JUDGMENT
J.M. James, J.
1. The first accused, Baiju, in C.C.No. 34/99, on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Thodupuzha, was convicted and sentenced, along with four other accused, to undergo simple imprisonment for three months each for the offence under Sections 143 and 447 IPC, and simple imprisonment for six months each for the offence punishable under Sections 148 and 324 IPC. No separate sentence was awarded for the offence under Section 147 IPC, though found guilty. All the five accused were also directed to pay an amount of Rs. 1000/- each to PWs. 1 and 2, the injured, as compensation, with the default sentence of simple imprisonment for a further period of two months each. The substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. The findings of the trial court were challenged in Crl.A.Nos. 18/2003 and 36/2003, the former by the 5th accused, and the latter by accused 1 to 4, before the Additional Sessions Court, Thodupuzha. The appellate court found accused 4 and 5 not guilty of the offence, and, therefore, they were acquitted. However, the conviction and sentence in respect of accused 1 to 3 were confirmed. Hence, the first accused preferred this revision.
2. During the pendency of the revision, Crl.M.A.No. 1438/2006 had been filed stating that the injured, PWs. 1 and 2, Job in and Renjith, had compounded the offence with the revision petitioner-first accused, and, therefore, they sought permission of the court to compound the matter. Counsel, Sri. P. Dalbi Emmanuel, appeared for the de facto complainants.
3. I heard the counsel on either side. I have gone through the principles contained under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, in short ‘the Code’. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 of the Code contains the offence that could be compounded and the persons by whom, it could be done. Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code, further state the offence which could be compounded with the permission of the Court. As stated above, Section 447 of the Indian Penal Code, in short ‘the Penal Code’, is compoundable under Sub-section (1) of Section 320 of the Code, and Section 324 of the Penal Code is compoundable with the permission of the court under Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code. However, Sections 143, 147 and 148 of the Penal Code are not included either under Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) of Section 320 of the Code.
4. The question, therefore, arise for consideration is, when the parties to the proceedings are willing to settle the matter or an injured person compound the matter with the assailant, and such other offence with which the accused charged, do not fall within Section 320(1) or (2) of the Code, whether that offence could be compounded at the instance of the affected person(s).
5. The Apex Court had an occasion to consider in B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. (2003) 4 SCC 675, the question about the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code read with Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, to quash the criminal proceedings, when the parties have settled the matter among themselves, although the sections of offence, Sections 498 A and 406 IPC, do not fall within Section 320 of the Code. Interpreting the position laid down in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra , as well as Section 482 of the Code, and Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the Apex Court was of the view that, if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power. The Court also laid down in State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy , that the inherent power of quashing a criminal proceedings under Section 482 of the Code, in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require.
6. In Ettoop v. Kunhikannan , this Court had an occasion to consider the compounding of the offence under Section 341 and 506(ii) of the Penal Code. While Section 341 of the Penal Code is compoundable under Section 320(1) of the Code, Section 506(ii) is non compoundable, ‘except when the offence is punishable with imprisonment for seven years’. The punishment for Section 506(ii) of the Penal Code, prescribed under the First Schedule of the Cr.P.C. is imprisonment for seven years or fine or both. Thus, Section 506(ii) of the Penal Code is non compoundable. However, considering the principles contained in the authorities laid down by the Apex Court, this Court had quashed the proceedings, considering the fact that the parties have settled the matter among themselves.
7. Accepting the principles contained in Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, (supra) and Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia and Ors. v. Sambhajirao Chandrajirao Angre and Ors. , the Apex Court held in B.S. Joshi and Ors. v. State of Haryana and Anr. cited above, that, while exercising the inherent power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint vested in Section 482 of the Code or the extra ordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case, whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. It was also held therein that even if the prosecution is allowed to continue, and the chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak, absolutely no useful purpose would then be served by keeping the complaint on the file of the court below.
8. In Y. Suresh Babu v. State of A.P. (2005) SCC (Cri) 320, the Apex Court had another occasion to consider the compounding of the offence under Section 326 of the Penal Code. The trial court convicted the accused to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. But the parties have amicably settled the matter among themselves. When this matter was brought to the notice of the Apex Court, Special Leave was granted to the parties to compound the offence, on condition of the appellant-accused paying an amount of Rs. 10,000/- to the second respondent herein, who had sustained a physical injury in the occurrence, and with that condition of deposit, the appellant-accused was enlarged on bail, and the matter was allowed to be compounded.
9. In yet another case, Badrllal v. State of M.P. 2005 SCC (Cri) 1597, the Apex Court had dealt with the compounding of the offence under Section 307 IPC read with Section 34 IPC. There the accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for ten years. In appeal, the High Court, though upheld the conviction, had reduced the sentence from ten years to six years. The Apex Court granted Special Leave. Meanwhile, the accused had already undergone the sentence for 14 months. A joint petition for compromise had been filed on behalf of the parties, but not allowed to be compounded, as Section 307 of IPC is non compoundable. However, accepting, the settled position of law that while awarding the sentence, compromise could be taken into consideration, the period of 14 months already undergone by the accused, was held to be adequate, and the appellant-accused was, therefore, acquitted.
10. The degree of wrong done to the State through the commission of an offence appears to be the basis whether the offence would be compoundable or not compoundable. Petty wrongs done to citizens which do not seriously affect the interest of the community or the State are generally compoundable by the injured parties, without reference to the State. Where an injury to the State is recognised, and the State considers it expedient in a given case, on the basis of discretion exercised by the judicial authority, to permit the aggrieved party to compound the offence, the Court grants sanction for such compounding. Generally, the broad principles that form the basis of the Scheme and Objects of Section 320 of the Code, inter alia, to compound certain offence and not to allow to compound other offence, are based primarily and essentially whether the offence committed is of private in nature and relatively not serious. Some of the authors have suggested that all those offence, where the punishment prescribed do not exceed imprisonment of three years, could be allowed to be compounded. But there are also opposite and varied views on such principle of generalisation.
11. It can safely be concluded that where the interest of the public are not rightly affected, the complainant may be permitted to come to a compromise with the party, against whom he had originally complained of, and the offence being those mentioned under Section 320 of the Code. But in case of non compoundable offence, and not mentioned under Section 320 of the Code, the Court should consider the facts and circumstances of each case and allow the parties to compromise, thereby to restore an amicable and harmonious relationship between the parties, which otherwise would likely to result in an enduring feud. In view of the above basic principles laid down by the Apex Court, as well as to maintain amity and harmony among the persons involved in a crime, it is necessary for the Court to grant permission to compound the offence, even if they are not compoundable as per the procedure, and also that such offence does not seriously affect the interest of the public at large.
12. In the case at hand, Sections 143, 147 and 148 of the Penal Code are the offence that are alleged in the crime, and, therefore, are not compoundable under Section 320 of the Code. However, as the parties have settled the matter among themselves, and in the light of the foregone discussions, I permit them to compound the offence, as the offence do not affect any one else, other than Pws.1 and 2 as well as the accused in the case.
13. In the result, Crl.R.P. is allowed. The conviction and sentence passed against the revision petitioner-first accused under Sections 143, 147 and 148 of the Penal Code are set aside. Sections 447 and 324 of the Penal Code have already been compounded by the parties. Thus, the revision petitioner-accused is acquitted of all the offence alleged against him, under Section 320(8) of the Code.