ORDER
Janarthanam, J.
1. M/s. Chemicals & Plastics India Ltd., Madras-86 (petitioner in all W.Ps.) is a public limited company, registered under the Companies Act, 1956, carrying on, inter alia, business in the manufacture of Chemicals and Plastics such as polyvinyl chloride, compounds etc. The petitioner, it is said, for the purpose of manufacturing the above chemicals and plastics had large plants and machineries, storage facilities, equipments etc., in a large area of land, totally measuring 1,261 grounds and 1,030 sq.ft., in Mettur Dam, R.S., falling within Mettur Taluk, Salem District. The said area, it is said, had been divided into four blocks, namely, Block No. 61(2A), Block No. 61(2B), Block No. 62(1) and Block No. 64(1).
2. The Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Act, 1966, (Tamil Nadu Act XII of 1966 – for short ‘the Act’) had been extended to Mettur Municipality by the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Amendment Act, 1991 (Tamil Nadu Act I of 1992), which must be deemed to have come into force on and from first July, 1991. After the coming into force of the said Act, the petitioner was stated to have filed individual returns in respect of the aforesaid four blocks under Section 7-D of the Act.
3. The Special Tahsildar (Urban Land Tax, Mettur (respondent in all W.Ps.), on perusal of the returns so received, passed individual assessment orders of even date, namely, 15.6.1993 in Case Nos. 139 (Block No. 61(2A), 140 (Block No. 61(2B), 141 (Block No. 62(1) and 142 (Block No. 64(1) levying urban land tax on and from fasli 1401, determining the market value at Rs. l6,800. Subsequently, the petitioner was stated to have received a notice dated 6.7.1993 from the respondent in all the four cases under Section 32(1) of the Act seeking to revise the assessments on the ground of 40% concession extended instead of 10% concession.
4. The petitioner was stated to have submitted a reply dated 20.7.1993 to the respondent objecting to the proposal for suo motu revision of assessment, after the assessment orders had been passed. After taking into consideration the objections, the respondent passed revised assessment orders in all those four individual cases of even date, namely 27.8.1993 and intimated the petitioner that an appeal against the levy of urban land taxin those orders lie to the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Tribunal (for short ‘Tribunal’) under Section 20(1) (a) of the Act within thirty days from the date of receipt of those orders.
5. The petitioner, without resorting to file appeals before the Tamil Nadu Urban Land Tax Tribunal, resorted to the present actions praying for issue of writs of certiorarified mandamus to quash those orders and direct the respondent to determine the market value of the land at Rs. 2,400 per ground, contending that the market value of the land had been determined much against the settled principles of law, besides stating that the appeal remedy, as had been provided under Section 20 of the Act is rather onerous and illusory, in the sense of an appeal not having been entertained, unless urban land tax levied is paid.
6. The petitioner also filed W.M.P. Nos. 30090 to 30093 of 1993 praying for interim stay of those orders pending disposal of these writ petitions.
7. When these writ petitions, along with W.M.Ps., came up for admission to-day (28.10.1993), this Court, directed Mr. T. Ayyasamy, learned Government Advocate (Taxes) to take notice and he accordingly did so, and arguments of either learned Counsel were heard.
8. There is no pale of controversy that as against the impugned individual assessment orders, the petitioner did not at all file appeals before the tribunal and instead the present actions had been resorted to. The reasons given for not availing of the statutory remedy of appeal as has been provided under Section 20 of the Act, is that such appeal provision is rather illusory and not efficacious for the reason of casting an undue burden on the shoulders of the affected party like the petitioner, in the sense of being required to pay the tax assessed before ever the appeals are entertained.
9. No doubt true it is that the proviso adumbrated to Sub-section (1) (b) of Section 20 of the Act prescribes that no appeal shall lie, unless urban land tax levied has been paid before the appeal is filed. To avail of the statutory remedy of appeal, as had been provided under the Act, it is but necessary for the petitioner to pay the tax assessed, before ever the appeals are entertained by the competent authority. The fact that the payment of tax for availing of this statutory remedy of appeal is rather burdensome is not at all a ground to be taken into consideration for allowing the petitioner to resort to knock at the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thereby short-circuiting the statutory remedy of appeal provided under the Act. So long as such a statutory provision is available in the Act, it cannot at all be stated that such a provision casts a heavy burden to pay tax before ever the appeals are entertained and therefore, such a remedy of appeal is rather illusory and not efficacious.
10. In a taxing statute like the present Act, there is no question of any emotive appeal of harshness of the provisions casting undue burden on the shoulders of the assessee. The plain meaning of the statutory provisions must be strictly adhered to by the court without having any sway or consideration, other than the explicit provisions adumbrated therein.
11. At this juncture, the interpretative approach to be adopted in respect of a taxing statute may be referred to and the same is getting revealed by the classic statement of Rowlatt, J., in Cape Brapdy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commrs. (1921) 1 K.B. 64 at 71 and the Apex Court of this country had an occasion to refer to and extract such a classic statement in paragraph (8) of its decision in the case of the Commissioner of Income-tax, Patiala v. M/s. Shahzada Nand & Sons and it runs as under:
In a Taxing Act one has to look merely at what is clearly said. There is no room for any intendment. There is no equity about a tax. There is no presumption as to a tax. Nothing is to be read in, nothing is to be implied. One can only look fairly at the language used.
To this may be added a rider in a case of reasonable doubt the construction most beneficial to the subject is to be adopted. But even so, the fundamental rule of construction is the same for all statutes, whether fiscal or otherwise.
The underlying principle is that the meaning and intention of a statute must be collected from the plain and unambiguous expression used therein rather than from any notions which may be entertained by the court as to what is just or expedient.
12. The Supreme Court, in the process of consideration of the duty of the Court to interpretation of statute and dealing with the effect and importance of the maxim “ut res magis valeai quam poreat” in the case of The Commissioner of Sales Tea, U.P. v. Manual Sen Shyam Lal, A.L.R. 1975 S.C. 1106 at paragraph 27 said thus:
A statute is supposed to be an authentic repository of the legislative will and the function of a court is to interpret it “according to the intent of them that made it.” From that function, the court is not to resile. It has to abide by the maxim ut res magis valeatquam pereot, lest the intention of the legislature may go in vain or be left to evaporate into thin A.I.R. Where that intent is clearly expressed in the language of the Act, there is little difficulty in giving effect to it, But where such intent is covert and couched in language which is imperfect, imprecise and deficient, or is ambiguous or enigmatic and external aids to interpretation are few, scanty and indeterminate, the court may, despite application of all its experience, ingenuity and ratiocination, find itself in a position no better than that of a person solving a cross word puzzle with a few given hints and hunches. In such a situation, a’ mere reference to the High Court of a question for opinion may not afford an adequate solution. Only Legislative amendment may furnish an efficacious and speedy remedy.
13. With the rules of construction, as extracted above, in mind, the facts of these actions, if scanned and sifted, it goes without saying that the legislative intent, as had been clearly expressed under Section 20 of the Act must have to be given effect to, without any reservation whatever and if this Court resorted to entertain these actions, by short-circuiting the statutory remedy, as had been provided under the Act, it would tantamount to give a go-by to the statutory provisions thus adumbrated under the Act, in the sense that exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, can go to the extent of violating such a clear statutory provision.
14. In this view of the matter, all these writ petitions deserve to be dismissed, even at the admission stage and they are accordingly dismissed. Consequently, W.M.Ps. are also dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs, in the circumstances.