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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1027 OF 2001
Maruthi Jaiwant Nakadi ...
Appellant
VERSUS
Eknath G. Navarekar(Dead) By L.Rs. & Ors. ....
Respondents
JUDGMENT
TARUN CHATTERJEE, J.
1) This appeal by special leave arises from the
judgment and order dated 4th June, 1998 passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in
LRRP No. 1960 of 1989, whereby the High Court
had allowed the Petition filed by the
Landlords/Respondents, under Section 121A of the
Karnataka Land Reform Act,1961(in short `the Act’)
setting aside the orders passed by the Additional
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Land Reforms Appellate Authority, Sirsi and the
Land Tribunal, Halyala.
2) The Tenant/Appellant in this appeal, claiming to be
the tenant of Block No. 20 measuring 11 acres and
17 guntas of Kumbarkoppa Village in Haliyal
Taluk (hereinafter referred to as `land in question’),
filed an application in Form No. 7 before the Land
Tribunal, Halyala claiming occupancy rights under
the Act. In his application it was alleged that he
was cultivating the land in question for many
years and was paying rent on crop share basis. It
was further alleged by the tenant/Appellant that
since the Landlords/Respondents never stayed in
the Kumbarkoppa Village, the question of
cultivating the land in question by them would not
arise at all. Accordingly, the appellant prayed for
an order of occupancy right in respect of the land
in question on the aforesaid allegations.
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3) The Landlords/Respondents denied the material
allegations made in the application filed by the
Tenant/Appellant, inter alia, alleging that the land
in question was never leased to anybody and was
cultivated through coolies, even the revenue
records from the year 1956 onwards showed the
names of the landlords themselves and the mode of
cultivation as No.2, i.e. through hired labourers.
Accordingly, Landlords/Respondents prayed for
rejection of the application filed by the appellant
claiming occupancy rights in respect of the land in
question.
4) By an order dated 6th of December,1998, the Land
Tribunal, Halyala allowed the application of the
tenant/Appellant holding that it was the appellant
who continued to cultivate the land in question
and therefore entitled to claim occupancy rights.
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5) Feeling aggrieved, the Landlords/Respondents filed
an appeal before the Appellate Authority, Sirsa
which dismissed the appeal of the Landlords/
Respondents and confirmed the grant of
occupancy rights relating to the land in question in
favour of the tenant/Appellant inter alia holding
that :-
1) The Landlords/Respondents could not prove by
cogent and sufficient evidence that they were in
cultivation of the land in question;
2) The presumption of the entry in the record of rights
stood rebutted by the oral evidence of the
tenant/appellant;
3) The admission of the Landlords/Respondents that
they were not staying in the Kumbarkoppa village would
itself be sufficient to grant occupancy rights in favour of
the appellant.
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6) Aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority,
the Landlords/Respondents filed a revision petition
under Section 121A of the Act which came to be
registered as No. 1960 of 1989 before the High
Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. The High Court,
by the impugned judgment, had set aside the
concurrent findings of fact of the Tribunals below
and thereby allowed the application by the
landlords/respondents under Section 121A of the
Act and rejected the application of
tenant/appellant for grant of occupancy rights in
respect of the land in question. It was, inter alia,
held in the impugned order that the
tenant/appellant had failed to rebut the
presumption of entries in the record of rights by
adducing reliable evidence and, therefore, had
failed to prove their tenancy relating to the land in
question.
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7) Before us, the pivotal issues raised by the learned
counsel for the parties were as follows:
a) Whether the High Court, exercising jurisdiction
under Section 121A of the Act can re-appreciate
the evidence and come to a contrary finding to
that of the Tribunals below ?
b) Whether the High Court, while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 121A of the Act, could
set aside the concurrent findings of fact recorded
by the Tribunals below only because another view
was possible ?
8) We have heard Mr. Chandrashekhar, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the
tenant/appellant and Mr. S.N. Bhat, learned
counsel appearing on behalf of the
landlords/Respondents. We have carefully
examined the impugned judgment of the High
Court as well as the orders of the Tribunals below.
Before proceeding any further it is necessary to
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understand the scope of Section 121A of the Act.
The power conferred on the High Court to revise
the order of the Tribunal below has been provided
in Section 121A of the Act which reads thus:
“The High Court may at any time call for the records of
any other order of proceeding recorded by the Appellate
Authority under this Act or any other law for the purpose
of satisfying itself as to the legality of such order or as to
the regularity of such proceeding and may pass such
order with respect thereto as it thinks fit.”
9) The scope of Section 121A of the Act has been
widely discussed in the case of Jagdeesh v. State of
Karnataka [AIR 2008 SC 1304], in which one of us
was a party (Chatterjee J.). In paragraphs 8 and 9
of the said decision it has been made clear as to
when the High Court could interfere with the
concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the
Tribunals below in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 121A of the Act for setting aside the
concurrent orders of the Tribunals below. In this
view of the matter, it would be appropriate to
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reproduce Paragraphs 8 & 9 of the decision which
reads as below:
“8. From a plain reading of Section 121A of the Act, under
which revisional jurisdiction can be exercised, it would be
clear that the High Court, while exercising such power is
entitled to re-appreciate the evidence when it finds that
the conclusion arrived at by the appellate authority runs
contrary to the materials on record and when it finds that
there is no evidence to support the conclusion of the
appellate authority or when it finds that the reasons
given by the appellate authority are absolutely perverse
and cannot be supported by the evidence on record. It
would also be clear from a plain reading of Section 121A
of the Act that the High Court is also entitled to interfere
with the orders of the Tribunals below when the material
evidence on record was ignored or a finding was such
that no court would come to such conclusion or that the
decision of the Tribunals below was manifestly unjust.
9. We have carefully examined the provisions under
Section 121A of the Act, which is the revisional power
under the Act, and also the provisions under Section 115
of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short “the Code”). So far
as Section 115 of the Code is concerned, it has been
made clear that it is only in case of a jurisdictional error
or when the courts below had acted with material
irregularity in the exercise of their jurisdiction that the
question of interfering with such an order can arise,
otherwise, the High Court is not entitled to interfere with
any other order which does not satisfy the conditions laid
down for interference under Section 115 of the Code. On
the other hand, in our view, under Section 121A of the
Act, it would be open to the High Court to interfere with
the orders of the tribunals below as the High Court is
empowered to look into the legality of the order or
regularity of the proceedings although, in the exercise of
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revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code, the
High Court is not entitled to look into the legality of the
order or the regularity of the proceedings but only entitled
to interfere with the orders of the Tribunals or the courts
below when it finds that they have a) exercised a
jurisdiction not vested in them by law, or b) failed to
exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or c) acted in the
exercise of their jurisdiction illegally or with material
irregularity. Reading the aforesaid provisions viz., Section
121A of the Act and Section 115 of the Code, we have no
hesitation in our mind to hold that the revisional power
exercised by the High Court under Section 121A of the
Act is wider than the one exercised by the High Court in
its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code.
As noted herein earlier, since Section 121A of the Act
clearly empowers the High Court to look into the legality
of the orders impugned, therefore, it would be open to the
High Court to consider the material evidence on record,
when it finds that such evidence was not at all
considered by the tribunals below or when the conclusion
arrived at by the tribunals below run contrary to the
materials on record or when it finds that there is no
evidence to support the conclusion of the tribunals below
or that the reasons given by the tribunals below are
absolutely perverse or a finding was such that no court
would come to such a conclusion or that the decisions of
the tribunals below were manifestly unjust.”
10)In the present case while setting aside the findings
of the Tribunal, the High Court made the following
findings:
“In the present case, except the oral evidence of the
tenant no material has been placed before the court.
According to the tenant, he is cultivating the land since
1962 and has been paying 40 bags of paddy per year
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towards rent. He has stated that he has got a residential
house at Kumbarkoppa Village and also a cattle shed in
the land. He has admitted that he has not taken any
receipt from the landlords and that on the say of Eknath
Gopal Navarekar, one of the landlords, he was coming to
Kumbarkoppa to cultivate the land in question. As
against this evidence there is evidence of the landlord
who has stated that, though his two brothers are staying
away from the land in question as they are in service, it
is one of the brothers,, viz., Shankar Gopal Navarekar,
Petitioner 2, who is staying at Haliyal which is just 5 km
away, is getting the land cultivated through hired
labourers or coolies. He has also stated the land was
never leased to anybody and that sometimes the tenant
was also engaged as a coolie……………………..”
“He has further stated apart from the oral evidence that
the landlords have produced the revenue records from the
year 1962 onwards which shows that it is the petitioners
who are in possession and cultivation of the land in
question. The mode of cultivation is also shown as No. 2
which is through hired labourer or coolie. There is
absolutely no rebuttable evidence produced or even
suggested from him to show these entries are false and
fabricated. As observed by this Court in the case of
Radhakrishna Setty v. Land Tribunal, Somwarpet, &
Another [1977(2) Kar.L.J., 281], the statutory presumption
arising out of the revenue record should be given due
importance and the mere subjective satisfaction of the
Tribunal is not enough. The tribunal has to give reasons
to discard the entries in the record of rights. Thus there is
no rebuttal evidence led by the tenant to show that,
though he was cultivating the land in question, his name
was not entered for some reason or even due to high
handedness of the landlords. The only circumstance
relied upon by the Tribunal and the Appellate authority is
the statement of the landlord that the tenant is residing
at Kumbarkoppa and one of the tenant is staying at
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Haliyal which is 5km away and it is not possible for him
to cultivate the land by himself or through coolie; that as
2 out of 3 Appellants are staying away on job it is not
possible for the landlords to self- cultivate the land and
that by admitting that the tenant was sometimes engaged
as coolie, the presumption arising under Section 133 of
the Act has been rebutted”.
11)Finally, while setting aside the findings of fact, the
High Court, came to a conclusion:
“As noted by me earlier, the discussion of the Appellate
Authority and the tribunal is absolutely based on no
material evidence. The so called admissions of the
landlord are not admissions at all…………..
I find that the reasoning given by the Appellate Authority
as well as by the Tribunal are totally baseless without
any evidence and they have relied upon the so-called
statement and arrived at the finding merely on
conjectures and surmises.”
12)From a careful examination of the findings given
by the High Court, as quoted hereinabove, it would
be clear that the High Court, while setting aside the
concurrent orders of the Tribunals below, has
rightly taken into consideration that although the
tenant/Appellant was claiming to be cultivating the
land in question, he had failed to produce any
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receipt taken from the Landlords/Respondents in
lieu of rent and on the other hand, the High Court
was fully justified in holding that the
Landlords/Respondents had produced the entries
made in record of rights relating to the land in
question from the year 1962 which amply proved
that the landlords/respondents were cultivating
the land in question and in absence of any reliable
evidence it was difficult to prove that the
tenant/appellant was in cultivation of the land in
question.
13)We are also in agreement with the High Court,
when the High Court had held that the statutory
presumption arising out of the revenue record
must be given due importance and mere subjective
satisfaction of the tribunal was not enough. It was
for the tribunal to give reasons to discard the
entries made in the record of rights. The High
Court also, in our view, was fully justified that
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there was absolutely no rebuttal evidence led by
the tenant/appellant to show that though he was
cultivating the land in question his name had not
been entered for some reason or even due to the
high handedness of the landlords/respondents.
Furthermore, in view of our discussions and
findings made herein above and considering the
power and scope of the High Court under Section
121A of the Act to interfere with the findings of fact
of the courts below and the power and scope of the
High Court to interfere under Section 115 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, we do not find any ground
to upset the judgment of the High Court which is
impugned before us.
14)Accordingly, we do not find any infirmity and
illegality in the impugned judgment of the High
Court. The appeal has thus no merit and is,
therefore, dismissed and there will be no order as
to costs.
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………………………………..J.
(TARUN
CHATTERJEE)
……………………………….
…J.
(DALVEER BHANDARI)
New Delhi;
December 14, 2009.
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