ORDER
R. Basant, J.
1. Does Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act oblige the divorce woman to comply with any religious mandate or observances during the period of Iddat? Will a non believer be disentitled to claim amounts under Section 3? These interesting questions arise for consideration in this Revision Petition.
2. This Revision petition is directed against a direction for payment of a total amount of Rs. 129000/- issued to the petitioner by the learned Magistrate under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act. Marriage is admitted. Divorce is also admitted. There is no contention that any amounts have been paid and the liability under Section 3 has been discharged.
3. The petitioner/divorced husband took up a contention that the wife was guilty of improper matrimonial conduct and that she had eloped with another person while the petitioner was employed abroad. The claimant examined herself as PW1. On the side of the petitioner his brother and a friend of his were examined as CP Ws 1 & 2. Exts. Dl to D3 were marked.
4. The learned Magistrate on an anxious consideration of all the relevant inputs came to the conclusion that liability under Section 3 is not discharged and that at any rate the petitioner is liable to pay amounts under Section 3 even accepting all the contentions. The learned Magistrate then proceeded to hold that as maintenance during the period of Iddat @ Rs. 3.000/- per mensem – a total amount of Rs. 9000/- was payable. The court further took the view that a total amount of Rs. 120000/- is payable as fair and reasonable provision and maintenance to the divorced wife.
5. The petitioner claims to be aggrieved by the impugned order Counsel for the rival contestants have advanced their arguments. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the direction for payment of Iddat is not justified in as much as the claimant divorced wife had not observed Iddat. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the woman must observe religious rituals or observances during the period of Iddat and if she does not do the same, she is not entitled to claim maintenance during that period. Section 3 (1)(a) of the Act deals with the liability to pay maintenance during the Iddat period. It is not the law that the lady has to observe any religious rituals or observances during iddat period. Such a conclusion cannot be reached from the plain language of Section 3(1)(a) and the definition of Iddat period in Section 2(b), which I extract below:
Section 3. Mahr or other properties of Muslim woman to be given to her at the time of divorce-
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, a divorced woman shall be entitled to:
(a) a reasonable and fair provision and maintenance to be made and paid to her within the iddat period by her former husband :
S.2: Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires.:
(a) xxx xxx xxx (b) "iddat period" means, in the case of a divorced woman,: (i) three menstrual courses after the date of divorce, if she is subject to menstruation: (ii) three lunar months after her divorce, if she is not subject to menstruation; and (iii) if she is enceinte at the time of her divorce, the period between the divorce and the delivery of her child or the termination of her pregnancy, whichever is earlier:
6. The purpose of Section 3 and the Act is certainly not to compel persons to be religious or observe religious rituals and observances. The secular State was only attempting, by the enactment to ensure that vagrancy was prevented and Muslim husbands also do justice to their divorced wives. The concept of Iddat under the personal law was referred to only to fix the period and not to perpetuate religiosity or religious rituals or observances. This contention must hence fail. Moreover there is no tangible evidence to prove that she had not observed any ritual or observances which she is bound to observe during the period of Iddat as per religious stipulations.
7. The next contention is that the quantum directed to be paid as fair and reasonable provision is not justified. It is excessive, it is contended. The quantum is attacked on two grounds. First of all it is contended that the expression fair and reasonable must have bearing on the nature of conduct which led to the termination of the marriage. Secondly it is contended that the petitioner is without any employment and in these circumstances, he should not have been directed to pay an unreasonable and excessive amount of Rs. 120000/-.
8. It is contended by the petitioner that his wife had eloped with another. Except assertions, there is no satisfactory evidence which can persuade a court to enter a finding of fact in favour of the petitioner on that aspect in this proceedings No specific and acceptable evidence on this aspect is adduced. There is a contention that a criminal case has been launched against the claimant/wife and one Sulaiman. The claimant wife feigns ignorance of such case altogether. I shall assume the worst and conclude that the said assertion of hers was not true. But even that cannot be equated to proof of such improper conduct of elopement by the claimant wife with the said Sulaiman. Thus it remains that there is no satisfactory evidence to prove such theory of elopement by the claimant wife.
9. The learned Magistrate noted that the divorced woman would include a woman who has been divorced by her husband for whatever reasons. The reason for divorce has no bearing on the entitlement of the divorced wife, to claim amounts under Section 3. In these circumstances her status as a divorced wife must be held to be not altered or disturbed even assuming that allegations of adulterous behaviour had led to the proved divorce. Contumacious behaviour in matrimony, which led to divorce, may at worst have a bearing while fixing the quantum of fair and reasonable provision for the divorced wife but cannot affect her status as a divorced wife or her entitlement to fair and reasonable provision. There is no satisfactory proof of such behaviour in this case.
10. The only contention that remains to be considered is that the quantum of amount awarded is excessive. Admittedly the petitioner is employed abroad. There is a contention that after the circumstances which led to the divorce, the petitioner is off his mind and is not able to concentrate on work at his place of employment. The Malayalee community in the locality at the place of employment abroad is looking after and maintaining him, it is urged. This remains in the realm of a fanciful theory suggested in cross examination with nothing tangible to substantiate the same. No conclusions can be drawn or findings entered on the basis of such a theory advanced, which is not substantiated.
11. The court below has not given the break up as to how the court came to the conclusion that an amount of Rs. 120000/- is payable. The court must have been done the same. But that inadequacy does not persuade me at all to interfere with the impugned order. The amount awarded is Rs. 120000/-. The claimant wife has two children born in the wedlock. Remarriage of the divorcee in the Muslim community may be a common event. But with two young children to be looked after, it would certainly be not as easy for the claimant/wife to secure another marriage. Though it is contended that she had eloped with her paramour, there is nothing to show – not even a contention that she has actually been married again to him. Remarriage is not thus proved also.
12. The court below has granted maintenance during the period of Iddat @ Rs. 3000/- per mensem. Against a person employed abroad, such a direction cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be excessive or perverse. The quantum of fair and reasonable provision is thus equivalent to 40 months’ maintenance @ Rs. 3000/-per mensem which is awarded for the period of Iddat. It would be absolutely fair according to me to direct lump sum payment of monthly maintenance for a period of 5 years as fair and reasonable provision under Section 3. An amount of Rs. 120000/- can then be reckoned as maintenance for a period of 5 years @ Rs. 2,000/- per mensem (2,000 x 12 x 5 years). So reckoned, the quantum of maintenance during the period of Iddat or the fair and reasonable provision under Section 3 cannot by any stretch of imagination be held to be excessive or perversely high as to warrant invocation of the revisional jurisdiction of superintendence and correction. The challenge must and does hence fail.
13. This Revision Petition is, in these circumstances, dismissed.