JUDGMENT
Bhawani Singh, J.
1. This revision under Section 24(5) of the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (briefly ‘the Act’), is against the order dated 27-4-1989 passed by Appellate Authority (I), Shimla, confirming the order dated 31-8-1989 passed by the Rent Controller (2), Shimla. Eviction of the petitioner from the premises in dispute has been ordered by both the authorities under the Act, hence the petitioner has challenged the same by way of this revision petition.
2. Briefly stated, the facts are that the landlords (hereinafter referred to as ‘the respodents’) are the owners of the building known as ‘Rattan Deep, Talbot Cottage’, the Mall, Shimla. The petitioner is a tenant under them. He is in occupation of a big room measuring 14′ x 11: 6″ on the first floor with a kitchen 6′ 1″ x 6′.6″ and toilet-cum-bath 6′.7″ x 6′.6″ on a monthly rent of Rs. 23.75 paise in addition to the municipal taxes.
3. The respondents filed a petition under Section 14 of the Act for the eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner was in arrears of rent from 1-3-1977 to 21-7-1987 amounting to Rs. 2683.75 along with 8 per cent municipal taxes, totalling Rs. 214.72 and interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum Rs. 772.92 paise; the total coming to Rs. 3671.39 and that the respondents bona fide required the premises for their own use and occupation and they had not vacated any such residential building without sufficient cause in the urban area of Shimla within five years of the filing of the eviction petition.
4. The case of the petitioner is that he is a contractual tenant on an yearly rent of Rs. 288 and he had paid the rent up to 31-3-1987 in pursuance of the demand notice dated 12-6-1985 along with municipal taxes. The assertion of bona fide need set up by the respondents had been denied. It is stated that the respondents have already sought eviction of another tenant, namely, Dalip Singh, who is occupying almost similar accommodation on the ground floor of the premises. Finally, it is also asserted that the respondents were creating nuisance and were harassing the petitioner.
5. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the Rent Controller framed the following issues : "1. Whether the respondent is in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3671.39 p. i.e. from 1-3-1977 to 31-7-1986 as alleged? OPP. 2. Whether the premises are bona fide required by the petitioners for their personal use and occupation? OPP. 3. Whether the petitioners are not occupying any other residential scheduled building within the urban area and they have not vacated any such premises within five years of the filing of this petition within the Urban Area? OPP. 4. Whether the petitioners is barred by res judicata? OPR. 5. Whether the petitioners are creating nuisance and harassing the respondent, as alleged? If so, to what effect? OPR. 6. Relief."
6. The Real Controller, after the trial, came to the conclusion that the respondents had succeeded in proving their bona fide need of the premises and the eviction of the petitioner was ordered. The tenant appealed against this order to the Appellate Authority (1), Shimla, who also held that the decision of the Rent Controller on issues Nos. 2 and 3 was correct and thus the appeal was dismissed. This is how the matter has come here.
7. Miss Kamlesh Sharma, learned cousel appearing for the petitioner, has assailed the judgment of the courts below on claim of bona fide requirement of the landlords and urged that this Court may also look into the factual aspect of the matter, despite the concurrent findings of facts by the courts below, in the interest of justice, despite the objection of Shri K.D. Sood, appearing for the respondents, insisting that in view of (1988) 2 SCC 172 : (AIR 1988 SC 852) (Hiralal Kapur v. Prabhu Choudhury), (1987) 3 SCC 538 : (AIR 1987 SC 1782) (Helper Girdharbhai v. Saiyed Mohmad Mirasaheb Kadri, (1987) 2 SCC 219 : (AIR 1987 SC 1150) (Sushila Devi v. Avinash Chandra Jain and AIR 1968 Delhi 299 (Sant Ram v. Mekhu Lal & Co.), Reappraisal of evidence was not permissible nor findings of facts could be set aside by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction. However, keeping these limitations in mind and the fact that the jurisdiction of this court is wider in revisions under the Rent Act as compared to Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. I proceed to examine the matter in the light of the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and the evidence on the record of the case in order to examine whether the conclusions arrived at by the courts below are correct.
8. The main emphasis laid by the parties is as to the actual accommodation with the respondents and in order to explain the same, the learned counsel appearing for them referred to Ex. R/2, which is on the record of this case. The petitioner lays complete emphasis on this document for the purpose of accommodation and its measurements but the respondents also accept the same except
as to measurements, nature of the space and utilization thereof, being discussed hereafter.
9. Miss Kamlesh Sharma, on the basis of Ex. R/2, argues that the respondents are in occupation of two rooms measuring 9′ x 14′ and 9′ x 14′ and a dining room measuring 11’x 11′ a kitchen and a bath room on the ground floor and two rooms measuring, 7′ x 11′ and 11’x 11’and a drawing room measuring 18′ x 14′ on the first floor. It is further argued that the room measuring 18′ x 14′ can be divided into two parts, thus making an addition of one room to the premises in occupation of the respondents. It is also argued that the petitioner was prepared to leave the use of the passage marked A-B-C also. It is also stated that the landlords have some accommodation in the celling portion of the house as well. Finally, it is urged that the respondents have already sought eviction of Shri Dalip Singh, one of the tenants, on the ground floor with accommodation to the extent of a big room measuring 14′ x 11′, 6″, kitchen 6′.7″ x 6′.6″ and latrine-cum-bath room 6′.7″ x 6′.6″. These premises are also to be added in 1992 to the accommodation presently in occupation of the respondents.
10. The case of the respondents is that they are in occupation of the western portion of the building consisting of one room measuring 14′ x 12′ on the ground floor and the same has been divided into two parts by a temporary partition (this room has been described as two rooms, measuring 9′ x 14′ each in the arguments of Miss Kamlesh Sharma), one kitchen and one small improvised dining room (described 11’x 11′ above). On the first floor, there is only one drawing room measuring 18′ x 14′ and a small room measuring 7′ x 11′. Thus, total accommodation in their occupation is only 4 rooms with a kitchen and a latrine and that too is situate on the ground floor of the premises and it is being shared by them with the tenant.
11. It is argued by the respondents that the premises which are being used by them as a dining room cannot be counted because it is a space for coming into a room on the ground floor of the premises and due to the nonavailability of proper accommodation, this
space is being used as a dining room provisionally. Same is the case with respect to the partition dividing the rooms on the first floor into two parts so that some more accommodation could be made available for the purpose of an office by one of the landlords, namely, Shri Prikshit Mehdudia, who is a lawyer in the High Court. This arrangement, it is alleged, is also temporary otherwise the space is equivalent to the space described in the ground floor as drawing room. Qua the space A-B-C and the room 11′ x 11′, adjacent to it, it is argued that this space cannot be made use of since it is a passage coming to the two sides of the accommodation on the first floor and going to the ground floor. It is argued that description of some part of this place as room measuring 11′ x 11′ is absolutely incorrect since it is an open space used for coming into adjoining rooms. Therefore, in nutsheil, the argument is that there are, in fact, only 4 rooms (if space described as 9′ x 14′ and 9′ x 14′ in the ground floor is counted as two in the occupation of the respondents since rest of the provisions provided are thoroughly temporary and provisional. Regarding the rooms from which tenant Dalip Singh has been evicted, it is contended that the premises are likely to be obtained in 1992 and even if the same are annexed, the premises needed by the respondents fall short of their reasonable requirements and the portion of the ceiling is being used only as a godown and for storing articles. These are the respective submissions of the learned counsel for the parties made in this case.
12. There is no dispute between the parties that the landlords are five in number. They are Smt. Prem Lata, widow, and her sons, Shri Abhey Kumar (2), Shri Prikshit Kumar, Advocate (27), Shri Sujay Sood (23) and Shri Rahul Kumar (21). There is also no dispute that Shri Abhey Kumar is likely to be married in October 1989 but the dispute is as to the place of his living. The petitioner submits that Shri Abhey Kumar is working in Delhi whereas the landlords say that he is working at Shimla, However, it is not stated by the petitioner that after the marriage he will stay in Delhi. Moreover, no cogent and
convincing evidence has been led on this point. Therefore, it is quite believable that he is working at Shimla and after marriage he will live in these premises and, therefore, in that situation, he will require at least two rooms in these premises.
13. Shri Prikshit Kumar is an Advocate. He too is of marriageable age. It is stated that immediately after the marriage of his elder brother, his marriage too is on the cards. Besides, a Lawyer obviously requires a separate room to be used as office to meet his clients. Therefore, a landlord placed in such a situation, reasonably requires three rooms for his living. Other two landlords Sujay and Rahul are also quite grown up. Their requirement can reasonably be placed in near future to be to the extent of two rooms each. Their mother, will naturally occupy one room in the premises. Thus seen, the present requirement of the landlords can be reasonably placed at 8 rooms and in near future the same is placed to be about 10 rooms. So, eight rooms can be said to be their minimum reasonable requirement for the present. The appellate Authority has rightly excluded rooms (measuring 11′ x 11′ and 11’x 11′), marked ‘E’ as well as marked ‘D’ from the calculation because they are simply passages leading to the adjoining accommodation and it has been rightly observed that if the space has been used in some way; that does not mean that a complete room is formed out of such a use. According to the Appellate Authority, the respondents have a hall 18′ x 14′ and a room 7′ x 11′ (first floor), one room partitioned into two rooms of 9′ x 14′ (ground floor). Rest of the accommodation urged by the petitioner to be included, has been rightly left out by the Appellate Authority.
14. It has been contended that the future requirement of the landlords cannot be taken into consideration while assessing the requirement of the landlords by the Court. This argument is not at all tenable, On the one hand, the petitioner wants the premises with Shri Dalip Singh tenant to be counted towards the accommodation of the respondents even if they are to fall vacant on 31-12-1992 and on the other hand insists that the future requirement of the landlords should
not be taken into consideration. This issue was raised before the authorities below but the same was rejected. In my opinion. This approach of the authorities was perfectly justifiable and legally permissible. The present as well as near future requirement of the landlord has to be taken into consideration in order to determine his bona fide requirement for more accommodation. The requirement of the landlord for additional accommodation has to be seen on the principle of reasonable accommodation for living and it cannot be contended by the tenant that the landlord must live in a particular accommodation and in a manner suggested by him. In view of the conclusion that the present and future requirement of the landlords is bona fide, the submission of Miss Kamlesh Sharma that the landlords want accommodation for comfortable living is not correct, rather the requirement is only to provide for habitat for themselves (See (1986) 4 SC 736 : (AIR 1987 SC 741), Amarjit Singh v. Smt. Khatoon Quamarain) Future requirement had essentially to be taken into consideration while examining the case (See AIR 1976 Punjab Haryana 107 J.G. Kohli v. The Financial Commissioner Haryana Chandigarh, AIR 1977 Himachal Pradesh 21. Ran Singh v. Sagar Chand. AIR 1989 Calcutta 14, Mono Rartjan dasqupt v. Suchitra Ganquly and 1979 (2) RLR 327. Ishwar Dutt v. Duni Chand Bhoil) and the rent authorities have also to notice and take into consideration the facts and circumstances which come to its notice during the trial of the case (See 1980 (1) RCJ 197, Shri Harbans Singh v. Shri Gurdas Mal Mittaland AIR 1988 SC 1422, Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander.
15. The judgment under appeal discloses an exhaustive analysis and examination of the matter by the Appellate Authority and I am of the opinion that the inferences drawn or the conclusions arrived at are perfectly in tune with the evidence on record and the legal principles applicable in such cases. I also arrive at the same conclusion after hearing the learned counsel for the parties, examination of the matter and the evidence of the parties to which reference was insisted.
16. No other point was argued by any of the learned counsel for the parties.
17. The conclusion, therefore, is that the landlords have clearly established their bona fide requirement in this case. There is, therefore, no merit in this revision petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner is given three months time to put the respondents in possession of the premises in his occupation. The parties are left to bear their own costs.