbitrary, unfair, unjust and as such violates the equality
clause contained in Article 14 of the Constitution?

(3) Whether the impugned notification permits the
Private Medical Colleges to charge capitation fee in the
guise of regulating fees under the Act?

(4) Whether the notification is violative of the
provisions of the Act which in specific terms prohibit the
charging of capitation fee by any educational institution in
the State of Karnataka?

In order to appreciate the first point posed by us it
is necessary to refer to various provisions of the
Constitution of India. The preamble promises to secure to
all citizens of India “Justice, social, economic and
political” “liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith
and worship”. It further provides “equality of status and of
opportunity” and assures dignity of the individual. Articles
21, 38, 39(a) (f), 41 and 45 of the Constitution are
reproduced hereunder:

666

“21. Protection of life and personal liberty.-No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal
liberty except according to procedure established
by law.”

“38. State to secure a social order for the
promotion of walfare of the people.-(1) The State
shall strive to promote the Welfare of the people
by securing and protecting as effectively as it may
a social order in which justice, social, economic
and political, shall inform all the institutions of
the national life.

(2) The State shall, in particular, strive to
minimise the inequalities in income, and endeavour
to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and
opportunities, not only amongst individuals but
also amongst groups of people residing in different
areas or engaged in different vocations.”
“39. Certain principles of policy to be followed by
the state.-The State shall, in particular, direct
its policy towards securing-

(a) that the citizens, men and women equally, have
the right to an adquate means to livelihood;

(f) that children are given opportunities and
facilities to develop in a hearlthy manner and in
conditions of freedom and dignity and that
childhood and youth are protected against
exploitation and against moral and material
abandonment.”

“41. Right to work, to education and to public
assistance in certain cases.- The State shall,
within the limits of its economic capacity and
development, make effective provision for securing
the right to work, to education and to public
assistance in cases of unemployment, old age,
sickness and disablement, and in other cases of
underserved want.”

“45. Provision for free and compulsory education
for children.- The State shall endeavour to
provide, within a period to ten years from the
commencement of this Constitution, for free and
compulsory education for all children until they
complete the age of fourteen years.”

667

It is no doubt correct that “right to education”as such
has not been guaranteed as fundamental right under Part III
of the Constitution but reading the above quoted provisions
comulatively it becomes clear that the framers of the
Constitution made it obligatory for the State to provide
education for its citizens.

The preamble promises to secure justice “social,
economic and political” for the citizen. A peculiar feature
of the Indian Constitution is that it combines social and
economic rights along with political and justiciable legal
rights. The preamble embodies the goal which the State has
to achieve in order to establish social justice and to make
the masses free in the positive sense. The securing of
social justice has been specifically enjoined an object of
the State under Article 38 of the Constitution. Can the
objectice which has been so prominently pronounced in the
preamble and Article 38 of the Constitution be achieved
without providing education to the large majority of
citizens who are illiterate. The objectives flowing from the
preamble cannot be achieved and shall remain on paper unless
the people in this country are educated. The three pronged
justice promised by the preamble is only an illusion to the
teaming-million who are illiterate. It is only is the
education which equips a citizen to participate in achieving
the objectives enshrined in the preamble. The preamble
further assures the dignity of the individual. The
Constitution seeks to achieve this object by guaranteeing
fundamental rights to each individual which he can enforce
through court of law if necessary. The directive principles
in Part IV of the Constitution are also with the same
objective. The dignity of man is inviolable. It is the duty
of the State to respect and protect the same. It is
primarilty the education which brings-forth the dignity of a
man. The framers of the Constitution were aware that more
than seventy per cent of the people, to whom they were
giving the Constitution of India, were illiterate. They were
also hopeful that within a period of ten years illiteracy
would be wiped out from the country. It was with that hope
that Articles 41 and 45 were brought in Chapter IV of the
Constitution. An individual cannot be assured of human
dignity unless his personality is developed and the only way
to do that is to educate him. This is why the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 emphasises “Education
shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality…” Article 41 in Chapter IV of the Constitution
recognises an individual’s right “to education”. It says
that “the State shall, within the limits of its economic
capacity and development, make effective provision for
securing the right…..to
668
education”. Although a citizen cannot enforce the directive
principles contained in Chapter IV of the Constitution but
these were not intended to be mere pious declarations. We
may quote the words of Dr. Ambedkar in that respect:
“In enacting this Part of the Constitution, the
Assembly is giving certain directions to the future
legislature and the future executive to show in
what manner they are to exercise the legislature
and the executive power they will have. Surely it
is not the intention to introduce in this Part
these principles as mere pious declarations. It is
the intention of the Assembly that in future both
the legislature and the executive should not merely
pay lipservice to these principles but that they
should be made the basis of all legislative and
executive action that they may be taking hereafter
in the matter of the governance of the country”
(C.A.D. Vol.VII p.476.)
The directive principles which are fundamental in the
governance of the country cannot be isolated from the
fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III. These
principles have to be read into the fundamental rights. Both
are supplementary to each other. The State is under a
constitutional mandate to create conditions in which the
fundamental rights guaranteed to the individuals under Part
III could be enjoyed by all. Without making “right to
education” under Article 41 of the Constitution a reality
the fundamental rights under Chapter III shall remain beyond
the reach of large majority which is illiterate.

This Court has interpreted Article 21 of the
Constitution of India to include the right to live with
human dignity and all that goes along with it. In Francis
Coralie Mullin v. The Administrator, Union Territory of
Delhi,
[1981]2 SCR 516, this Court elaborating the right
guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of the India
held as under:

“But the question which arises is whether the right
to life is limited only to protection of limb or
faculty or does it go further and embrace something
more. We think that the right to life includes the
right to live with human dignity and all that goes
along with it, namely the bare necessaries of life
such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter
and facilities for reading, writing and expression
oneself in diverse forms, freely
669
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow
human beings. Of course, the magnitude and content
of the components of this right would depend upon
the extent of the economic development of the
country, but it must, in any view of the matter,
include the right to the basic necessities of life
and also the right to carry on such funtions and
activities as constitute the bare minimum
expression of the human-self.”

In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India Ors., [1984]
2 SCR 67, this Court held as under”-

“This right to live with human dignity enshrined in
Article 21 derives its life breath from the
Directive principles of State Policy and
particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and
Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it
must include protection of the health and strength
of workers men and women, and of the tender age of
children against abuse, opportunities and
facilities for children to develop in a healthy
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity,
educational facilities, just and humane conditions
of work and maternity relief. These are the minimum
requirements which must exist in order to enable a
person to live with human dignity and no State –
neither the Central Government nor any State
Government – has the right to take any action which
will deprive a person of the enjoyment of these
basic essential.”

“Right to life” is the compendious expression for all
those rights which the Courts must enforce because they are
basic to the dignified enjoyment of life. It extends to the
full range of conduct which the individual is free to
pursue. The right to education fiows directly from right
to life. The right to life under Article 21 and the dignity
of an individual cannot be assured unless it is accompanied
by the right to education. The State Government is under an
obligation to make endeavour to provide educational
facilities at all levels to its citizens.

The fundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the
Constitution of India including the right to freedom of
speech and expression and other rights under Article 19
cannot be appreciated and fully enjoyed unless a citizen is
educated and is conscious of his individualistic dignity.

670

The “right to education”, therefore, is concomitant to
the fundamental rights enshrined under Part III of the
Constitution. The State is under a constitutional-mandate to
provide educational institutions at all levels for the
benefit of the citizens. The educational institutions must
function to the best advantage of the citizens. Opportunity
to acquire education cannot be confined to the richer
section of the society. increasing demand for medical
education has led to the opening of large number of medical
colleges by private persons, groups and trusts with the
permission and recognition of State Governments. The
Karnataka State has permitted the opening of several new
medical colleges under various private bodies and
organisations. These institutions are charging capitation
fee as a consideration for admission. Capitation fee is
nothing but a price for selling education. The concept of
“teaching shops” is contrary to the constitutional scheme
and is wholly abhorrent to the Indian culture and heritage.
As back as December 1980 the Indian Medical Association in
its 56th All India Medical Conference held at Cuttack on
December 28-30, 1980 passed the following resolutions:
“The 56th All India Medical Conference views with
great concern the attitude of State Goverments
particularly the State Government of Karnataka in
permitting the opening of new Medical Colleges
under various bodies and organisations in utter
disregard to the recommendations of Medical
Council of India and urges upon the authorities and
the Government of Karnataka not to permit the
opening of any new medical college, by private
bodies.

It further condemns the policy of admission on the
basis of capitation fees. This commercialisation of
medical education endangers the lowering of
standards of medical education and encourages bad
practice.”

Dr. K.S. Chugh, Chairman, Department of Medicine and
Head Department of Nephrology Postgraduate Institute of
Medical Education and Research Chandigarh, recipient of Dr.
B.C. Rai National Award as `eminent medical man for 1991′,
in his Presidential Address delivered on January 17, 1992 at
the 4th Annual Conference of the Association of Physicians
in India held at Patna observed as under:
“In the recent past, there has been a mushroom
growth of
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medical colleges in our country. At the time of
independence we had 25 medicaal college which
turned out less than 2000 graduates every year. At
the present time, there are 172 )150 already
functioning and 22 are being established) medical
colleges with an annual turn over of over 20,000
graduates. The Mudaliar Commission had recommended
a doctor-population ratio of 1 : 3500. We have
already achieved a ratio of 1 : 2500. If we take
into account the practitioners of other systems of
medicine who enjoy pay scales and privileges
comparable to those of allopathic doctors, India
will soon have a doctor-population ratio of 1 :

500. Such over production of tehnical man-power
from our medical colleges is bound to lead to
unemployment and frustration. Indeed the unabated
exodus of our professional collegues to other
countries is a direct consequence of these lop-
sided policies.

According to some estimates. India has exported
human capital worth over 51 billion dollars to USA
alone during 1966-88. Currently about 8000 skilled
young men and women are leaving the country every
year. It is high time a blanket ban is imposed on
any further expansion of medical colleges in our
country and a well thought out plan to reduce the
intake into existing institutions is prepared. This
will help to improve the standard of medical
education and health care in our country.
It is common knowlege that many of the newly
started medical colleges charge huge capitation
fees. Besides, most of these are poorly equipped
and provide scanty facilities for training of
students. At best such institutions can be termed
as “Teaching Shops”. Experience has shown that
these colleges admit students who have been unable
to gain admission in recognised medical colleges.
The result is a back door entry into medical
training obtained solely by the ability to pay
one’s way through. Even the advice of the Medical
Council of India is sidelined in many such cases.
The Government must resist all pressures to allow
this practice to continue. Admission to medical
colleges bought by paying capitation fees must be
stepped forthwith and all such existing
institutions required to strictly adhere to the
Medical Council of India rules.

672

In the words of my predecessor Dr. V. Parameshvara,
“The need of the hour is better doctors than more
doctors, better health education than more
education, better health care than more health care
delivery.”

The indian Medical Association, the Association of
Physicians of India and various other bodies and
organisations representing the medical profession in this
country have unanimously condemned the practice of charging
capitation fee as a consideration for admission to the
medical college.

We hold that every citizen has a `right to education’
under the Constitution. The State is under an obligation to
established educational institutions to enable the citizens
to enjoy the said right. The State may discharge its
obligation through state-owned or state-recognised
educational institutions. When the State Government grants
recognition to the private educational institutions it
creates an agency to fulfil its obligation under the
Constitution. The students are givin admission to the
educational institutions-whether state-owned or state-
recongnised-in recognition of their `right to education’
under the Constitution. Charging capitation fee in
consideration of admission to educational institutions, is a
patent denial of a citizen’s right to education under the
Constitution.

Indian civilsation recognises education as one of the
pious obligations of the human society. To establish and
administer educational institutions is considered a
religious and charitable object. Education in India has
never been a commodity for sale. Looking at the economic-
front, even forty five years after achieving independence,
thirty per cent of the population is living below proverty-
line and the bulk of the remaining population is struggling
for existence under poverty-conditions. The preamble
promises and the directive principles are a mandate to the
state to eradicate poverty so that the poor of this country
can enjoy the right to life guaranteed under the
Constitution. The state action or inaction which defeats the
constitutional-mandate is per se arbitary and cannot be
sustained. Capitation fee makes the availability of
education beyond the reach of the poor. The state action in
permitting capitation fee to be charged by state-recognised
educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. During
the last two decades the horizon of equality clause has been
widened as a result of this Court’s judgments.

673

Earlier the violation of Article 14 was judged on the twin t
ests of classification and nexus. This Court in E.P. Royappa
v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr.,
[1974] 2 SCR 348 gave new
dimension to Article 14 in the following words:
“Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects
and dimensions and it cannot be “cribbed, cabined
and confined” within traditional and doctrinaire
limits. From a positivistic point of view, equality
is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact equality
and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs
to the rule of law in a republic while the other,
to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch.
Where an act is arbitrary it is implicit in it that
it is unequal both according to political logic and
constitutional law and is therefore violative of
Article 14.”

This Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [1978] 2
SCR 621 Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. The International Airport
Authority of India and Ors.,
[1979] 3 SCr 1014 and Ajay
Hasia etc. v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi and Ors. etc., [1981]
2 SCR 79 following E.P. Royappa authoritatiovely held that
equality is directly opposed to arbitrariness. In Ajay Hasis
this Court observed as under :

“Unfortunately, in the early stages of the
evolution of our constitutional law, Article 14
came to be identified with the doctrine of
classification… In Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu
this Court laid bare a new dimension of Article 14
and pointed out that that Article has highly
activist magnitude and it embodies a guarantee
against arbitrariness…..”

The capitation fee brings to the fore a clear class
bias. It enable the rich to take admission whereas the poor
has to withdraw dur to financial inability. A poor student
with better merit canoot get admission because he has no
money whereas the rich can purchase the admission. Such a
treatment is patently unreasonable, unfair and unjust. There
is, therefore, no escape from the conclusion that charging
of capitation fee in consideration of admissions to
educational institutions is wholly arbitrary and as such
infracts Article 14 of the Constitution.

We do not agree with Mr. Hegde that the management has
a right to admit non-meritorious candidates by charging
capitation fee as a con-

674

sideration. This practice strikes at the very root of the
constitutional scheme and our educational system.
Restricting admission to non-meritorious candidates
belonging to the richer section of society and denying the
same to poor meritorious is wholly arbitrary against the
constitutional scheme and as such cannot be legally
permitted. Capitation fee in any form cannot be sustained in
the eyes of law. The only method of admission to the medical
colleges in consonance with the fair play and equity is by
ways of merit and merit alone.

We, therefore, hold and declare that charging of
capitation fee by the private educational institutions as a
consideration for admission is wholly illegal and cannot be
permitted.

Mr. Santosh Hegde and Mr.Vaidyanathan learned counsel
for respondent 3 and the interverner have relied upon D.P.
Joshi v. The State of Madhya Bharat and Anr.,
(supra) for
the proposition that classification of candidates for
admission to medical colleges on the basis of residence is
permissible. In D.P. Joshi’s case a resident of Delhi was
admitted as a student of Mahatma Gandhi Memorial Medial
Cellege Indore which was run by the State of Madhya Bharat.
His complaint was that the rules in force in the said
institution discriminated in the matter of fees between
students who were residents of Madhya Bharat and those who
were not, and that the latter had to pay in addition to the
tuition fee and charges payable by all the students a sum of
Rs.1500 per annum as capitation fee and that the charging of
such a fee from the students coming out of Madhya Bharat was
in contravention of Articles 14 and 15(1) of the
Constitution of India. In D.P. Joshi’s case the only point
for decision before this Court was whether the
classification on the ground of residence was justified.
This court while dealing with the question observed as
under:

“The impugned rule divides, as already stated,
self-nominees into two groups, those who are bona
fide resident of Madhya Bharat and those who are
not, and while it imposes a capitation fee on the
latter, it exempts the former from the payment
thereof. If thus proceeds on a classification based
on residence within the State, and the only point
for decision is whether the ground of
classification has a fair and substantial relation
to the purpose of the law, or whether it is purely
arbitrary and
675
fanmciful.

The object of the classification underlying the
impugned rule was clearly to help to some extent
students who are residents of Madhya Bharat in the
prosecution of their studies, and it cannot be
disputed that it is quite a legitimate and laudable
objective for a State to encourage education within
its borders. Education is a State subject, and one
of the directive principles declared in Part IV of
the Constitution is that the State should make
effective provisions for education within the
limits of its economy. (vide article 41). The
State has to contribute for the upkeep and the
running of its educational institutions. We are in
this petition concerned with a Medical College, and
it is well-known that it requires considerable
finance to maintain such an institution. If the
State has to spend money on it, is it unreasonable
that it should so order the educational system that
the advantage of it would to some extent at least
enure for the benefit of the State? A concession
given to the residents of the State in the matter
of fees is obviously calculated to serve that end,
as presumably some of them might, after passing
out of the College, settle down as doctors and
serve the needs of the locality. The
classification is thus based on a ground which has
a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the
legislation, and is in consequence not open to
attack. It has been held in the State of Punjab v.
Ajaib Singh and Anr.,
that a classification might
validly be made on a geographical basis. Such a
classification would be eminently just and
reasonable, where it relates to education which is
the concern primarily of the State. The
contention, therefore, that the rule imposing
capitation fee is in contravention of article 14
must be rejected.”

D.P. Joshi’s case is an authority for the proposition
that classification on the ground of residence is a
justifiable classification under Articles 14 and 15(1) of
the Constitution of India. The question that capitation fee
as a consideration for admission is not permissible under
the scheme of the constitution, was neither raised nor
adverted to by this Court. The imposition of capitation fee
was also not questioned on the ground of arbitrariness. The
only question raised before the Court was that the Madhya
676
Bharat students could not be exempted from the payment of
capitation fee. It is settled by this Court that
classification on the ground of residence is a valid
classification. Subsequently this Court in Dr. Pradeep Jain
etc. v. Union of India and Ors. etc., [1984] 3 SCR 942
reiterated the legal position on this point. we are,
therefore, of the view that D.P. Joshi’s case does not give
us ary guidance on the points before us.

To appreciate the third point it is necessary to notice
the relevant provisions of the Act and the notification.
Section 2(b), (e), 3, 4, and 5 of the Act are as under:
“2(b). “Capitation fee” means any amount, by
whatever name called, paid or collected directly or
indirectly in excess of the fee prescribed under
section 5, but does not include the deposit
specified under the proviso to section 3.

(e) “Government Seats” means such number of seats
in such educational institution or class or classes
of such institutions in the state as the Government
may, from time to time, specify for being filled up
by it in such manner as may be specified by it by
general or special order on the basis of merit and
reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes,
Backward Classes and such other categories, as may
be specified, by the Government from time to time,
without the requirement of payment of capitation
fee or cash deposit.

3. Collection of capitation fee prohibited. –
Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for
the time being in force, no capitation fee shall be
collected by or on behalf of any educational
institution or by any person who is incharge of or
is reponsible for the management of such
institution:

Provided…………..

4. Regulation of Admission to educational
institutions etc. – Subject to such rules, or
general or special orders, as may be made by the
Government in this behalf and any other law for the
time being in force.

(1) (a) the minimum qualification for admission to
any course of study in an educational institution
shall be such as
677
may be specified by –

(i) the University, in the case of any course study
in an educational institution maintained by or
affiliated to such University:

Provided that the Government may, in the interest
of excellence of education, fix any higher minimum
qualification for any course of study.

(ii) the Government in the case of other courses of
study in any other educational institution;

(b) the maximum under of students that could be
admitted to a course of study in an educational
institution shall be such as may be fixed by the
Government from time to time;

(2)in order to regulate the capitation fee charged
or collected during the period specified under the
proviso to section 3, the Government may, from time
to time, by general or special order, specify in
respect of each private educational institution or
class or classes of such institutions.

(a) the number of seats set apart as Government
seats:

(b) the number of seats that may be filled up by
the management of such institution.

(i) from among Karnataka students on the basis of
merit, on payment of such cash deposits refundable
after such number of years, with or without
interest as may be specified therein, but without
the payment of capitation fee; or

(ii) at the discretion:

Provided that such number of seats as may be
specified by the Government but not less tha fifty
per cent of the total number of seats referred to
in clauses (a) and (b) shall be filled from among
Karnataka students.

Explanation. – For the purpose of this section
Karnataka students means persons who have studied
in such educational institutions in the State of
Karnataka run or recognised by the
678
Government and for such number of years as the
Government may specify;

(3) an educational institution required to fill
seats in accordance with item (i) of sub-clause (b)
of clause (2) shall form a committee to select
candidates for such seats. A nominee each of the
Government and the University to which such
educational institution is affiliated shall be
included as members in such committee.

5. Regulation of fees, etc. – (1) It shall be
competent for the Government, by notification, to
regulate the tuition fee or any other fee or
deposit or other amount that may be received or
collected by any educational institution or class
of such institutions in respect of any or all class
or classes of students.

(2) No educational institution shall collect any
fees or amount or accept deposits in excess of the
amounts notified under sub-section (1) or permitted
under the proviso to section 3.

(3) Every educational institution shall issue an
official receipt for the fee or capitation fee or
deposits or other amount collected by it.
(4) All monies received by any educational
institution by way of fee or capitation fee or
deposits or other amount shall be deposited in the
account of the institution, in any Scheduled Bank
and shall be applied and expended for the
improvement of the institution and the development
of the educational facilities and for such other
related purpose and to such extent and in such
manner as may be specified by order by the
Government.

(5) In order to carry out the purposes of sub-
section (4), the Government may require any
educational institution to submit their programs or
plans of improvement and development of the
institution for the approval of the Government.
The relevant part of the notification dated June 5,
1989 issued by the Karnataka Government under Section 5 of
the Act is reproduced hereunder:

679

“In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section
(1) of Section 5 of the Karnataka educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act,
1984, the Government of Karnataka hereby fix the
Tuition Fee and other fees and deposits that may be
collected by the private Medical Colleges in the
State with effect from the academic year 1989-90
and until further orders as follows:

(a) Candidates admitted to seats in Government
Medical Colleges shall be charged a tuition
fee of Rs.2,000 each per annum (Rupees two
thousand only);

(b) Candidates admitted against Government seats
in Private Medical Colleges shall be
charged a tuition fee of Rs.2,000 each
per annum (Rupees two thousand only).

For this purpose “Government seats” shall
mean Government seats as defined by section 2

(e) of the Karnataka Educational
Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation
Fee) Act, 1984;

(c) Karnataka Students (other than students
admitted against Government seats as at

(b) above) admitted by Private Medical
Colleges shall be charged tuition fee not
exceeding Rs.25,000 each per annum
(Rupees Twenty-five thousand only);

(d) Indian Students from outside Karnataka
admitted by Private Medical Colleges
shall be charged tuition fee not
exceeding Rs. 60,000 each per annum (Rupees
Sixty thousand only);

The Act has been brought into existence by the
Karnataka State Legislature with the object of effectively
curbing the evil practice of collecting capitation fee for
admitting students into the educational institutions in the
State of Karnataka. The preamble to the Act which makes the
object clear is reproduced thereunder
“An Act to prohibit the collection of capitation
fee for admission to educational institutions in
the State of Karnataka and matters relating
thereto;

Where the practice of collecting capitation fee
for admit-

680

ting students into educational institutions is
widespread in the State;

And whereas this undesirable practice beside
contributing to large scale commercialisation of
education has not been conducive to the maintenance
of educational standards;

And whereas it is considered necessary to
effectively curb this evil practice in public
interest by providing for prohibition of collection
of capitation fee and matters relating thereto;
Be it enacted by the Karnataka State Legislature
in the Thirty-fourth Year of the Republic of India
as follows:”

Section 3 of the Act prohibits the collection of
capitation fee by any educational institution or by any
person who is in charge of or is responsible for the
management of such institutions. Contravention of the
provisions of the Act has been made punishable under Section
7 of the Act with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than three years but shall not exceed seven years and
with fine which may extend to five thousand rupees. Section
5 of the Act authorises the Government to regulate the
tuition fees by way of a notification. The Karnataka
Government have issued a notification under Section 5(1) of
the Act wherein the fee charged from Indian students from
outside Karnataka has been fixed not exceeding Rs. 60,000
per annum. Whether Rs. 60,000 per annum can be considered a
tuition fee or it is a capitation fee is the question for
our determination.

The notification fixes Rs.2000 per annum as the tuition
fee for candidates admitted to the seats in Government
medical colleges and for the candidates admitted against
“Government seats” in private medical colleges. All these
seats are filled purely on the merit of the candidates. It
is thus obvious that the State Government in fulfilling its
obligation under the Constitution to provide medical
education to the citizens has fixed Rs. 2000 per annum as
tuition fee for the students selected on merit for admission
to the medical colleges and also against “Government seats”
in private medical colleges. Therefore, the tuition fee by
student admitted to the private medical college is only Rs.
2000 per annum. The seats other than the “Government seats”
which are to be filled from outside Karnataka the management
has been given free hand where the criteria of merit is not
applicable and those who can afford to pay Rs. 60,000 per
annum are
681
considered at the discretion of the management. Whatever
name one may give to this type of extraction of money in the
name of medical education it is nothing but the capitation
fee. If the State Government fixes Rs.2000 per annum as the
tuition fee in government colleges and for “Government
seats” in private medical colleges than it is the state-
responsibility to see that any private college which has
been set up with Government permission and is being run with
Government recognition is prohibited from charging more than
Rs. 2000 from any student who may be resident of any part of
India. When the State Government permits a private medical
college to be set-up and recognises its curriculum and
degrees than the said college is performing a function which
under the constitution has been assigned to the State
Government. We are therefore of the view that Rs.60,000 per
annum permitted to be charged from Indian students from
outside Karnataka in Para. 1(d) of the notification is not
tuition fee but in fact a capitation fee and as such cannot
be sustained and is liable to be struck down. Whatever we
have said about para 1(d) is also applicable to Para 1(c) of
the notification.

Since we have held that what is provided in para 1(d)
and 1(c) of the impugned notification dated June 5, 1989 is
capitation fee and not a tuition fee it has to be held that
the notification is beyond the scope of the Act rather goes
contrary to section 3 of the Act and as such has to be set
aside. We therefore hold and declare that it is not
permissible in law for any educational institution to charge
capitation fee as a consideration for admission to the said
institution.

For the reasons given above we allow this writ petition
and quashed para 1(d) and 1(c) of the Karnataka State
Government notification dated June 5, 1989. As a
consequence paragraph 5 of the said notification
automatically becomes redundant. We make it clear that
nothing contained in this judgment shall be applicable to
the case of foreign students and students who are non-
resident Indians. We further hold that this judgment shall
be operative prospectively. All those students who have
already been admitted to the private medical colleges in the
State of Karnataka in terms of the Karnataka State
Notification dated June 5, 1989 shall not be entitled to the
advantage of this judgment and they shall continue their
studies on the same terms and conditions on which they were
admitted to the consolidated MBBS course.

682

Although we have struck down the capitation fee and
allowed the writ petition to that extent, we are not
inclined to grant any relief regarding admission to the
petitioner. She was not admitted to the college on merit
and secondly the course commenced in March-April, 1991 and
we see no justification to direct respondent 3 the medical
college to admit the petitioner. The writ petition is
allowed in the above terms with no order as to costs.

V.P.R.					   Petition allowed.
						       683