ORDER
Bhaskar Bhattacharya, J.
1. Challenging an order dated November 27, 2001 passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal, Calcutta in O.A. No. 51 of 2001, the petitioner in the past moved an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before this Court on December 6, 2001 when this Court refused to entertain the said revisional application on
the ground that the said order being an appealable one under Section 20 of the Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act. 1993 (“Act”), the petitioner should approach the Appellate Tribunal constituted under the Act. This Court however did not go into merit and permitted the learned advocate for the petitioner to take back the certified copy of the order impugned on furnishing a xerox copy thereof.
2. Pursuant to the aforesaid order dated December 6, 2001 the petitioner preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act being Appeal No. DRAT/ CAL-/A/21 of 2001 but the learned Appellate Tribunal by its order dated January 10, 2002 dismissed the said appeal on the ground that no appeal lay against an Interlocutory order appointing Receiver over the property. The learned Appellate Tribunal was of the view that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act was maintainable only against a final order passed by the learned Tribunal on an application under Section 19 of the Act.
3. After the passing of the aforesaid order, the petitioner has filed an application for review of my earlier order dated December 6, 2001 and has prayed for leave to file a fresh application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against order dated November 27, 2001 as also an earlier order dated October 18, 2001 which had merged with order dated November 27, 2001.
4. At the time of hearing of these two applications I issued a suo motu rule calling upon the bank to show cause why the order dated January 10, 2001 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal dismissing the appeal as not maintainable should not be set aside.
5. Mr. Dhandhania, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the bank waived service of notice on behalf of his client and thus the said suo motu rule was also heard along with these two applications.
6. By the application for review the petitioner has prayed that in view of subsequent order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal under the Act holding that the appeal against order dated November 27, 2001 was not maintainable, this Court should vary or recall the earlier order passed by this Court refusing to entertain the application, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India and
should permit the petitioner to move a fresh application against the selfsame order dated November 27, 2001. In my opinion, the ground taken in the application for review is devoid of any substance. This Court in the past having specifically held that the order impugned in the said application viz. order dated November 27, 2001 was an appealable order under Section 20 of the Act, the learned Appellate Tribunal which is subject to the superintendence of this Court cannot come to a different conclusion holding that no appeal is maintainable against such order. The said order dated December 6, 2001 was passed in the presence of the petitioner as well as the bank and as such was binding not only upon the parties but also upon the learned Appellate Tribunal which is bound to follow the direction given in the said order. Thus, even though the petitioner has not challenged the said order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal, when attention of this Court was drawn to such order, this Court was compelled to issue a suo motu rule under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it appears that neither of the parties challenged my order dated December 6, 2001 before the Supreme Court and on the contrary, the petitioner by complying with my direction preferred an appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal. Thus, there is no scope of disputing the correctness of my order at the instance the petitioner unless it can establish that any of the grounds available to a litigant for reviewing an order exists.
7. Mr. Mitra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made twofold submissions in support of the application for review. First, he has contended that existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal is not an absolute bar to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Even if there is any efficacious alternative remedy available to a litigant. Mr. Mitra continues, this Court sitting in a jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India can entertain such application if It appears that the order impugned was without Jurisdiction or against the principle of natural justice causing Injury to such a party. In support of such contention Mr. Mitra has relied upon various decisions of the Supreme Court.
8. Secondly, Mr. Mitra contends that in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank , Chatterjee. J. held that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act is available only against final order under Section 19 of the Act. Mr. Mitra submits that attention of this Court was not drawn to the aforesaid decision of Chatterjee, J. and in view of existence of such a decision of this Court, this Court should be bound by such decision and on that ground alone this Court should recall the earlier order dated December 6, 2001.
9. As regards the first contention of Mr. Mitra there is no dispute with the proposition of law that existence of an alternative remedy is not the absolute bar in the matter of entertaining an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, But law is equally settled that such discretion should not be exercised unless it is established that the order impugned in such application was passed without jurisdiction or against the principles of natural justice or is manifestly illegal which requires no elaborate argument. In the Instant case, the learned Tribunal by order dated October 18, 2001 ex parte appointed a Receiver over the business of the petitioner. Subsequently, the petitioner came up with an application for variation or cancellation of the said order whereupon the learned Tribunal below after hearing both the parties has made the previous order absolute thereby appointing a Receiver till the disposal of the proceedings under Section 19 of the Act. There is no dispute that a Tribunal constituted under the Act is vested with ample authority to pass order appointing Receiver in appropriate cases. Whether in the fact of the present case such appointment was justified or not is a question which depends upon the facts and circumstances of this case. But at any rate, the said order could not be described as an order passed by the Tribunal having no authority to appoint Receiver. By the previous order I held that such order being appealable, the petitioner can make appropriate submission before the appellate authority. Therefore, in the instant case, under such situation. I refused to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India in view of existence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal. If the petitioner thinks that the Receiver was appointed by not following the
well accepted principles which are required to be followed before appointing a Receiver, the petitioner can agitate such grounds before the Appellate Tribunal. Whether I was justified in refusing to entertain such application is a question which can be agitated by the petitioner only before a higher forum but there is no scope of investigating such question again in an application for review. This is not a case of error apparent on the face of record which requires no argument. Moreover, if the Appellate Tribunal erroneously refused to entertain such appeal in spite of specific direction of this Court, that cannot afford a ground for reviewing my earlier order. In such a case, it was the duty of the petitioner to challenge the order passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal refusing to entertain an appeal in spite of specific direction of this Court. I, thus, do not find any reason to go into a detail discussion whether in the fact of the present case I was justified in refusing to entertain the application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or whether this is a fit case where in spite of efficacious alternative remedy I should have entertained the earlier application.
10. As regards the second point advanced by Mr. Mitra, it is true that in the case of M/s. Pratap Ch. Dey. (supra), Chatterjee, J. while disposing of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India held, inter alia, that the words “an order” appearing in Section 20 of the Act do not mean “any order” but those words should be interpreted as only “final order” passed by learned Tribunal on the application under Section 19 of the Act. In the said case before His Lordship, the petitioner came up under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against an order refusing to hear out a particular issue as preliminary issue of law by exercising power conferred on a Court under Order 14, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure before deciding other issues. The learned Tribunal below refused to hear out such Issue as preliminary Issue but directed that the same should be taken up with other Issues at the time of final hearing.
11. Being dissatisfied, a defendant came up under Article 227 of the Constitution of India before His Lordship. While entertaining such revislonal application and ultimately dismissing the same on merit. His Lordship was of the opinion that even exist-
ence of an efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal is no bar to entertain an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. His Lordship further held that an order refusing to hear a Jurisdictional issue as preliminary issue is not a final order and therefore such an order was not an appealable one and as such it could not be said that the petitioner therein had any efficacious alternative remedy by way of an appeal.
12. In arriving at such conclusion His Lordship mainly relied upon Section 21 of the Act which provides that where an appeal is preferred by any person from whom the amount of debt is due to a bank or a financial institution or a consortium of banks and financial Institutions, such appeal shall not be entertained by learned Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal 75% of the amount of debt so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under Section 19. His Lordship thus was of the opinion that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act could be filed only against a final order of the Tribunal and not against “any order” that may be passed by it.
13. With great respect to His Lordship, I am unable to convince myself to agree with the reasons assigned by His Lordship. In my view, the provisions of Section 21 of the Act describe only a situation where an appeal is preferred by a defendant against whom the amount of debt due to the plaintiff has been determined by the Tribunal. But that does not mean that no appeal can be preferred under any other circumstances. For instance, even if an application under Section 19 of the Act is dismissed by holding that no amount is due or payable to the bank or by passing a decree of a lesser amount than one claimed by bank, in such a case, the bank can prefer appeal and for the purpose of preferring such appeal the bank is not required to deposit any amount as condition precedent. Therefore, the provisions contained in Section 21 of the Act are not guiding factors in interpreting the words “an order” appearing in Section 20. It appears from the said order that although His Lordship made reference of Sections 17 and 18 of the Act but overlooked a very relevant specific provision contained in Section 17(2) of the Act. The said provisions are quoted hereunder :–
“17. Jurisdiction, powers and authority of Tribunals.– (1) …..
(2) An Appellate Tribunal shall exercise, on and from the appointed day, the jurisdiction, powers and authority to entertain
appeals against any order made, or deemed
to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act.”
14. The aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that an Appellate Tribunal from the appointed day is entitled to entertain “appeals” against “any order made” or deemed to have been made by a Tribunal under this Act. Thus, there is no scope of interpreting the words “an order” appearing in Section 20 of the Act as only “final order” and not as “any order”. Even in Sub-section (2) of Section 20, only bar created for entertaining an appeal against order made by Tribunal is the order passed with the consent of parties. Therefore, if Sections 17(2) and 20 of the Act are read together there is no scope of ambiguity that appeals lie before learned Appellate Tribunal against “any order” passed by Tribunal except a consent order. His Lordship overlooked the phrase “appeals against any order made” appearing in Section 17(2) of the Act as quoted above and thus I am unable to treat the aforesaid decision passed by His Lordship as a precedent.
15. In this connection it will be profitable to refer to the meaning of the adjective ‘any’ in the following dictionaries :–
a) Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English by A. S. Hornby (Fourth Edition) — Every; no matter which.
b) Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary — Every; All; One or some indiscriminately of whatever kind;
c) Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary — One indefinitely; some : whichever, no matter which;
16. Moreover, it appears from the Debts Recovery Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1993 that Rule 22 vests the Register with the authority to exercise such other functions as are assigned to him under those rules and/ or by the Presiding Officer by a separate order in writing.
17. Rule 23 enumerates those powers and in addition to that the Tribunal can also authorise the Registrar to pass such other
functions as it thinks fit. It appears from Sub-rule (5) of Rule 5 that there is provision of an appeal against the order of Registrar to the Tribunal only against an order declining to register an application under Section 19 of the Act passed under Sub-rule (4) of Rule 5, but against orders passed by the Registrar by virtue of powers under Rule 23 or against other functions especially assigned by Tribunal there is no provisions for appeal to the Tribunal Itself. Therefore, those orders passed by Registrar should be “deemed to be made by the Tribunal”. The inclusion of the phrase “deemed to have been made by Tribunal” appearing both in Section 17 and in Section 20 indicates that those orders of the Registrar are also appealable before learned Appellate Tribunal. His Lordship also overlooked the aforesaid aspect.
18. In view of what have been stated above. I am unable to follow the decision in the case of Pratap Ch. Dey v. Allahabad Bank, (supra), as an authority for the proposition of law that only a “final order” under Section 19 of the Act is appealable under Section 20 of the Act. In my opinion, any order made or deemed to have been made by the Tribunal can be challenged in appeal if such order prejudicially affects an aggrieved appellant.
19. It may not be out of place to mention here that four different High Courts in the following cases have taken the view that an appeal under Section 20 of the Act is maintainable not only against final order but also against interlocutory orders :–
1) Gemini Arts Pvt. Ltd. By its Director P.R.K. Rao v. Indian Bank, Writ Petition Nos. 15892, 16798 to 16801 and 16358 to 16369 of 1997 — decided by a Single Judge of Madras High Court on February 25, 1998, (2000 DRC 226).
2) Sandeep Singh Sandhu v. Debt Recovery Tribunal, Civil Revision No. 3644 of 19972
— decided by P.& H High Court on February 13, 1998; (2000 DRC 265).
3) Bank of India v. Baroda Cables Pvt. Ltd., Letters Patent Appeal No. 470 of 19972
— decided by a Division Bench of Gujarat High Court on September 1, 1997; (2000 DRC 269).
4) Kavita Pigments & Chemicals (P) Ltd. and Ors. v. Allahabad Bank and Ors., Civil Writ Jurisdiction Cse No. 2373 of
1999 — decided by Patna High Court on August 26, 1999; .
20. Of the aforesaid four decisions, the Patna High Court and the Madras High Court have taken note of the aforesaid decision passed by Chatterjee, J. and have disagreed with the view expressed by His Lordship on the aforesaid question.
21. I thus dismiss the application for review holding that there is no error not to speak of error apparent on the face of record in my order dated December 6, 2001 and thus the other revisional application being C.O. No. 80 of 2002 by which the petitioner has prayed for leave to file fresh revisional application against earlier order is also dismissed as not maintainable. My order dated December 6, 2001 was quite in conformity with the principles laid down by the Apex Court in case of P. N. B. v. O. C. Krishnan .
22. As regards the suo motu rule Issued by this Court, I make the said rule absolute by setting aside the order dated January 10, 2002 passed by the learned Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. DRAT/CAL-/A/21 of 2001 and direct the learned Appellate Tribunal to consider the said appeal on merit. I have already indicated that the learned Appellate Tribunal was bound by the order dated December 6, 2001 passed by this Court and acted illegally in holding that the appeal was not maintainable. The learned Appellate Tribunal is directed to dispose of the appeal on merit positively within one month from the date of communication of this order. I make it clear that 1 have not gone into the merit of the said appeal.
23. In the facts and circumstances there will be however no order as to costs.