JUDGMENT
Anand Byrareddy, J.
1. The appeal is filed against that portion of the common order allowing I.A. No. IV filed by respondent, who was the defendant before the Trial Court.
2. Sri H.S. Dwarakanath, appearing for the appellant, would contend that the appellant is the plaintiff before the Trial Court. The plaintiff claims that he has put up structures over the suit land. The defendants sought to interfere with his possession and sought to demolish the structures and it is in this circumstances that the suit was filed along with I.A. No. II seeking an order of injunction restraining the respondents from interfering with his possession and I.A. No. III restraining them from demolishing the structures in the suit property. Respondent 2, who claimed as an agreement holder, to purchase a portion of the suit property, had, in turn, filed an application numbered as I.A. No. IV seeking a restraint against the appellant from putting up construction. The Trial Court granted both the applications in favour of the plaintiff, restraining the defendants from interfering with his possession and from demolishing the structures. However, the plaintiff was also restrained from carrying on with any construction activity on the suit property.
3. The appellant questions the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain LA. No. IV at the instance of respondent 2. He relies on the judgment of this Court in G. Veerabhadmppa v. Mayappa wherein it has been held that it is only Sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of Order 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘CPC’ for short) that any party could be restrained by means of an order of temporary injunction, which clearly presupposes that either the plaintiff or the defendant could file an application against either party under this particular Sub-clause. Sub-clauses (b) and (c) of Order 39, Rule 1 of the CPC as also Order 39, Rule 2 of the CPC enable the Court to grant injunction against the defendant restraining the defendant from committing any acts mentioned therein. The words “any party” occurring in Sub-clause (a) of Rule 1 of the CPC does not find a place in these rules. Therefore, it is clear that it is only the plaintiff, who can seek redress against the defendant having regard to the plain meaning of the Rules. By no means is the defendant able to obtain an order of injunction under these very sub-rules, and therefore would contend, that as I.A. No. IV filed by respondent 2 does not arise out of the pleadings of the appellant and that since the prayer was beyond the scope of the suit and since such a prayer was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, the defendants were not entitled for any relief, as the relief prayed for by respondent does not arise out of the same cause of action as that of the plaintiff and hence the Trial Court has committed an error.
4. Per contra, the Counsels for respondent 2 would seek to support the order of the Trial Court in IA. No. IV.
5. To appreciate the contention of the appellant, the case-law cited by the appellant needs to be examined. The facts in the case decided in the case of G. Veerabhadrappa, the suit was for specific performance of agreement. During the pendency of the suit, the defendant filed an application seeking for grant of temporary injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession. The application being rejected, the same was carried in appeal before the Civil Judge, who set aside the order and granted an injunction in favour of the defendant, restraining the plaintiff from interfering with his possession. The plaintiff then preferred a revision petition, which was considered by this Court. After examining Sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC, this Court held that it is only under Sub- clause (a) of Rule 1 of the CPC that the defendant could maintain an application and in the circumstances, spelt out thereunder, that the alleged circumstances pleaded by the defendant not falling under the said Sub-clause, the application by the defendant was not maintainable.
6. In the case of Suganda Bai v. Sulu Bai and Ors. 1975(1) Kar. LJ. 96 : AIR 1975 Kant 137 in a case where the plaintiff brought; a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the possession in the year 1970, the plaintiff did not pursue the application for temporary injunction. In the year 1973, during the pendency of the suit, the defendant made an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC seeking temporary injunction restraining the plaintiff from interfering with the defendant’s possession. The Trial Court allowed the application, against which a revision petition was filed before this Court. This Court, while reiterating the principles as regards the right of a defendant to seek an interim injunction against the plaintiff, as stated in Collision v. Warren (1901) 1 Ch. 812 : 76 LJ Ch. 382 and (1824) 2 Ch. 541, 63 LJ Ch 723, namely, that it is only in cases where the defendant’s claim to relief arose out of the plaintiffs cause of action or is incidental to it, that he can ask for a temporary injunction against the plaintiff. This Court found that in the given case, the cause of action for the plaintiffs suit arose in the year 1970 whereas the cause of action for the defendant’s suit arose in the year 1973 and therefore held, that the Trial Court had erred in granting an order of injunction. The principle laid down in this judgment was referred for reconsideration to a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramaiah and Ors. v. Godappa and Ors. (DB) and this Court held that the view taken was in line with the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal .
7. Hence, it is to be examined with reference to the facts of the present case whether the respondent 2 could maintain an application seeking an order restraining the plaintiff from putting up further construction in the suit property, in the circumstances of the present case.
8. It is averred that the respondent 2 had sought for the relief of injunction on the contention that the appellant’s father had entered into an agreement of sale and had executed incidental documents, under which the said respondent was claiming an interest over the suit property and therefore was entitled to an order of injunction restraining the appellants from carrying on any construction activity in the suit property. It cannot therefore be said that the relief claimed would be covered in the circumstances contemplated under Sub-clause (a) of Rule 1, Order 39 of the CPC. It would possibly fall under Sub-clause (c) of Rule 1 and hence, it may be said that the defendant is not entitled to file an application against the plaintiff in the circumstances enumerated therein and it cannot be said that the cause of action for the defendant’s prayer arises out of the cause of action of the appellant.
9. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order passed on I.A. No. IV is set aside.