ORDER
Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J.
1. This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of the learned single Judge in Writ petition No. 14035 of 1989 decided on 1st December 1989.
2. The appellant herein was working as a Traffic Manager with the Madras Port Trust at the relevant time. On the allegation of being in possession of property disproportionate to his known sources of income, a criminal case was instituted against him. The appellant was placed under suspension. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 329 of 1989 seeking enhancement of the subsistence allowance, since he was paid only 50% of his pay as subsistence allowance. The writ petition came to be allowed on 3rd March 1989 and the respondents were directed to consider the case of the appellant for the grant of the enhanced subsistence allowance (1990-II-LLJ-5). In the meanwhile, the first respondent also initiated disciplinary proceedings against the appellant and a charge memo was drawn up on 14th February 1989 containing four charges under the Madras Port Trust Employees’ (Classification, Control & Appeal) Regulations, 1988. The gravaman of the charge related to violation of the various provisions of the Madras Port Trust Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations, 1987. The charge was served on the appellant and an enquiry officer came to be appointment on 19th July 1989. A preliminary enquiry was directed to be held and it commenced at New Delhi on 28th July 1989. The appellant, it appears, sought the permission of the enquiry officer to be represented by a legal practitioner during the disciplinary proceedings which was however, declined. The appellant filed Writ Petition No. 11063 of 1989 seeking a writ of mandamus directing the respondent to permit him to be represented by a legal petitioner in the department proceedings pending before the second respondent. The writ petition was allowed on 18th September 1989.
3. The appellant thereafter instead of participating in the enquiry and allowing it to be concluded despite the directions of the High Court in the earlier litigation for its early disposal, filed W.P. No. 14035 of 1989 praying for the issue of a writ of mandamus forbearing the second respondent (Enquiry Officer) from proceeding with the departmental enquiry against the appellant till the disposal of the criminal case in C.C. No. 1 of 1989 pending on the file of the Special VIII Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Madras.
4. Before the learned single Judge, the appellant relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in Kusheswar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (1988-II-LLJ-470) and in particular on paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof to urge that the trial of the disciplinary proceedings was required to be stayed till the disposal of the criminal case. The learned single Judge after hearing elaborate arguments on behalf of the parties found that three out of the four charges in the charge memo in the disciplinary proceedings pertain to the failure on the part of the appellant to report or obtain approval of the competent authority before acquiring immovable property either in his own name or in the names of other members of his family. It was also found that so far as charge No. 4 in the disciplinary proceedings is concerned, the allegations detailed therein refer to four deposits; whereas the criminal case pertains to several more allegations regarding deposits. The learned single Judge found that the criminal case and the disciplinary proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the case, could not be said to be grounded upon identical set of facts and that the scope of the two proceedings differ vastly. The writ petition was accordingly dismissed. Hence the writ appeal.
5. Before this Court also, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the submissions made by him before the learned single Judge and referred to the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Kusheshwar v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra) in support of his submission. We are afraid we cannot agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the disciplinary proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of this case, require to be stayed pending disposal of the criminal case. It is no longer disputed that disciplinary proceedings and criminal cases can go on simultaneously, depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as noticed by the Supreme Court in the Kusheshwar’s case (supra), Courts will decide whether the disciplinary proceedings should or should not be stayed pending the judicial consideration of the criminal proceedings.
6. In this case, it is not disputed, as indeed it cannot be, that the gravaman of the charges in the disciplinary proceedings pertain to violations of the Conduct Rules which are not the charges in so far as the criminal case is concerned. The violations include the acquisition of immovable property by an employee of the Madras Port Trust either in his own name or in the names of his family members without the prior permission of the competent authority or without reporting the transaction to him. The violation of the Conduct Rules is, therefore, an independent matter as compared to the charges in the criminal case which have been drawn up against the appellant. We are, therefore, not satisfied that this is a fit case in which an injunction should be issued in favour of the appellant to stay the departmental proceedings. We are influenced in taking this view also since we find that the appellant appears to be delaying the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings, which this court had ordered to be expedited in the earlier litigation between the parties, In Writ Petition No. 11063 of 1989 field by the appellant seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the second respondent to permit the appellant to be represented by a legal practitioner in the departmental proceedings, no grievance was made of the nature which has been projected in this writ petition, even though admittedly the criminal case had already been initiated and the disciplinary proceedings had commenced. This only shows that the appellant wants to delay the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings. Though charge No. 4 in the disciplinary proceedings and some of the allegations in the criminal case may overlap, that by itself does not justify the staying of the disciplinary proceedings in toto.
7. The technicality which the learned counsel for the appellant has projected before us in seeking a writ as prayed for is that the appellant in the disciplinary proceedings would have to disclose to some extent his defence which may be prejudicial to him in the criminal case. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the apprehension expressed is rather fanciful and not bona fide. The effort to delay the disposal of the disciplinary proceedings, which are pending for a sufficiently long time, shows that the narrow technicalities on which the appellant seeks to get an order to stay the proceedings in the disciplinary enquiry cannot be allowed, as it would amount to putting premium on dilatory tactics. Under these circumstances, the learned single Judge, in our opinion, was perfectly justified in recording a finding based on the materials before him that there was no justification to stay the disciplinary proceedings. In view of the specific directions given in Writ Appeal No. 144 of 1989 which arose out of the Judgment in Writ Petition No. 329 of 1989 that the disciplinary proceedings should be expedited, we find no reason now to grant the request of the appellant. The writ appeal has no merit. It fails and is dismissed.