JUDGMENT
T.S. Thakur, J.
1. Dismissal of two earlier writ petitions filed by the petitioner has not deterred the petitioner from filing the present writ petition to challenge the legality of the acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents. What is significant is that the Special Leave Petitions filed against the orders passed by this order were also dismissed by the Supreme Court both on the ground of limitation as also on merits. The finality thus attained by the orders notwithstanding the petitioner seeks to re-agitate the issues touching the validity of the proceedings in the present third round of litigation. The controversy arises in the following circumstances:
2. By a composite notification dated 27th September, 2000 issued under Section 4 and 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, land measuring 18 bigha and 13 biswa situate in Survey No. 270 of Village Bahapur, Delhi owned by the petitioner trust was notified for acquisition for the public purpose of providing housing accommodation to government servants. A Declaration under Section 6 was pursuant to the said notification was issued on 9.4.2001. Aggrieved by the said notifications, the petitioner trust filed WP(C) No. 6384/2000 in this Court during the pendency whereof it moved an application before the Lieutenant Governor seeking de-notification and release of the land. When the filing of the said application was brought to the notice of the court hearing the writ petition, it passed an interim order on 4th July, 2006 to the following effect:
The learned Counsel for the petitioners submits that he has moved an application before the Lt. Governor for de-notification of the land sought to be acquired. The said representation is stated to be still pending before the Lt. Governor. The learned Counsel for the respondent states that a decision on petitioners’ representation shall be taken expeditiously, not later than 7.8.2006. This decision shall also be communicated to the petitioners within two weeks from the date of the decision. The said decision by way of an affidavit be placed on record before the next date of hearing.
3. The prayer for de-notification of the land was pursuant to the above direction examined by the respondents but declined in terms of an order dated 21.8.06. The relevant portion of the order refusing to denotify the land reads as under:
The land in question has been inspected by the staff of the department and it was found that the two Banquet Halls were running their business on the open space which was meant for school playground. Since the society has blatantly violated the undertaking given earlier and also that the land is still required for the purpose of which it was notified, the representation of the society for de-notification of land was considered and it rejected by the competent authority.
4. Writ petition No. 6384/2000 was then heard and dismissed by a Division Bench of this Court comprising Mukul Mudgal and S. Muralidhar, JJ. who took the view that a prayer for de-notification of the land before the Govt. tantamounted to giving up the challenge to the validity of the impugned notification. The court observed:
During the pendency of the writ petition, the petitioner opted to seek de-notification of the land in question by filing an application in terms of Section 48 of the Act. Therefore, clearly, the petitioner gave up its challenge to the validity of the notification under challenge.
5. The Court on the above reasoning held that the writ petition no longer survived for consideration and dismissed the petition giving liberty to the petitioner to seek whatever remedies were available to it as regards the rejection of its request for de-notification. The operative portion of the order passed by the court reads as under:
In view of the request for de-notification having been declined, the present petition no longer survives. It is always open to the petitioner to seek whatever remedies are available to it in law as regards the rejection of its request for de-notification.
Accordingly this writ petition is dismissed. However, interim order passed on 23.10.2000 by this Court shall continue for one week from today, i.e., till 29.08.2006.
6. Pursuant to the liberty given to it, the petitioner filed WP(C) No. 13653-54/06 challenging the order passed by the Government declining to denotify the land under Section 48. That petition was dismissed by us by an order dated 18th September, 2007. This Court took the view that Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act did not create any enforceable right in the owner of the property to demand de-notification of the land and that the request for de-notification had been properly considered and rejected which rejection was not vitiated by any perversity to warrant interference from this Court. The court observed:
Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act is, in our opinion, a provision that simply enables the government to withdraw from acquisition of any property at any time before taking possession of the same. It does not create any enforceable legal right in the owner of the property to demand de-notification of the land. That apart, the request for de-notification made by the petitioner appears to have been considered and declined for reasons which are neither irrelevant nor irrational or perverse to warrant any interference from this Court.
7. Learned Counsel for the petitioner, however, sought leave of the court to seek such remedy as may be open to it in law against the earlier order passed by the Division Bench in WP(C) No. 6384/2000 either by way of an appeal or a review petition which liberty was granted subject to all just exceptions including limitation. A review petition was then filed by the petitioner to seek recall of the order dated 22nd August, 2006 in WP(C) No. 6384/2000. The said petition also failed and was dismissed by a Division Bench comprising Mukul Mudgal and S. Muralidhar, JJ. by an order dated 12th October, 2007. The petitioner then filed three Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court against the three orders passed by this Court in WP(C) Nos. 6384/2000, 13653-54/2006 and Review Application No. 380/2007 in WP(C) No. 6384/2000 . All these petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court by an order dated 23rd November, 2007 to the following effect:
UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following ORDER
SLP(C) No. …CC 11030/2007 : The special leave petition is dismissed on the ground of delay as well as on merits.
SLP(C) No. 21346-21347 of 2007 : The special leave petitions are dismissed on merits.
(A.D. Sharma) (Phoolan Wati Arora) Court Master Court Master 8. The present writ petition has now been filed by the petitioner once again challenging the validity of the acquisition proceedings.
9. Appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Parekh strenuously argued that since the validity of the acquisition proceedings had not been examined by this Court in the earlier rounds of litigation, it was legally open to the petitioner to maintain the present writ petition and have the legality of the proceedings tested. He submitted that an action for acquisition of land in exercise of powers of eminent domain could not be said to have been given up without examining the legality of such action for otherwise it would amount to approving any legal usurpation of the property owned by an individual. He further contended that an act of a court could never leave a person without a remedy and that a writ court could prevent miscarriage of justice by invoking its inherent powers. The challenge was not according to Mr. Parekh barred even by the principles of res judicata or waiver or any such analogous principle in the present case as the challenge to the validity of the acquisition proceedings had not been examined or determined on merits in the earlier round of litigation.
10. On behalf of the respondents, it was per contra argued by Mr. Poddar that the present writ petition was wholly misconceived in as much as a second petition on the very same subject matter was not legally maintainable. He submitted that the challenge to the acquisition proceedings having failed in the earlier round of litigation and the order of dismissal passed by this Court having been upheld by the apex court, there was no justification for the petitioner to re-agitate the same question on a fresh ground. Relying upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh 1992 (Suppl.) 3 SCC 62 and Harjeet Singh @ Seeta v. State of Punjab and Anr. , he argued that this Court could neither sit in judgment nor find fault with the view taken by a Bench of coordinate jurisdiction and that judicial discipline required adherence to the doctrine of finality of decisions.
11. We have given our careful consideration to the submissions made at the Bar. The notification impugned in the present petition was admittedly challenged even in WP(C) No. 6384/2000. That challenge had eventually failed and the petition dismissed. The court had taken the view that filing of a petition for de-notification of land under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act tantamounted to giving up the challenge to the validity of the notification although the petitioner could question the decision of the Government whereby it had declined to denotify the land. The petitioner, it is noteworthy had not found fault with that reasoning. It accepted the view that filing of a petition for de-notification tantamounted to accepting the validity of the acquisition proceedings. It had, therefore, challenged the refusal of the Government to denotify the land in WP(C) No. 13653-54/06. Unfortunately for it, the said petition also failed. The petitioner then went back to the court that had dismissed the earlier writ petition in a bid to persuade it to review the order of dismissal and look into the validity of the acquisition proceedings. That petition was also dismissed thereby leaving no option for the petitioner to challenge the validity of the dismissal order in the Supreme Court. Even that attempt proved abortive for the petitioner. The dismissal of the Special Leave Petitions against all the three orders passed by this Court gave a quietus to the controversy. It shut out the challenge to the acquisition proceedings as also the refusal of the Government to denotify the land. Such being the position, there is no legal principle on which the petitioner can file a second petition to reagitate the very same controversy. It is trite that the matters that have been finally settled cannot be reopened in a subsequent proceeding for there can be no finality to judicial adjudications if legal proceedings could be instituted consecutively one after the other on the same subject matter and cause of action. The legal position in this regard is so well settled that we need not refer to decisions to support the same. Reference to State of UP and Anr. v. Labh Chand should in our view suffice where the court observed the principles of finality of decisions and the doctrine of res judicata apart. Judicial discipline requires the Court to respect the decision delivered by a court of coordinate jurisdiction. We need only add that this Court is not in the present proceedings sitting in appeal over the view taken by another Bench of coordinate jurisdiction. It would, therefore, be legally impermissible and indeed judicially improper to comment on the view taken by the Bench hearing WP(C) No. 6384/2000 that the filing of an application for de-notification of the land under Section 48 has the legal effect of giving up the challenge to the validity of the acquisition proceedings. The following passage from the decision of the Supreme Court in Vikramjit Singh’s Case (supra) on the jurisdiction of a Bench of a coordinate jurisdiction to make observations regarding decision delivered by another bench, is instructive:
No bench can comment on the functioning of a co-ordinate bench of the same court, much less sit in judgment as an appellate court over its decision. That which could not be done directly could also not be done indirectly. Otherwise, a party aggrieved by an order passed by one bench of the High Court would be tempted to attempt to get the matter reopened before another bench, and there would not be any end to such attempts. Besides, it was not consistent with the judicial discipline which must be maintained by courts both in the interest of administration of justice by assuring the binding nature of an order which becomes final, and the faith of the people in the judiciary.
12. To the same effect is the decision in Harjeet Singh’s Case (Supra) relied upon by Mr. Poddar.
13. In the circumstances, therefore, we see no room for any interference with the acquisition proceedings the validity whereof stands concluded by the orders already passed by this Court and upheld by the Supreme Court.
14. This writ petition accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed but in the circumstances without any orders as to costs.