JUDGMENT
Anand Byrareddy, J.
1. The appellants herein are the widowed daughter and grandchildren of a deceased workman. The Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Dakshina Kannada Sub-Division, Mangalore (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Commissioner’ for brevity), after considering the claim petition, which was contested by the respondents, held that there was a relationship of employer and employee between the deceased workman and the first respondent, but however, dislodged the claim of the appellants, since they do not fall under the definition of ‘dependents’, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923.
2. The substantial questions of law that are framed in the above appeal for consideration of this Court are as follows.-
“1. Whether the learned Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Dakshina Kannada Sub-Division, Mangalore, is justified in disallowing the claim made by the appellants in full by not including widowed daughter who was being maintained by a workman during his lifetime within the expression “unmarried daughter” defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923?
2. Whether the learned Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Dakshina Kannada Sub-Division, Mangalore, is justified in applying principle of restrictive interpretation to the term “dependents” as enumerated under Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, even when it is clear there is material dependency?
3. Whether the restrictive interpretation of word “dependents” as applied by the learned Labour Officer and Commissioner for Workmen’s Compensation, Dakshina Kannada Sub-Division, Mangalore, defeats the benevolent purpose of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923, which is intended to compensate the dependents of the workman, who were materially maintained by the workman, may not be suddenly deprived of source of their maintenance and so far as possible they may be provided with means as were available to them before the accident took place?”
3. Counsel for the appellants submits that even if it is on the basis that the definition of dependent under Section 2(1)(d) of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for brevity), is exhaustive, that a widowed daughter who was being maintained by the workman and who was, along with her minor children, dependent upon him, could not be denied from calling herself an ‘unmarried daughter’ as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Act. It is his contention that though the popular meaning to be assigned to the words ‘unmarried daughter’, is one who is not married, the fact that the widowed daughter is one who was once married can certainly be considered as an unmarried daughter, since in law she is eligible for marriage and therefore, unmarried at the time of the death of the workman.
4. He draws support for this proposition from the judgment in the case of Mt. Moti Bai v. Agent, N.W. Ry., AIR 1932 Lah. 1 wherein it has been laid down that although the expression ‘unmarried’ ordinarily implies a person who has never been married, it is capable of meaning of being ‘unmarried at that time’, i.e., not having a husband or wife, as the case may be, if the surrounding circumstances indicate that it was intended to be used in that sense.
5. He further draws my attention to a decision in the case of Soleman Bibi v. E.I. Ry, AIR 1983 Cal. 358(2) wherein it was held as follows.-
“With regard to the meaning of the word “unmarried” the learned Commissioner expresses his own view at the end of Clause 3 and the beginning of Clause 4 of the letter of reference as follows: (1) that the word “unmarried” has a primary and a secondary significance; (2) that in its primary or ordinary signification the words “unmarried means never having been married”; and (3) that the application of the secondary meaning of the word “unmarried” is entirely a matter of context and circumstances. These propositions he founds upon a reference to the dictionary and his reading of the English authorities to which he had access.
With regard to the dictionary meaning of the word I am however of opinion that the view taken by the learned Commissioner is not correct. In all the general dictionaries to which I have referred – Murray’s Dictionary, Johnson’s Dictionary and some of the later ones – the meaning given is as “not married” or “single” and another meaning given is as “never having been married”. On the other hand in Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, which of course is based upon legal decisions, there is a definite division into primary and secondary meanings – the primary meaning being given as “never having been married”.
For a discussion of the authorities and the circumstances under which the Courts have held one or other meaning to apply reference may be made to three passages in Jarman on Wills, Edition 7, respectively, at pp. 589, 1251 and 1597, I propose to refer to certain of the cases cited in order of date.
In Moberly v. Strode, (1797)3 Ves Jr. 450, “never married” is said to be “the common and usual meaning in a Will” and again as “the common acceptation of it in language”. At p. 454 there is a reference to the Statute 3, Will and Mary, Chapter 11, Section 7 (a Poor Law Act) where “unmarried”, is used as not married at the time. In Maugham, v. Vincent, (1840)9 LJ Ch. 329 : 4 Jur 452, at page 331, “never married” is referred to as “the common use of the word, but not necessarily the meaning”; “strictly speaking it would mean not being in a State of marriage or otherwise “discoverte” In Clarke v. Colls, (1861)9 HLC 601, (a report which was not available to the Commissioner) at p. 612 it is said that the expression “may without violence of language mean either”, and at p. 615 it is referred to as “capable of two constructions”… “the context must determine”.
The argument in that case was based not upon primary and secondary meaning, but upon redundancy. In Day v. Barnard, (1861)30 LJ Ch. 220, at p. 221, it is said that the words, “unmarried popularly and most frequently means never married”, but “the popular sense is not the grammatical or dictionary sense”. That it is a word therefore which has “a flexible meaning”. In Dalrample v. Hall, (1881)16 Ch D 715, at p. 716, it is stated that the ordinary meaning is “never married”; and in the result the Judge decided that as there was no context to indicate the meaning of the word “unmarried” he would attribute to it the ordinary meaning “without ever having been married”. In Re: Sergeant, (1883)26 Ch. D 575, at p. 576, it was stated that the “primary and natural sense” is “never married” and that if the instrument is colourless it would be construed in that sense. Lastly, in Blundell v. De Falbe, (1889)57 LJ Ch. 576 at p. 577, it is stated that “never married” is “the first of the meanings, the more ordinary and the more usual”, but that it is “a very flexible word and is constantly used in ordinary life in each of the two meanings”.
I would therefore prefer to state the result of the authorities as to the meaning of the word as follows: (1) that the dictionary or grammatical sense of the word is not married; (2) that the popular and more usual sense is never having been married; (3) that the word is commonly used in either sense and is therefore a “flexible” or equivocal term; (4) that for this reason the meaning must in all cases be discovered from the context; (5) that in the case of deeds and Wills where there is no context, where the document is completely colourless, the popular sense will usually be adopted. In other words I think it is putting it too high to say that in all cases there is a primary meaning and a secondary meaning or that the first is the rule and the second is the exception. With regard to the special rules for the construction of Statutes one rule is that words may and normally should be construed in their popular sense: See Maxwell, Edn. 7, p. 47. There is however another rule that words should be construed so as to advance the remedy provided by the Act: See p. 59 and the following. The two cases illustrative of this rule which have some topical connection with the present case are Jones v. Davis, (1901)1 KB. 118, where in a Statute, relating to another matter altogether, “single woman” was construed so as to include as a married woman living apart from her husband. In King v. Inhabitants of Wymondham, (1841)2 QB 541, a case which arose out of the Poor Law Statute I have referred to, “single and unmarried” in an “examination” was interpreted as “never having been married”, the converse case. With regard to the context of the word in the present case the view taken by the Commissioner is expressed on the last page of the letter of reference as follows in the following manner:
“The words in the definition constitute an inclusive list of all the nearer relatives; on marriage a daughter acquires a new relationship *** and I see nothing in the definition of dependants to warrant a supposition that on the death of her husband she resumes the original relationship”.
The comment which occurs to me is as follows: a daughter undoubtedly acquires a new relationship on marriage. She does not however lose the old relationship; she remains a daughter. Once a daughter always a daughter: qua relationship she is a daughter before, during and after marriage. On the other hand the Legislature has attached a qualification or condition that in order to participate a female child must not only be a daughter, but she must he an “unmarried” daughter. The question is what is the meaning of that qualification. Does it exclude daughters once, but no longer, married? I think not. It appears to me that the important portion of the context to read in connection with the definition is the operative part of Section 8 which provides for one payment to be distributed at a special time or period – the death of the employee – among particular persons. According to the English authorities and also I think in common conversation, when “unmarried” forms a qualification in the description of a person who is to receive a sum of money at a definite time or period, the meaning “not married” appears to be appropriate: see Leshingham Trust 24 Ch. D. 703 and Jarman on Wills in particular at p. 1252. For these reasons I agree with the decision in 13 Lah. 228(1) and construe the expression “unmarried daughter” in Sections 2(l)(d) of the Act as including widowed daughter.
Rankin, C.J.
I agree and I would only add that, in my judgment, while it is quite true that the definition of dependency is made by the statute by a list of certain relatives, it is quite clear that in the case of a daughter the mere relationship to the workman was not regarded as itself a sufficient test. The statute has by speaking of “unmarried daughter” introduced an element extraneous to the mere question of relationship to the workman and I think it is legitimate in considering the effect of the word “unmarried” in such a case as that to consider it as a factor chosen by the Legislature because in many cases at least it has a certain bearing upon the question of dependency in fact. I think, therefore, that there is no reason to dissent from the decision of the High Court of Lahore in Mt. Moti Bai v. Agent, N.W. Ry., AIR 1932 Lah. 1; and with all respect to the Commissioner who has put before us a very well-reasoned opinion, I am not prepared to depart from the principle laid down in that case. The applicant will have her costs before the Commissioner and before us from the employers. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs”.
6. He would next contend that even a person who is capable of answering the description defendant under the Act would necessarily have to demonstrate dependency in the absence of which such a person would not be entitled to compensation. In the given case the appellants having established dependency when the expression ‘unmarried daughter” is capable of being applied to the first appellant, to deprive her of the benefit of compensation under a social welfare legislation, would result in gross injustice.
7. Per contra, the Counsel for the respondents would argue that having regard to the exhaustive definition of the expression ‘dependent’ and the Legislature having chosen to identify the various categories of relatives, who would fall under that definition, it is not open for this Court to extend the meaning assigned by the statute. The usage of the expressions ‘widowed daughter’ and ‘unmarried daughter’ distinctively, while referring to the several relations covered under the definition, it is apparent that the status of ‘widowed daughter’ was present to the mind of the Legislature and the exclusion is obviously deliberate.
8. The further contention is that such exclusion is on account of an unmarried daughter on marriage acquires rights and privileges through her husband and is not generally considered as part of her parents’ family any longer and is also not expected to be dependent on the income of her parents. She is certainly entitled to the estate of her husband when she is widowed. There is no obligation in law for the parents to maintain the widowed daughter. In this light of the matter, it would amount to creating yet another category of dependant, which is not permissible while interpreting the statute.
9. On these rival contentions, I proceed to consider the present appeal, apart from the judgments that have been cited by the Counsel for the appellant. Though there are several English and American cases on this aspect, there are no other reported judgments made available. The passages extracted from the judgment in Soleman Bibi’s case, is illuminating and has digested several authorities on this aspect and the lucid reasons that flows from the authorities, which are referred to in the body of the judgment, do certainly advance the appellants’ case and I am in respectful agreement with the judgment, which is rendered by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court and hence, I hold that the widowed daughter was dependant on the earning of the deceased father, who is held to be a workman under the second respondent, would be covered under the definition ‘unmarried daughter” and would therefore, be entitled to the claim “for compensation. Hence, the following judgment:
The appeal is allowed in part. The award of the Commissioner holding that the appellants are not entitled to claim as dependants of the deceased workman is set aside and the matter is remitted to the Commissioner for determination of compensation in favour of the appellants. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner is directed to expedite the hearing insofar as quantum of compensation is concerned and render an award within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment.